Israeli foreign policy : South Africa and Central America

Foi{eign Policy

Central

Am eric

Jane Hunter

i

Israeli
Foreign Policy

South
Africa
and
Central
America

hy Jane Hunter

South End Press Boston, MA

Copyright ® 1987 by Jane Hunter

Copyrights are required for book production in the United States.
However, in our case it is a disliked necessity. Thus, any properly
footnoted quotation of up to 500 sequential words may be used without
permission, so long as the total number of words does not exceed 2,000.
For longer quotations or for a greater number of total words, authors
should write to South End Press for permission.

The charts on pages 110, 133, and 141 are reproduced with the kind
permission of Bishara Bahbah, from his book Israel and Latin America: The
Military Connection (New York: St. Martin's Press, in association with
Washington, D.C.: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1986).

Typesetting, design, and layout by the South End Press collective
Cover by Todd Jailer
Manufactured in the U.S.A.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Hunter, Jane, 1943-

Israeli foreign policy.

Includes index.

1 . Israel — Foreign relations — South Africa.

2. South Africa — Foreign relations — Israel.

3. Israel — Foreign relations — Central America.

4. Central America — Foreign relations — Israel.
I. Title.

DS119.8.S6H86 1987 327.5694068 87—13024
ISBN 0-89608-286-5
ISBN 0-89608-285-7 (pbk.)

South End Press 1 1 6 St. Botolph St. Boston, MA 02 1 1 5

96 95 94 93 92 91 90 89 88 87 12 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

To my children
Charlie and Jenny
with love and affection

Table of Contents

Introduction i

Part I: Israel and South Africa

History 19

Arms Industry 31

Arms Sales and Policy 47

Economy 61

The Bantustans 71

Political and Cultural Ties 81

Part II: Israel and Central America

El Salvador 95

Guatemala Ill

Nicaragua Under Somoza 137

Israel and the Contras 145

A Classic Case of Disinformation:

"Anti-Semitism and the Sandinistas" 169

Will the Lessons Be Learned? 179

Conclusion i85

Footnotes 201

Index 263

Introduction

Another Man's Genius

"This will always be our response to international boycotts and
threats against us," said President P. W. Botha as he unveiled the Cheetah,
South Africa's advanced combat aircraft. The South Africans said that the
plane was a secret project of the government's Armaments Corporation.'

Claiming the new aircraft was more than a match for neighboring
Angola's MiG-23s, Gen. Magnus Malan, the white government's defense
minister, told the assembled industrialists and foreign press corps that the
Cheetah "signaled a new era of self sufficiency and enhanced operational
capability for the South African Air Force." It was proof of the
technological leadership of the South African arms industry, asserted
President Botha.^

The Cheetah was also the one major item an international arms
embargo had managed to deny South Africa. The South Africans, who in
July 1986 were anxiously following the progress of sanctions legislation in
the U.S., lost no time in driving that point home.

In its nightly broadcast to North America, Radio South Africa said the
"futility" of the UN's 1977 arms embargo

was recognized 1 8 months ago by the UN General Assembly,
which called on member countries to stop importing arms from
South Africa. After all, they were supposed to be applying an
arms boycott against the country... The arms embargo has
achieved the opposite of what it was intended to achieve. In the

1

2 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

last two decades the country has built up the tenth largest arms
industry in the world and this achievement was the direct
response of the misguided attempt to isolate South Africa and
make it more vulnerable to outside pressures.'

In all their jubilation, the South Africans omitted one key detail: Israel
Aircraft Industries (lAI) had played a major role in creating the Cheetah
out of the carcass of an aging Mirage III-C. The Cheetah was the latest of a
number of projects on which the state-owned lAI and other Israeli
weapons manufacturers had collaborated with the South Africans.

Vanunu and Hasenfus

On October 5, 1986 the London Sunday Times carried a front page
account of Israel's nuclear capability. The information had been provided
by dissaffected Israeli technician Mordechai Vanunu, who had worked at
Israel's secret plutonium plant in an underground facility in the Negev
Desert. The account astonished leading nuclear scientists — some of whom
had been called in to challenge Vanunu, and to verify the photographs he
had smuggled out of Israel — who were forced to revise their estimates
upward and declare Israel to be the world's sixth largest nuclear power.*

Over the years bits and pieces of Israel's nuclear weapons development
had emerged: a series of tests on weapons and delivery systems with the
French in Algeria;^ Francis Perrin, for many years head of the French
atomic agency, recently admitted that France built Israel the nuclear reactor
at Dimona in the Negev, and also that between 1957 and 1959 the two
governments had been working together on an atomic bomb;' the
discovery in 1 965, just after the Dimona plant came on line, that as much as
130 pounds of enriched uranium was missing from the NUMEC enrich-
ment plant (which the CIA believed was largely financed by Israel) in
Apollo, Pennsylvania;^ the preparation of nuclear-tipped Jericho missiles
for use in the early days of Israel's 1973 war;^ a joint program with Iran
under the Shah to build and test long-range, nuclear-capable missiles;' the
test with South Africa of a nuclear missile in the South Atlantic in
September 1979; and reports in 1985 that Israel had deployed nuclear-
armed Jericho II missiles in the Negev Desert and perhaps also in the
occupied Golan Heights.

All this, coming as it did in fragmentary reports over a period of 30
years, did not add up to alarm. The October 5, 1986 story which for the

Introduction 3

first time portrayed all the megatonnage at Israel's disposal and described,
in the words of leading nuclear scientists, Israel's ability to produce
sophisticated thermonuclear warheads, did not rouse much reaction from
disarmament activists or from most Western governments. A report by a
small newsletter that South African scientists had habitually worked at the
secret plant in Dimona was put on the desk of every member of Congress. It
was ignored.

Had it not been for the continuing drama surrounding the fate of
Mordechai Vanunu, the matter might have been completely forgotten. On
September 30, 1986, Vanunu disappeared in London. The following
November 9, the Israeli government announced it had him in custody and
would try him for treason and espionage. Vanunu later made it known to
journalists that he had been kidnapped in Rome. Although smeared by the
Israeli media as a traitor and a money-grubbing opportunist, through a
hunger strike and messages delivered through his lawyer, a friend, and his
brothers, Vanunu contended that he had acted out of principle. His travails
sparked Israel's first ever anti-nuclear effort. Support for him began to
grow in the U.S.'"

Also on October 5, 1986, a U.S. mercenary was captured when
Nicaraguan soldiers shot down the plane in which he had been ferrying
arms to the anti-Nicaragua contras. The admissions made by load master
Eugene Hasenfus to the press in Nicaragua sparked investigations that
revealed a network of high U.S. officials and former military and
intelligence officers put together to circumvent the will of Congress and aid
the counterrevolutionary bands assembled by the CIA in the early days of
the Reagan Administration. It soon emerged that financing for the supply
operation — it had been called, with a wink and a nod, "private aid" — had
been obtained by shaking down Egypt and Israel for kickbacks on their
U.S. aid. Even greater amounts of money had been squeezed out of Saudi
Arabia, as an expression of thanks for administration support of the
kingdom's purchase of AW ACS aircraft against the wishes of the pro-
Israeli lobby in Congress in 1981.

The Hasenfus scandal was soon transcended by the discovery that
Israel had led a small group within the Reagan Administration into a
complicated morass where Israel sold U.S. arms to Iran (persuading the
Iranians to ransom U.S. hostages held in Lebanon) and applied a part of the
profits from those arms deals to the purchase (from Israel and other sources)
of weapons for the contras. Known as the Iran-contra affair, this imbroglio
riveted the national attention to several areas of policy which had long been
ignored.

4 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

However, in their understandable — if belated — lust to pin these crimes
on the President, the Congress and the media blithely ignored the
intellectual author of the intricate disaster — Israel."

The Perfect Coup d'Etat

The coup came off like clockwork. Since 1981, the young officers had
been meticulously planning their move. On March 23,1982, soldiers of the
Mariscal Zavala Brigade ran through the streets of Guatemala City to take
up positions around the Presidential Palace. So secret had been the
preparations — by one account even the CIA and the U.S. embassy were
taken by surprise — that in order to identify one another the participants
had, at a coded signal, rolled up the right sleeves of their combat fatigues.

While helicopters flew above the palace, other participants took over
radio and television stations and closed the national airport. Outside
Guatemala City, garrison by garrison, the military declared its allegiance to
the young officers' revolt. At four in the afternoon, head of state Gen.
Romeo Lucas Garcia quietly surrendered.

The man chosen by the young officers to succeed him. Gen. Efrain
Rios Montt,'^ told ABC News that he attributed the success of the coup to
the training of "many of our soldiers" by Israelis.'^ As they had assisted
Lucas Garcia, Israeli advisers would help Rios Montt's scorched earth fight
against the insurgency that was sweeping the rural highlands. They would
help with the implementation and design of a forced resettlement program
in that largely Mayan Indian area.

Rios Montt was a Protestant Evangelical affiliated with a U.S.
fundamentalist sect — the first non-Catholic head of state in Guatemala's
history. During his tenure, right-wing fundamentalists from the U.S.
flooded into the Indian highlands and began to take an active part in the
"pacification" activities underway there.

In August 1983, Rios Montt was overthrown by officers offended by
"the aggressive and fanatic religious groups" which had access to the
highest levels of his government (and by his promotion of young
officers).'* He was then spirited away to Miami by an Israeli adviser. Both
Israelis and right-wing U.S. Christians continue to work in the resettle-
ment program, where Indians must often eat food donated by right-wing
religious organizations while they are forced to grow crops for export.

Introduction 5

*

In each of these instances Israel acted autonomously, directing its own
foreign policy for the sake of its own objectives. Yet in all of these
instances — and they are not selective, but rather illustrative of the many
occasions on which Israel has intervened in the course of another nation's
history — the United States was party to Israel's action.

Israel's presence in Guatemala cannot be divorced from the historical
process begun when the CIA overthrew that country's elected government
in 1954. Regarding South Africa, the Carter Administration gave Israel a
green light to continue its relationship with apartheid, asking only that the
Israeli Kfir aircraft and the Merkava tank, developed with substantial U.S.
funding, not be suplied to the white government" and, as shall be seen,
turned a blind eye when Israel and South Africa tested a nuclear weapon in
1979. It can be safely assumed that the Reagan White House was
wholeheartedly in support of the continuing growth of Israeli-South
African ties. But even some of the most ardent progressives within the U.S.
Congress went out of their way to avoid confronting Israel over its support
of South Africa at the same time they were fashioning sanctions against the
apartheid state.

Of the instances cited, and of those to be mentioned in the following
pages, there is not a single one that does not cry out for the attention of
those who oppose the course of post-war foreign policy from a progressive
perspective.

There is also a special responsibility for U.S. activists to make
themselves heard regarding Israel's ambitious involvement in repressive
situations. Throughout the world Israel is perceived as acting as a
representative of the U.S., whether or not, in any given set of circum-
stances, this is actually the case. When the victims of Israeli weapons hear no
outcry from the opponents of U.S. policies, they are justified in wondering
by what set of criteria progressives operate.

In fact, it is the very reluctance of the progressive movement to turn its
critical focus on Israel that has led to the growth of Israel's role as an adjunct
to some of the most inexcusable undertakings of U.S. foreign policy.

Ratcheting this irony yet another turn is the indisputable correlation
between progressive foreign policy achievements and Israeli intervention:
the latter cancels the former out, almost every time. When Congress,
pressed by constituents, cut off aid to the anti-Nicaraguan contras, Israeli
aid to the contra mercenaries increased. When Congress warned that a

6 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

rightist coup in El Salvador would result in a cancellation of U.S. aid,
Salvadoran rightists propitiated Israel.

To cite a more current — and retrievable — example, when the South
Africans carry on about the bracing effect of sanctions they are bragging
mainly for domestic consumption, to reassure anxious whites. They are
also providing their supporters abroad a last-ditch argument: sanctions
don't work. However, sanctions do work and the South Africans are very
nervous about their actual and psychological effect. The U.S. anti-
apartheid measures are particularly frightening to the South Africans, but
they will only have their desired effect if their enforcement by the
administration and Congress is monitored vigilantly — and if Israel is
prevented from making a mockery of them.

The U.S. has had a reasonably functional arms embargo against South
Africa for a decade — during which time Israel, as shall be seen, helped
South Africa establish an indigenous arms industry." Months before the
1986 anti-apartheid legislation was passed, Israeli officials were urging
South African businessmen to ship their products to the U.S. via Israel to
take advantage of Israel's special duty-free trade agreement with Wash-
ington.

Thus, our hard won victories regularly turn to ashes. The congres-
sional intention built so laboriously by grassroots activism is cynically
subverted. The obvious corrective would be for Congress to accompany
each of its anti-intervention and anti-apartheid actions with a postscript
enjoining Israel to adhere to the spirit of the action. In a pointed (if
unintended) message to activists, a small step was taken in this direction
when an amendment requiring that South African dealings of U.S. allies be
scrutinized was tacked onto the anti-apartheid legislation of 1986 (see
Conclusion). Authored by retiring Republican Senator Charles McC.
Mathias, it raised the hackles of not a few Congresspeople.

It is clear, however, that no sustained initiative will come spon-
taneously from Congress, and that without vigorous pressure Congress
will go on as it has for so long considering Israel to be beyond reproach.

Indeed, Congress is the last body that might be expected to reassess its
no-questions-asked support of Israel. In the process of cultivating the U.S.
support so critical for its survival, Israel and its domestic support system
have, logically enough, made Congress, with its powers of appropriation,
the central focus of their efforts. (The executive branch of government and
the media have been a secondary, but by no means insignificant, focus.)

The enormous amount of U.S. aid that Congress regularly bestows
upon Israel — $3 billion for 1987 — is a testament to the success of those
efforts. So large has Israel's aid package become, by any standard of

Introduction 7

comparison, that it is commonly considered to be indebted to the U.S.
Many, upon hearing that Israel has taken over the task of propping up this
dictator or that despot, simply assume that Israel has taken over in
situations which Congress (or, as in the case of the Carter White House and
its human rights policies, the President) has declared out of bounds for the
U.S., as a quid pro quo for the aid it receives — that these are the invisible
strings attached to Israeli military and economic assistance. But this
perception is not entirely accurate, nor is it very useful in understanding the
dynamics of Israeli interventionism in the framework of U.S. -Israeli
relations.

How the U.S.-Israeli Relationship Evolved

There are two important historical threads to follow — Israel's search
for an international backer and its quest for political independence. Out of
their ostensibly contradictory meanderings is woven the stark fabric of
Israel's reality.

Israel was established in part by a plan drafted by the United Nations
and in part by "facts on the ground," territory in Palestine occupied by
Jewish forces in fighting during the final days of the British Mandate and
immediately following the departure of the British from Palestine.

A United Nations plan passed in 1947 for the partition of Palestine
into Jewish, Arab, and international states conferred legitimacy on the
concept of a Jewish state. The partition plan was approved by the USSR,
the U.S., and France. In its early days Israel — which declared independence
in May 1948 while claiming sovereignty over a territory already well
outside its UN-drawn borders'^ — would turn to both of the latter for
support.

France was the most immediately forthcoming, supplying the new
state with weapons and technical support. Then, in June 1967, the Israelis
received the back of de Gaulle's hand. Just as Israel commenced its attack on
its neighbors, the French president blocked the delivery of all arms to Israel,
an embargo which included an already-paid- for fleet of 50 Mirage aircraft
and a number of missile boats."

It was at that point that Israel turned the full force of its attention to the
U.S. If the 1967 war had repelled de Gaulle, it had the opposite effect on
U.S. Jews, inspiring them into devoted support for Israel. The U.S. had
soon replaced France as a reliable international backer for Israel.

/

8 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Froi^i the Ruins, an Israel Lobby

/'

/ The history of American Jews and their interactions with the
/ government in Washington is complex, as were Jewish communal politics
' in the first half of this century. There were then, as now, progressive Jews,
many of whom came to the U.S. from Eastern Europe during the mass
' migrations o f the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries . There were
also the self-styled aristocrats, mostly German Jews, who had arrived in the
U.S. throughout the course of the nineteenth century and who had
prospered. In a very general sense the progressive Jews participated in the
broad popular movements of the day, while the aristocrats— in their
organized manifestation represented by B'nai B'rith, a fratern al order, and
the A merican Jewish Committee, an _exclusiv e organiz ation^nstituted to
*combat anti-Semitism — appropriated the role of sometime ethnic advo-
cates, piiSicmgTquTet diplomacy with highly-placed officials to whom
they had access by virtue of their wealth and power.^"

With the rise of Hitler, the divisions in the Jewish community became
apparent. The aristocrats counseled quiet approaches to those in power —
the U.S. was, until well after World War II, an unabashedly anti-Semitic
society and many Jews believed it was best not to have too high a profile —
while those Jews identified with popular causes participated in strenuous
efforts to warn of the dangers of German fascism. Preeminent among these
efforts was a boycott campaign against Hitler, spearheaded by Rabbi
Stephen Wise of the American Jewish Congress.^' The attempted 1933
boycott was undercut in its initial stages by the American Jewish
Committee and B'nai B'rith who feared a backlash against Jewish
assertion.

The protest drive against Nazi Germany started with a March 27,
1933 rally in New York's Madison Square Garden that drew tens of
thousands and received international support." The ground was soon cut
out from under this early opposition to Hitler when several (competing)
Zionist factions began negotiating with the Third Reich to ransom the Jews
of Germany.

Zionist leaders, during April 1933, sought to cooperate with the
Nazi Reich to arrange the orderly exit of Jewish people and
wealth from Germany. But during the very same weeks, Jewish
groups throughout the world were struggling to resist and
topple the Reich to keep Jews in Germany as citizens.^*

Ultimately a "Transfer Agreement" was worked out, under which the
funds of wealthy German Jews were shared between the Reich, the Jewish

Introduction 9

authorities in Palestine, and, on arrival there, by the emigrating Jews. It
was, as intended, a way of rapidly building Zionism during a period when
the movement for a Jewish national homeland had a small and divided
following.^^

Relatively few organized American Jews were Zionists until after the
shock of the Holocaust, Hitler's murder of 6 million Jews. News of Hitler's
genocide against the Jews was confirmed by the governments of the U.S.,
the UK, and the USSR in \9\l?-'> A shaken Jewish community came
together to issue a statement that included endorsement of a Jewish state in
Palestine. 2^ However, the ascendancy of Zionism during the critical period
1942-44 had the overarching side-effect of blunting efforts to rescue
European Jews. Bound up in political contention, very few Jewish leaders
responded forcefully to the plight of the Jews in Europe.

An unavoidable conclusion is that during the Holocaust the
leadership of American Zionism concentrated its major force on
the drive for a future Jewish state in Palestine. It consigned
rescue to a distinctly secondary position.^^

After the war Jews intensively lobbied the Truman Administration,
first to back the UN partition plan, and then to recognize the newly
established state of Israel. Facing an uphill fight for reelection in 1948,
Harry Truman ignored the counsel of the State Department, the Depart-
ment of the Navy, the War Department and the Joint Chiefs of StafP' and
responded instead to a flood of letters and personal approaches, recognizing
Israel in May 1 984.^" There was bitterness in the State Department, where
it was remembered that the recently deceased President Roosevelt had
promised Arab leaders to consult with them before taking such a step.''

Suddenly moved by the Holocaust, both houses of Congress also
responded to the political onslaught mounted by Jewish activists with
resolutions supporting recognition of Israel.'^

Dwight D. Eisenhower was the only President to resist pressure from
the pro-Israeli lobby, as the incresingly well organized Jewish com-
munity was coming to be known. On three occasions Eisenhower withheld
U.S. aid from Israel: to force it to stop diverting water from Jordan in 1953,
to force it to cease its attack on Egypt (the Suez crisis of 1 956) and to force it
to withdraw from Egyptian territory occupied during its 1956 war. In the
face of militant opposition from a Congress already swayed by Israeli
lobbying efforts and supportive of Israel's determination to hold the land it
had seized, Eisenhower maintained his hardnosed approach, asking,
"Should a nation which attacks and occupies foreign territory in the face of
''^he United Nations disapproval be allowed to impose conditions on its own
withdrawal?""

1 0 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

' Israel received more solicitious treatment from the next two presidents,
Kennedy and Johnson. U.S. arms sales began under the Kennedy
Administration.^* The Johnson Administration secretly helped Israel
prepare for its 1 967 war, and when the French cut off Israel's arms supplies,
the Johnson Administration kept Israel in equipment" long enough for
Israel to increase the territory under its control by 200 percent.'^ President
Johnson courted the Jewish community by calling attention to the aid his
administration was giving Israel." Johnson also strongly urged Israel to
extend diplomatic recognition to the puppet government his administration
was backing in South Vietnam and to send a health team there. Israel
refused, agreeing only after months of requests to accept under conditions
of complete secrecy eight Vietnamese agricultural trainees in Israel.'^
Almost two decades later, this scenario would be repeated, when Israel
refused to be the lead player with the contras.

Richard Nixon was a strong supporter of Israel and was generous with
aid during its 1973 war, although as Watergate engulfed him he was
\ reportedly toying with the idea of suspending military aid to Israel as a way
of forcing it to approach its Arab neighbors for peace.'' Nonetheless, with
the exception of some elements of Reform Judaism, no major Jewish
organizations took a stand against Nixon, and when it became clear that
Nixon might have to surrender the presidency, some Jewish leaders
expressed a preference for him over Vice President Gerald Ford.*" Ford
actually did suspend aid to Israel, during a 1975 "reassessment" of U.S.
Middle East policy.*' Reassessment was a euphemistic way of expressing
extreme displeasure with Israel's intransigent refusal to vacate several
positions in Egypt. In response to the Ford cutoff, pro-Israeli forces
worked the Congress until Ford relented.*^

Jimmy Carter is remembered for knocking together the heads of
Menachem Begin and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat to achieve the 1 978
Camp David accords. But his administration was very susceptible to Israeli
pressure, both directly and through the Congress, where ^IPAC (the
American Israel Public Affairs Committee}Jmel^egisjere£]oy^^
^as "maklhgltTptrwerlelt. ~Ca^^ IrecThis UN^ Ambassador Andrew
Young after Young met with the PLO representative to the UN.
Unwilling or unable to order Israel to stop its dealings with South Africa,
Carter presided over a cover-up "investigation" of a nuclear weapons test
conducted by Israel and South Africa in 1979.

While all of the administrations since Eisenhower were obliging to one
degree or another, the Reagan Administration seems to have made Israel
the object of cult worship. It is known that the President subscribes to the
superstition propounded by right-wing Christian fundamentalists that

Introduction 1 1

Israel will be the site of the battle of Armageddon which precedes the end of
times.*' To help Israel prepare for more immediate battles, the Reagan
Administration has increased its military and economic aid to the highest
levels ever. It was also Ronald Reagan that allowed his administration to be
directed by Israeli officials and Americans partial to Israel in the sale of arms
to Iran and funneling of funds to the war against Nicaragua. But even with
Reagan, a president with whom Israel enjoyed a "virtual honeymoon that
existed over most of.. .six years,"** the pro-Israeli lobby often felt
compelled to intervene, through Congress and with other government
agencies, in the fashioning of Middle East policy and other matters it
considered to be within its realm of interest.

Several years into the Reagan Administration it was common
knowledge that the Israeli government had "friends" placed in every nook
of the vast bureaucracy of the executive branch of the federal government.

The [pro-Israeli] lobby's intelligence network, having numer-
ous volunteer "friendlies" to tap, reaches all parts of the
executive branch where matters concerning Israel are handled.
Awareness of this seepage keeps officials — whatever rung of the
ladder they occupy — from making or even proposing decisions
that are in the U.S. interest.*'

Whereas the State Department, with its history-conscious bureaucracy and
its seasoned professionals had once acted as a counterbalance to the political
suasions of the pro-Israeli forces, under Reagan it seems to have succumbed.
Even the Secretary of State, George Shultz — formerly with the large
Bechtel construction company and close to Arab governments — has
become a wholehearted supporter of Israel.

While relations with each administration had their high and low
points, Israeli influence with the Congress was plotted on an ever-
ascending curve. Besides cultivating the legislative branch as the source of
financial assistance, Israel mastered the craft of using Congress to overcome
political opposition from the executive branch. In legislation concerning
Israel, Congress has set numerous precedents: a Free Trade Agreement; a
resolution demanding the relocation of the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel
Aviv to Jerusalem (having been advised by State Department officials that
such a move would ignite anti-U.S. protests in Muslim nations as far distant
as Indonesia, the President did not act on this); permission to spend military
aid on development of weapons in Israel.*' Although it has empowered
itself to do so. Congress has never called Israel to account for its nuclear
weapons program. Members of Congress seem to compete to speak at
pro-Israel events (many of which include honoraria).

1 2 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

The incredible success of Israel's lobby argues strongly that rather
than progressively obligating Israel, the astronomical rise in aid is a product
of Israeli influence on the Congress. That much of the influence is gained
by pressure, browbeating, and intimidation rather than the presentation of
a convincing case— Congress, for example, routinely appropriates billions
for Israel's "defense" rather than pressing it to conclude a just peace with its
neighbors and with the Palestinian people— suggests that as it wins more
concessions from Congress, Israel is simultaneously entrenching its
position in a never-never land called "beyond reproach."*'

The Development of Israel's Arms Industry

De Gaulle's halting of the arms flow at such a critical juncture also
provided Israel with the impetus to embark on a crash program to develop
an arms industry.

In this endeavor, Israel was not starting from scratch. As early as 1 92 1 ,
Jewish settlers in Palestine had made hand grenades and explosives for use
against Arabs protesting their presence.*^ The history of the Jewish state's
foundation is laden with tales of weapons obtained abroad by hook or by
crook, and of secret workshops in British-ruled Palestine where primitive
small arms were constructed.*'

After the establishment of Israel in 1948 these munitions factories
were brought above ground and incorporated into a government-owned
military industry. As the great powers, for varying geopolitical reasons,
were slow to sell arms to the new state, the Israelis pressed ahead, producing
the Uzi submachine gun in 1 952 , and by 1 965 had developed the rudiments
of aviation, munitions, and electronics industries. Israel's objective was a
guaranteed source of supply, but as early as 1954 it also began marketing
weapons.^"

In 1 967, shaken by de Gaulle's abrupt cancellation of major contracts
for aircraft and patrol boats, the Israelis embarked on a crash effort to lower
their future political vulnerability by striving toward self-sufficiency in
weapons production.^' They opted to invest funds that had previously
been earmarked for purchases overseas into the indigenous arms industry.^^

In keeping with the decision immediately after the war to
proceed with an intensified effort to develop and enlarge Israel's
own weapons industry, cost-benefit calculations were set aside
in favor of producing essential items in Israel."

Introduction 1 3

With some critical technological inputs from abroad— some arriving in
the form of foreign investment and purchase of foreign technology ,5* some
pilfered, such as plans for the Mirage combat aircraft which were stolen by
Mossad, Israel's secret service, from the French Dassault company's Swiss
licensee," making possible the task of designing and building the Mirage-
copy Kfir jet fighter — the arms industry expanded rapidly. Israeli deter-
mination was further spurred by displeasure with the amount of time it
took the U.S. to resupply Israel during the 1973 war.^^

By the end of the 1 970s, the Israeli military industry was supplying 40
percent of Israel's military needs." But production runs solely for the
domestic market resulted in high costs per item. The longer production
runs necessary to lower unit costs created an imperative to export.

The government began a concerted marketing campaign, through
diplomatic and military contacts, as well as news releases and exhibits at
fairs. In later years a sales force of retired military officers eager for
commissions fanned out over the globe.'' While the secrecy of the Israeli
government makes it impossible to exactly calculate the volume of Israel's
weapons sales abroad, the general consensus of analysts of the international
arms trade indicates that between 1972 and 1980 Israel's arms exports
soared, particularly in the latter part of that span, rising from $50 million'"
to top $1 billion,^' and, with the possible exception of 1983," have
remained over $1 billion annually . A 1986 estimate puts annual sales at
"m ore than II . 2 5 bi llion ■ "'^ Since 1982 Israel has been ranked among the
world's top ten arms producers.'''

The importance to the overall economy of the arms manufacturing
sector also increased, with weapons exports estimated to have comprised 3 1
percent of industrial exports in 1975, up from 14 percent in 1967'^ and
more recently 30 to 40 percent of Israel's industrial output.'* The arms
industry employs "anywhere from 58,000 to as many as 1 20,000 Israelis,"
or, taking the lower figure, 20 percent of the industrial labor force,'' with
the biggest unit, Israel Aircraft Industries, the nation's largest employer,
carrying 20,000 on its payroll.'^

The export imperative, in turn, brought its own set of problems, these
centering on the overseas markets available to Israel and on its choice of
customers from that list. For varying reasons, Israel was largely shut out of
the Eastern Bloc, the Arab world and NATO countries. That left its poten-
tial clientele to be found on the peripheries: pariahs such as South Africa and
Guatemala, the strong-man regimes of Taiwan, Zaire, and Chile, and the
occasional government wary of strings-attached arms purchases from the
superpowers. Over the years Israel has sold weapons — and often along
with the weapons come Israeli advisers — to Costa Rica, Dominican

1 4 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua
(under Somoza), Panama, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Venezuela, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya,
Liberia, Morocco, Nigeria, Rhodesia, South Africa, Svi^aziland, Tanzania,
Uganda, Zaire, Australia, China, Indonesia, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Papua-New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand,
Iran, and a number of European countries and several non-governmental
factions.'*' Sometimes even the least desirable customers have required some
softening up: "Greatly detailed stories abound of the huge bribes Israel has
used to suborn defense ministries, with the sole objective of nailing down
arms deals."'"

As time went on an additional problem arose: arms sales became the
motor driving Israel's foreign policy. In times of economic crisis it became
the supreme exigency. In September 1986, the Israeli defense minister
explained to a press conference what was behind a raft of scandals involving
Israeli arms exports and technology thefts (these last, most frequently from
the U.S., have been an inevitable hallmark of a small country attempting to
sustain a full-scale armaments industry). "...We cut our orders in our
military industries..." he said, "and I told them quite frankly: 'Either you'll
fire people or find export markets.'

The export markets open to Israel are frequently among the world's
most unsavory; indeed, to be off limits to the superpowers they often are
located inside the very gates of hell. Already under international censure for
its oppression of the Palestinians in the territories it occupies, Israel's
dealings with the scum of the world's tyrants — including the white clique
in South Africa, Somoza of Nicaragua, Gen. Pinochet of Chile, Marcos of
the Philippines, Duvalier of Haiti, Mobutu of Zaire, the allegedly
cannibalistic Bokassa of the Central African Republic'^ — invariably result
in its further exclusion from more "respectable" circles. "A person who
sleeps with dogs shouldn't be surprised to find himself covered with fleas,"
comments the military correspondent for Israel's major daily newspaper.'^

Israeli critics, who term the phenomenon "arms diplomacy," warn
that the export imperative has motivated a sequence of ad hoc, opportunistic
decisions that have precluded the development of a coherent foreign policy,
which, in turn, might over the long term mitigate Israel's isolated position
in the world. Yet these critics are far from sanguine about the ability of
Israel to set itself on a different course.

They point to the power of the "security establishment lobby,"
comprised of the upper echelon of Israel's political leadership (this has
remained remarkably constant since the founding of the state), the top
levels of the military, and the officials of the parastatal arms industries. As in

Introduction 1 5

the U.S., there is a "revolving door" in Israel, with many of the top figures
serving successively in two or all three of these sectors. It is these men who
find the clients and have insider access to the Ministerial Committee on
Weapons Transfers (MCD) — its members are the prime minister and the
ministers of defense, foreign affairs, and trade and industry — which will
make the final decision on every sale.'* Such decisions are made secretly —
the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, excluded. The cabinet, too, is often
excluded. Critics of the hegemony of the arms export business say it has
relegated the foreign ministry to a subordinate role in Israeli foreign policy
making, and they see in its wake grave social and political consequences.

A sector has evolved in Israel, headed by an elite with identical
social characteristics and marked by a fairly high degree of
cohesiveness, whose decisions and actions have a significant
effect not only on the country's economy and its foreign and
defense policy but also on its social and value systems. No less
important, however, is the issue of whether a closed system has
been created whose activities and decisions undergo less public
supervision and scrutiny than any other area of life in the
country."

A Co-equal Type of Proxy

Israeli analysts often argue that Israeli arms sales are dependent on U.S.
approval;'* in a limited sense this is true. The U.S. has blocked — at the
behest of Britain— the delivery of A-4 Skyhawks to Argentina, and it has in
the past vetoed the export of the Kfir aircraft, leverage it is able to exert
because of the Kfir's U.S. engine. However, the Carter Administration was
unable to prevent Israeli nuclear cooperation with South Africa, and the
Reagan Administration was unsuccessful in persuading the Israelis to halt
their arms sales to Iran in the early 1980s (assuming it wanted to). The
Israeli success in persuading the Reagan Administration to incorporate
Israeli arms sales to the Islamic Republic into a bizarre and controversial
series of contacts with Iranian leaders is probably more typical of the
operative U.S. -Israeli dynamic.

On the other hand, Israel has often obliged this or that sector of the
U.S. government, selling arms where it would be embarrassing or illegal
for the U.S. to do so: the contras, the Peoples Republic of China in the early
1980s," and the Derg government of Ethiopia'^ are examples. In 1975,

16 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Israel followed Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's advice and helped
South Africa with its invasion of Angola.''' Even after the passage the
following year of the Clark Amendment forbidding U.S. covert involve-
ment in Angola, Israel apparently considered Kissinger's nod a continuing
mandate.

Given the export imperative under which the Israeli government
operates, this 1981 proposal from the chief economic coordinator in the
Israeli cabinet, Yacov Meridor, should be taken with great seriousness:

We are going to say to the Americans, "Don't compete with us
in South Africa, don't compete with us in the Caribbean or in
any other country where you can't operate in the open." Let us
do it. I even use the expression, "You sell the ammunition and
equipment by proxy. Israel will be your proxy," and this would
be worked out with a certain agreement with the United States
where we will have certain markets... which will be left for us.^"

Part I

Israel and South Africa

History

Israel and South Africa

Israel's ties with South Africa seem to be especially disturbing to many
who follow Israel's international activities. Perhaps it is natural that Israel
has been castigated more harshly for its arms sales to South Africa than for
its sales to other countries: first, because there has been for a decade an arms
embargo against South Africa; and second, because of the unsurpassed
criminality of the white regime and the uses to which it puts the Israeli-
supplied weapons.

It has also been said that those arms sales are understandable, given the
striking similarities between the two countries in their day-to-day abuse
and repression of their subject populations. South African blacks and
Palestinians under Israeli rule; in their operating philosophies of apartheid
and Zionism; and in their similar objective situations: "the only two
Western nations to have established themselves in a predominantly non-
white part of the world," as a South African Broadcasting Corporation
editorial put it.' That understanding, however, is somewhat superficial,
and the focus on similarities of po/iaca/ behavior has somewhat obscured the
view of the breadth and depth of the totality of Israeli-South African
relations and their implications.

Israel's relations with South Africa are different than its interactions
with any of its other arms clients. That Israel gave South Africa its nuclear
weapons capability underscores the special nature of Tel Aviv's relations
with the white minority government and begins to describe it— a full-

19

20 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

fledged, if covert, partnership based on the determination of both countries
to continue as unrepentant pariahs and to help each other avoid the
consequences of their behavior.

For South Africa's sake the partnership is designed to thwart
international efforts against apartheid. What South Africa is expected to do
for Israel is not as easily delineated; some Israeli critics, in fact, have argued
that nothing South Africa can do for Israel is worth the price Israel has paid
in international opprobrium.

Israel has become embroiled in an unequal relationship with
ambiguous returns. The scope of exchange, though diverse, is
meager. The benefit Israel derives from these interchanges is
unclear; in any event it is in no way commensurate to that reaped
by the other partner in the equation.^

Beyond the guessing game (due to the strict secrecy maintained by
Israel and to a lesser extent by South Africa) into which discussions of
Israeli-South African links frequently deteriorate, it is certain that some-
thing of value is being received in Israel. To Naomi Chazan, the Israeli
critic whose words appear above, that value received might be worthless,
even negative, as she is holding it up to a standard she describes as "the
nature and development of an Israeli ethos" out of what she views as Israel's
contradictions.'

Chazan's image of a liberal, beneficent state of Israel is also the
dominant one in the minds of many North Americans. However, during its
not quite 40 years, the liberal, or socially progressive state of Israel has
existed mostly in the blandishments of fundraisers and the flatterings of the
U.S. media, where it has existed at all.* The Israeli leadership, from the
start, were hardened people, who took a hard lesson from the Holocaust
and the centuries of Jewish travail that preceded it. The current leadership,
where it differs from the founders, almost all of whom have come through
the higher ranks of the Israeli military, have not softened.

Their understanding of modern Jewish history , with its themes
of the Holocaust and poweriessness, reinforced by long profes-
sional military training, causes these elites to be impressed by
visible manifestations of power and strength at the same time as
they are inclined to be cynical toward false standards of
international conduct.'

Whatever the large and small incentives to be found in links with South
Africa, Israel's leaders have pursued them avidly.

Israel and South Africa

21

An Early Zionist Outpost

Fifty years before the Holocaust, utterly determined Zionists began
going to South Africa to enlist support for a Jewish national home in
Palestine. They found support in the flourishing Jewish community and
access to leading figures in the British empire.

Small numbers of Jews had arrived in South Africa in the beginning of
the nineteenth century — when non-Christians were first allowed to settle
in the Cape Colony.* In the wake of pogroms in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries a great migration from Eastern Europe — mainly
Lithuania — brought the major part of the present day Jewish community to
South Africa. A small number of the new immigrants were socialists who
considered the idea of a Jewish national home in Palestine a backward
notion; the large majority of South African Jews were rapidly won over to
Zionism^ decades before their co-religionists in the U.S. or Europe.

Early in this century South African Jews began to lobby leaders of the
South African government to "persuade them to intercede on behalf of
Zionism with the British Government which controlled the fate of
Palestine." At the request of Theodore Herzl, considered the founder of
Zionism, the South Africans approached Cecil Rhodes, the Cape Colony
premier who took personal responsibility for extending Britain's grasp on
Africa, and other prominent figures. A 1916 approach to General Jan
Smuts, who would later lead the South African government, bore
spectacular fruit. As a member of the British War Cabinet, Smuts supported
the drafting of the 1917 Balfour Declaration, a statement of Britain's
commitment to a Jewish homeland in Palestine. Through the years, though
British commitment to the declaration wavered, Smuts' support was
constant.

He consistently maintained that the strategic safety of Britain's
main line of imperial communication through the Suez Canal
would be best assured if there were a British-sponsored Jewish
homeland adjacent to it...[W]hen the Balfour Declaration was
being drafted, his immediate consideration was to find "a
formula to which the Great Powers would agree," for staking
Britain's claim "to the main role in the future of post-war
Palestine in cooperation with the Jews.

In London Smuts befriended Chaim Weizmann, who would become
Israel's first president. In 1943, Weizmann wrote a memo to Smuts
outlining a plan to develop industry and agriculture in Africa and the
Middle East capable of competing with U.S. industry. The scheme was "of

22 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

great importance," Weizmann stressed, "and it is doubtful whether there
exists any other scheme of equal importance for the future of the empire."'

Although the British Empire through which Weizmann and Smuts
foresaw the realization of their peoples' futures was about to collapse, their
contacts, and Smuts' continuing attachment to Zionism— as premier, the
South African leader would remain a stalwart supporter of the Zionist
movement, often acting as a fundraiser for Zionist organizations-
generated significant momentum for the drive for Jewish statehood.

Many other South African leaders were attracted to the Zionist cause.
In 1962, the cabinet of the Union of South Africa passed a resolution
pledging support in international forums for "a National Home for the Jewish
People in Palestine — an object which it regards as an important contribu-
tion to peace and civilization."'"

In 1 934, South African Jews formed Africa-Israel Investments to buy
land in Palestine. Now owned by Israel's Bank Leumi, Africa-Israel
Investments owns choice residential and industrial real estate. South
Africans remain as minority shareholders and company debentures are sold
in South Africa." Bank Leumi itself has about 1,000 South African
stockholders. At the height of the civil turmoil in 1986, the Africa-Israel
Company was negotiating a $50 million contract with the white South
African government and a West German firm to build 1,700 units of
housing for blacks near Capetown "in order to calm hostilities there. "'^

In the late 1 940s, Prime Minister Smuts permitted South African Jews
to send money and supplies to the Jewish forces in Palestine, as well as
permitting a great number of enthusiastic South African volunteers to join
the fight to establish the state of Israel. South African Jews have long been
the highest contributors to Zionist causes and Israel on a per capita basis."
In May 1948, Prime Minister Smuts extended de facto recognition to the
new state.

The Founding of the State: Jews Should Go "Thither"

In 1948, the end of the British mandate— and the concurrent estab-
lishment of the state of Israel — coincided with the accession of a new set of
leaders in South Africa. These were the Afrikans-speaking Nationalists
who had supported the Nazis in the recent war and whose defeat of the
Smuts government was greatly worrying to South African Jews. However,
the Nationalist Premier, Daniel Malan, publicly assured Jews that there

Israel and South Africa 23

would be no discrimination against them.'^ Malan allowed the money and
supplies sent by South African Jews to Israel to continue and even turned a
blind eye to the departure of Jewish volunteers."* He extended de jure
recognition to Israel in 1949, and in 1953 became the first foreign head of
state to visit Israel.'^

There was a cynical side to all this good will, which would haunt the
South African Jewish community in following years. The centerpiece of
the Afrikaner Nationalists' campaign platform was apartheid, and they
moved quickly to institutionalize the racial segregation that had always
been a feature of South African life. According to James Adams, Malan's
cordiality to the Jewish community was "a shrewd move." Not only did
the Nationalists realize that persecution of the Jews would have sparked
both international repercussions and a flight of capital from South Africa,
writes Adams, but their granting of concessions:

bought off the Jewish hierarchy who were now faced with a
very delicate issue of divided loyalty. ..the Jews were well aware
that a vociferous campaign against apartheid might well result in
the Malan government or its successors abandoning previous
agreements... [and] possibly introducing discrimination in some
form against the Jewish population.'^

However, the Transvaal branch of the Nationalist Party continued for
several years to bar Jews from membership." And although (spurred by
their dislike for the British) Afrikaners had begun in the late 1940s to
identify with the establishment of a Jewish state, as the Afrikaner press
expressed it, their well-wishing was the kind of support so often given to
Zionists by anti-Semites. At a time when the displaced person camps in
Europe were flooded with homeless Jews, The Transvaaler editorialized that
it "grant[ed] the Jew his ideals in Palestine but, at the same time, desire[d] an
increasing exodus of Jews thither and not their increase here."^"

Gen. Yigal Allon, who would later be Israel's Foreign Minister, got a
warm reception from South Africa's Defense Minister F. C. Erasmus in
May 1956. He warned the South Africans of the Egyptian leader Col.
Nasser and said, "it would not be many years before South Africa would
have to ask permission to cross the Red Sea."^' This did not grab the
Afrikaner imagination, as South Africa was developing trade ties with
Arab nations and did not have a great deal of use for Israel in the 1950s.
South Africa did not reciprocate the Israeli establishment of a consulate (in
1 949) until 1 97 1 ,^2 ten years after it was forced out of the Commonwealth
of Nations and eight years after the first serious round of UN sanctions
against it.

24 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Although Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Sharrett visited in 1951"
and war hero (later Defense Minister) Moshe Dayan in 1957,2* just as
South Africa was being internationally ostracized because of its apartheid
system, Israel's interest in closer ties had diminished as it began to
successfully court the emerging nations of Africa with creative develop-
ment assistance programs.

The approach to Africa reflected Israel's decision in the late 1950s to
leapfrog over its immediate — hostile — neighbors in its search for diplomatic
and economic contacts. Africa, where many nations were just receiving
independence, was a natural choice. A friendship cultivated by Israeli
Premier Ben Gurion with Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's founding leader,
facilitated the approach. During the 1960s, Israel signed cooperation
agreements with 20 African nations. By 1970, 2,483 Israeli experts had
completed assignments in Africa in fields ranging from rural development
to banking and construction; and 6,62 3 African trainees had come to Israel
for training. 2'

Israel and its assistance programs were well received in Africa.
Africans identified with Israel as a fellow graduate from British colonialism,
and Israel's shirt-sleeve instructors were welcome for their egalitarianism.
The Israelis brought none of the political baggage that the former
colonizers inevitably carried. Then too, many African leaders admired the
rapid progress Israel had made in the social and technological integration of
new immigrants, as well as its agricultural achievements. Along with the
civilian expertise, military assistance was frequently given to friendly
African governments.

Ironically, one of the major fields of emphasis was trade unionism.
Israel's labor federation, Histadrut, played a leading role in training African
unionists and members of cooperatives.^^ Evidence is now beginning to
mount which indicates that during its halcyon African days, Israel served as
a conduit for money from the CIA.^^

During its Africa phase Israel dipped deep into South Africa's reserve
of goodwill. A joint communique criticizing apartheid was issued in 1961
by Ben Gurion and the president of Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso).
That same year Israel voted to censure remarks made at the UN by South
Africa's foreign minister. It aligned itself against the West on a General
Assembly vote for sanctions that almost passed. These actions deeply
offended the white regime — and alarmed the South African Jewish
community which came under Afrikaner pressure to condemn the Israeli
actions. (The ensuing backlash to this pressure was of utmost significance,
as will be discussed below.) Even before Israel committed a still graver
provocation, siding with African states on a 1962 UN vote to impose

Israel and South Africa

25

sanctions on South Africa — Israel, then led by Golda Meir, was hoping to
win African support for a UN resolution calling for direct Arab-Israeli
negotiations — the South African Treasury had refused to approve a routine
transfer of Jewish donations to Israel. When Jewish officials appealed the
denial, the minister of finance said the currency export privilege had been
withdrawn because Israel had "slapped South Africa in the face and ganged
up with her enemies."^'

Leaders of Israel's Labor government argued that reasons of state,
specifically the necessity of pleasing Israel's African allies, took precedence
over the exigencies of the South African Jewish community.'" In 1963,
Israel lowered the level of its diplomatic mission in South Africa, and in
1 966 it voted at the UN to revoke South Africa's mandate over Namibia,
the colony formerly known as Southwest Africa."

Israel and South Africa Draw Together

Although Israel would continue to step on Pretoria's toes in its pursuit
of African governments— a 1971 Israeli attempt to make a $2,000
contribution to the Organization of African Unity's (OAU) Liberation
Committee triggered another South African cutoff of Jewish funds"—
Israel's 1967 war delivered a telling blow to its relationships with African
nations. Coming at a time of strengthened African- Arab links, the resulting
Israeli occupation of Arab and African territory (i.e. Egypt's Sinai)
brought about the beginning of a shift in African perceptions: Israel was no
longer viewed as an embattled underdog, but a powerful aggressor."

Israel's 1 967 war had the opposite effect on South Africa, eliciting its
admiration. A team of South African military observers is reported to
have flown to Israel "to study tactics and the use of weapons." Israel's war
(which resulted in the occupation of substantial areas of Jordan and Egypt)
would become one of two battles taught in South Africa's "maneuver
schools."'* In October 1967, the Chief of Staff of the Israeli Air Force,
General Mordechai Hod, lectured the South African military on the
conduct of the war.'^

The drawing away from Israel of independent African states provided
South Africa with a political opportunity. Almost totally bereft of friends
itself by the late 1 960s, South Africa demonstrated its interest in closer ties
by coming quickly to Israel's aid. Currency-hoarding Pretoria permitted
South African Jews to transfer immediately an extra $20.5 million to Israel.
The white government itself sent replacement weapons and aircraft.'' After

26 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

the Fr ench embargoed arms shipments to Israel, South Africa, which had
also received a great part of its arsenal from France, "ran an emergency
service, supplying Israel with just about all the components it wanted.""
These gestures generated a response in Israel. In 1 968, Israeli politicos
formed the Israel-South Africa Friendship League.'^ Menachem Begin was
president of this organization when he became prime minister of Israel in
1977." Simcha Erlich headed the League during the time he served as
Israel's finance minister.*" In 1 969, former Prime Minister Ben Gurion paid
a high profile visit to South Africa and met there with Prime Minister John
Vorster.*' Accompanying Ben Gurion was Chaim Herzog, currently the
president of Israel.*^ In 1972, South Africa opened a Consulate General in
Israel.*'

After the June 1967 war— four years after the UN's first embargo on
arms sales to South Africa— Israel began to sell weapons to the white
minority government. Israel was said to have offered South Africa both its
Arava short-take-off-and-landing aircraft** (used by other customers for
counterinsurgency warfare, see chapter on Guatemala) and plans for the
Mirage III aircraft, stolen by Mossad in Switzerland.*^ James Adams in The
Unnatural A lliance noted reports that the Arava had been tried in Namibia.*'
Israel was also said to have offered the apartheid regime weapons captured
during the 1967 fighting.*^ By 1971, South Africa was manufacturing the
Uzi submachine gun under a license arranged through Belgium.*^ In 1 97 1 ,
it was reported that a Greek freighter had brought high explosives from
Eilat to Durban.*'

During this period Israel's relations with independent African nations
continued to deteriorate. Finally, the October 1973 war hastened a mass
rupture of diplomatic relations. Between September and November 1973,
22 African governments severed ties with Israel, leaving only 4 indepen-
dent African nations with diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv.™ (All four,
Swaziland, Lesotho, Malawi, and Mauritius, also have relations with South
Africa.51)

During the 1973 war, South Africa again came to Israel's aid. Defense
Minister (later State President) P.W. Botha said that practical ways would
be found to manifest South Africa's moral support for Israel." It was
reported that the South Africans' sympathy extended to Mirage jet fighters
and that these were piloted by South Africans eager for combat experience.
The Egyptians claimed that they had shot down a South African Mirage. "
The war also drew 1,500 Jewish volunteers from the white-run state.^*
Also, the Pretoria government permitted South African Jews to send over
130 milUon to Israel.

Israel and South Africa 27

Israel responded with the appointment of an ambassador to Pretoria in
June 1974— a move reciprocated by South Africa the following year."

Starting shortly before Israel went to war in the fall of 1973, the
frequency of visits back and forth between Israel and South Africa
increased in status, as well as in number. Yitzhak Rabin, between stints as
Israel's ambassador to the U.S. and prime minister, arrived on a fund-
raising mission in 1 973 ; and Moshe Dayan was hosted by the South Africa
Foundation in 1974." Other Israeli visitors to South Africa in 1973 and
1974 included the former Israeli ambassador to Denmark, Israel's Deputy
Minister for communications, and Israel's Chief Rabbi Shlomo Goren,
who met President J.J. Fouche, Defense Minister Botha and other military
brass. South Africans travelling to Israel included the head of BOSS (the
since disbanded Bureau of State Security), Hendrik van der Bergh, and the
Mayor of Johannesburg and a team of 1 5 housing officials led by the
director of the building branch of the South African Council for Scientific
and Industrial Research.^'

Far from being irrelevant, or, in another sense, comparable to counting
dogs frequenting a favorite fire hydrant, this matter of visits for "pariah"
countries is immensely important. Both the Israeli and the South African
state-run media go on at great length about foreign visitors — especially
ranking officials — or trips abroad by their own dignitaries, whose wel-
comes are recounted in great detail. This we-are-not-alone syndrome also
explains the frequent and almost always baseless predictions that this or that
African nation is about to renew diplomatic ties with Israel. That the Israeli
visits were more "diplomatic" is explained by the presence of the South
African Jewish community and the greater degree of South African
isolation. That the South African visits to Israel during this period appear
to have been more "business-oriented" is readily explained by Israel's
slightly stronger international standing and its concomitant lack of interest
in parading South African political figures before its populace.

Recalling Israel's sea change. South Africa's first ambassador to Israel
wrote:

The latent support for South Africa, which we knew existed but
which had been difficult to quantify came to the surface. Why, it
was asked, had Israel been supporting resolutions in the United
Nations which were hurtful to South Africa, when South Africa
now stood revealed as one of the few countries to stand up and
be counted when Israel was in peril.'^^

A number of circumstances propelled the bonding process. The
lessons of Israel's recent war took on new significance for South Africa as

2 8 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Portugal was forced to give up its African colonies and South Africa
worried about a military threat from the newly independent Mozambique and
Angola.'' Moreover, the Nonaligned Movement, then coming into its own
as a force of the developing world, was bringing increasing pressure to bear
on South Africa.

Because of its intransigent refusal to negotiate a withdrawal from the
territories it had occupied since 1967 and the brutality of its occupation of
them, Israel was also the object of intense international criticism. In
November 1975, the United Nations General assembly passed Resolution
3379 declaring Zionism a form of "racism and racial discrimination." The
resolution also condemned "the unholy alliance between South African
racism and Zionism."*" Also in 1 974 the UN began steps that would result
in the conferral of observer status on the Palestine Liberation Organization.

In late 1974, Israel's resistance to the U.S. peacemaking efforts led the
Ford Administration to declare an aid moratorium to all countries in the
Middle East while Washington "reassessed" its policy in the region. The
anxiety this caused Tel Aviv was considerable. (A letter signed by 76
Senators that urged continued U.S. support for Israel "was a blunt
reminder to the President... [that] should cause [him] to think twice before
making any rash move on the Middle Eastern scene,"" reflected the level of
Israel's consternation at the time.) A scandal breaking in 1975 over CIA
"dirty tricks" in Angola led Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to suggest
to Israel that it help South Africa with its invasion of Angola." Israel
complied with Kissinger's request by sending counterinsurgency weapons
and instructors. In July 1975, a former Israeli intelligence chief said that
senior Israeli military officers were giving South African troops counter-
insurgency training.*' The Economist said Israel had stopped short of
sending the troops which Kissinger had wanted, but that the Israelis took
his suggestion as a green light for developing a closer relationship with
South Africa.*''

Conspiracy Opens Up a Whole New Phase of Relations

In June 1975, Connie Mulder — his star was then rising and, as heir
apparent to the prime minister, he had been made Information and Interior
Minister — and Information Secretary Eschel Rhoodie made a secret trip to
Israel. Their meetings with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, Defense
Minister Shimon Peres, and six other members of the Israeli cabinet was

Israel and South Africa 29

arranged by Oscar Hurwitz , a Jewish South African and an instrumental
figure in the plot that would become known as the "Muldergate" scandal.*'
Les de Villiers, the South African Deputy Information Minister who also
attended that meeting, asked the Israelis to recommend a "lobbyist." The
name of New York public relations man Sydney Baron was mentioned and
the South Africans retained him.** Baron, who had past connections to
New York political boss Carmine deSapio, would funnel $200,000 of
South African money into the 1976 U.S. senatorial race of Republican S.I.
Hayakawa in a successful attempt to defeat South Africa's nemesis,
California Senator John Tunney, a Democrat. In 1 978, Baron would repeat
the process with a $250,000 South African donation to Iowa Republican
Roger Jepson in his successful challenge to Democratic Senator Dick Clark
(the author of the Clark Amendment, forbidding CIA involvement in
Angola).*^

These deals were only a fraction of the influence-buying of the secret
"information project" set up by the South Africans in the early 1970s.
Eschel Rhoodie and Connie Mulder spent at least $100 million in at least
half a dozen countries— buying newspapers, setting up front organizations,
running junkets for politicians or buying them outright— all in a fruitless
attempt to improve South Africa's image. The Mulder gang was ultimately
charged with flagrant "financial irregularities" and forced out of office in a
1978 power play that won P.W. Botha the right to succeed the retiring
Premier John Vorster.*^

In the 1975 meetings in Israel, the Labor government under Yitzhak
Rabin agreed to play a consultative role in the Mulder- Rhoodie disinforma-
tion offensive.*' (They also apparently agreed to let the South Africans
operate Project David in Israel, which funded propaganda and brought
South African sports teams to Israel.'") They recruited Arnon Milchan , an
Israeli arms dealer— he would also be used to funnel" weapons to South
Africa— to launder the funds. Milchan has admitted that he agreed to play
this role and said that on one occasion he put 66,000 pounds sterling into a
Swiss bank; the money was then withdrawn and used to purchase the
London-based magazine West Africa, later sold.'''

In March 1 976, then Defense Minister Shimon Peres made a secret visit
to South Africa and invited the South African prime minister to visit Israel.
John Vorster arrived in Israel the following month, eager for his first
official visit to a democratic state.

The visit by John Vorster was certain to be provocative, but the
isolated Israelis must have felt they had very little to lose, and, in South
Africa, with its gold and minerals and its complement of transnational
corporations, they must have seen a possible substitute for the U.S.

Arms Industry

The 1976 Accords

Israel received Vorster warmly, with a red carpet running to the door
of his plane. At the other end Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin headed
the pack of dignitaries waiting to greet him. Vorster met with Foreign
Minister Allon, with President Ephraim Katzir, and numerous other Israeli
leaders. Half the cabinet turned out to a farewell banquet for Vorster hosted
by Rabin,' this despite a formal communication from the Netherlands
warning that the visit would make it more difficult for "Israel's friends
abroad to persuade the world that there is no connection between Zionism
and racism."^ Vorster, who had been jailed for 20 months during World
War II by the British for his pro-Nazi activities and had never repudiated
his Nazism,^ had last been made welcome in Paraguay.*

At the state banquet Prime Minister Rabin turned to his South African
counterpart and said,

We here follow with sympathy your own historic efforts to
achieve detente on your continent, to build bridges for a secure
and better future, to create coexistence that will guarantee a
prosperous atmosphere of cooperation for all the African
peoples, without outside interference and threat.^

When the head of the apartheid regime was not being received or
visiting religious sites or climbing to the Masada fortress where Jewish
rebels made a last stand against the Romans in the first century, or.

31

32 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

incongruously, laying a wreath at the Yad Vashem Holocaust memorial,
Vorster spent his four days in Israel touring military installations,
including the state-owned Israel Aircraft Industries (lAI).*

These visits gave rise to reports that the South Africans were shopping
for Israeli arms. Both Israeli and South African officials denied that this was
the case.' Yet obviously, at least from the Israeli standpoint, there was more
to receiving Vorster than a provocative and defiant political statement. It is
generally accepted that among the comprehensive set of bilateral agree-
ments announced as having been concluded during Vorster's trip to
Israel — covering commercial, trade, fiscal, and "cooperative" arrange-
ments^ — were secret pacts covering arms sales and nuclear cooperation.'
All of the agreements, the departing Vorster told reporters, would be
overseen by a joint cabinet-level committee which would meet annually to
review and promote Israeli-South African economic relations. Vorster also
spoke of a "steering group" to coordinate the exchange of information and
encourage the "development of trade, scientific and industrial cooperation
and joint projects using South African raw material and Israeli man-
power."'"

What Israel and South Africa had accomplished was a strategic
meshing of strengths and weaknesses: South African capital and raw
materials to Israel, counterpoised against the transfer of Israeli weapons and
advanced technology to South Africa." The 1976 agreements have been
periodically renewed. As the years progressed the strength generated by
Israeli-South African cooperation would be turned outward to sanctions-
busting, allowing South Africa to fend off internal and external pressure for
reform.

Israel has also reaped benefits from the relationship — in the tangible
sense for the development of its arms industry, and in a not altogether
ephemeral sense, politically: as long as South Africa remains the focal point
of international outrage, Israel escapes the brunt of that attention;
moreover, as long as it can be shown that sanctions are ineffective against
South Africa, there is less chance they will be imposed on Israel.

Nuclear Apprentice

There are few areas where the respective needs and advantages of
Israel and South Africa dovetailed so perfectly as in the field of nuclear
cooperation.

Israel and South Africa 33

"The most powerful reason for Israeli willingness to bear the
undesirable consequences of expanded and more open trade with South
Africa may be her desire to acquire material necessary to manufacture
nuclear weapons," wrote a military analyst in 1980.'^ To that must be
added Israel's great desire to test the nuclear weapons it already had, and the
attractions of South Africa's vast territory and proximity to even vaster
uninhabited spaces— the Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

Then at the point in its nuclear development where it was fashioning
sophisticated bombs (devices which use less nuclear material but have
infinitely greater explosive force than the "primitive" bomb dropped by
the U.S. on Hiroshima), Israel would find it particularly helpful to observe
the performance, explosive force and fallout of a detonated weapon.''

Since 1 984, Israel had been operating a plutonium extraction plant in a
secret underground bunker at Dimona in the Negev Desert. Built by the
French in the late 1950s, the Dimona plant also included facilities for
manufacturing atomic bomb components.'^ At the time of the 1976
accords, Israel was preparing to build an adjoining plant for the extraction
of lithium 6, tritium and deuterium, materials required for sophisticated
thermonuclear weapons.'^

Israel's reasons for devoting what had to have been a significant
portion of its scant resources to such an ambitious nuclear weapons
program— nuclear experts have recently ranked it as the world's sixth
nuclear power, after the U.S., the USSR, Britain, France and China'*—
have been variously offered as the desire to develop a credible deterrent to
attack by its neighbors and the desire to substitute that deterrent for at least
part of the costly conventional arsenal that Israel, with one of the world's
most powerful military forces, maintains, and also (with much less
frequency) as an "umbrella" over a partial withdrawal from the occupied
territories.'''

However, these are by way of superficial rationales. The decision to
develop nuclear weapons was taken in the earliest days of the state and has
been doggedly pursued for over a quarter of a century.'^ Israel's determina-
tion suggests that it has always been directed toward establishing, perhaps
expanding, its borders by force and has always believed that its existence
can only be guaranteed by maintaining the entire Middle Eastern region in a
state of fearsome disequilibrium.

There is no consolation to be found in a search for an element of
responsibility in the Israeli nuclear program. The Middle East as tinderbox
has become a cliche, while Israel's own track record of flagrant aggres-
sion—since 1981 Israel has bombed Iraq's nuclear reactor, invaded
Lebanon, bombed Tunisia, and tried to persuade India to conduct a joint

34 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

raid on Pakistan's nuclear research facility"— does not recommend Tel
Aviv as a mature guardian of the ultimate weapon. Moreover, it is quue
possible that Israel has accumulated an estimated 100-200 warheads for
political purposes. Dr. Francis Perrin, the head of the French nuclear
program from 1951-1970, during which time France collaborated with
Israel on building an atom bomb and built the Dimona reactor/ plutonium
plant, recently explained:

We thought the Israeli bomb was aimed against the Americans,
not to launch it against America but to say "if you don't want to
help us in a critical situation we will require you to help us,
otherwise we will use our nuclear bombs. "^^

South Africa is not thought to have been as highly motivated as Israel
to acquire nuclear weapons capability. Given its— reasonable— expectation
of a domestic uprising perhaps aided from neighboring states. South
Africa's first priorities were Israeli weapons and Israeli technological input
for its conventional weapons industry. Yet South Africa is magnificently
endowed with uranium and during the 1970s was striving to manufacture
enriched uranium for export. To the South Africans a nuclear bomb was
something of a bonus.^'

They are thought to have achieved the requisite techniques in 1980
and since then have incorporated nuclear weaponry into their bluster, and
perhaps into their military doctrine. In 1 977, Information Minister Connie
Mulder said, "If we are attacked, no rules apply at all if it comes to a
question of our existence. We will use all means at our disposal whatever
they may be."^^ In 1979, Prime Minister P.W. Botha said, "we have
military weapons they do not know about."^^ In 1985, the South Africans
let it be known that they were capable of building two bombs a year."

South Africa's nuclear position roughly parallels Israel's. There is the
deterrent factor against a threat from the outside, which has become
somewhat more credible than Israel's with talk among members of the
OAU of establishing a pan- African force to aid the liberation struggle in
South Africa;^^ this is a somewhat sad turn of events for an organization
which made its first demand that Africa be a nuclear weapons-free zone m
1963.2* There is the notion of regional dominance, to which Nigeria has
already begun to react by broaching for consideration the idea that it, or
Africa, must develop a nuclear counterdeterrent.^' There is South Africa's
history of brazen attacks on its neighbors. There is the possibility that "by
threatening use of the bomb, Pretoria could effectively block international
efforts to impose sanctions on it for its racist policies. "^^

There is also the distinct possibility that the white minority govern-
ment has developed detailed plans to use neutron-type bombs (low-yield

Israel and South Africa 35

^' devices that kill people without widespread devastation of property) on the
domestic black majority. A set of maps in the possession of the African
National Congress ( ANC) appears to show population concentrations and
fallout radii.2'

In conjunction with its nuclear weapon "option," the Pretoria regime
is apparently aiming to enrich uranium for export at its Palindaba plant, due
to start operation in 1 987. Although the South Africans have refused to put
the plant under international safeguards,'" it might well be that they cherish
hopes of establishing lines of communication with potential Western
customers through sales of uranium for nuclear power plants. ''

During the 1 950s, when "peaceful" atomic energy was in vogue, Israel
I and South Africa had both participated in U.S. atomic energy programs.
South Africa has had help from Britain, West Germany and France, as well
as the U.S. Over the years, though, it has become more and more difficult
for both Pretoria and Tel Aviv to obtain nuclear technology because both
refuse to sign the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and each has refused to
open all its nuclear facilities to inspection.

In 1 965, after South Africa brought its Safari I safeguarded reactor on
line, Israeli scientists began advising South Africa on their Safari 2 research
reactor. '2 In 1968, Prof. Ernst Bergmann, the "father" of Israel's nuclear
program, went to South Africa and spoke strongly in favor of bilateral
cooperation on the development of nuclear technolgy.^'

According to the authors of a novelized treatment of Israel's nuclear
program — barred from publication by the Israeli censor — as early as 1 966,
South Africa had invited Israel to use its land or ocean space for a nuclear
i\ weapons test. Led at that time by Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, Israel
declined the invitation. However, according to the Israeli authors, whose
sources included Shimon Peres, an enthusiastic intimate of the Israeli
nuclear program, and Knesset Member Eliyah Speizer, during his April
1976 visit to Israel Premier Vorster again extended the invitation to Israel
to conduct a nuclear test.

It is commonly held that Israel wanted a test venue far from the Middle
East in order to uphold its longtime position that it would not be the first to
introduce nuclear weapons into the region.'* This "position," hinging on
some arcane reading of the word "introduce," is as meaningless as the
endlessly heard term "peace process."

The following year, a Soviet satellite picked up unmistakable signs of
preparation for a nuclear test in the Kalahari Desert. Fearing that such a test
"might trigger an ominous escalation of the nuclear arms race," the U.S.,
Britain, France and West Germany joined the USSR in pressuring South
Africa to abort the test.'^ As to the bomb that was to be tested, " 'I know

36 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

some intelligence people who are convinced with damn near certainty that
it was an Israeli nuclear device,' said a high-ranking Washington official."'*

At three o'clock in the morning on September 22, 1979, Israel and
South Africa conducted a nuclear weapons test where the South Atlantic
and Indian Oceans merge."

A newly recalibrated U.S. Vela intelligence satellite'^ recorded the
characteristic double flash of light. It was a small blast, designed to leave
very little evidence." The CIA told the National Security Council that a
two- or three-kiloton bomb had been exploded in "a joint South African-
Israeli test."*" A Navy official revealed that U.S. spy planes over the test
area had been waved away by South African Navy ships and forced to land
secredy in Australia.*' The CIA knew (and later told Congress) that South
African ships were conducting secret maneuvers at the exact site of the
test.*2 The South African military attache in Washington made the first ever
request to the U.S. National Technical Information Service for a computer
search on detection of nuclear explosions and orbits of the Vela satellite."

Almost immediately the Carter Administration convened a special
panel to conduct an investigation of the incident. The panel heard reports
from the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, the Defense Intelligence
Agency, and the CIA; and representatives of the Los Alamos National
Laboratory, the Department of Energy and the State Department presented
evidence to the panel supporting the occurrence of a nuclear explosion.
Their findings were summarily dismissed by the Carter White House,
which after a delay of seven months declared:

Although we cannot rule out the possibility that this [Vela]
signal was of nuclear origin, the panel considers it more likely
that the signal was one of the zoo events [reception of signals of
unknown origin under anomalous circumstances], possibly a
consequence of the impact of a small meteroid on the satellite."

Moreover, as new information became available, it was simply
ignored. In one critical instance, evidence of radiation observed in the
thyroid glands of Australian sheep was discounted. The initial lack of this
"smoking gun," traces of radiation, suggested to a Los Alamos scientist
that the low-yield weapon tested had been a neutron bomb. However, the
Carter panel had used the absence of radiation as a prime excuse in its
cover-up.''^

Many who had been involved with the investigation were aghast and
wondered why the Carter White House was "equivocating."*' Some
within the government said that the Carter Administration was hiding
behind the "zoo" theory to avoid dealing with the political headaches that

Israel and South Africa 37

would accompany acknowledgement of the test. An affirmative report
might have affected the ongoing negotiations over the creation of
Zimbabwe in which South African cooperation was needed and upset the
just negotiated Camp David accords between Israel and Egypt. Carter also
had reason to fear "complications in garnering Jewish votes during the
upcoming Democratic Party primary campaign against Sen. Edward
Kennedy."*^

But beyond that, as a State Department official explained, coming
clean on the test "would be a major turning point in our relations with
South Africa and Israel if we determined conclusively that either had tested
a nuclear bomb. It makes me terribly nervous just to think about it."*^ Of
course by deciding to ignore reality the Carter administration — and following
in its footsteps, the Reagan Administration, which went on record May 2 1 ,
1985 as upholding the Carter "verdict"*' — destroyed the already tattered
credibility of the nonproliferation posture of the U.S. There was no
challenge forthcoming from Congress. Quite the contrary: in 1981
Representatives Stephen Solarz and Jonathan Bingham withdrew legisla-
tion they had introduced calling for a cutoff of U.S. aid to nations
manufacturing nuclear weapons after they learned from the State Depart-
ment "that such a requirement might well trigger a finding by the
Administration that Israel has manufactured a bomb."^" The U.S. govern-
ment turned its back on the potential victims of Israeli and South African
nuclear aggression, and stuck its head in the sand like an ostrich.

Five years later, the Washington Office on Africa Educational Fund in
cooperation with Congressman John Conyers (D-MI), the Congressional
Black Caucus Foundation and the World Campaign Against Military and
Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa issued a report on the 1979
nuclear weapons test. Based on documents obtained from the government
under the Freedom of Information Act, the report detailed scientific
evidence not taken into account by the Carter panel. It demonstrated
conclusively that a cover-up had been perpetrated by the Carter Adminis-
tration. Written by Howard University Professor Ronald Walters, the
report warned that the cover-up, "coupled with the Reagan Administra-
tion's subsequent allowance of an increase in nuclear aid to South Africa has
serious implications for international peace and security."^'

The sponsors of the report urged that the investigation be reopened
under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences and the National
Academy of Engineers, and also called for a Congressional investigation
and "the release to the public of all pertinent information.""

Although it came at a time of heightened anti-apartheid activity, the
report was largely ignored. Small, dutiful articles about a Conyers press

38 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

conference appeared but generated none of the official (or activist) response
that might have iiept the issue alive.

In July 1985, during debate on the 1986-87 Foreign Aid Authoriza-
tion bill, Rep. Conyers offered an amendment stipulating that "United
States foreign assistance may not be provided to any country having a
nuclear relationship with South Africa." Howard Wolpe, Chair of the
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa persuaded Conyers to
withdraw the amendment, promising instead that upcoming hearings on
nuclear proliferation would consider the implications of South Africa's
nuclear capabihty.^' As 1985 wore into 1986, and while Congress spent
itself in a literal orgy of anti-apartheid legislation, the promised hearing was
never scheduled.

Congress may succeed in shelving the problem of the 1979 test for
another few years, but despite the refusal of the U.S. political monkeys to
see, nuclear collaboration between Tel Aviv and Pretoria continues. A
second test in December 1980 was reported in the same area, with another
CIA sighting of South African ships nearby. A British authority on nuclear
weapons. Dr. David Baker, said that the weapon fired in this test was
probably a 1 55 mm nuclear shell fired from a special howitzer which the
Israelis had helped the South Africans acquire^^ (see below).

In 1 98 1 , it was reported that South Africa had hired Israeli consultants
"to advise on the safety aspects of its first two commercial reactors." As
those reactors were being built by the French company Framatome, some
thought it odd that Israeli, rather than French, scientists would be hired.
The Israeli advice, which according to intelligence officials "could assist the
Government there to acquire the technological expertise to build nuclear
weapons," came in exchange for uranium.^'^ Although South Africa has its
Koeberg commercial reactor under international safeguards, these are lax,
"making diversion of materials for nuclear weapons possible if a govern-
ment so chooses."^'

In 1 986, Mordechai Vanunu, a technician who had worked nine years
at the Dimona installation, told reporters that South African scientists and
metallurgists had regularly worked at Dimona.

In 1985, the BBC reported that Israel and South Africa had tested an
Israeli-made Jericho II (nuclear-capable) missile in South Africa.^'

Late in 1986 South African scientists working on remote Marion
Island, halfway between Antarctica and the southern coast of South Africa,
disregarded Pretoria's orders to remain silent and reported that Israeli and
South African military officers had been visiting the island. Experts said
that the two nations were undoubtedly in the process of developing a
nuclear missile-testing range in conjunction with a $6 million mile-long

\

Israel and South Africa 39

airstrip South Africa was planning to build on the island and that this
"important military asset" could also be used as a base for anti-submarine
warfare. The scientists said they had gone public out of fear that their
meteorological station would be used to cover such activities. They
discounted South African excuses that the airstrip would be useful for
resupply, medical evacuation and rescue activities. The scientists said there
was little shipping, fishing or aviation in the area.""

The environmental organization Greenpeace, at the time setting up a
research station to monitor the large Antarctic wildlife population, issued a
statement opposing the airstrip. A Greenpeace spokeswoman at the
organization's Washington office said the organization was also opposed to
use of the island for military purposes by Israel and South Africa. (The
Greenpeace statement notes that Marion Island is near the site of their 1 979
nuclear test). If work was begun on the runway, she said, "it will definitely
engender a response.""'

Collaboration on Weapons

Although the 1976 Vorster agreements marked the beginning of a
large and systematic commerce in arms, it by no means launched the
sanctions-busting commerce in weapons between Tel Aviv and Pretoria.
Israel had already sold South Africa an assortment of military gear, and, by
one account, had imported Chieftain-type tanks from South Africa.^ By
1971, South Africa was building the Uzi submachine gun under license." In
fact, shortly before the signing of those agreements, the Israelis, acting in
concert with "retired" CIA agents and cooperative European companies,
played an important role in an elaborate deception that resulted in the
delivery of one of the most sophisticated weapons ever to reach South
Africa. This was the Space Research Corporation (SRC) 155 mm
howitzer, acknowledged at the time to be the most advanced long-range
artillery piece in the world. Originally developed by Canadian- American
Gerald Bull to launch satellites, the SRC howitzer is also capable of firing
miniaturized nuclear shells.

After failing to secure production rights to Bull's invention for
themselves (and for resale to South Africa), Israel served as the official "end
user" on U.S. papers accompanying conventional 1 55 mm shells through
their production process in the U.S. and Canada." According to Britain's
Independent Television, the Israeli Cabinet discussed the deal."

40 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

In a welter of phony addressees and illicit shipments, the conspirators
also accomplished the transfer to South Africa of the SRC howitzer
blueprints and the machine tools necessary for its production. South Africa
now produces and markets the howitzer as the G5 and G6; it is this artillery
piece with its 2 50 mile range"*' that was apparently used in the 1 980 nuclear
test mentioned above.*'

As in the SRC case, as Western nations came under pressure to abide
by the UN arms embargo of 1963 — and the subsequent United Nations
Mandatory Arms Embargo of 1977 — Israel began to act as a funnel for
shipments from other Western countries. One notorious case involved the
shipment of 1 1 U.S.-made Bell helicopters from Haifa to South Africa (and
thence to Rhodesia) using Singapore as a phony destination.'^ Another
concerned the shipment from Italy of Oto Melara naval cannon through
Israel to South Africa. South Africa installed the guns on Reshef patrol
boats, which by then it was making under Israeli license (see below)." In
1983, authorities in Copenhagen stopped a shipment of 400 pistols for
South Africa. The pistols were then taken to Vienna — Austrian law
permits export to South Africa of "sports and civilian weapons" — and from
there were to "be dispatched to South Africa via Israel."'"

Although it is difficult to pinpoint precisely the date of sale of Israeli
weapons to South Africa, following the Vorster agreements Israeli
military sales to South Africa increased dramatically. Israeli equipment
deployed in South Africa includes mortars," electronic surveillance
equipment, radar stations, anti-guerrilla alarm systems and night vision
devices,'^ high technology equipment for a squadron of South African
helicopters," "a large number of Soviet-made artillery pieces"'* and eight
Reshef long-range missile boats, two of which were supplied with
helicopter decks and sophisticated electronic gear.'^ South African navy
personnel, about 50 by one account, were brought to Israel to train on the
boats."

South Africa also bought six Dabur patrol boats (for $300,000 each)
and equipped them (and its own German-built corvettes) with Gabriel
surface-to-surface missiles for the Israeli craft." South Africa is also
thought to have bought Israeli Shafrir (heat-seeking) missiles some time
around 1978.'^

It is equally difficult to try to pinpoint the amount of money involved
in these transactions. A 1976 assessment by the London International
Institute for Strategic Studies said that Israel and France were South
Africa's "primary suppliers."" A 1 977 report said Israel had received $100
million worth of orders from South Africa that year.^" More recent reports
have varied between $50 million and $800 million annually.^'

Israel and South Africa 41

Nonetheless, with the official curtailment of British and French
weapons transfers to the white government, Israel became a lifeline for the
apartheid regime— and apartheid became a gold mine for Israel. In its 1 98 1
Yearbook, the respected Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) lists South Africa as the major customer for Israeli arms, taking 3 5
percent of the total prior to 1980.^^

After the well documented sales of the 1970s, and especially with the
imposition of the UN's 1977 mandatory arms embargo, secrecy on
arms shipments remained nearly absolute until 1986-87 when a great deal
became known (see below). Although the statistics suggest the sale of
numerous weapons systems in great quantity, very little is known about
what has actually changed hands. This is because of the overarching
secrecy observed by all facets of the Israeli arms industry^' and the obvious
need of the South Africans to avoid revealing the source of their imported
arms— every so often they can't resist a gleeful reference to "friendly
countries" — and thus drying it up.

Despite this decade of secrecy, a few sales have become known. The
South Africans have been steady purchasers of Israeli electronic "security"
fencing. This is the early warning barrier Israel has strung around its own
borders. Microwave devices and infra-red devices alert soldiers to those
intruders who are not snared by the anti-personnel mines which are part of
the package.8* The South Africans call the system a "ring of steel" and have
said that other border areas near Mozambique and Angola are "riddled
with anti-personnel mines manufactured in Israel. "^^

Although the Israelis have variously insisted that they scrupulously
respect the 1 977 UN embargo, or that their arms sales to South Africa do
not include weaponry that could be used for internal repression, a 1986
report on National Public Radio proves them wrong on both counts.
Listeners to "Morning Edition" on January 13 heard a tape of Israeli
military industries salesmen making a sales pitch to two delegations of
South African "security men." Tear gas and smoke gas grenades were
being demonstrated. During its almost perpetual state of emergency. South
Africa has used a great deal of tear gas.^*

During the broadcast an Israeli professor told "Morning Edition" that
none of South Africa's other trading partners "is quite as intimately
involved in security matters, in the preservation of apartheid through
force," as Israel is.*'

Israel has sold South Africa one or more "drones" (remotely piloted
spy planes). In 1983, one of these camera-laden aircraft shot down over
Maputo, Mozambique still bore its lAI factory markings.**

42 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Indications of Magnitude

Two news leaks about arms shipments in 1986 (three, counting the
Cheetah — see Introduction and below) might well be indicative of what has
been passing between Israel and South Africa on a regular basis. One arms
shipment included 50 Gazelle helicopters, armored cars, cannons, mortars,
20,000 automatic rifles and 1 2,000 machine guns purchased from Egypt on
Israel's behalf by Adnan Khasogghi, the infamous international arms
dealer, after Egypt rebuffed a direct Israeli attempt to purchase them. They
were shipped to Israel and from there immediately sent to South Africa.
(Another ten hehcopters from Zaire were also included in this shipment.^')
While the South Africans are probably eager for the helicopters it is likely
that the small arms will be passed along to one of the mercenary forces,
Unita, or the "Mozambican National Resistance," attacking the Frontline
states.

Late in the year, converted Boeing 707 aircraft appeared in South
Africa.'" There were four to six in all, and Israel had outfitted them as dual
in-flight refueling platforms and flying electronic warfare stations." Far
beyond anything available to any other African government, these aircraft
gave South Africa command of the entire continent.'^

There is no way of gauging the frequency and magnitude of similar
sales which escape detection. The transfer of ready-to-use weaponry,
however, is overshadowed by other aspects of Israeli military collaboration
with South Africa which have been instrumental in South Africa's
achieving a high degree of immunity from the effects of international
sanctions, in part through an extensive weapons industry of its own.''

The South African publication Intercomir stated, "thanks to the
friendship which binds us to Israel. ..we have succeeded in creating a
nucleus of modern ships based on fast-attack and missile craft derived from
the Israeli Reshef."'* This appreciation was not merely for Israeli
willingness to sell missile boats; nor was it simply to buy and sell weapons
outright that Israel and South Africa hammered out their 1 976 agreements.
Instead, the agreements

centered on South Africa's willingness to finance some of
Israel's costlier military projects. Israel was to reciprocate by
supplying weapon systems and training... Israel was asked to fill
[South Africa's] needs for naval, armored, electronic and
counterinsurgency equipment.'^

In the case of the Reshef patrol boats, after selling the first three
outright and training South African officers, the Israelis licensed the South

Israel and South Africa 43

Africans to produce nine.'* The South Africans call their Reshef the
Minister, or Minister of Defense (MOD). Israel also licensed South Africa
to produce the 65-foot Dabur patrol boat.'''

In addition to the famous Uzi submachine gun, the apartheid
government produces the Israeli Galil assault rifle under license as the
R-4.'8

Both the Dabur and the Reshef carry Gabriel missiles, the Israeli-made
equivalent of the French Exocet. South Africa now produces these under
license, calling them the Scorpion." It was with a Scorpion that the South
Africans sank a Cuban food ship during a June 1986 attack on the Angolan
port of Namibe. '00 These licensing agreements include the future transfer of
any Israeli modifications of the systems.""

There have been persistent reports of other licensing arrangements
between Tel Aviv and Pretoria, including submarines and a new Israeli
guided missile patrol boat, but none have been definitively confirmed.
Reports of collaboration on the missile boat go back to 1977, when it was
described as "a miniature aircraft carrier.""'^ James Adams calls this the Q9
corvette. >»3 A more recent report says South Africa is "considering buying
several new corvettes from Israel."'"^

A four- way deal to construct submarines seems in the making. South
Africa is planning to build submarines at its own yards in cooperation with
Chile. Meanwhile, Israel has been negotiating with Washington over a
submarine to be built jointly by Israel and West Germany'"' while a West
German state-owned shipyard has sold blueprints for submarines to South
Africa (resulting in a fairly severe scandal in Bonn, when it was determined
that Chancellor Kohl and other top officials discussed the sale). '"' If there is
any substance to the reports of an Israeli-South African submarine project,
then in all probability the ship will be a three-way project including Israel,
South Africa and Chile. (Israel is performing the same Mirage update for
Chile that resulted in the South African Cheetah.'"^) Israel's submarine
project is being financed by its U.S. military aid.'"' South Africa could be a
direct recipient of the benefits of U.S. military assistance to Israel. It is a
pattern that marks other purported licensing deals as well.

There have been frequent reports that South Africa is a silent partner in
the next generation Israeli fighter, the Lavi. The Israelis embarked on this
ambitious project in 1 977, hoping to advance their own technological base
a giant step with copious helpings of the latest U.S. technology."" Israel
also wanted to produce an aircraft without any U.S. parts, which would
make the export of the Lavi not subject to a veto by Washington.'"

As the evolving design incorporated features of a vastly more
sophisticated aircraft, Israeli leaders sought and won U.S. financing for

44 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

rising costs of the Lavi's development. By the end of 1986, Congress had
earmarked 11.3 billion of Israel's U.S. military assistance for the Lavi.''^
Furthermore, Congress allocated $700 million of that sum to be spent in
Israel on the Lavi's development.'"

As early as 1977, it was reported that Israel was helping South Africa
develop a fighter plane within the framework established in 1976: South
African financing and Israeli technological input."* A top secret trip by
Israeli Defense Minister Ezer Weizman to South Africa in March 1 980"^ is
thought to have been "to discuss, among other things, the joint Lavi fighter
project.""* Weizmann definitely reached agreement with the South
Africans over financing the development of the avionics— the computerized
flight systems— for the Kfir aircraft, which the South Africans later
obtained for their Cheetah."'

An I AI marketing document in the early years of this decade spoke of
an outright sale of the Lavi to South Africa. It projected selling 407 Lavi
aircraft to South Africa, Chile, Taiwan and Argentina. "^ In 1984 it was
reported that "South Africa is known to be prepared to invest in
the...Lavi.""'

An objective analysis of the Lavi's current status would appear to rule
out the possibility that South Africa still hopes to be cut in on the deal. As
the project and the Israeli economy ran into trouble in the mid- 1 980s, Israel
was forced to contract an increasing amount of the work on the Lavi to U.S.
firms,'2° and thus the amount of leverage the U.S. has over any potential
export deals has risen. The Lavi's avionics have been developed by Israel,
and hence are not subject to a U.S. export veto.'^' At one point, the Israelis
sought a U.S. partner for the Lavi.'" The Bet Shemesh engine plant, which
was to co-produce the first batch of Pratt and Whitney engines for the Lavi,
went into receivership, presumably eliminating the possibility that Israel
could pass along the engine for the Lavi to South Africa. Yet the situation
surrounding the transfer of Kfir technology to South Africa to produce the
Cheetah (see Introduction) may be instructive. It had long been suspected
that Israel was about to let South Africa build the Kfir under license (or sell
the aircraft outright to the white regime).'" Israel eventually passed along
pieces of Kfir technology and also gave South Africa assistance in
producing the engine. It is not out of the question that South Africa would
receive plans for building the Lavi power plant; nor is it out of the question
that another country might be drawn into the scheme, increasing the
opportunities for legerdemain.

Minister Without Portfolio Moshe Arens— as Defense Minister, head
of lAI, and Ambassador to the U.S., Arens made the Lavi his personal
"obsession'''^* — recently went to Japan and proposed that Israel share its

Israel and South Africa 45

Lavi technology with Tokyo, which is contemplating co-producing a
fighter plane with the U.S.'" Arens has called the Lavi "the most potent
new jet fighter in the Western world. "'^^

While these scenarios of the Lavi's future are speculative, they are
nonetheless germane. For all the |l-plus billion it has designated for the
Lavi— "with such alacrity that it initially provided $ 1 50 million more than
Israel could spend"'^' — Congress has ignored a number of problems
associated with the plane, as well as the reports of South African
collaboration. It has not dealt with the prospects of the Lavi as an export,
even though it had been pointed out repeatedly that the Lavi would
compete with the U.S. -built Northrop F-20 Tigershark. The F-20, which
had no federal funds for its development, was abandoned in November
1986 after failing to find U.S. or foreign buyers. '^^

The Israelis have assured Washington "categorically" that they were
not developing the Lavi for export, but some U.S. officials remain
skeptical. '2'

Pentagon efforts to persuade Israel to scrap the Lavi project because its
rising costs would impair other Israeli military programs — the Pentagon
said the finished aircraft would cost $22 million per plane, the Israelis
claimed it would be $15 million"" — were ignored by Congress. Instead,
eight U.S. Representatives wrote a letter to the Departments of State and
Defense and to the White House urging that the next installment of $70
million for the Lavi be released."'

In an editorial calling into question the fiscal soundness of the Lavi
project, the Oakland Tribune also suggested: "...If Congress does extend
further aid, it should insist on guarantees that none of the technology will
leak out to South Africa. ""^

In the face of general knowledge on the hill of Israeli-South African
military cooperation, shouldn't Congress' lack of interest in possible South
African access to the Lavi be interpreted by Israel as "a wink and a nod"?

In 1979, the U.S. allowed Israel to use $ 1 07 million of its military aid to
develop its main battle tank, the Chariot, or Merkava, in Israel. (This
precedent, spending foreign aid outside the U.S., would later be used to
justify the far larger sums the U.S. permitted Israel to convert to its local
currency for the Lavi.'")

Meanwhile, South Africa's help was enlisted in the production of the
armor plating for the tank. Israel obtained rare steel alloys from South
Africa, and also — in a rare turnaround— South Africa's advanced steel
manufacturing technology. In return Israel supplied the formula for
fabricating the plating and refitted all of South Africa's tanks and armoured
vehicles."* The armor is said to be the hardest in the world. The production
was handled by Iskoor,'" a joindy owned steel company located in Israel.

Arms Sales and Policy

Toward Arms Self- Sufficiency

In addition to permitting South Africa to build its systems under
license, Israel has given South Africa direct assistance in the establishment
of its arms industry:

The Haifa shipyard helped establish South Africa's virtually
non-existent shipbuilding industry by supplying personnel to
the Sandock-Austral yard [in Durban] and advising on the
organization of an efficient production line.'

Representatives of Israel's major military electronics producers,
Tadiran, Elbit and lAI helped South Africa establish its own electronics
sector. South Africa now produces— and smugly claims credit for de-
veloping—a range of military communications gear.^ As it is clear that in
their daily routines the South African police and military, the enforcers of
apartheid, benefit directly from state of the art Israeli electronic technology,
it is equally clear that the so-called "dual-use" communications gear used
by the police and military must be included in the category of military
goods that should be denied to South Africa (by both the U.S. and Israel).

Many of the 20,000 Israelis now living in South Africa'— a number
that has increased from 5,000 in 1978<— are believed to be involved in the
high tech and military sectors. In 1 98 1 South Africa began recruiting Israeli
engineers, and electronics and computer specialists. ^

47

48 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

From surrounding a township to mounting an invasion of Angola, the
white government has had the advantage of sophisticated and secure
communications. In May 1985 a South African commando captured by
Angolan troops while preparing to bomb the Gulf Oil installation in the
enclave of Cabinda explained how an emergency escape into neighboring
Zaire would have been handled:

If the situation arise that we have to go to Zaire, then by means
of that radio over there, we can talk to Pretoria, who will then
exactly tell us which people will meet us there.

South Africa's capacity for havoc and destruction is underscored by
continuing speculation that a sophisticated decoy radio signal was respon-
sible for the crash of the airplane carrying Mozambican President Samora
Machel from Zambia to Mozambique on October 1 9, 1 986 at 9: 1 5 in the
evening. Coming in for a landing at Maputo, the plane instead flew into a
mountain just over the South African border.

Machel, revered within and far beyond his own nation, lay dying in
the wreckage, while South African police and soldiers, who arrived
immediately after the crash, drove off medical volunteers and prowled
through the wreckage, trampling bodies, searching by flashlight for
documents (the South Africans later displayed notes from the meeting
which they said discussed a plan to overthrow the government of Malawi,
where South African backed mercenaries attacking Mozambique have
found refuge) and asking "Where's Samora.?" The foreign minister himelf,
Pik Botha, came to the crash site. Later, recounted one of the passengers
who lay in the wreckage with both legs broken. South African vehicles and
helicopters arrived. The vehicles ringed the crash site and then turned off
their headlights, their drivers joining the search with flashlights. It wasn't
until the following morning that the first survivors were taken to a
hospital.'' Later the South Africans would say that Machcl's heart and brain
were "not present due to the violence of the accident."^

Amidst a consensus that South Africa was generally to blame-
according to President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia "because apartheid is
responsible for all our distress in this region"'— it was quickly established
that South Africa had the ability to send decoy radio signals.'" Careful
studies of the flight's last moments led analysts to believe that a decoy
beacon from South Africa led it astray." The South Africans themselves
said that the pilot was "disoriented" by a powerful omnidirectional beacon
transmitting from Swaziland,'^ a nation completely in the thrall of South
Africa (and also a country where Israelis are made to feel at home).

It is also, perhaps, worth noting that Zairian President Mobutu was at
the meeting Machel was attending on the southern shore of Lake

Israel and South Africa 49

Tanganyika, m a remote area of Zambia. Mobutu's personal guard has
been tramed by Israelis.'* And what the South African Foreign Minister
, said the day of Machel's funeral, as he expressed regret that South Africa
, had not been mvited: that his government's presence at the crash site
I showed "clear evidence of the respect shown for President Machel," and
' South Africa's willingness to "ben[d] over backwards. "'^

The area where the crash occurred is a restricted South African
military zone, and unusual army activity had been observed there in the
j days immediately preceding the crash. Eyewitnesses said a camp was
dismantled immediately after the crash.

An investigation under the control of South Africa (in which
Mozambique did not participate) revealed that the cockpit voice recorder
contained exchanges among crew members over whether the beacon signal
they were receiving indicated a turn in the proper direction. They followed
a signal that led them 37 degrees off course.'*

Whether or not South Africa acquired the specific technology capable
of bringing down Samora Machel's aircraft from Israel, after a decade of
formalized cooperation with Israel, the white-ruled outlaw state has the
ability to manufacture all kinds of advanced equipment. The apartheid
government brags it has accomplished this itself:

The arms boycott failed for a perfectly simple reason: white
South Africans refused to commit political suicide. The price
that had to be paid in buiding up a local armament industry had
to be paid. There was simply no alternative.''

While Pretoria might be correct in touting itself as the world's 1 0th
argest exporter of arms,'^ it is far less self-sufficient than it pretends to be."
It IS dependent on Israel for access to developing technology and thus it is
critical that Israel be prevented from providing South Africa any further
updates.

This question came up as Israel, facing unprecedented Congressional
scrutiny, and possibly a forced curtailment, of its military commerce with
South Africa, wondered (through the media) whether "semi-military
systems" might also provoke Congressional objection. This was only one
of the questions Israel raised, indirectly through leaks and in private talks
with the Reagan Administration and on Capitol Hill, as the day (April 1 ,
1987) approached when the President was to submit to Congress a report
on U.S. allies' military dealings with South Africa.

That report had been mandated by a provision of an amendment to the
1986 Comprehensive Ami- Apartheid Bill, passed by Congress on October
2, 1986. Drafted not by anti-apartheid activists but by two Republican
senators (Charles McC. Mathias of Maryland and Dan Evans of Washing-

50 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

ton) and appearing as Section 508 of the final bill, the provision required the
President to conduct a study "on the extent to which the international
embargo on the sale and exports of arms and military technology to South
Africa is being violated," and, 180 days after passage of the anti-apartheid
bill, to submit a report to Congress containing "a detailed assessment of the
economic and other relationships of other industrialized democracies with
South Africa." The report was to identify "those countries engaged in such
sale or export with a view to terminating United States military assistance
to those countries."

Had it not had such serious ramifications, the whole episode could be
appreciated as a farce. When it was introduced in the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, some of Israel's special friends there scrambled to
delete it from the larger amendment offered by Mathias and Evans. The
committee took three separate votes on the measure: first accepting, then
rejecting, finally, after adjourning to a back room where several Democratic
senators were made to realize how hypocritical their attention-getting
opposition to apartheid was if they weren't willing to act against Israel's
violations of the arms embargo, it was rejected. On the final vote Senators
Pell (D-RI, who in 1987 became chair of the committee) and Cranston
(D-CA, who had greatly pleased his progressive constituents by intro-
ducing in the Senate the very stiff sanctions bill authored by Rep. Ronald
Dellums (D-CA) and passed by the House) stood firm, voting against the
provision with a minority comprised of ultra-rightist Jesse Helms (R-NC)
and other anti-sanctions Republicans.

While Israel's lobby could normally have had the amendment deleted,
in this case the legislation sped along so quickly AIPAC was never able to
catch up with it. Debate was limited in the full Senate to prevent
filibustering. The House immediately abandoned its own previously-
passed anti-apartheid legislation (the Dellums bill) and passed the Senate's
version without debate. After the President (who never saw a racist he
didn't try to help) vetoed the measure, both houses of Congress passed it
over his veto — again, without debate. AIPAC never had a chance.

In the end, Congress, the administration, and, most of all, Israel, were
faced with a responsibility that none of them wanted.^" In January and
February, Israel worked to achieve an understanding with the administra-
tion over what "gesture" might satisfy the Congress—constituents, who
might have been harder to satisfy, were, unfortunately, silent. When Prime
Minister Yitzhak Shamir visited Washington in mid-P'cbruary, the subject
of how much Israel needed to change its relations with South Africa was
high on the list of matters discussed.

Israel and South Africa

51

After announcing through official sources that to precipitously end
existing contracts with South Africa would cost $500 million (over several
years) and many million more in possible lawsuits, not to mention
"hundreds, if not thousands, of jobs in Israeli military industries, "^i Israel's
friends raised questions in the press about whether Congress might accept
the continuation of licensing deals and sales of "semi-military" items."
With a deafening silence from both the White House and Capitol Hill, Israel
decided on a:

"deprofilization" of [its] presence in South Africa. In other
words, the special relationship between the two nations—
particularly in what is called "strategic affairs"— will continue,
but in a much less visible manner and with less direct involve-
ment of the military so as not to clash with the will of
Congress.^'

Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin was dispatched to South Africa— the
South Africans were threatening to "tell all" about some yet undisclosed
aspect of Israeli collaboration^*— where he gave reassurances" and urged
the Boers to keep their heads down. Shamir told U.S. reporters that Israel
would keep its "commitments" to South Africa.^*

The impression was left floating— through intentional newsleaks—
that Israel might phase out existing agreements and not enter into new
ones,^' but there was no evidence of any intention to put that offer into
effect. Moreover, six weeks before the report was due to be submitted to
Congress it was clear that Congress would not cut off Israel's $1.8 billion
annual military aid, and Israeli officials had begun concentrating on
preventing

political backlash [that] could nonetheless be very damaging.
Shamir and his colleagues hope that both the Reagan Adminis-
tration and Congress will stop short of any public condemnation
of Israel based on assurances that it will gradually end its
military relationship with South Africa.^^

Was Israel to end its nuclear collaboration with South Africa
"gradually".? Before Section 508 of the Ami- Apartheid Act of 1986
fortuitously pried out the information that Israel did hundreds of millions
of dollars per year of military business with South Africa, Israel always
denied any arms dealings at all. What assurance is there that Israel is now
accurately portraying the extent of its trafficking, not just half or one-
quarter.' The assertion of Defense Minister Rabin, that "whatever happens
Israel has to maintain its credibility with the U.S. and Israel has never

52 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

played tricks with the U.S.,"^' is less than satisfying after the Iran-contra
revelations and the Pollard spy case.

There was no voice in Congress to question Israel's word, much less to
wonder aloud if the people of Southern Africa were not owed some kind of
reparations from the people of the U.S., whose client Israel has contributed
so greatly to their death, suppression and suffering. Instead, Israel's efforts
to keep the lid on its continued lethal supply lines to South Africa and
Congress' efforts to keep its own dereliction of duty out of the minds of its
constituents are both greatly assisted by the almost blanket censorship
imposed by the South African government.

The notion of South Africa's "self-sufficiency" should not obscure the
degree of integration between the two arms industries. James Adams calls it
their "joint arms industry."'*^ Iskoor, the steel partnership, is one example
of this integration. A joint Scorpion^' helicopter operation involves initial
construction in South Africa at the Cape Town firm of Rotoflight
Helicopters and then final assembly at Israel's Chemavir-Masok." Yet
another example is Israel's permitting South Africa construction companies
to bid on a military complex in the Negev Desert.^^

Coordinated Exports

The integration of military industries also appears to have led to some
degree of integration of foreign operations. Tadiran and the South African
firm Consolidated Power have established an electronics enterprise in
Guatemala.

It seems the two might also be coordinating their weapons exports to a
certain extent. A 1982 report noted that South Africa was delivering rush
orders of parts for Israeli Gabriel missiles and the Neshcr (an early version
of the Kfir) to Argentina, then engaged in the Malvinas/Falklands war
with Britain.'^

Although the full extent of coordination between Tel Aviv and
Pretoria is impossible to know, both Israel and South Africa have been
supplying arms to the governments of Sri Lanka,'* Iran and Morocco.

Israel, which had counted the Shah of Iran im most important arms
customer, had been selling arms to the Islamic Republic »ince its war with
Iraq began in 1980," and in 1985 brought the U.S. into partnership in this
enterprise, later known as the Iran-contra affair, South Africa followed
Israel into the Iranian market with an oil-for-arms swap reportedly
concluded in 1985, under which Iran received $750 million worth of

Israel and South Africa 53

weapons. The only weapon known to have been involved in that deal was
the G-5 howitzer,38 the South African version of the SRC 155 mm
howitzer which Israel helped South Africa obtain from the U.S. (South
Africa cut the same deal with Iraq.'') There is an international embargo on
oil shipments to South Africa, and Israel has often used violations of the
embargo by Middle East governments to support its claim that it should not
be singled out for its dealings with South Africa. Although many of the
shipments to South Africa that originate in the Gulf are purveyed to the
apartheid regime by private dealers such as fugitive financi er Marc Rich , it
appears (although the news accounts seem mainly to emanate from the
London newshnei Euromoney Trade Finance Report) that Iran and Iraq are
directly involved in such deals.'*"

Visitors to th e Sahraw LArab Democratic Repnhlir have seen South
Africa weapons which the Polisario Front has captured from Morocco in
its battle for control of the formerly Spanish Western Sahara. Polisario also
charges that South Africa is training Moroccans. Following a visit of Prime
Minister Shimon Peres to Morocco in July 1 986— described in terms of the
(interminable) "peace process"— Israel reportedly pledged to provide
Morocco with sophisticated arms and training.*' In the past, Israel has sold
Morocco tanks and armored personnel carriers.''^ Israeli officers have been
signted near the wall" King Hassan II is building to try to maintain the fiction
that he controls the territory claimed by the SADR, and taking part in the
"African Eagle" military exercises staged by the U.S. and Morocco in
November 1986.«

Discouraging as these developments may seem to advocates of
sanctions against South Africa, our continued efforts to curtail the flow of
military technology to Pretoria still matter: preventing the white regime
from producing state-of-the-art weaponry will make its export offerings
less attractive, hence depriving it of further income to pursue its aggressive
domestic and external policies.''^

Southern Africa: After the IsraeU Model

In these foreign operations, which strengthen both countries and
challange the confines of their international isolation, Israel has generally
been the facilitator, possessing the entre to such adventures as Guatemala
and Sri Lanka. As it came snarling and hissing into the 1980s in its own
region, South Africa has also looked to Israel for help and inspiration.

54 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Many parallels in the tactics and strategies employed by Israel and
South Africa have been noted. *^ Partly this is a result of collegiality: the
military attaches of Israel and South Africa "consult frequently on
counterinsurgency tactics."*' Yet there is an unmistakable teacher-student
pattern in the communication of the very techniques which have brought
down international criticism on both. As in the direction of the technology
flow between the two nations, the imparting of repressive techniques
usually casts Israel in the mentor's role.

The South Africans greatly admired the Israeli raid on Entebbe
airport.*^ "South African generals now consciously emulate the flam-
boyance of the Israeli generals," wrote a specialist on the South African
military.*' Even before 1976 South Africans had looked to Israel for
techniques they might adapt. Describing the lecture given by Air Force
General Mordechai Hod during his 1967 visit to South Africa, a member of
the select military audience said, "It was an intensely interesting lecture,
which made it apparent that the tactics employed by the Israeli Air Force
were brilliant. The Israelis seem to have been as clever as a cartload of
monkeys."™

The South Africans began teaching the lessons of Israel's 1 967 war at
their maneuver school,^' and Israeli advisers began teaching the Boers the
arts of suppressing a captive population and keeping hostile neighbors off
balance." In the Vorster agreements discussed earlier, Israeli advisory
services for South Africa were institutionalized.

Senior army officers in Israel have confirmed that IDP" [Israeli
Defense Forces] personnel have been seconded to all branches of
the South African armed forces , and according to senior sources
in the Israeli defense establishment, there are currently some 300
active Israeli servicemen and women on secondment in South
Africa. These include army, navy and air force personnel who
help train the South Africans, border security experts, ..counter
intelligence experts... and defense scientists who cooperate on
the development of new weapons systems. In addition, there are
several hundred South Africans in Israel at any one time, being
trained in weapons systems, battle strategy and counter-
insurgency warfare.^'

The white government's practice of donicitic counterinsurgency
combines outright military brutality with the extensive use of informers
and collaborators. It is impossible to know how many refinements of these
age-old techniques have been borrowed from the Israelii' occupation of the
West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heigiits. The Israeli system of village
leagues is obviously comparable to the hated town councils imposed on

Israel and South Africa 55

segregated townships by the apartheid government. The collective pun-
ishment employed by the Israelis, such as the destruction of a whole
family's home when one of its members is arrested as a suspect in an act of
resistance, has lately been matched by the recent South African practices of
sealing off townships, and assaulting entire funeral processions. What is
perhaps more salient is the South African victims' perceptions of Israel's
involvement in their oppression and how readily that perception is
communicated.

At a party in Santa Cruz, California, a South African student passes
around a photograph of a street scene in Soweto, the large black township
outside Johannesburg. Somewhat reproachfully he calls attention to the
white policeman in the picture and the Uzi he's holding.

Nobel laureate Archbishop Desmond Tutu, was more direct when he
told guests at a San Francisco breakfast sponsored by the American Jewish
Congress that he was troubled by reports of Israeli collaboration with
South Africa, "with a government whose policies are so reminiscent of
Nazis. (While quick to point out the contributions of individual Jews to
the struggle against apartheid. Tutu has in the past lambasted Israel for its
"monopoly on the Holocaust. "^^)

Even those South African blacks willing to cooperate with Israel have
publicly called on Tel Aviv to stop selling arms to South Africa. Chief
Gatsha Buthelezi, a great favorite of Israel, told reporters there that he
favored an international arms embargo against South Africa.^* One
member of a group of black South African "activists" brought to Israel for
a training program (see below) told the press that Israel was "among the
countries that sell weapons to South Africa, which kill [sic] blacks with
them, including three-year-old children."^'

"Israel," wrote a reader to the City Press, a black South African paper,
"has chosen to support the South African Government— thereby sanc-
tioning the brutal suppression of our people. "^^

It should also be noted that South Africans — with other people around
the world— regard the activities of Israel as an extension of U.S. policy.

If Israel's role in the internal repression meted out by South Africa
(including the active Israeli role in the bantustans — see below) is a matter of
perception, evidence is accumulating, despite strenuous attempts to main-
tain a lid of secrecy, of Israeli involvement in South Africa's foreign
aggressions against Namibia and the Frontline states.

56 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Namibia

Israeli specialists have been "permanently based" along South African
border areas for over a decade. Numbering "more than fifty" in 1 984, their
assigned task is to advise the South Africans on preventing cross-border
infiltration.^' In the late 1970s, uniformed Israeli soldiers were reported
active in Namibia, the former colony of Southwest Africa which South
Africa has refused to relinquish, against fighters for SWAPO, the South
West Africa Peoples Organization, which has an extensive following in
Namibia. One of these reports noted that uniformed Israelis had been seen
in the capital, Windhoek, and that "they were constructing an electrified
barrier the length of the [Namibian] frontier with Angola."*'"

In 1981, Ariel Sharon, at the time Israel's Minister of Defense, spent
10 days with South African troops in Namibia on the Angolan border.*'
Uri Dan, a close associate of Sharon who accompanied him on that visit,
wrote of his experience:

36-year-old Col. Lamprecht does not talk as an army man, but
as someone in charge of civilian administration in an area under
military rule.. .When I look at the South African officers, talking
Afrikans or English, and during operations, I get the feeling that
they will soon begin giving orders in Hebrew. Their physical
appearance, their freshness, their frankness, their conduct on the
battlefield, remind one of Israeli officers. And I didn't say this
about the American and South Vietnamese officers I met 1 1
years ago in Vietnam...

"Don't underestimate the influence the example of the
Israeli army as a fighting army has on us," a senior officer told
me in Pretoria."'^

In the guise of development assistance, Israel has also helped the South
Africans establish control of the long-suffering population of Namibia.*'

In 1984, at a time when even South Africa's staunchest Western
supporters took a hands-off position in response to a South African
challenge to take Namibia off its hands'* the Israeli Ambassador to Pretoria
went to Windhoek and told South African radio that "Israel would not
insist on a precondition that the territory first become independent before
agreeing to help it in its economic development."*'

In response to the ambassador's invitation a team of high ranking
officials of the South African colonial government paid a twelve-day visit to
Israel the following April. They were there to look at what Israel had to

Israel and South Africa 57

offer in the field of "agriculture, water management and water supply,
community development and regional planning."**

A second visit to Israel the following year brought the puppet
government's Health and Education ministers to Israel. They issued a long
report when they returned to Namibia, prattling on about Israeli integra-
tion of peoples from "non-industrial cultures into an industrial and
technical culture, including the accompanying social, language and unem-
ployment problems" and the Israeli labor unions and health systems. Their
report promised specific proposals for Namibia.*^ Namibian recruits were
taking courses in Israel at Histadrut's A fro- Asian In stitute in early 1 986 *^

The true definition of "community development" programs in
contested areas is, of course, "pacification," as practiced unsuccessfully by
the U.S. in Vietnam— and as practiced with increasing effect by Israel. As
elsewhere, the object of these programs in Namibia is to destroy indigenous
and/or revolutionary forms of social organization and to construct a
repressive, regimented system that monopolizes provision of social services
and compels participation— "winning hearts and minds," it is called— and
thereby establishing political control. In the case of Namibia, much of
which is under a dusk-to-dawn curfew and occupation by more than
100,000 South African troops (compared to a white Namibian population
of 76,000)*' the benefits to South Africa of long-term control of the
population are obvious. South Africa, which established a puppet regime in
Namibia in June 1985, clings to the former German colony both for its
wealth of natural resources and as part of its drive for dominance over
Africa.

Israel's doctrine of pre-emptive attack has served as a model for South
Africa. Its 1982 invasion of Lebanon— Israeli officers briefed the Afri-
kaners on their operations there'"- inspired South Africa to attack
Mozambique in 1983 and to invade Angola in 1984. A somewhat
imprecise term, "invade," as South Africa has occupied part of Southern
Angola almost constantly for the last decade. (As with Israel's wars. South
Africa's constant aggressions have enabled officials to boast that their
export weapons are "battle-tested."^')

The Frontline States

The South Africans noted that their May 1 983 aerial attack (dubbed
"Operation Shrapnel") on Mozambique's capital, Maputo, was analogous
to Israel's attack on Beirut the previous summer. One analyst, Joseph

58 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Hanlon, believes that one of South Africa's objectives in the attack was to
see how its version of events would play in the media. It was received very
well indeed, according to Hanlon, with the Western press accepting South
Africa's claim that its attack was in "retaliation" for an ANC attack and that
ANC "bases" were hit.

Instead, the South African Air Force hit a childcare center and private
houses with "special fragmentation rockets," leaving 6 dead and 40
wounded. This follows the Israeli practice in Lebanon of speaking about
PLO installations while civilians are the actual targets, and attacking with
particularly heinous anti-personnel weapons — cluster bombs and phos-
phorous bombs.''

The victims of South Africa's angst are not blind to the similarity of
attacks — or motives.

President Samora Machel likened the Israeli Government to the
Pretoria regime. He said that because of its inability to contain
the fury of the Palestinian people led by the PLO, the Zionist
regime is trying to transfer the war to other regions.

So reported Mozambican radio shortly after Israeli aircraft bombed PLO
headquarters in Tunisia in October 1985.'*

The model provided by Israel, which punishes every internal act of
resistance and violent act outside its jurisdiction with a bombing raid on
Palestinian targets in Lebanon — almost always refugee camps cynically
identified by the Israelis as "terrorist bases" or "headquarters"— has served
South Africa well. In January 1986, the white government's radio
delivered a commentary on "the malignant presence" of "terrorism" in
neighboring states and said "there's only one answer now, and that's the
Israeli answer." Israel had managed to survive "by striking at terrorists
wherever they exist.""

In May 1986, South Africa demonstrated that it had assumed the right
to attack its neighbors at a time and on a pretext of its own choosing. The
chosen time was during a visit by the Eminent Persons Group of the
Commonwealth of Nations, which was attempting to establish negotiations
between the apartheid regime and its opposition. The victims— Zambia,
Botswana and Zimbabwe, all Commonwealth members— were chosen for
their alleged harboring of "terrorists"; the real victims were South African
exiles and an employee of the government of Botswana. The South
Africans said they had attacked "international terrorism" and compared
their raids to the Israeli attack on Tunisia and the U.S. attack on Libya in
April 1986.76

The attack was similar in style to Israel's 1985 attack on Tunisia.
Initially, the Israelis had been threatening Jordan" and perhaps because

Israel and South Africa 59

Kmg Hussein of Jordan was at the time on an official visit to the U S the
Israelis chose to take revenge for the killing of three Israelis (believed to be
top Mossad agents) in Larnaca, Cyprus on the PLO in Tunisia.'^

Two weeks after its three-pronged attack on its Commonwealth
neighbors, South Africa attacked the Angolan harbor of Namibe, firing
their version of the Israeli Gabriel missile."

Israel has also been connected with the mercenary forces deployed by
South Africa against Angola and Mozambique. In the 1970s Israel aided
the FNL A (Angolan National Liberation Front) proxy forcesS" organized
and trained by the CIA to forestall the formation of a government led by
the MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola-now the
ruling party of Angola). John Stockwell, who ran the CIA operation
against Angola, recollected three arms shipments Israel made in coopera-
tion with the CIA: a plane full of 1 20 mm shells sent via Zaire to the FNLA
and Unita; a shipment of 50 SA-7 missiles (all of which were duds); a
boatload sent to neighboring Zaire in a deal that the Israelis had worked out
with President Mobutu, even though the Zairian strong man had broken
ties with Israel two years earlier.^'

When Israel reestablished relations with Zaire (in 1 982) and began to
train Zairian forces in the Shaba border province, Angola had cause for
concern. The leader of the FNLA had been Holden Roberto, brother-in-
law of Zairian president Mobutu, Israel's new client.s^ In 1 986, it would be
established that Zaire acted as a funnel for "covert" U.S. military aid for the
Unita forces of Jonas Savimbi.83

In 1983, the Angolan News Agency reported that Israeli military
experts were training Unita forces in Namibia.st Since Zaire began
receiving military aid and training from Tel Aviv, Angola has been ill at
ease. Its worries increased after discovering that:

Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon was personally involved
in the organization, training and equipping of "commando"
units of the army of Zaire, especially organized for missions
along the borders of the RPA [AngolaJ.^J

In 1984, the Financial Times (London) wrote of "joint Israeli-South
African support for Unita forces.''^^ Other sources also report the transfer
of Israeli arms and financial support to Unita.^'

In 1 983 , Angola's President Jose Eduardo dos Santos told Berkeley
California Mayor Eugene (Gus) Newport that an Israeli pilot had been
shot down during a South African attack. The Angolan President showed
Newport pictures of captured Israeli weapons. The following year,
Luanda reported the capture of three mercenaries who said they had been
trained by Israeli instructors in Zaire.^^

60 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Israel has also been involved with the Mozambican "contras," the
South African-backed MNR (Mozambique National Resistance or "Re-
namo"), which has brought great economic and social distress to Mozam-
bique. Renamo has a particular reputation for ideological incoherrence,
being regarded by most other right-wing insurgencies as a gang of
cutthroats. For several years there have been stories coming from Southern
Africa of captured mercenaries of Renamo who say they were trained in
neighboring Malawi— one of the four nations to maintain relations with
Israel after the Organization of African Unity (OAU) declared a diplo-
matic embargo in 1973— by Israelis. And more than one report has told of
"substantial Israeli aid" to the MNR, thought to have been funded by the
CIA and Saudi Arabia as well as South Africa and former Portuguese
colonialists.

In late 1986, "intelligence reports" from Southern Africa confirmed
the reports of Israeli training and attributed the MNR's "greatly improved
tactics" to the Israeli trainers.^' Around the same time, found among a
number of white men left dead after an attack on Zimbabwean troops on
duty in Mozambique was a man wearing a Star of David.'"

There are at least two earlier reports of Israelis captured in Mozam-
bique. One, a pilot captured in the late 1970s, might have been included in
an east- west spy swap in 1978." The other, 2 7-year-old Amikam Efrati of
less certain occupation, was held for three months by Mozambique and
released after Israeli Laborites asked members of the French Socialist Party
to intervene. A warm welcome was prepared for Efrati on his Golan
Heights kibbutz.'^

Economy

Economic Cooperation

In addition to South Africa's cash and strategic mineral contributions
to Israeli-South African military undertakings, the two have forged
economic links that are as strategic as they are profitable. They are almost
as well concealed as the military commerce between the two nations,
enabling Israel to claim that its trade with South Africa is insignificant.' '

However, well before grassroots campaigns in the U.S. and Britain
prompted the exodus of big business from South Africa and, in the case of
the U.S., the imposition of economic sanctions, Israel qualified in many
ways as South Africa's most important trading partner. This determination
was reached by adding the undisclosed amounts of the weapons Israel sells
to South Africa and the diamonds it obtains from the white-run state.^

Because the diamonds are sold from a London office by the South
African DeBeers syndicate, the Central Selling Organization, which has a
lock on the world market for uncut stones, they do not appear in statistics of
two-way trade between Israel and South Africa. Polished diamonds are
Israel's largest single export item, accounting for over $1.5 billion in 1 986.3
There is very little value added in the polishing: imports for 1986 were
$1.25 billion.*

Also invisible in the published statistics of trade between the two
nations are revenue from joint military and civilian enterprises of Israel and
South Africa. The known civilian undertakings are Zimcorn, a shipping
company,^ and South Atlantic Corporation, a fishing enterprise.^ A range

61

62 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

of business activities are carried out by one in the economy of the other.
Iskoor, the Israeli-South African steel company which makes tank armor, is
owned by South Africa and Israel's Histadrut trade union federation, and
operates in Israel.''

Thus, although the revealed statistics of trade between Tel Aviv and
Pretoria seem rather paltry — $66.4 million Israeli exports to South Africa
and 1187 million exports from South Africa to Israel^ — it is important to
bear in mind that they reflect only trade in items both sides are willing to
make public. These include coal, steel, base metals, timber, tobacco, hides,
wool, paper, minerals, and foodstuffs from South Africa and from Israel
finished products such as computer software, agricultural and other types
of machinery, textiles, pharmaceuticals, electrical goods, and "safety and
security products."' Although trade grew by a multiple of ten between
1970 and 1979 (from $20.9 million to $199.3 million)io the numbers on
paper certainly do not seem large enough to explain the existence of
dynamic Israel-South Africa Chambers of Commerce in Tel Aviv and
Johannesburg, or the annual meetings of finance ministers" under the
framework of the ministerial committee set up during the 1976 Vorster
talks. By contrast, Israel exported $2.2 billion worth of goods and services
to the U .S_, in 1985.'^ *

What is truly remarkable is the unrevealed and hence uncalculated
scope of Israeli-South African economic cooperation. It goes well beyond
weapons and diamonds, falling under the broad category of investment in
each other's economies, but it is most notably directed to helping South
Africa escape the rigors of the sanctions which, in an effort to force the
white minority government to dismantle apartheid, the international
community has begun to impose.

South Africa has a significant interest in the Israeli economy,
providing 35 percent of all non-U. S. investment in the three years prior to
1984.'^ This South African investment, "tens of millions of dollars. ..has
been an important source of new funds for Israeli industry and con-
struction."'*

Although originally an exception to South Africa's extraordinarily
tight currency and trade laws, the export of Jewish contributions to Israel,
(see above) was expanded under the 1976 bilateral agreements as a unique
dispensation for South African citizens to invest in approved projects in
Israel.'^ In 1980, the white minority government also gave permission for
Israeli government bonds to be sold in South Africa. While Israelis trying
to minimize the extent of their country's economic relations with South
Africa will often explain that dealing with Pretoria enables South African

Israel and South Africa 63

Jews to get their capital out of the country, a South African newspaper
points out:

...investors in Israel today include names off the company
boards of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange]. For the in-
dividual or smaller corporate investor, there exists a handful of
Israeli companies whose specific business is to attract [South
African] and other foreign investment in joint ventures."

In fact, raising funds from the Jewish community and boosting
business links with South Africa go hand in hand. In 1982, on one of the
annual meetings established under the 1976 agreements, Israeli Finance
Minister Gideon Pat visited South Africa and:

[took] part in 1 7 meetings of the emergency [a reference to
Israel's invasion of Lebanon that June] bonds fundraising
group, will meet with economic officials and will see to
increasing investments by South African companies in Israel.

South African capital has contributed to major Israeli infrastructural
projects: development projects in the Negev desert, a coal loading facility, a
Mediterranean-Dead Sea water diversion project, a major insurance
company, tourist and sports facilities and commercial and residential real
estate as well as a railroad linking Tel Aviv with the Red Sea port of Eilat. "
Other approved areas for South African investment include film produc-
tion, oil exploration, and the purchase of shares in Israeli companies to
increase production capacity,^'' all areas of obvious benefit to South Africa.

The Springboard

Although Israel's economy hit the skids in the 1980s, South African
businessmen have had a compelling motive for continuing to invest their
money in the Jewish state: Israel provides a tried and true "springboard"
into markets where South African products are unwelcome. Since the late
1970s South Africans have been establishing joint ventures in Israel where
their cheap-labor products are brought for final assembly and marked with
a "made in Israel" label. Shipped abroad, these products enter U.S. and
European markets under Israel's duty free entitlement. Israel has a Free
Trade Agreement with the U.S. under which all tariffs will be removed by
1995; a similar agreement with the EEC allows duty-free entry for all
Israeli nonagricultural products.

64 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

In the 1970s and early 1980s, such an opportunity was particularly

attractive to South African businessmen, as their own highly protected

economy was faced with steep tariffs by Western trading partners. In 1 977,

in conjunction with the South Africa-Israeli Chamber of Commerce, the

Universities of Tel Aviv and Stellenbosch presented a series of seminars in

South Africa entitled "Israel: Crossroads of International Trade," to

acquaint South African businessmen with the benefits of exporting via
Israel. 22

In 1979, South African industrialist Archie Hendler, whose joint
venture in Israel manufactured kitchen ware, noted that "the main reason
for going into Israel is to gain access to the Common Market" on Israel's
favorable terms.^^

In the mid 1980s, as sanctions began to threaten South African
exporters, the use of Israel as a springboard or back door into Western
markets became even more attractive. In 1 983 the Israeli Finance Minister
went to South Africa with specific proposals for joint industrial ventures
that the South African Government could establish with Israel.^*

How effective has this bilateral conniving been.' What is the actual
amount of goods Israel has helped South Africa sneak into the market
baskets of unwitting consumers.' That, of course, is difficult to determine-
especially since no one has tried very hard to unearth the facts. It has been
known for a decade that Iskoor has been representing the South African
steel industry in the European Economic Community.^^ It was reported in
1 980 that the Israeli government's agricultural marketing board, Agrexco,
was selling South African fruit in the U.S." South Africa's large electronics
firm (owned by the Oppenheimer holding company Anglo American)
Control Logic mated with the Israeli Elron group to form Conlog, whose
business is to springboard South African products from Israel." The
United Nations, in 1 98 1 , published a report containing the names of several
companies and their products— Koor, owned by Histadrut, and Sen-
trachem, a South African fertilizer and chemical concern;^^ Israel's Poli-
chrom and South Africa's Chemtra, exporting chemicals for the paints and
plastics industries; Transvaal Mattresses, exporting with Israel's Green-
stein and Rosen; and Israel's Muenster foods, selling the South African
brands Honey Crunch, Epol and Vital"— but this did not contain the
brand names under which South African products were sold abroad.

In one more recent case, products were sold with no labels. The
Hanita kibbutz, which is affiliated with the labor movement

buys drills and other small tools from South Africa and re-
exports them to Japan, South Korea, the European Economic

Israel and South Africa 65

Community and the United States . . . The products are sold with
no marks to identify them as either Israeli or South African.^o

Histadrut, the parent of Koor, is involved in a great deal of the South
African trade^i and the Hanita Kibbutz is no aberration.

What is certain is that as the antiapartheid movement in the U.S.
gathered force via local and union boycotts of South African products, and
local and institutional divestment from corporations involved in South
Africa and, in 1985 and 1986 pushed sanctions legislation to the top of the
Congressional agenda, Israel and South Africa both stepped up efforts on
this type of sanctions busting.

In September 1985, the South African Ministry of Trade and Industry
released an Export Bulletin reminding exporters:

[Companies] can use Israel as a production base from which they
can export their goods duty-free to the U.S. provided value
added in Israel is at least 3 5% of the article's value when it enters
the U.S.

A Johannesburg daily said that "Local companies... say they are being
encouraged by senior Israeli officials." " A November 1985 report noted a
53 percent increase of South African exports to Israel between the previous
January and May.^*

Also in November 1985, the white South African government set up
an office to coordinate "nonconventional trade" through "other coun-
tries."" Several months earlier an Israeli businessman, Amnon Rotem, had
offered himself to the South African government as "a middleman in
channeling [South African] exports to European and American markets...
duty free" and said the scheme would require "a large investment" by the
government.'* By year's end, "new strategies to counter the challenge on
sanctions and boycotts by overseas political lobbies" were in place, and
South Africa's exports had risen 44 percent in the first 10 months of the
year over the corresponding period the previous year." During the first
two months of 1986, South African exports increased again by 25 percent
over the first two months of 1 985.38 Although it is not possible to establish
a direct relationship with the increased South African exports, Israeli
imports of merchandise did register a gain of 1 1 .4 percent in the first five
months of 1986 over the corresponding period in the previous year.'' In
August 1986, the South African minister of trade and industry urged
censorship of trade statistics, which "could easily be used by our
adversaries..."*"

South Africa has tried to organize businessmen in a number of western
countries and to establish front companies in dependent African countries.

66 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

For instance, a joint South African-Israeli operation called Liat has
recently set up shop in the West African nation of Sierra Leone*' and a
number of South African companies operate in Swaziland. ''^

A great portion of South Africa's sanctions busting strategy has
involved Israel. As early as July 1 984, the senior general manager of Iscor
Ltd., the South African partner in Iskoor, met with Israeli leaders to discuss
the consortium of South African companies and banks proposed to
finance — to the tune of $250-1300 million — the completion of the Eilat rail
road. "The railway to the Red Sea port city would spark new life into the
flagging port facilities and would help speed South African exports to their
destinations in Israel."*^

Despite mounting pressures from international circles and within its
own ruling establishment — a former director-general of the Israeli Foreign
Ministry urged Tel Aviv to downplay "the public aspect of the South
Africa connection" and also to resist "the pressures [of] some South African
businessmen" and their Israeli counterparts "who have their links with
influential politicians here" to act as an export conduit for South Africa"** —
Israel has continued to respond to the white government's needs as if
helplessly in its thrall.

The grim news for anti-apartheid activists is that South Africa, 54
percent of whose trade is already clandestine, would only need to boost its
sanctions-busting by 16 percent to compensate for the U.S. sanctions now
on the books.*'

In late 1986 both Israel and South Africa were embarrassed by an
advertisement placed in the Johannesburg paper Business Day offering
"unconventional trade" services including " trans-shipments , r e-invoicing,
document recertification, temporary warehou sing, bartering and buy-
backs." The Voyager Corporation in l ei Aviv placed the ad. Its South
Aincan agent said it had been placed in error by U.S. associates!*'

In June 1 986, in an effort to head off demonstrations marking the 1 0th
anniversary of the Soweto uprising, the apartheid government instituted its
most brutal state of emergency to date. At the last moment, Israel followed
other Western governments in a 24-hour closure of its Pretoria embassy.
The Israeli Knesset took the opportunity to issue some elegant statements
condemning apartheid. One of these claimed, "Israel as the state of the
Jewish people is commited to stand at the head of those who negate
apartheid and fight for human rights."*' Prime Minister Peres said, "We
know it is impossible to compromise with racial discrimination."*'

Less than two months later, with one official privately warning "In the
end, we're going to have to pay a heavy price for this," a delegation
departed for South Africa, under the leadership of the director general of

Israel and South Africa

67

the Finance Ministry.*' The director general said that the annual agree-
ments with South Africa were about to expire'" and Israel justified the trip
by pointing out that the delegation was for the first time not headed by the
finance minister himself."

The talks were said to concern Israel's fishing rights in South African
waters, a better deal on credits for its coal imports, and, most significantly,
increased South African investment in and trade with Israel. The talks
"highlight[ed] Israel as a potential weak link in the chain of international
sanctions against South Africa.""

The trip, taken when South African authorities were jailing and
torturing thousands of anti-apartheid activists, made international headlines
and prompted intense speculation on the role of Israel (and the South
African Jewish community) as "South Africa's insurance policy against
isolation. "'3 A statement issued after the talks said they had been held in "a
friendly atmosphere" and "were fruitful and continued trade and financial
cooperation is considered to be in the interest of both countries."'* It was
also announced that South African investment in Israel would be allowed
up to about $15 million during the coming year."

Meanwhile, to revive its beached economy, Israel is banking on a more
sophisticated and aggressive marketing campaign for its exports to the U.S.
and specialization in high technology development and exports," another
area of vital concern to South Africa, which will be discussed below.

It is worth contemplating whether protection for Israel is embedded in
the agreements the two governments have signed, should international
attention some day turn from South Africa to focus on Israel's human rights
abuses. One known area of such cooperation is the coal which Israel
receives from South Africa.

Israel was badly traumatized by the oil price rises of the 1 970s, and by
the abrupt cessation of its oil supply when the Shah of Iran was overthrown
in 1 978. It later returned the Sinai oilfields to Egypt under the Camp David
Accords. Although Israel's oil supply is guaranteed by the U.S. and
Mexico,'^ and it is therefore not subject to the threat of boycott, there is no
guarantee that the price won't go through the roof again. Because of its
refusal to sign the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, Israel has also been unable
to find a country willing to help it build nuclear power plants. South
African coal companies have not only signed a series of contracts to deliver
increasingly large allotments of coal to Israel for power generation,'^ but
South Africa has promised to join Israel in a naval escort should there be a
problem with making deliveries." Israel has built a new coal-fired
generator and unloading facilities and is "aggressively moving" toward
coal-fired powerplants.*"

68 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Israel's Stake in South Africa

Israel obviously does not compare in size of investment to U.S. and
European participation in the South African economy, as the latter occurs
through national and multinational corporations. However, Israeli invest-
ment in South African enterprises has shot up recently; excluding the
United States and Western Europe, Israeli investment in 1983 and 1984
trailed only Taiwanese investment and included investment in South
African steel enterprises,*' with ten new Israeli enterprises reported in
1984.*2 A 1985 report said Israeli investment in South Africa had grown
"tenfold" in two years." Meanwhile, U.S. and European firms are leaving
South Africa in droves.

What the Israeli investment might lack in volume, it makes up by being
concentrated in two key areas: high technology and the bantustans, the
austere tribal reserves to which the white government has exiled more than
half of the black majority.

Scientific cooperation — in the civil as well as the military sphere — was
a major element in the 1976 Vorster agreements, and what has been
provided on a commercial basis (with either private or parastatal enter-
prises) seems to have been in close conjunction with the bilateral
undertakings. As time goes by and one of the most powerful effects of
international sanctions— that South Africa will be left by the wayside of
technological progress*'' — does not come to pass, the significance of the
Israeli contribution will be understood, perhaps lamented.

Visiting Israel in the fall of 1986, S. Kruger, the director of the South
African Department of Trade and Industry, noted that "Israel could
provide much of the high-technology needed by South Africa."*'

Although much of the collaboration in technology has seen South
African money going to the Israeli industrial sector, some energy has been
directed toward providing the Boers with their own industrial applications.
The 1983 agreement, according to the South African Finance Minister
Owen Horwood,

covered joint projects already tackled and still to be tackled by
the two countries. It also made provision for the freer flow of
money between the two countries and the setting up of mutual
trade and credit and cooperation in the spheres of agriculture,
technology and research.**

Out of that agreement was born the Israel/South Africa Industrial and
Agricultural Research and Development Programme. Working under the
direction of Saidcor (South African Inventions Development Corporation)

Israel and South Africa 69

and the Israeli Ministry of Trade and Industry, the program establishes
bi-national partnerships for specific projects. To date the projects have
included educational software, computerized water management systems,
and an enhancement of the capability of South Africa's Posts and
Telecommunications Department. Under consideration are a laser-material
processing center and a pilotless (drone) crop spraying plane.*^

In 1984, the Israeli minister of science and development and South
Africa's ambassador to Israel met and announced that Israel and South
Africa would strengthen scientific and research ties.*^ In early 1985, a
South African delegation concluded a visit to Israel by secretly signing yet
another agreement with Tel Aviv for cooperation in science and tech-
nology. According to similar reports in Jane's Defense Weekly and the Israeli
daily Ha'aretz, the "joint ventures and projects in high technology fields"
stipulated by the contract were worth $5 million. The agreement was
negotiated by the Israeli ministries of finance and trade and industry. It was
then approved by the Israeli cabinet.*'

(That two such articles should evade Israeli censorship is highly
unusual. It might even be that the story was floated as an attempt at a priori
damage control. Thus, the suspiciously low figure of |5 million might have
been given with the idea that later on it could be cited to prove the
"minimal" nature of Israel's dealings with South Africa.)

The inclusion in the trade delegation that visited South Africa in
August 1986 of a representative from the chief scientist's office™ points to
yet another increase in Israeli cooperation with South Africa in the sphere
of civilian technology. Israel and South Africa have held 14 joint
scientific symposiums, nine in Israel and five in South Africa. The last one
was held in 1 984 at Ben Gurion University in the Negev.^' South African
money has also been poured into Israel's Technion, the country's major
scientific university. In 1984 the South Africa Advanced Manufacturing
Systems Building and Laser Laboratory, financed by $1.5 million from
South African, was dedicated.'^

It is in this institutional context that Israeli investment in South Africa
must be regarded. At least a dozen major Israeli companies have invested in
South African operations," among them the military electronics firms
noted above. Afitra, one of many companies owned by the Israeli labor
federation Histadrut, whose giant Koor is a major player in South Africa,
markets some of Israel's most sophisticated products (advanced software,
computerized milling machines, emergency lighting systems, etc.) as well
as products of Israel's kibbutzim,'''^ or collective farms. Another Israeli firm,
Agri-Carmel, brings the latest Israeli agricultural developments to South
Africa. Agri-Carmel is a partnership of the Israeli parastatal Agridev and
the South African company Gerber Goldschmidt."

The Bantustans

The Bantustans

A critical element of Israeli investment in South Africa is a rapacious
"private enterprise" interest in the bantustans, the barren pseudostates that
warehouse much of the black majority. The centerpiece of apartheid, the
bantustans were envisioned as "tribal homelands," putting forth the fiction
of South Africa as a number of diverse tribal groups. The "white" tribe,
which did the geographical engineering, just happened to have the
homeland with all the industrial infrastructure, rich farmland and access to
transport.

The Israeli government provides development and military aid and a
measure of political recognition for the bantustans accorded by no other
government. This has been especially evident in the case of Ciskei, an
enclave of 600,000 near Cape Town, which has been described as "one of
the most economically underdeveloped areas in the world and also one of
the poorest in Africa."'

During the 1983 Israeli-South African bilateral economic meeting, the
Israeli radio reported: "It was. ..decided that close ties will be established
between Israel and Ciskei, one of the puppet states set up in South Africa for
the blacks." The radio quoted South African reports that Israel would also
supply weapons to Ciskei.^ The Israeli government denies it now, but it
was reported to have signed an arms contract with Ciskei in 1 982.' A twin
engine jet once used by Israeli Prime Minister Begin was sold at a nominal
cost, and "special weapons and knowhow" was also transferred to Ciskei.*

71

72 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Included in the deal was the gift of a police dog to Charles Sebe, security
chief and the brother of bantustan "President" Lennox Sebe.^ During the
summer of 1984, a group of farmers from Ciskei studied on Israeli
kubbutzim and moshavim (communal and cooperative settlements,
respectively)/

In late 1982, Ciskei had established a trade mission in Tel Aviv.' It
appointed Yosef Schneider and Nat Rosenwasser as representatives.
Schneider had previously served as an aide to extremist Knesset Member
Meir Kahane.8 Rosenwasser was a member of the Herut Party Central
Committee.' Herut is the dominant component of the Likud coalition.
Schneider and Rosenwasser had arranged a number of tours to Ciskei for
Israeli notables.'" Undoubtedly their work encouraged Israeli entrepre-
neurs, some of them former officials, others with close connections to the
highest echelons of the Israeli governing establishment, to avail themselves
of the cornucopia of investment incentives offered by the minority
government in Pretoria to lure employers to Ciskei and the other
bantustans."

By July 1 984 there were 60 Israeli entrepreneurs operating in Ciskei.
Ephraim Poran, former Prime Minister Begin's military secretary, went in
with two other major Israeli industrialists to establish the Ciskatex textile
factory. Other enterprises taking advantage of Ciskei's cheap labor were a
plant of the apparel company Indian Head, Oren Toys'' and Classic Cars,
an establishment belonging to former Finance Minister Yoram Aridor,
which manufactures vintage automobile replicas.'*

In 1985, there were 200 Israelis— advisers and technicians as well as
entrepreneurs— in Ciskei. '^ Ciskei presented special opportunities because
of the exalted level of brutality of its leader Lennox Sebe, and his
consequent insecurity. Bisho, the "capital" of Ciskei was "rife with stories
of the 'fast buck' approach of Israeli entrepreneurs." '* An explicit look at
their activities was provided in 1985, when a scandal burst into the
international press as the "authorities" of Ciskei announced— via large
advertisements in the Israeli press— that it had closed the bantustan's trade
mission in Israel and fired its Israeli representatives.

The scams in which many of the Israeli investors became involved
were auctioning, or subcontracting, of contracts— many of these were
awarded without bids, often far above actual cost— to South African
companies. Many of the Israelis participating in these deals did so through
shell companies. ■'

A key contact for the Israelis was Dr. Hennie Beukes, the only white
"minister"— his portfolio was "health"— in Ciskei's "cabinet," who was
said to have acted as intermediary in many Israeli activities in Ciskei. These

Israel and South Africa 73

included two hospitals built by the Gur Construction Company which
Ciskei rejected. (In their off hours, Gur's workers built a bar and swimming
pool at Beukes' residence.)

Buekes also arranged for a |10 million pilot training project, which
sent 1 8 trainees to Israel to receive training that critics charged was inferior
and overpriced. '8 It is unclear whether the training was for commercial or
military aviation. A South African paper noted that Ciskei had two air
bases and said Israeli Air Force instructors were to give preliminary
training to Ciskeians before they attended pilot classes in Israel."

Beukes also arranged the contracts for I sraeli mili tary advisers to work

^±^2^£S^^^"^d^^^5^^SS^'^^^^SS'^^ Ciskei. One companyiTammus— its
owner a former Isr aeli^artillejry officer -made 1300,000 a year providing
security adv^^sers^tc^ was one of the first

Israeli firms to have its Ciskeian contracts canceled.^'

Ira Curtis, the Israeli owner of the flight school, also bribed the
Ciskeians to choose U.S. aircraft, which he attempted to smuggle into the
South African tribal reserve, over superior French aircraft.^^ The planes
were bought for Ciskei by listing Israel on the sale documents.^'

In 1 984, the Israeli government was forced to reassure Pretoria that it
was not involved in a scheme for cheap Israeli flights from Ciskei to Israel
and on to Europe. Word of the flights, which would compete with the
government-owned South Africa Airways, had sparked a South African
government protest to Israel. The apartheid regime warned that it would
not be liable for Ciskei's debts for projects that were not in the category of
"urgent development" and expressed its unease "over the intrusion of
Israeli entrepreneurs and paramilitary advisers into its sphere of influence in
the black homelands."^* The Israeli government then denied landing rights
in Israel to Ciskei— even though Israeli entrepreneurs had convinced
Ciskei's rulers to build an airstrip.

Ciskei is not the only bantustan in which Israel and Israelis played a
role. In 1 985, the president of the Development Bank of Southern Africa-
former South African finance minister Owen Horwood— visited Israel and
told reporters that he had come "to evaluate Israel's role in facilitating the
economic development of the southern African independent states (i.e.
bantustans)."^*

Israel has invested |45 million in Bophuthatswana agriculture, and is
training youth in that tribal reserve after the model of its own "Nahal" (a
program combining military training with agricultural development)."
Israel has also developed a television service for Bophuthatswana.^^ An
Israeli, Ilan Sharon, served as a "special adviser" for the bantustan
authorities . Israeli architects have signed contracts for major public edifices.

74 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

An Israeli company has also moved into Bophuthatswana to manufacture
sports shoes. 2' When Bophuthatswana opened a Tel Aviv office, Israeli
officials were embarrassed. 3°

Israeli security mercenaries also guard the casino tables at Sun City, the
"interracial" gambling resort attached to the pseudo-state of Bophu-
thatswana.''

In early 1 983 the entire "chamber of commerce" of another bantustan,
Venda, visited Israel.'^

The Israeli government is pulled two ways over the bantustans. On
the one hand, there is a powerful "lobby" comprised of former officials and
their associates who have investments in the pseudostates. To this must be
added the obvious sympathy most Israeli officials must feel for the South
African dilemma: no government in the world recognizes the benighted
bantustans as the independent countries the racist regime has declared them
to be. Israel has the same dilemma, in that not one government (including
the U.S.) recognizes its claim to the occupied West Bank, to which it has
given the spurious names Judea and Samaria, or, for that matter, (with the
exception of Costa Rica and El Salvador) to East Jerusalem, which Israel
captured from Jordan in 1967 and annexed as its capital in 1980.

In 1984 during ceremonies held in the Israeli-occupied West Bank
town of Ariel, twinning that settlement with Ciskei's "capital" Bisho,
Ciskei's Israeli representative Yosef Schneider said, "It is symbolic that no
country in the world (except South Africa) recognizes Ciskei, just as there
IS no country in the world that recognizes the Jewish settlements in Judea
and Samaria.""

On the other hand, the Israelis are well aware that recognition of the
bantustans would be an unbearable offense to the many African nations,
which they have courted assiduously during the 1 980s. They tread a fine
line.

In its decision in August 1985 to establish close working ties with
Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi, chief minister of the KwaZulu bantustan, a
patchwork of settlements in Natal, Israel seems to have ignored his status as
the leader of the entity designated by Pretoria as the "tribal homeland" of
the Zulu people. In the West this is also frequendy overlooked.

When such heads of state as Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher
receive the urbane, wealthy and ambitious Buthelezi— he is a frequent
visitor to the West, where he argues against the imposition of sanctions and
badmouths the mainstream liberation organizations— they present him as a
"moderate" black leader, opposed to the "violent" methods of the
oudawed African National Congress (ANC).

Israel and South Africa 75

Chief Buthelezi speaks eloquently and sincerely against apartheid.
According to a longtime friend of the descendant of Zulu royalty, Buthelezi
(along with many of his Western promoters) sees himself as leader of a
post-apartheid government. Presumably to further this goal, Buthelezi has
developed ties across the entire spectrum of white South Africa. He has
close links with the white opposition Progressive Federal Party, with
which he tried in 1986 to design a multiracial government for Natal
Province. Their plan called for a complex system of racial checks and
balances, with overweighted guarantees for the white minority— Buthelezi
has always promised to give whites a veto, as opposed to the ANC demand
for universal suffrage— but the Pretoria government rejected it out of
hand.'*

Although his disagreements with the Botha government have been
widely heralded-Buthelezi has refused "independent" status for his
bantustan and has refused to participate in "negotiations" over South
Africa's future with the Botha regime-he has certainly been the witting
instrument of the minority government, both during his trips abroad and
during the turmoil of the past several years.

In 1981, the Economist noted that

Shrewd white strategists know that, sooner rather than later, the
Afrikaner government will have to negotiate with the only
coherent tribe larger than its own, the 5 million-strong Zulu...
The tolerance of the political activities of Chief Buthelezi has
deepened into private contacts between his Inkatha movement
and the secret Afrikaner Broederbond.'^

The Broederbond has been the acknowledged manipulator of the ruling
Nationalist Party. Inkatha is Buthelezi's political vehicle and means of
patronage distribution. As polls taken over the years have shown,
Buthelezi's following is trifling, even in Natal province, compared to that
of the ANC, the United Democratic Front (UDF), or Nelson Mandela.
Membership in Inkatha, which Buthelezi claims has one million members,
is supposedly voluntary, but "strongly recommended for those living in
Zululand."'*

In 1 983, the year the UDF was created, the murder of five University
of Zululand students was traced to supporters of Buthelezi, in marked
contrast to his "nonviolent" label.'^ Inkatha thugs, organized in bands
called impis have frequently been reported to have attacked and often killed
UDF protesters against the white government.

Visiting South Africa in June 1986, Denis Healey, the British Labor
Party's spokesman on foreign affairs, refused to meet with Buthelezi.
Instead Healey cited sworn affadavits from vigiliante attack victims in the

76 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Durban area and showed newsmen a photograph of a member of the Zulu
royal family (to which Buthelezi is related) leading impi vigilantes.'^ Later
that month, with the nation under a lock-down that forbade any gathering,
Pretoria allowed Buthelezi to hold a rally in Soweto, the black township
outside Johannesburg. Thousands of Buthelezi's followers, some armed
with traditional Zulu weapons, were bused in from Natal for the event."

In December 1 986, Inkatha members were blamed for abducting and
then shooting to death a shop steward of the Metal and Allied Workers
along with another union member and the daughter of a third.*"

During the period in which these incidents took place, no Israeli leader
moved to dissociate the Tel Aviv government from the close ties it had
established with Buthelezi in 1985. Indeed, Buthelezi's official visit to
Israel began the day before a mob of armed impis, under the complacent
eyes of government police, began an attack on their opponents in
KwaMashu township in Natal. In the week of strife that followed, 66
blacks died, of which the police admitted to having shot 36. The others,
"stabbed and mutilated," were assumed to be victims of Inkatha.""

That was in August 1985. Israel was at the time casting about for a
way to deflect mounting criticism of its ties with South Africa. The
criticism came from liberal Israelis who worried that Tel Aviv's South
Africa policy was becoming noticably out of line with other Western states,
and, more quietly, from the U.S., where South Africa's links with Israel
were increasingly discussed on campuses and within anti-apartheid organi-
zations, causing dismay on the liberal wing of organized Jewry. A poll of
the Congressional Black Caucus underway at the time was revealing that
those members of Congress and their constituents believed that Israel was a
major backer of South Africa.i^ On August 5 Prime Minister Shimon Peres
had been queried by Rep. Howard Wolpe (D-MI) and had assured him that
Israel was against apartheid. In a separate meeting Yitzhak Shamir, then
foreign minister, also assured Wolpe of Israel's "objections" to apartheid."

It was never clear exactly who took the initiative for the Buthelezi
visit— the South African embassy made phone calls to the Israeli media,
askmg them to go easy on the chief minister, and the Jerusalem Post
responded with particular alacrity, in one case crediting him for preventing
a revolutionary explosion in South Africa and asserting that "the wrong
South African [then Bishop Desmond Tutu] won the Nobel Prize for
peace""— but for the Israeli government, his arrival was a godsend, even
though he perpetuated his critical motif, calling for enforcement of the UN
arms embargo against the white government.*'

A wide range of the Israeli leadership held official meetings with the
Zulu chief: Prime Minister Peres and Foreign Minister Shamir; former

Israel and South Africa 77

Labor Foreign Minister Abba Eban hosted a luncheon in his honor;
Foreign Ministry Director-General David Kimche, Israel's most persistent
critic of links with South Africa, agreed to help him.*^ The Israeli
government and the Histadrut labor federation eagerly responded to
Buthelezi's requests for assistance for KwaZulu, regarding the connection
as "a new door into African development."''' Israel offered agricultural aid
and a range of training including "leadership and trade union training in
Israel, and assistance for women's organizations and cooperatives.
Buthelezi said he had been assured that Israeli specialists would soon visit
his bantustan.*' Yehuda Paz, director of Histadrut's Afro- Asian Institute,
made plans with Buthelezi for the establishment of links between Histadrut
and labor unions affiliated with Inkatha.™

The connection was somewhat odd, even for a labor aparatus like
Histadrut, whose companies are active in South Africa, and whose unequal
treatment of Arab workers is legendary. Buthelezi has made no bones about
running his bantustan for the convenience of those who invest there.
Although there is a KwaZulu labor bureau and a labor relations act, the
average wage in 1985 was 1 00 rands a month (at the time less than $100),
and workers who complain to the bureau find themselves blacklisted.^' In
March 1986 the KwaZulu "government" announced that the "United
Union of Workers of South Africa," widely perceived as a challenge to the
powerful Congress of South African Trade Unions, or COSATU, would
be launched that May."

Israel presented its new relationship with Buthelezi as a look toward
the future and a connection with South Africa's black majority. "Buthe-
lezi's visit will give a boost to Israelis who would like to criticize apartheid
without breaking off political and diplomatic relations with Pretoria,"
announced the Israeli government radio. Buthelezi, explained the state
radio, "is more than a puppet. While he accepted the chief ministership of
the KwaZulu homeland, he refused to have it declared independent like
Ciskei or Bophuthatswana."" Few critical observers find the distinction a
meaningful one.

A Weapon Against the ANC

Nonetheless, Israel's newly forged links with Buthelezi provided its
supporters in the U.S. with fresh ammunition to use against critics of
Israel's relations with South Africa. Near East Report, the weekly
publication of AIPAC, celebrated Buthelezi's visit as "the first by a leading

78 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

South African opposition leader," and quoted Buthelezi's parting words:
he was "encouraged and inspired by the complete abhorrence which.. .the
Israeli people have for apartheid, and the commitment of the Israeli people
to its destruction."^* For AIPAC, which often sets the pace for other U.S.
Jewish organizations, the quote was welcome relief from the old chestnut
from Andrew Young, which has been used unremittingly for years:

It is unfair to link Israel to South Africa. If there is a link, you
must compare Britain, Germany, Japan, and the United States.
All of them have links with South Africa. Israel becomes a too
easy scapegoat for other problems we have.""

Unlike Young, who left the Carter Administration (only several
weeks before Israel and South Africa detonated a nuclear weapon) with the
Israeli government in hot pursuit after he had met with the PLO's
representative to the United Nations," Buthelezi continued to provide
valuable copy. "Israel is indeed a land of miracles," he told a Jewish
Telegraphic Agency OTA) reporter, who tagged the KwaZulu leader as a
possible first black president of South Africa.^'

The interview Buthelezi gave JTA served to justify Israel's linkage
with South Africa, and, as it consisted mostly of a hot diatribe against his
sworn rival, the ANC, it delivered the message of the white government in
Pretoria to the U.S. Jewish community on the respectable pages of such
publications as the Washington DC Jewish Week.

"I would say that Libya's Col. Muammar Qaddafi is today part of the
ANC," offered the Zulu chief, a propos of nothing in particular.

"The ANC describes itself as anti-Zionist, not anti-Semitic, like many
African groups. But anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism are one and the same
thing, I have always found," propounded Buthelezi. In a lengthy aside,
interviewer Levine informs his American readers that

Buthelezi's friendship for Israel is music to the ears of the many
South African Jewish leaders, who have grown increasingly
concerned over the prospects of an ultimate ANC victory and
the establishment of a pro-Soviet regime.^^

The Washington Jewish Week published the Buthelezi interview as
part of a front page spread which delivered a clear message— straight from
Israel: "Israeli officials are reluctant to criticize the ANC publicly for fear of
appearing pro-apartheid. Privately, however, they freely share their
growing concern over the prospect of an ANC takeover." The spread
containing the Buthelezi interview appeared at the same time a wider effort
was set in motion by the right wing of organized Jewry to defame the
ANC.

Israel and South Africa 79

In May 1 986 the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith ( A DD had
circulated its newsletter to members of Congress with a front page headline
promising "A Closer Look" at the ANC. The piece was written in old-
time McCarthyist style, as if for an audience not aware that most industrial
democracies have communist parties which contest and win elections.

Although the ADL built its reputation on original research on racist
hate groups, the article it sent to Congress was simply a collection of
clippings on the ANC and "evidence" from testimony given at 1982
hearings conducted by far-right Sen. Jeremiah Denton (R-AL), arranged
to "prove" that "the ANC is oriented toward the Soviet Union and its East
Bloc allies, who have furnished it with arms, funding, military training and
other logistic support."^'

The ADL did not trouble to set forth the context of what it described
as the 30-year alliance between the ANC and the South African Com-
munist Party, for years the only multiracial anti-apartheid organizations in
South Africa. Besides, the article was in error about the length of the
association. "It's been 65 years, not 30," noted Lifford Cengue, a West
Coast representative of the ANC, explaining that the alliance between the
two organizations goes back to 1 92 1 , the year the SACP was founded, and
has been public knowledge since that time. Cengue pointed out that the
ANC was founded in 1912, "before the October Revolution."

The ADL article also delved into the ties between the ANC and the
PLO, an organization with few defenders in Congress.

As a revolutionary national liberation movement oriented
toward Moscow, the ANC has long echoed Soviet attempts to
undermine the legitimacy of Israel. Moreover, the ANC is a
strident supporter of the Palestine Liberation Organization.

It noted that some ANC members "trained in the USSR with PLO cadres"
and refers to statements critical of Israeli policy made during the 1 970s by
Oliver Tambo.*" As have many governments and international organiza-
tions, the ANC has long been critical of Israel's treatment of the
Palestinians under occupation; its criticism has been informed by Israel's
close ties with South Africa. The ADL's assault on the ANC came at a time
when Congressmembers of both parties were calling for the release of
imprisoned ANC leader Nelson Mandela, and the State Department was
moving toward contacts with the ANC.^'

The ADL article had great value for friends of South Africa, as well as
apologists for Israel's ties to the apartheid regime. As Sniith Hempstone
commented approvingly in the Washington Times, which is generally
acknowledged to support the white minority government:

80 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

None of this [the ADL's "findings"] is particularly original
stuff. The same points have been made many times by this
columnist. But when B'nai B'rith gets into the game, congress-
men who know on which side their political bagels are buttered
are likely to sit up and take notice.*^

In the same issue of Washington's Jewish Week that carried the
interview with Buthelezi was a second piece of propaganda authored by
Charley Levine, this one titled to play on a prevalent theme of the times:
"Arab Terrorists Aid South African Groups." And it was a far more
sophisticated job than the ADL's smear job, admitting, for instance, that
Sweden contributed more to the ANC than the Soviet Union. Along with
some of the same data employed by the ADL, Levine concocted his piece
on the seemingly authoritative statements of unnamed "Israeli and South
African intelligence sources." (Perhaps they were the source for a rather
singular item included by Levine about black South African Muslims
forming Libyan "hit teams.")

Levine wrote of instances when he says the PLO gave military
training to the ANC — the one about the training of parachutists is
particularly interesting given that the USSR has not provided the ANC
with the kind of aeronautical assistance Israel has given South Africa— and
confided that "Israeli experts on international terrorism" have concluded
that the ANC's tactics are similar to those of the PLO."

These journalistic efforts were made just as anti-apartheid activists
were intensifying their lobbying of Congress for sanctions against South
Africa.

Soon after Buthelezi's departure, Israel would host another group of
South African blacks — and again use the opportunity to demonstrate its
"anti-apartheid" credentials, without, of course, jarring its vital links to
white Pretoria.

Political and Cultural Ties

Friends Hunt "Authentic" Blacks for Israel

In Los Angeles in 1984, a gathering at the home of Tom Hayden,
former Chicago Seven radical, currently a member of the California State
Assembly, and his wife, actress Jane Fonda, left a bitter taste. Guest of
honor Bishop Desmond Tutu had lambasted Israel that night for its support
of South Africa and Jewish guests took issue with his remarks.

Afterwards, a "deeply disturbed" Tom Hayden consulted Prof.
Steven Spiegel, a Middle East specialist at UCLA about a remedy for "an
ever deepening antagonism of South African blacks towards Israel."

Four years earlier Speigel had started a think tank, the Center for
Foreign Policy Options (CFPO),' but in 1 986 it was virtually unknown to
the foreign affairs community in Los Angeles.^ After talking to Hayden,
Spiegel went to Israel, spoke with a variety of leaders, and developed a plan.
He selected Shimshon Zelniker, a professor at Beit Berl, the Labor Party's
college, to be "field director."

After strenuous attempts, Tom Hayden persuaded then-Bishop Tutu
to meet with Zelniker, whose way the CFPO then paid to South Africa.
There, in June 1985, Zelniker met with Tutu and a number of his
associates. They were harshly critical of Israel.' The Nobel laureate who
would later be appointed Archbishop of Cape Town accused the Israelis of
having a "monopoly on the Holocaust'"'— that is, ignoring or down-

81

82 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

playing the sufferings of other peoples. Ultimately Zelniker was able to sell
the group on CFPO's idea of bringing groups of black South Africans to
Israel for what might loosely be called leadership training. Bishop Tutu
refused to become involved.^

In January Shimshon Zelniker went back to South Africa to select
trainees. It proved difficult to recruit black leaders whose authenticity was
widely recognized in their communities. Not one of the nine men and
eleven women Zelniker signed up would admit to membership with the—
legal and mainstream— United Democratic Front. Yehuda Paz, Director of
the Histadrut's Afro-Asian Institute which ran the program, called them
"leaders in the struggle against apartheid."' Paz and Zelniker, it should be
noted, had also met with Chief Buthelezi when he was in Israel.

In April 1 986, the trainees arrived in Israel to take part in a workshop,
which, given by Histadrut, was entitled "The Role of People's Organiza-
tions in Community Building and National Development." According to
Israeli officials it was designed to provide the students with skills they
would need in the event of a transition to black rule in South Africa.
Oblivious— or antagonistic— to the rapidly developing South African
trade union movement, the training program Histadrut devised for the
visitors "focus[ed] on unionizing the country's 1 2 million black laborers."^
Meanwhile, Tom Hayden and CFPO's fundraiser had been promo-
ting the project in Israel.^ They gained the endorsement of the Israeli
government' and the Israeli foreign ministry defrayed part of the expenses
of one of Shimshon Zelniker's trips to South Africa.'" CFPO also brought
Zelniker to the U.S. to describe his work to Jewish organizations."

While the CPFO planned to spend $1 million over a period of two
years on the transportation, living expenses and training programs in Israel
for 6 to 12 additional groups of South African trainees, many questions
remain unanswered about the project's relationship to the South African
government— especially since part of its function appears to be to
propagandize for South Africa in the U.S.

In addition to Prof. Spiegel, CFPO's members include Edward
Sanders, an adviser on Middle East and Jewish affairs to President Carter,
Osias S. Goren (CFPO's chairman and chief fundraiser), who headed
Jewish efforts for President Reagan's 1980 and 1984 campaigns, and
Maxwell F. Greenberg, honorary chairman of the ADL, which has so
reviled the ANC.'^

Tom Hayden's role is also puzzling. Hayden, whose first foray into
California electoral politics was a losing primary race against Sen. John
Tunney (ironically, a leading foe of South Africa, whose defeat in the
general election was partly attributed to South African contributions to

Israel and South Africa

83

his Republican opponent S.I. Hayakawa), revealed in 1 986 that during his
anti-war activities in the 1960s, he had cooperated with U.S. intelligence
agents and had had intensive talks with CIA agents.

During his three terms in the California state legislature, Hayden has
gradually eased away from his left-liberal identification. In 1986, he
dissolved his Campaign for Economic Democracy (funded by the profits
from Fonda's fitness video royalties, it had, charged many critics, become
simply an electoral vehicle for "Tom") and set up a new personal
organization called Campaign California.

Well ahead of his metamorphosis, Hayden had established himself as a
leading promoter of Israel. During the 1982 invasion of Lebanon, he and
his wife visited Israeli troops on the front lines. This maneuver, during
Hayden's first assembly campaign, was intended to appeal to the great
numbers of Jews in his district,

Hayden's involvement with the recruitment of black South African
trainees for Israel is not, however, the kind of activity designed for mass
voter appeal. It seems more in the nature of a quiet favor.

There is no question that the Israeli government would be pleased
with CFPO's project; it was a propaganda success, with all the major North
American newspapers covering it extensively and favorably. Through
their Histadrut instructors, Israel could establish and maintain contact with
the trainees— useful in the event that the minority government is over-
thrown, and also useful for sharing intelligence with the minority
government.

Was Pretoria well served by the Histadrut endeavor? That the white
regime did not lift the passports of the attendees prior to their departure'^
suggests that the project enjoys at least benign indifference, if not Pretoria's
actual support.

It was obvious that Israel had to tread carefully. During the mid-June
1 986 state of emergency in South Africa, when Israel was casting about for
ways to portray itself as opposed to apartheid, some of the Israelis involved
with the project:

were wary of recommending that Israel adopt any "crisis
approach" or abrupt break with Pretoria; the white govern-
ment's retaliation might mean an end to the new ties with Black
organizations before they were properly off the ground.'*

As the interactions with Buthelezi and the "leaders in the struggle
against apartheid" who came to Israel for training indicate, the exact nature
of the political linkage between Israel and South Africa, the ties that bind
over and above the military and economic quid pro quos, is concealed, left to

84 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

be deduced by the observer. That those ties are close and rich can be gauged
by the sports, cultural and diplomatic exchanges countenanced by Israel.

Breaking the Sports and Cultural Blockade

Israel has made a practice of ignoring international boycotts against
South Africa. Since the late 1960s a steady stream of athletes and
performers have gone from Israel to South Africa. According to a report
issued by the United Nations Special Committee Against Apartheid in
1979, the continuing sports contacts had "strong encouragement by the
Government of Israel, "i^ In fact, this report chronicled a revealing episode
of Israeli policymaking concerning sports and apartheid.

On January 21,1979, amidst rumors that the Soviet Union might try
to block Israel's participation in the 1980 Moscow Summer Olympics, the
presidium of the Israeli Olympics Committee voted unanimously to cut off
sports exchanges with South Africa "at least until after the Olympics." The
committee told the Israeli gymnastics team to cancel an upcoming visit.

Two days later at a plenary session— with the director of the
government's sports authority in attendance— that decision was overturned
and it was further decided that any Israeli sports boycott of South Africa
would be limited to compliance with the rules of international sports
organizations, '8 which have always lagged behind the efforts to isolate
South Africa undertaken by many athletes and anti-apartheid organiza-
tions. Several days later a representative of the Foreign Ministry told the
Knesset that the decision to boycott had hurt Israel's relations with South
Africa. 1'

Disagreement on policy on sports exchanges with South Africa has
continued to the present, with Israel displaying a considerable degree of
ambivalence— or, alternatively, making a show of opposition to sports
contacts for the benefit of its anti-apartheid supporters.

On the one hand, in its own struggle to gain access to international
sports, Israel has made a great effort to conceal its sports exchanges with the
apartheid regime. Israel itself has been barred from participation in, among
others, the European soccer confederation and the Olympic Council of
Asia, an exclusion made all the more bitter by the admission to that body of
the Palestine Olympic Committee.^"

On the other hand, Israel must apparently continue to cater to South
Africa. In one 1985 instance, the Maccabiah Games (the quadrennial
"Jewish Olympics," which brings national Jewish teams to Israel), these

Israel and South Africa 85

two exigencies clashed, then merged in a clever piece of duplicity. South
African teams had been among the largest contingents in the 1973, 1977
and 1981 Maccabiah Games.

In 1985, however, Canada and some other countries objected to
participating along with a South African team. After the South African
Zionist Federation and the director of the Israeli Maccabiah Committee
mounted a vigorous protest of this instance of mixing politics and sports,^'
the South Africans abruptly withdrew "so as to avoid serious problems for
athletes from a number of participating countries." In announcing the
South Africans' withdrawal, the Israeli Maccabiah director hinted that
something would "happen" so that they could attend the games after all.^^
That something transpired in the form of 200 "potential immigrant" visas
issued by the Israeli consul in Pretoria to the South African athletes. On the
strength of these documents, usually issued to people who want to try out
life in Israel, the quasi-governmental Jewish Agency registered the South
Africans as "temporary residents."^' They were then, with 20 legitimate
immigrants, formed as a special team of newcomers to Israel.

It was not until the games were almost at an end that one of the phony
immigrants blurted out the truth. By the time the ruse had hit the press, the
games were over. Only later did it become known that the organizers of the
games had plotted the whole subterfuge during a meeting in 1984. 2*

Yet another sports encounter had all the earmarks of a well-rehearsed
"good cop/bad cop" routine. In November 1986, Israel's top three male
tennis stars — its national Davis Cup team — went to compete in the South
African Open. It was their second trip there in 1986, and their names had
been on international boycott lists long before that.^^ One of the three, the
young and rising Amos Mansdorf, won the tournament."

Almost immediately the Foreign Ministry sent a "reprimand" to the
Israel Tennis Authority.^' The head of that body retorted that the
International Tennis Federation's rules concerning South Africa only
apply to to teams, not individuals, and that the Israeli players had gone as
individuals.

The ministry hit back with phone calls from the political director
general, reminding the heads of sports organizations about Israel's
"opposition to 'all participation' by Israelis in South Africa. "^^ and
suggested that private trips in the future should be "coordinated" with the
foreign ministry. In an editorial called "The hypocrisy syndrome" the
Jerusalem Post wondered why the foreign ministry had professed surprise to
discover the tennis players had been to South Africa.

The true surprise is to learn that it is now national policy to keep
contracts with South Africa down to a minimum.

86

ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

If the government, of which the foreign ministry and its
officials are presumably a part, wants to shift Israel's policy on
South Africa, let it say so. If not, then the foreign ministry has
ample other targets in that increasingly queer contrivance called
Israel's foreign policy, on which to direct its self-right-
eousness.^'

It is more likely that, with all the bases covered— to metaphorically mix
sports — there was satisfaction all around.

Meanwhile, the flow of Israeli entertainers to South Africa has
continued unabated, suggesting that Israel really can't say no. A list of 24 of
these cultural emissaries covering the period between August 1981 and
April 1 985 tops by one a similar list of performers from West Germany,^''
one of South Africa's major trading partners and a nation with a population
of 61 million, compared to Israel's 4 million.

After 1984, when the international cultural boycott against South
Africa became highly effective, Israel continued to supply diversions to the
apartheid state. In April 1 985 Yardene Arazi, a popular Israeli singer, went
to South Africa to organize a celebration of Israel's independence day.''

Most tellingly, in July 1986— one month after South Africa had
clamped down a brutal state of emergency— Israeli Foreign Minister and
Alternate Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir cleared the Israel Chamber
Orchestra for a tour of South Africa. Shamir also recommended that two
South African choirs be allowed to take part in a song festival in Israel. One
of the South African choirs was a white boys' ensemble; the other was a
black group from Bophuthatswana. The festival organizers had urged the
decision on the government in advance of the South Africans' request to
come to Israel. According to the festival manager, the decision was based on
a variation of the old South African standby: "no room to mix music and
politics.""

The following month South Africans also participated in a puppet
festival in Jerusalem."

More intimate than players on the field or stars on stage, Israeli-South
African relations also proceed along that corridor established by govern-
ments for people-to-people contacts by their citizens. In late 1984, a Ben
Gurion University organization called the Associates of South Africa drew
attention for its active promotion of cultural and scientific exchanges.'^

Haifa and Cape Town are sister cities, and there are frequent
exchanges of various sorts between the two cities and their universities.

Israel and South Africa 87

Tourism

Israeli tourism in South Africa has defied international trends,
growing 50 percent between 1981 and the end of 1985,'* and rising by 12.5
percent during the first six months of 1985 alone.'^ This was undoubtedly
providential, as tourism to South Africa had just about dried up, with 1985
hotel occupancy reaching an eleven-year low.'^ South Africa was the first
government to establish a tourism office in Israel, but it is quite likely that
the tone established by the government in Tel Aviv is equally responsible
for the high rate of Israeli travel to the apartheid state. (Pretoriais iond of
nabbing tourists for interviews on its external radj^o^ervice; all these
visitors swear that they've ha JTfinenm^eincI weren't even aware that there
was anything unpleasant going on.)

The 1 986 tourism event of the year had to have been "Malchi's dream
holiday on board the luxurious cruise ship Achille Lauro to South Africa,"
which sailed November 26 from the Israeli port of Ashdod. A year earlier
the Italian liner had been hijacked on the way to Ashdod, an event resulting
in the murder of a disabled American, Leon Klinghoffer; the U.S. hijacking
of the plane on which the ship's hijackers were traveling to their negotiated
freedom; and the fall of the government of Italy, where the plane was forced
down. (Another casualty of that week was Alex Odeh, Southern Regional
Director of the American- Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, killed by
a bomb the morning after a television appearance during which he had
stressed the desire for peace of PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat.) Malchi
Shipping Tours and Travel Ltd. of Haifa promised stops in the Seychelles
and Durban and a tour through Kruger Park, Cape Town, Johannesburg
and Sun City, the notorious entertainment complex in the bantustan called
Bophuthatwana. "World known Italian cuisine," enticed Malchi's adver-
tisement, "more surprises every day!" The advertisement bore the logos of
SAX£>UR, and^AA, the South African government's tourism agency and
its airline.^'

There was also a 30 percent increase of South Africans traveling to
Israel between July and September 1986. In October 1986 (when
detentions under the state of emergency were being estimated in the
thousands), the Director-General of Israel's Ministry of Tourism made a
secret trip to South Africa. Rafi Farber "met important South African
travel agents and discussed with them the possibility of increasing bilateral
tourism through a public relations and marketing campaign." Farber also
wanted South Africa to increase its investment in Israel's tourist sector.*"

88 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

It is possible that a series of articles, "South Africa Without Prejudice,"
extolling South Africa— with all the usual phrases about the rapid pace of
"reform" underway in South Africa and the "complexities" of the situation
there— that appaeared in the Jerusalem Post's weekend magazine in Novem-
ber and early December 1986 were one result of those talks.*'

How exactly do the citizens in question regard their governments'
moves to bring them together? Strongly enough— on both sides— to come
out and demonstrate. The Mapam Party has picketed a performance by
visiting South African entertainers.'*^

Israeli supporters of South Africa — among them many immigrants
from the Soviet Union— have also come out to wave their banners
proclaiming that "South Africa Has Been Israel's Ally.'"" In late 1985 after
Israeli leftists had mounted several attention-getting demonstrations pro-
testing the assignment of a new ambassador to South Africa,*'' 60
supporters of the white government met in the presence of the South
African ambassador to Israel and formed an Israeli-South African Friend-
ship League.*^

What exactly does Israel get out of its alliance with South Africa that it
is willing to spit in the face of the very international community it is trying
to beguile.' This question is likely to provoke the snap response that Israel
and South Africa have so much in common, from their militarism to their
racism to their intransigence and thus their consequent isolation from the
main current of the human family. Or, it might be offered, Israel is eager to
have its cake and eat it too— a feat which it can accomplish as long as its
appetite and its tenacity do not impede its relations with its main protector,
the United States.

Something else should be considered, however: blackmail. Several
observers believe that it would more damaging for Tel Aviv to attempt to
extricate itself from its involvement than to continue pandering to South
Africa. "They say to Israel 'Look, if you don't continue with this
relationship on every level, we're going to blow the guff on you,' " Michael
Wade, a professor of African Studies at Hebrew University in Jerusalem
said to National Public Radio. Himself of South African birth. Wade said
the South Africans were quite capable of embarassing Israel before the
world by revealing details of the relationship.*^ Others believe that South
Africa might be able to make trouble for Israel with Washington by
revealing intelligence or technology thefts. Another possibility is that
Israel's involvement in Muldergate went much father than has yet been
revealed and includes various manipulations of the U.S. media and the
electoral process.

Israel and South Africa 89

A hint of such a South African hold on Israel came in October 1984
when an Israeli paper, Ma'ariv, noted that Pretoria had requested the Israeli
Foreign Ministry to "provide the exact wording" of a statement about
apartheid Prime Minister Peres had made during a visit to the U.S. Press
accounts of the remarks credited Peres with calling apartheid "a stupid
system."*'

The Link Feeds on U.S. Tolerance

There was really no "South Africa problem" for Israel as long as
Washington was willing to declare in the face of damning evidence that the
white regime was reforming itself, just as there was absolutely no problem
for Israel as long as an avowedly anti-apartheid Congress continued simply
to mumble its self-imposed collective ignorance of Israel's dealings with the
apartheid government, and was willing to accept without challenge the
Carter Administration's short-circuited investigation of the 1979 Israeli-
South African nuclear weapons test.

In late 1986, however, its indissoluble bonds with Pretoria began to
give Israel moments of profound discomfort. Ronald Reagan's supportive
policy of "constructive engagement" was wearing thin, as South Africa
declared its cataclysmic June state of emergency and jailed thousands of its
critics, while escalating its attacks on neighboring countries. Before the
year was over. Congress, motivated by an almost unanimous citizenry,
would pass its first real anti-apartheid legislation— and then pass it again
over the President's veto.

A little noticed Section 508 of the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid
Act of 1 986 contained language that demanded a White House report to the
House and Senate within 1 80 days of the legislation's passage "containing a
detailed assessment of the economic and other relationships of other
industrialized democracies with South Africa."

This amendment — authored by retiring Republican Senate Foreign
Relations Committee member Charles McC. Mathias— was "clearly a
threat to Israel," according to the Jerusalem Post,'^^ raising the possibility of a
cutoff of Israel's U.S. military aid.*' It came on the heels of another jolt, a
decision by the European Community (EC) to impose an array of limited
sanctions on South Africa.

Previously, Israel had temporized on the possibility of sanctions, but
the government had frequently alluded to Israel's conformity to the
(dastardly) positions of the Western powers: "keeping in line with what the

90 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Western countries are doing, no more and no less," was how a senior Israeli
diplomat phrased it in July 1986.^" The West African nation of Cameroon
had just been persuaded to establish formal diplomacy with Tel Aviv, and
Israel, making urgent efforts to engineer a domino effect, was working hard
to convince African countries of the sincerity of its opposition to
apartheid.^'

Taking all these factors into account, it apparently became expedient
to order a "reassessment" of Israel's South Africa policy. In late August "a
special internal discussion" on Israeli ties to South Africa was convened by
the Director-General of the Foreign Ministry David Kimche. Kimche,
who had always been a public critic of ostentatious contacts with South
Africa and the bantustans, warned that Israel must prepare for the
possibility that the West would impose stringent sanctions on South
Africa." Out of these discussions came a reaffirmation of the policy of
"stay[ing] in line with the Western democracies." A large loophole was left,
however, because of Israel's "special" concern for the South African Jewish
community.^'

This concern has frequently been debunked as "patent nonsense" and
"inexcusably shortsighted"^*— during one heated round of discussion on
the validity of using South African Jews as an excuse, a former director of
Israel's foreign ministry noted that the South African Jewish community
itself was "compromised. ..by passive collaboration with the evil of
apartheid""— but it remains Israel's second line of defense after its ritual
denunciations of apartheid.

Another Israeli concern about sanctions is that once a precedent is
established, Israel will also be subject to an international attempt at behavior
modification. "We have no reason to highlight our relations with South
Africa, but we have no wish to join sanctions either, the likes of which have
often been employed against Israel," said Prime Minister Shamir."

.-Eili.E.JHa,user, an influential figure in the U.S. Jewish community,
embedded the identical point in a more sophisticated rationale for a hands-
off policy toward Israel and South Africa:

The sense of embattlement and isolation felt by these two
Western-oriented nations comes in no small part from the
policies of the Western Alliance. The United States and its
NATO allies, in recent years, have not been able to separate
clearly the pressures put upon them by black Africa and the
Arab states with respect to the internal policies of South Africa
and Israel from the external, geopolitical situation now operative
in the Middle East and southern Africa. Even if they are correct
in the conviction that Israel must yield control over the West

Israel and South Africa 9 1

Bank to some form of Palestinian nationalism and that South
Africa must devise a method of sharing power with the blacks,
there is no justification for policies which isolate and weakeii
these two countries to the detriment of vital Western interests."

After a time that reassessment was forgotten, only to emerge again
with a spurious offer to phase out military contracts with South Africa over
the coming years^s several weeks before the April 1 date set for the
submission of the report stipulated by the 1986 anti-apartheid act. The
U.S. followed the EC with the imposition of even stiffer sanctions and the
world learned that Israel had supplied South Africa with refueling aircraft.

Some day, maybe not until the next century, someone will talk about
what it was that kept Israel dancing to the apartheid government's tune. At
present it is very clear that Israel will not have to exert itself very hard to
convince Congress that it has stopped dealing with Pretoria (a poignant
task, since Israel has never officially admitted its military and economic
sanctions busting). Should the moment come, Israel will have to employ all
its wiles to buttress what will predictably be Congress' easy credulity
against an outcry from activists.

Part II

Israel and Central America

El Salvador

Introduction: Central America

A world away from South Africa, Israel's activities in Central America
come more clearly under the aegis of the U.S., the seigneurial power in the
region, which sets up dictators in some nations and targets the governments
of others for destruction — and then, under pressure by Congress and the
U.S. public, sometimes abandons its allies. Yet, even when Israel picks up
the slack for Washington, its role in Central America is seldom if ever that
of an out-and-out proxy or surrogate.

In the 1970s, Israel was attracted to the troubled region by the
opportunity to sell weapons and military advice, and perhaps to pick up
some diplomatic chits. At the present, however, aside from supplying arms
and training to the contra mercenary forces the Reagan Administration has
flung against Nicaragua, the imposition of "pacification" regimes — some
of this work is financed with U.S. funds — on the rural populations of El
Salvador and Guatemala appears to be replacing arms sales as Israel's most
significant function in the region.

Rural "pacification," as it was used in Vietnam and as it is now being
applied in Central America, is an attempt to suppress forever a people's
ability to organize against an oppressive order. Israel's involvement with
pacification is carried out in the guise of the innovative technical assistance
programs it brought to African, Asian, and Latin American countries in the
1960s. Even those U.S. officials opposed in prmciple to intervention in
Central America don't seem to care about it.

95

96 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

In fact, in 1985 and 1986 one prominent Democratic liberal actually
helped Israel set up some agricultural projects right on the perimeter of the
war against Nicaragua, which, after four years of Reaganite subversion,
had spread out over a great part of Honduras and Costa Rica.

The Democrat was Howard Herman of Los Angeles, a congressman
with a sterling record of votes against aid to the contras and aid to the
U.S.-backed government in El Salvador. In 1984, Berman drafted legisla-
tion mandating the United States-Israel Cooperative Development Re-
search, or CDR, a made-for-Israel program whose stated purpose was "to
help meet a growing demand for Israel's unique technical assistance," and
to "build ties between Israel and developing countries."'

In testimony given during a hearing on Herman's legislation, which
sought $20 million of U.S. Agency for International Development (AID)
funds, it was pointed out that such a project would help "strengthen Israel's
relations with the Third World. Ultimately CDR was funded at |2
million for 1985. Congress gave it |5 million for fiscal 1986.

In late 1 985, the Jewish Telegraphic Agency OTA) wrote a glowing
article about Israel's CDR activities, mentioning cashews being improved
in Thailand, forest fungi research in Ghana, and similar projeas-in.
Portugal, the Philippines, and Malawi. The article mentioned that funding
for each project was limited to $150,000.3

Not mentioned by the JTA, and, while not classified, informally
shielded from public view, were three other Israeli "research" projects— in
Honduras, Costa Rica, and El Salvador— all funded under CDR by U.S
AID, at a total of $850,000.

At $393,000 the Costa Rican project was more than double the
1150,000 cap. Papers relating to the project described it as a two year
assignment for two Israeli technicians to help a newly-established private
growers association to find the most suitable export crops for irrigated
growing (an Israeli specialty). The site of this scientific activity was
Guanacaste, at the time an area of heavy contra activity near the border
with Nicaragua. Another part of the project was to study tomato-growing
techniques in other Central American countries.

In Honduras $360,000 was budgeted for two Israeli irrigation experts
to set up demonstration sprinkler and drip irrigation system in Choluteca, a
city close to the border with Nicaragua, in an area of significant contra
activity.

A more modest program in El Salvador was focused on labor intensive
export fruit and vegetable production. (Labor intensive nontraditional
export produce is a key element of Israeli ' 'pacification" doctrine in Central

Israel and Central America 97

America.) This project was to be coordinated through FUSADES, which a
Central America specialist identified as a Salvadoran "think tank."

In all three projects, the Israeli experts were government employees,
assigned by Mashav, the Israeli equivalent of U.S. AID. Certainly the three
projects were ideal opportunities for Israeli civil servants to work among
the local population, and should Washington and Tel Aviv agree, to gather
intelligence that might be inaccessible to an identifiable "gringo." In the
Honduran project, the local government was to provide the Israeli experts
with, among other services, contact with farmers and laborers.'*

In their time frame of the heyday of the activity that became known as
the Iran-contra scandal (in which Israel was a major player) and "low
intensity conflict"^ and in terms of the sordid history of Israel's involve-
ment in Central America, the three CDR projects appear relatively
mnocuous. It is Rep. Herman's role that is surprising— or maybe just
instructive.

When questioned in May 1986, Herman's office acknowledged a
continuing connection with CDR. When asked whether the Congressman
would endorse his legislation funding projects in Central America, Lise
Hartman, Herman's legislative assistant for foreign policy, said the question
was an "interesting" one to have raised.

However, said Hartman, it was raised at "a bad time" and no one in the
office "not even the person working on it, would have details" on the
program for the next few weeks. At that time, she continued. Rep. Berman
would begin meetings with representatives from AID and from the Israeli
government to determine the details of the program for fiscal 1987. All
three parties, Hartman said, would have a say in setting the direction of
CDR.«

This story raises some profound questions for those constitutents who
endorsed Herman, voted for him, perhaps even campaigned to elect him,
and who also support Salvadorans and Guatemalans struggling for
liberation and the sovereignty of the Nicaraguan government. Does Rep.
Herman— and dozens of others like him— think he has done right by his
anti-mtervention constituents by voting as they wish a few times and then
attempting to please other sectors with a claim on his allegiance, letting the
contradictions fall where they may.'

What Congressperson— for that matter, what movement leader— has
ever said, above a mumble or a whisper, that passing U.S. victims on to
Washington's close ally Israel for further target practice was morally and
politically unacceptable.' There have been vast stretches of silent space in
the Central America policy of the United States; the Carter Adminis-
tration's human rights policy of aid cutoffs to especially gory U.S. clients

98 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

opened further tracts. Israel has often filled these gaps, serving its own
interests and, on occasion, the interests of far right sectors of the U.S.
establishment.

El Salvador

From its earliest attempts to establish itself as an arms exporter, Israel
had enjoyed the patronage of the military of El Salvador, which ruled that
small, densely-populated country on the Pacific side of the Central
American isthmus on behalf of a powerful plantation oligarchy.

In 1973 Israel took orders from El Salvador for 1 8 Dassault Ouragan
jet fighter aircraft. Israel had obtained these planes from France for its own
use. Refurbished and delivered to El Salvador in 1 975, they were the first
jet fighters in Central America, representing a significant jump in the level
of military sophistication in a region where war had flared between
Honduras and El Salvador in 1969.

Other aircraft ordered from Israel by El Salvador in 1 973 included six
French-made Fouga Magister trainers and 25 Arava short-take-off-and-
landing aircraft. The Arava is produced by Israeli Aircraft Industries (I AI)
and is advertised for a variety of uses — from hauling cargo, to medical
evacuation, to transporting troops in counterinsurgency warfare. The
Salvadorans also bought a quantity of small arms, ammunition and rocket
launchers.^

Military links with El Salvador actually began around 1972, when the
Israeli Defense Ministry carried out a youth movement development
program there.^ Alongside their arms sales, the Israelis also sent advisers to
El Salvador. Former Salvadoran Army Col. and Undersecretary of the
Interior Rene Francisco Guerra y Guerra recalled that during the 1970s
ANSESAL, the Salvadoran secret poHce, had security advisers from Israel.
According to Guerra, as a low-ranking ANSESAL officer, Roberto
D'Aubuisson, who would later rise to prominence as leader of a far-right
faction linked to death squads, was a student of the Israeli instructors.'

At least one Salvadoran officer. Col. Sigifredo Ochoa was taught by
Israeli trainers in El Salvador and also went to Israel for training in the
mid- 1 970s. Ochoa, who was credited with a massacre of civilians in 1 98 1
made no secret of his preference for his Israeli mentors over the U.S.
advisers who came to El Salvador after 1981. The Americans, he noted
scornfully, "lost the war in Vietnam." During the Israeli siege of Beirut in
1982, Ochoa proffered an "Israeli solution" for Central America: a

Israel and Central America 99

combined assault by El Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala and the anti-
Nicaragua contras against Nicaragua."

When the Carter Administration took office in 1977 it wasted litde
time putting into practice a principle enunciated during the presidential
campaign and by Congress in 1 976: U.S. aid would be cut off to recipients
who were gross and persistent abusers of human rights. The idea was
to encourage dictatorial regimes to modify their behavior and reinstate
themselves in Washington's good graces.

It was a fairly reasonable assumption; after all, many of these tyrants
had been through U.S. military programs" and had adopted the anti-
communist line that a succession of U.S. governments had encouraged.
Washington had sired both the Nicaraguan and Guatemalan regimes, and
was not without profound influence in El Salvador.

In the 1960s, the U.S. had presided over the foundation of
CONDECA, a regional military council intended "to coordinate and
centralize military command of the region under U.S. military super-
vision."'^ In El Salvador, the Kennedy Administration set in motion a
series of meetings among Central American leaders that led to the
establishment of the feared ANSESAL secret police and its "parallel
domestic security agencies in Guatemala, Nicaragua, Panama, Honduras,
and Costa Rica." Years later the CIA connections of ANSESAL would
come to light in close connection with the death squads which have
terrorized El Salvador since the 1970s.i6 Also in the 1960's AIFLD, (the
American Institute for Free Labor Development, the AFL-CIO's foreign
operation dedicated to foiling the formation of left wing unions) tried to
organize a "tame" network of rural cooperatives in El Salvador. According
to one report the project was budgeted at $ 1 .6 million and had the assistance
of the Israeli Histadrut labor federation.'^

Even the prideful way that El Salvador and Guatemala responded
when their aid was terminated— both preempted the U.S. move by cutting
military ties with the U.S. 'S— might have been expected to blow over. That
was without reckoning on Israel, which was quick to fill the gap. Indeed,
one analyst believes the "surprisingly defiant position" of the Central
American clients was based on their advance knowledge that they could
maintain their military capacity by dealing with Israel."

El Salvador simply began to buy its weapons from Israel. Between the
1977 U.S. cutoff and the resumption of U.S. aid in 1981, El Salvador
obtained over 80 percent of its weapons from Israel. The balance came from
France and Brazil.^" The earlier aircraft orders still in the pipeline were
delivered and small arms and ammunition from Israel undercut the intent of
the Carter policy.^' By 1979 came the first report that Israeli advisers had

1 00 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

been giving the Salvadoran military counterinsurgency training both in
Israel and El Salvador."

During this period as well, Israeli technicians began installing a
computer system able to monitor utilities usage, thus giving the military the
ability to pinpoint houses where the telephone is heavily used, presumably
signifying that political organizing is going on. (A similar system provided
by Israel to Guatemala does the same with water and electricity use; see
below.) According to former Col. Guerra, the Israelis began work on the
system in 1978. As an electronic engineer familiar with El Salvador's
telecommunications installations, he did not believe that another company
would be brought in to finish the work, despite two changes of government
and the reentry of the U.S., following the installation of the Reagan
Administration.^'

It is quite certain that installation was completed. A CIA source
described a telephone-monitoring computer system to a journalist in El
Salvador, and Arnaldo Ramos of the FDR (the Democratic Revolutionary
Front, the political grouping fighting against the U.S. -backed government)
has spoken of another use to which the Salvadoran regime puts the
computer equipment:

They periodically block several downtown areas and take the
id's of people, just to check who they are. If they find the
person happens to be downtown in an area where he's not
supposed to be too often during the week, that right away makes
him a suspect.^*

Once the new human rights policy was implemented, little attention
was paid in the U.S. to what was going on in El Salvador. The Carter
policy had the virtue of slackening the long embrace between Washington
and Central American dictatorships; it had the obvious fault of not offering
redress for the century of manipulation of Central American governments
by the U.S. government and corporations. And it had the predictable
ground-level threshhold for tolerating a strengthening of the left— which in
El Salvador would bring Washington running to the assistance of the old
order in 1980.^5 But in the early years of the Carter Administration there
was little fretting over El Salvador and even less over the fact that Israel had
so quickly filled the traditional U.S. shoes.

Not surprisingly, however, there was great awareness of Israel's role
among Salvadorans. In 1979, FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Libera-
tion Front, the armed wing of the Salvadoran revolution) forces kidnapped
Ernesto Liebes, Israel's honorary consul, but unlike many of the other
people kidnapped by the FMLN for ransom, Liebes was executed "as a war

Israel and Central America 101

criminal because of the role he played in the sale of Israeli aircraft to the
Salvadoran armed forces."^* On December 11,1979, the Israeli embassy in
San Salvador was bombed, although it was never determined who was
responsible.^' Soon after, Israel closed its embassy.^^

By 1979, a series of successful actions by a quickly-unifying
Salvadoran left drew U.S. attention back to El Salvador. The triumph over
Somoza in July 1979 inspired stepped up political and military action by
the Salvadoran left and an intensified campaign of murder, disappearances,
and brutality by the military and paramilitary death squads. Well before
young officers seized power late that year, the Carter State Department had
begun to involve itself in the search for a viable centrist leadership for El
Salvador.^' During the tenure of the first junta, limited military aid ($5
million, largely "nonlethal") was promised— it was briefly held up in an
attempt to pressure the Salvadoran authorities to investigate the murder of
four U.S. religious workers'"— and the first U.S. advisers were sent to El
Salvador in January 1981, two months before Ronald Reagan took office."

During this period, the newly installed Reagan Administration,
inevitably attracted to ostentatiously grisly tyrannies, sought fast money
for what was at that point an essentially military government. Israel agreed
to loan — in actuality to defer receiving — 12 1 million of its U.S. assistance.'^

Even after the Reagan Administration committed itself fully to the
Salvadoran government in 1 98 1 —its civilian figurehead in those days was
Jose Napoleon Duarte — Israel received an order from El Salvador for three
Arava aircraft in 1 982." There was an unconfirmed report that Israel had
sold El Salvador three Super Mystere aircraft.'*

As late as 1984, the Salvadoran military was using napalm it had
purchased from Israel. The use of napalm on the civilian population was
verified by a number of U.S. medical workers, including Harvard
University burn specialist Dr. John Constable. The Israeli origin of the
napalm was disclosed by the U.S. Ambassador to El Salvador after
persistent questioning by members of Congress and journalists.'^

In May 1 982 , Joaquin Aguilar, the representative in Italy of the FDR,
was brought to Israel by a local solidarity committee to lobby against
continued Israeli arms sales to the Salvadoran regime. The leaders of most
of Israel's leftist factions met with Aguilar and, at the FDR representative's
request, Shimon Peres, at the time leader of the Labor opposition, also
agreed to meet with him.

The Salvadoran ambassador to Israel bitterly denounced the meetings
with Aguilar as dealing with a "terrorist," and issued pointed warnings
about the Salvadoran opposition's connection to the PLO. Aguilar
acknowledged that the FDR had relations with the PLO, "which

1 02 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

represents the Palestinian people." But he also stressed the FDR's
awareness of Jewish suffering.

I want to deliver a message of peace to the Israeli people — a
people who have suffered so much. That is why I think the
people of Israel can understand the suffering of the people in El
Salvador, who are under fascist repression by a dictatorship that
uses Nazi means and mass murder to defeat the people.''

According to one report, Aguilar "left empty-handed after talks with
Peres..."" Yet it is still not altogether clear whether Israel has continued to
sell weapons to the Salvadoran military, which continues to get most of
what it needs for such tasks as its daily bombing runs on the civilian
population from the U.S.

In any event, after the advent of the Reagan Administration, Israel did
maintain advisers in El Salvador.'^ "I never heard that those advisers left El
Salvador," noted Col. Guerra y Guerra, who went into exile after the fall of
the first junta in 1980, but in 1983 was still informed about events in El
Salvador. In numbers estimated at 100-200'' in 1982, they undoubtedly
filled in the holes left by Congressional restrictions limiting the U.S. to 55
advisers. In 1 984, its Salvadoran proteges having been slow to benefit from
U.S. training, the Pentagon asked Israel to supply more advisers.*"

The proliferating Israeli "security" firms made up of retired Israeli
military and intelligence officers have sent personnel to the Salvadoran
armed forces. The connection of these firms and the Israeli government is
direct: "One source said the Defense Ministry in fact often passes less-
desirable clients to private consulting firms when 'the government is
reluctant to have [active military] personnel directly involved.'

The Embassy and the Strings Attached

Israel continued to pursue its own relationship with El Salvador. On
April 13, 1984, El Salvador's Ambassador to Israel had nailed a large seal
on a doorpost in Jerusalem: "Republic of El Salvador in Central America —
Embassy." He ran a Salvadoran flag up next to the Israeli flag. An Israeli
foreign ministry official said Israel hoped to increase its cultural and
developmental ties with El Salvador.*^ It was a radical move. In 1 980, all 1 4
nations which had maintained embassies in Jerusalem relocated them to Tel
Aviv, in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 478 dis-
avowing the annexation of East Jerusalem by the Israeli Knesset earlier that
year. Israel captured East Jerusalem from Jordan in 1967, and under

Israel and Central America 103

international law it is regarded as occupied and disputed territory; the
significance of Jerusalem to three major religions— Christianity, Islam and
Judaism— only increases the sensitivity of the issue. Prior to the Salvadoran
decision, only Costa Rica had defied prevailing sentiment and in 1982
relocated its embassy to Jerusalem.

Radio Venceremos, the voice of the Salvadoran insurgency, con-
demned the embassy transfer as "a shameless violation of UN resolutions"
and condemned interim President Alvaro Magana— installed in 1982 after
Roberto D'Aubuisson's far right ARENA (Nationalist Republican Al-
liance) party captured the National Assembly in a dog and pony show
election and dismissed Duarte— for aligning El Salvador with Israel."

In El Salvador, the Israeli ambassador presented his credentials, and
interim President Magana voiced hopes for a security agreement and aid
from Israel. The following week, the Washington media was rife with
stories (which later turned out to be part of an administration pressure
campaign to get Israeli support for the contras; see below) that a meeting
between Israeli Foreign Ministry Director- General David Kimche and
State Department officals would discuss setting up a special fund, indepen-
dent of the U.S. budget, for Israeli "technological and agricultural projects
in Central America and Africa" and, in exchange, using Israel as a conduit
for aid to the Salvadoran government and the contras. Israel, noted all the
accounts, should be in a generous mood toward El Salvador because of that
country's recent recognition of Jerusalem.**

According to an official at the Salvadoran foreign ministry, the
ministry had also assumed "that something concrete had been offered in
exchange for the transfer since it contradicted the Foreign Ministry's
policy."^

Foreign Minister Fidel Chavez Mena had supported the 1980 UN
resolution that asked members to withdraw their embassies from Jerusalem.
Chavez Mena had been working to develop El Salvador's ties with Middle
Eastern countries; he was a friend of the Egyptian Ambassador. Now, some
Salvadoran officials began to worry that Arab governments might
recognize an insurgent government**— a justifiable worry as the FMLN-
FDR controlled a significant part of northern El Salvador.

This did not occur, but on April 20 Egypt and other members of the
Islamic Conference Organization broke relations with El Salvador and
Costa Rica.*'' The rupture was intended as a warning to the U.S., where a
bizarre election year roller coaster was gathering steam as Democratic
candidates competed in the strength of their commitment to a bill
mandating the move of the U.S. embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to
Jerusalem.*^ Congress passed the bill, which was non-binding, so President

1 04 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Reagan simply ignored it. But that spring Egypt and other Arab nations
suspected— erroneously— that El Salvador had been encouraged to make
the move to Jerusalem by Washington, as a kind of trial balloon.'"

In fact, the Salvadoran move had almost nothing to do with U.S.
politics and a great deal to do with the machinations of the Salvadoran far-
right, casting bitter irony on the words of an anonymous Salvadoran
official: "If Israel would help us fight our terrorism, we wouldn't have this
problem with the death squads."™ Moreover, it had all been set in motion
eight months earlier, in August 1983, when a Salvadoran delegation
arrived in Israel.

They were "not exactly" looking for military aid, said Ernesto
Magana, although "we are quite interested in the help of Israeli 'counter-
terrorist' specialists." The leader of the delegation, Presidential
Secretary Jose Francisco Guerrero, also spoke of "eradicating" the
worldwide blight of terror and of strengthening Israeli-Salvadoran
relations.''

At a meeting with Prime Minister Menachem Begin, the delegation
informed him that El Salvador was willing to relocate its embassy to
Jerusalem. Begin was so delighted he embraced Ernesto Magana.'^

It is still not certain exactly what — or who — propelled the Salvadorans
to Israel, although in retrospect it appears as though the initial move was a
not very well thought out fishing expedition. The Salvadorans were taken
on a tour of Israeli military installations and lAI plants,'^ but when the
embassy relocation was announced, aside from a pledge to support each
other at the UN,'* the terms of the agreement seemed somewhat vague.

In exchange for a gesture from El Salvador, Israel plans to
reopen its embassy here and begin a cooperation program that
could lead to Israeli military and internal security aid... The
arrangement also includes hopes in the Salvadoran government
[sic] that the influential pro-Israel lobby in the United States will
lend a discreet hand in congressional debates over the wisdom of
administration policy on Central America and the level of
military aid for the U.S.-supported government of provisional
President Alvaro Magana."

At any rate, despite El Salvador's stated intention to set up shop in
Jerusalem in September, through late 1983 and early 1984 nothing
happened, a sign perhaps of opposition to the move in El Salvador from
either the foreign ministry, where the well-educated staff was generally
opposed to Israeli policies,'* or even the U.S. embassy. It certainly was an
indication that Israel had not put enough on the table to match the
Salvadoran gesture. If the visit of top Salvadoran military officers to Israel

Israel and Central America 105

which Guerrero had said would occur later in 1983" took place, it was
under the strictest secrecy.

The move finally occurred in April 1984, only weeks before an
election that was critical to the continuation of U.S. aid to El Salvador. The
situation was a classic: an administration in Washington trying to present to
Congress and the U.S. public a credible image of a working democracy'^
and the emergence of a centrist government. In this case the Christian
Democratic Party of Jose Napoleon Duarte— or what remained of it after
the more principled elements joined the FDR— was pitted against the far
right ARENA Party. Led by cashiered army major Roberto D' Aubuisson,
ARENA was a carefully constructed above-ground political arm of the
death squads which had plagued El Salvador, causing the greater part of
40,000 civilian deaths between 1979 and 1983, although at the time the
degree of overlap was not known.'S The party of Francisco Jose Guerrero,
the top aid in the caretaker Magana government who had led the August
1983 delegation to Israel, had been eliminated in the initial round of the
presidential elections on March 25 and its support was regarded as a wild
card; but, with its ties to the growers and military, not much of one.

In the U.S., Congress had made itself quite clear: if D' Aubuisson won
the election the Administration's requests for military aid for El Salvador
would almost certainly be rejected. (With the 1984 elections approaching
the Democrats in Congress had briefly entered the zone of principle and
were vociferously blocking the Administration's war plans for Central
America. The mood soon passed.)

Likewise, led by Dale Bumpers (D-AR) the Senate had put itself on
record as willing to stop all military aid to El Salvador should its elected
government be deposed by a coup d'etat. That resolution was passed
unanimously in the midst of coup rumors.^"

It is significant that the embassy-moving ceremony took place
between the elmination of Guerrero from presidential contention and the
May 6, 1984 election of Duarte. Guerrero, according to one foreign
journalist who spoke with him extensively, had been fixed on the idea of
moving the embassy ever since he had returned from Israel. He greatly
admired the Israeli agricultural arrangements of "civil defense systems on
farms in endangered areas," and he believed that El Salvador should have a
fallback international backer.

The Salvadoran far right had also thought about an alternative to the
U.S., with its annoying lectures about human rights abuses and its history
of abandoning its client/allies. Georgetown University Center for Strate-
gic and International Studies fellow Robert Leiken had pointed out that, in
pursuit of their own agendas, the Salvadorans and other Central American

106 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

"anti-Communist (sic) military cliques" would disregard U.S. interests.
He also noted that Taiwan, Israel, Chile and South Africa "are countries
that... are frequently invoked by D'Aubuisson's supporters, increasingly
bitter and outspoken about U.S. 'meddling,' as substitutes should American
aid be cut off."" It was also evident that, if elected, Duarte would hold to
the Christian Democrat position on Jerusalem, that the status of the city is
still to be negotiated, and would never move the embassy. The timing of
the move, less than a month before the election, clearly suggests an attempt
by the Salvadoran right to establish links and curry favor with Israel.

Just as clearly, it suggests that when its own interests are involved— in
this case a sop to the legitimacy of Jerusalem as its "eternal" and
"undivided" capital— Israel has litde interest in coordinating its activities
with Washington. Apparendy it does not have to. Nor did it seem to
require the kind of distance from Roberto D'Aubuisson upon which even
the Reagan right (minus Sen. Jesse Helms) insisted.

Ultimately, with the benefit of money the CIA pumped into the
election, Duarte defeated D'Aubuisson." Soon after assuming office
Duarte was asked about the embassy. He answered

Regarding Jerusalem, that is a problem that concerns the
Foreign Ministry. I still do not know why this decision was
adopted. I hope to receive the official report from the foreign
minister. ..however, it is quite logical to think that at this
moment he is not completely aware of the details but will give us
a report regarding the situation, what has happened..."

Nonetheless, when in July 1984 Duarte came to the U.S., he won the
hearts of Congress , which approved $ 70 million emergency military aid in
August.^* Could those "hopes in the Salvadoran government" that Israel
would put its powerful lobby to work have come true for Duarte.'

Much later, Salvadoran officials would reveal that there had been
disappointment when, following the embassy relocation, Israel had not
provided the hoped-for economic and military aid.*^ Therefore, they
explained. President Duarte delayed naming an ambassador to the new
embassy in Jerusalem.^* In any event, Duarte— and even the negative Fidel
Chavez Mena— would later reap the benefits of Magana's move to
Jerusalem and the never quite defined "cooperation program."

Israel and Central America 107

"Pacification"

In March 1 985, El Salvador's Deputy Minister of Defense and Public
Security Col. Reynaldo Lopez Nulla visited Israel.*^ Lopez was the
strongest advocate in the Duarte cabinet of "citizens defense committees"
to guard plantations and businesses against insurgent attacks. By July 1 984,
the Salvadoran Assembly had passed a law approving the creation of such
units. In 1985 an enthusiastic Col. Sigifredo Ochoa began establishing
"self-defense" committees in Chalatenango province, in towns which the
military had succeeded in occupying. In May, Ochoa boasted that his
troops had organized 30 such committees.^s jhese forces, argued Lopez
Nulla, "have worked in many other countries."*' Later Lopez Nulla and
the director of the Salvadoran police academy visited Guatemala for advice
on counterinsurgency; while there they set up permanent links with their
counterparts.70 Israel has long advised the Guatemalan military and police
(see below). It is more likely, however, that Nuila's mission was related to
the "self-defense" forces which the Salvadoran government was trying to
set up.

These attempts came in the context of efforts the U.S. had been
making to establish the same kind of rural "pacification" program that it
had employed in Vietnam, the well-remembered Phoenix Program of
wmning hearts and minds with a combination of civic amenities and
murder. In El Salvador it was called the National Plan. Begun in 1 983, the
program in San Vicente province was a monumental failure. "Guerrillas
stole medicines from National Plan hospitals and held night classes at
National Plan schools. "7' Corruption in the ranks of Salvadoran officials
accomplished what the insurgents could not.'^

The military then began an intensified bombing campaign to depopu-
late areas whose residents were thought to support the rebels." It
developed its own pacification plan, and it was probably inevitable that
Israel would become involved.

Actually, Israeli aid to Salvadoran attempts at "pacification" might
have predated the embassy-moving agreement. At the April 1984 cere-
mony in Jerusalem, the Salvadoran ambassador had noted that, "We have
all the time a representation of Israel, mainly in the field of agricultural
cooperation, organization of communities. "^^ In early 1 985 the Salvadoran
military instituted a program called the Patriotic Youth Movement— "to
restore civic and moral values and seek rapprochement with the nation's
teachers and students""— the same name as that run by Israel many years
before.

108 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

At the end of 1 984 the Salvadoran government introduced something
called Project 1,000, designed to settle 500,000 war refugees in 1,000
"fortified communities." Total cost of the project (not counting the cost of
creating refugees, which is covered by U.S. military aid) was estimated at
$70 to 1100 million.'*

At first Salvadoran officians thought that U.S. AID and the UN
Development Program would provide funding. Perhaps because at one
point the Salvadoran government suggested restricting the distribution of
U.S. food aid to those who moved to the new communities — the
government offered as an excuse for this gambit that there was a new
marginal class of parasites resulting in "dependency, vagrancy, crime,
prostitution [and] frustration," — U.S. AID was emphatic in denying it had
any connection with Project 1 ,000.'^ The International Commitee for the
Red Cross and other established aid organizations said that they would not
participate in the program. AID officials said they were working on
resettlement plans with the Catholic Church, and an official of a major relief
organization charged that Project 1 ,000 was a plan for population control:
"People are displaced from conflicted or rebel-held zones in an effort to
drain away support from the guerrillas, then these people are herded into
camps where they are monitored and controlled."''

By early 1985, the promoters of Project 1,000 were speaking of
obtaining the financial wherewithal from European and Latin American
nations.^"

In late 1985 the West German government granted El Salvador $ 1 7.9
million for use in "agrarian reform and social projects in fields of health and
education, and to promote cooperatives."^' Agrarian reform has not been
implemented in El Salvador for several years. The word "cooperative" has
been used at least once to describe the fortified villages established by the
Salvadoran military.

On New Years Day in 1986, El Salvador's ambassador to Jerusalem
presented his credentials to the Israelis. (Ambassador Enrique Guttfreund
Hanchel was a former president of the Jewish community in El Salvador
and also of the Central American Confederation of Jewish Communities.^')
The following month Israel's ambassador in El Salvador said, "We will be
reinforcing our technical cooperation in the agricultural and community
development fields, in which we are considered specialists."^'' By that
mouthful of euphemisms the ambassador meant that Israel would help El
Salvador strip the last shreds of dignity and hope from thousands of civilian
victims.

Harking back to the scorched earth military pacification plan which
Israel had helped Guatemala implement (see below), a nongovernmental

Israel and Central America

109

community development worker spelled out the nature of Israel's speciali-
zation: "Once you have Israeli technicians coming into the country, you
can have military trainers coming in under the guise of agricultural
technicians. That is what they did in Guatemala." An adviser to President
Duarte said the government hoped that Israel's agricultural assistance
would prop up the agrarian reform program and "keep thousands of
peasants from joining rebel ranks out of frustration." The Israeli ambas-
sador said that his country's aid would be channeled through the
government agency supporting the military's relocation projects, Dideco.^^

In July 1986, Fidel Chavez Mena, now El Salvador's Planning
Minister, arrived in Israel and signed an agreement covering both
agricultural and industrial assistance. The financing to support the Israeli
technicians was reported to be coming from the World Bank, West
Germany and the U.S. According to the Israeli daily Davar, Chavez and his
counterpart Gad Yacobi discussed the possibilities of "technical assistance
for agricultural cooperation among the nations of Central America. "^^

A week before the signing of that agreement James LeMoyne, the
New York Times correspondent in El Salvador, wrote about the likely
recipients of Israeli aid.

The peasants captured for supporting the guerrillas represent an
especially difficult challenge for the Government. Winning their
sympathy will be extremely hard.

The villagers have been rounded up in army counter-
insurgency campaigns that are intended to separate guerrilla
sympathizers from armed rebel units. It is an unpleasant
business. The army enters selected guerrilla areas and burns the
peasants' fields, wrecks their homes and seiz'es anyone it can
catch.

If the Israelis' work is going to be done in conjunction with the latest
comprehensive counterinsurgency plan announced by the Salvadoran
government, "United to Rebuild," there will be at least $ 1 8 million of U.S.
funds involved.

Should the U.S. be forced to pull back from all or part of its misguided
commitments to El Salvador, Israel is ideally positioned to carry on the
work. In 1932 the Salvadoran military massacred 30,000 in quelling a
revolution. 8' Col. Guerra y Guerra recalls hearing hardline Salvadoran
officers say that they were prepared to kill 300,000 of their countrymen to
extinguish the current insurgency.'"

Should the Salvadoran far right win political control from the Duarte
Christian Democrats, thanks to its decisive action in relocating the
Salvadoran embassy in 1984, the Salvadoran right has an account with
excellent credit waiting in Jerusalem.

1 1 0 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Major Israeli Weapons Sales to El Salvador

Item

Comments

Reference Source

25 IAI-201 Arava
planes

6 Fouga Magister
trainers

18 refurbished
Dassault Ouragan
fighters

200 80-mm rocket
launchers

200 9-mm Uzi sub-
machine guns

Ammunition
Spare parts

"Security" equip-
ment

Galil assault rifles

4 Mystere B-2
bombers

Armored vehicles

3 Arava STOL
planes

Napalm bombs

Ordered September
1973; delivered
1974-1979. Unit cost
$0.7 million

Licensed production in
Israel. Ordered 1973;
dehvered 1975

Ordered 1973; deliv-
ered 1975. From Israeli
air force stock

Delivered 1974-77

Delivered 1974-77

Ordered and delivered
1981; unconfirmed

Sold in 1982

Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI),
World Armament and Dis-
armament Yearbook 1979, pp
212-213.

SIPRI, Yearbook 1976, p. 274.

Ibid., p 275.

U.S. Congress, House, Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, Eco-
nomic and Military Aid
Programs, p 84.

Ibid.
Ibid.

"Armas Israelis Contra Amer-
ica Latina," OLP Informa
(Mexico City), February 1982,
p 8.

Penny Lernoux, '"Who's Who
of Dictators Obtain Arms from
Israel," National Catholic Re-
porter, 25 December 1981.

SIPRI, Yearbook 1982, p 213.

Interview with "Miguel," nom
de guerre. International Rela-
tions Department of the Sal-
vadoran FMLN, Managua,
Nicaragua, 17 August 1982; in-
terview with "Santiago," Inter-
national Relations Department
of the Salvadoran Communist
Party, Managua, Nicaragua, 17
August 1982.

Latin America Weekly Report,
17 December 1982, p 6.

Hadashot, 2 October 1984, p
13.

Chan from hml and Latin Amtriai: The Military Connection, Bishara Bahbah, New York: St. Martin's, 1 986.

Guatemala

Salvadoran rightists are aware of how well their counterparts in
Guatemala have done over the last decade— without the United States and
with the help of Israel. The history of Israel's relations with Guatemala
roughly parallels that of its ties with El Salvador— except the Guatemalan
military was so unswervingly bloody that Congress never permitted the
(all-too-eager) Reagan Administration to undo the military aid cutoff
implemented during the Carter years.'

Weaponry for the Guatemalan military is the very least of what Israel
has delivered. Israel not only provided the technology necessary for a reign
of terror, it helped in the organization and commission of the horrors
perpetrated by the Guatemalan military and police. And even beyond that:
to ensure that the profitable relationship would continue, Israel and its
agents worked actively to maintain Israeli influence in Guatemala.

Throughout the years of untrammeled slaughter that left at least
45,000 dead,2 and, by early 1983, one million in internal exile'— mostly
indigenous Mayan Indians, who comprise a majority of Guatemala's eight
million people— and thousands more in exile abroad, Israel stood by the
Guatemalan military. Three successive military governments and three
brutal and sweeping campaigns against the Mayan population, described
by a U.S. diplomat as Guatemala's "genocide against the Indians,'"* had the
benefit of Israeli techniques and experience, as well as hardware.

Ill

1 1 2 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

As with El Salvador, the popular response to Israeli aid to the military
government was expressed with a bombing attack on its Guatemala City
embassy on the night of January 12, 1982. Guards fired at the fleeing
attackers, whose bomb did slight damage to the building.^ A few months
later another bombing blew out windows in the embassy, and a simul-
taneous bomb throwing attack on Guatemala City's only synagogue
resulted in no damage.'

Israel and Guatemala had more of a history than did Israel with El
Salvador. In 1 947, Guatemala's representative at the UN was appointed to
the UN Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), charged with
drafting a plan for Jewish and Palestinian nations in what was the British
Mandate of Palestine. After a trip to Palestine, where he met the pre-state
terrorist Menachem Begin, Jorge Garcia Granados was well disposed
toward the Jewish settlers; he is considered to have been instrumental in
drafting the plan of partition that created the state of Israel.^

History, however, has not run a straight course, and Israel's occasional
claims that it is somehow obligated to Guatemala are dubious. As Milton
Jamail and Margo Gutierrez note.

Although Israel points to its early special relationship with
Guatemala, it is important to note that that relationship began
between a progressive government in Guatemala and what was
perceived by the Guatemalans as an anti-colonial struggle in
Palestine. The situation has changed considerably in the ensuing
forty years. Guatemala's military dictatorship of today is the
direct descendant of a right-wing government that took power
in 1 954 by overthrowing the government that had forged such
good relations with Israel.*

In the 1960s and 1970s, Israel conducted quite an extensive technical
assistance program in Guatemala with the emphasis on agriculture. By
1 970, 1 6 Israeli advisers had worked on projects in Guatemala. In 1 97 1 the
two countries signed a cooperation agreement, following which Israel
taught a " youth leadership" course an d established a "workers' bank" in
Guatemala.' ' " —

As it did to El Salvador, the Carter Administration wrote Guatemala
off of the U.S. military assistance ledgers in 1 977.'" Guatemala had actually
been confronted with a U.S. aid cutoff two years earlier, when the Ford
Administration had held back arms shipments at the request of the British
government after Guatemala threatened to invade neighboring Belize, then
a British colony, on which Guatemala had long held territorial designs."

Israel began selling Guatemala weapons in 1974 and since then is
known to have delivered 17 Arava aircraft.'^ In 1977 at the annual

Israel and Central America 1 1 3

industrial fair, Interfer, Israel's main attraction was the Arava. "An
operative Arava is to be parked outside the lAI pavillion for public
inspection, although its silhouette in flight is a common sight over the
capital and countryside.""

Referring to the Aravas, Benedicto Lucas Garcia, chief of staff during
the rule of his brother Romeo Lucas Garcia (1978-1982) said, "Israel
helped us in regard to planes and transportation—which we desperately
needed because we had problems in transferring ground forces from one
place to another. " By 1 982 , at least nine of the Aravas had been mounted
with gun pods.'^

Among the other weapons sold by Israel were 10 RBY armored
personnel carriers, three Dabur class patrol boats armed with Gabriel
missiles, light cannons, machine guns and at least 15,000 Galil assault
rifles." The Galil became Guatemala's standard rifle'' and Uzis were
widely seen as well.

According to Victor Perera, "Uzis and the larger Galil assault rifles
used by Guatemala's special counterinsurgency forces accounted for at
least half of the estimated 45,000 Guatemalan Indians killed by the military
since 1978. "'«

In 1977, authorities in the Caribbean nation of Barbados seized two
separate shipments of Israeli arms and ammunition bound for Guatemala. "
Barbados, a Commonwealth member, had supported an OAS resolution
favoring Belize's independence and territorial integrity.^" That year it was
reported that Guatemala's feared Kaibiles (special forces) were based in
Peten near the Belize border "with new Israeli automatic rifles."^'

From the beginning, both sides took the arms buying and selling
seriously. In 1 9 7 1 , Guatemalan armed forces Chief of Staff Kjell Laugerud
Garcia visited Israel. Soon after, Laugerud was (fraudulently) elected
president. In 1974 he paid another visit "to widen cooperation with
Israel. Three years later, Israel's President Ephraim Katzir reciprocated
with a visit to Guatemala. According to Laugerud, his purpose was mainly
to discuss arms and military aid."

After Guatemala was cut off from U.S. military equipment, Israel
continued to fill in the gaps. Chief of Staff Lucas Garcia said he maintained
contact "with Israelis who advised us on matters of military purchases."
Lucas said that while Israel did not provide "large amounts" of weapons,
"it was the only country that gave us support in our battle against the
guerrillas. "2* It is particularly difficult to know exactly what was supplied
and how much it cost. Young officers complaining gf corruption on the
part of their superiors charged that between 1975 and 1981 some
Guatemalan generals had claimed $425 million in weapons purchases from

114

ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Israel, Italy, Belgium and Yugoslavia; however, according to the young
officers, only |175 million had really been spent on arms — the difference
was deposited in the Cayman Islands bank accounts of the generals.

Some of the payment for Israeli arms is thought to have been made in
quetzals, Guatemala's currency, which Israel would then use in its other
dealings with Guatemala.^^ Although there were reports of a big sale of
Israeli Kfir fighter planes to Guatemala,^' these were never seen and would
have required a U.S. re-export license, which the Carter Administration
was not willing to give Israel for resale to Ecuador. It is possible the reports
of Kfirs were born out of earlier reports (during the flare up of tensions over
Belize) that Israel (or France) had provided Guatemala with 24 "earlier
type" Mirage combat aircraft.^'

Likewise, there are reports of helicopter sales, although the number of
aircraft involved have not been determined. The transaction is said to have
been a barter arrangement, with Israel accepting Guatemalan currency to
be used for buying Guatemalan goods or financing Israeli operations in
Guatemala.'"

In 1985, the army's chief of staff said that several of the air force's
helicopters were at the time in Israel undergoing repairs and recon-
ditioning.31 In March 1986, Greek officials impounded the West Lion,
sailing from Israel and carrying a dismantled Augusta Bell 2 1 2 helicopter.
The first of several destinations given for the ship was Guatemala. It was
also carrying 209 tons of reinforced TNT, bazookas, machine guns and
ammunition (although some of this could well have been intended for the
contras; see below).

It is certain that over the years Israel has delivered quantities of smaller
items to Guatemala: flak jackets, helmets," until "[a]rmy outposts in the
jungle have become near replicas of Israeli army field camps."'* "When I see
the quantity of arms involved in some of these transactions, such as
Guatemala at the height of the internal terror!" commented former Foreign
Minister Abba Eban, now head of the Knesset's defense and foreign affairs
committee.

Under an agreement with Guatemala's air force, Israel trained pilots.'*
A 1983 report said that Israel had built an air base in Guatemala.'^

Israel also installed a radar array at Guatemala City's La Aurora
International Airport; in 1983 the radar was reportedly run by Israeli
technicians.'^

When the Reagan Administration took office it was determined to do
everything it could for Guatemala. It had promised as much during the
election campaign. Never had Ronald Reagan seen a rightist dictatorship he
didn't like; during his 1980 campaign he met with a representative of the

Israel and Central America

115

right-wing business lobby Los Amigos del Pais, and, referring to the Carter
Administration's aid cutoff, told him, "Don't give up. Stay there and fight.
I'll help you as soon as I get in."

The Guatemalan far-right apparently helped Reagan get in.

Guatemalan business leaders reportedly pumped large illegal
contributions into the Reagan campaign coffers. Their tentacles
reached right into the core of the new administration through
the lobbying activities of the Hannaford-Deaver law firm of
White House troika member Michael Deaver. Within three days
of the Republican victory on 7 November 1980, Hannaford-
Deaver were busy arranging a Capitol Hill briefing for Amigos
del Pais.^'^

Congress, however, did not change its attitude about Guatemala, and
as late as 1985 remained adamant about denying it military aid. In 1981,
Reagan's Secretary of State Alexander Haig "urged Israel to help
Guatemala."*" In July 1985 Israel helped the administration move a
shipment of 40 assault rifles with advanced night sights and 1,000 grenade
launchers from Israel to Guatemala on a KLM (Royal Dutch Airlines)
flight.*'

In late 1983, the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP) issued a
communique saying that the previous May a munitions factory producing
bullets for Galil rifles and Uzi submachine guns had begun operation in
Alta Verapaz.*^ Subsequently the director of Army Public Relations
confirmed that the military was producing Galil rifle parts, had begun
armor plating its vehicles at the factory, and that the facility would soon be
capable of building grenade launchers.*' The following year the factory
began manufacturing entire Galil rifles under license from Israel.**

Israeli advisers set up the factory and then trained the Guatemalans to
run it, said Gen. Benedicto Lucas Garcia, who had headed the army at the
time. "The factory is now being run by Guatemalans," he added.*' There
are hopes in Guatemala that 30 percent of the plant's output can be sold to
Honduras and EI Salvador.**

The EGP said in 1983 that there were 300 Israeli advisers in
Guatemala, working "in the security structures and in the army."*^ Other
reports were less specific as to numbers, but suggested that these Israeli
advisers, "some official, others private," performed a variety of functions.
Israelis "helped Guatemalan internal security agents hunt underground
rebel groups."*^

Gen. Lucas said Israeli advisers had come to teach the use of Israeli
equipment purchased by Guatemala.*' Throughout the 1960s and 1970s
the Guatemalan police agencies had had extensive U.S. training in "riot

1 1 6 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

control training and related phases of coping with civil disturbances in a
humane and effective manner," a euphemism for the terror campaigns in
which these forces participated that in 1967-1968 took 7,000 lives while
ostensibly fighting a guerrilla force that never numbered more than 450.^"
When Congress forbade U.S. forces to train the internal police forces of
other countries— passed in 1974, this law was supplanted in 1985 by
legislation that put the U.S. back in the police-guidance business^i— the
Israelis stepped in and "set up their intelligence network, tried and tested on
the West Bank and Gaza."'^

Israeli noncommissioned officers were also said to have been hired by
big landowners to train their private security details. (Under Marcos, Israel
did the same in the Philippines.^^) These private squads, together with
"off-duty military officers formed the fearsome 'death squads' which later
spread to neighboring El Salvador, where they have been responsible for an
estimated 20,000-30,000 murders of left-wing dissidents."^*

Not only did the Israelis share their experiences and their tactics, they
bestowed upon Guatemala the technology needed by a modern police state.
During the period Guatemala was under U.S. tutelage, the insurgency
spread from the urban bourgeoisie to the indigenous population in the rural
highlands; with Israeli guidance the military succeeded in suppressing (for
now) the drive for land and political liberation. The Guatemalan military is
very conscious of that achievement, even proud of it. Some officers argue
that with the help of the U.S. they could not have quelled the insurgency, as
Congress would not have tolerated their ruthless tactics.^^

In 1979, the Guatemalan interior minister paid a "secret and confiden-
tial" visit to Israel, where he met with the manufacturers of "sophisticated
police equipment."" In March of the following year Interior Minister
Donaldo Alvarez Ruiz was in Israel to conclude an agreement for police
training. Following the overthrow of Lucas Garcia, the home of Interior
Minister Alvarez was raided, "uncovering underground jail cells, 50 stolen
vehicles. ..[and] scores of gold graduation rings, wrenched from the fingers
of police torture victims."'^

Israeli advisers have worked with the feared G-2 police intelligence
unit.^^ Overseen by the army general staff, the G-2 is the intelligence
agency — sections charged with "the elimination of individuals" are
stationed at every army base— which has been largely responsible for the
death squad killings over the last decade. The present civilian government
has dissolved the DIT, a civilian organization subordinate to G-2, but not
G-2 itself."

In 1981, the Ar my's School of Tr ansjriissions and Electronics, a
school designed and financed by the Israeli company Tadiran to teach such

Israel and Central America

117

subjects as encoding, radio jamming and monitoring, a nd the use of Israeli
equipment was opened in Guatemala City.*" According to the colonel
directing the school, everything in it came from Israel: the "teaching
methods, the teaching teams, the technical instruments, books, and even the
custom furniture. ..designed and built by the Israeli company DEGEM
Systems."^'

At the opening ceremony the Israeli ambassador was thanked by Chief
of Staff Gen. Benedicto Lucas Garcia for "the advice and transfer of
electronic technology" which, Lucas said, had brought Guatemala up to
date.*^ Calling Guatemala "one of our best friends" the ambassador
promised that further technology transfers were in the works.*'

Perhaps the most sinister of all the equipment supplied by Israel to
Guatemala were twocomguieis. One was in an old military academy and
became, as Benedicto Lucas called it, "the nerve center of the armed forces,
which deals with the movements of units in the field and so on."** The
other computer was located in an annex of the National Palace. The G-2
have a control center there, and, since the days of Romeo Lucas Garcia,
meetings have been held in that annex to select assassination victims.
According to a senior Guatemalan army official, the complex contains "an
archive and computer file on journalists, students, leaders, people of the left,
politicians, and so on." This material is combined with current intelligence
reports and mulled over during weekly sessions that have included, in their
respective times, both Romeo Lucas and Oscar Mejia Victores.

The bureaucratic procedures for approving the killing of a
dissident are well-established. "A local military commander has
someone they think is a problem," the officer explains. "So they
speak with G-2, and G-2 consults its own archives and
information from its agents and the police and, if all coincide, it
passes along a direct proposition to the minister of defense.
They say, 'We have analyzed the case of such and such a person
in depth and this person is responsible for the following acts and
we recommend that we execute them.'

The computer, installed by Tadiran, and operational in late 1979 or
early 1980,** was used to sort through dossiers and to distribute lists of
those marked for death. Said a U.S. priest who fled the country after
appearing on a death list, "They had printout lists at the border crossings
and at the airport. Once you get on that — then it's like bounty hunters."*'

The computer was also capable of monitoring utilities usage and
identifying surges in consumption that might indicate a meeting underway,
a mimeograph producing leaflets, bombs being made. In 1981, relying on
information generated by the computer system, the Guatemalan military

118

ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

raided 30 safe houses of the Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms
(ORPA)/8

Along with the computer system came public registration. In May
1983, the government announced that Col. Jaime Rabanales, a specialist in
counterinsurgency propaganda, had been put in charge of a program to
register the entire population,^' a task that would be undertaken "with the
help of Israeli intelligence."™ Soon after he wrested power from Rios
Montt, Gen. Oscar Mejia Victores called a halt to the census-taking, which
he said was a burden to the military and a public relations disaster.^'

Something resembling that plan cropped up again in August 1984,
according to a report by the Mexico City El Dia about a "sectoral"
(sectorization) plan to contain urban political activity. The paper said the
plan was modeled after "Jsrael's experiences in Palestinian areas," and
called fo r eight police for ea ch tour blocks, a census ot' th e residents and "
remtorcement of neighborhood orga nizations— " a torm ot the civil selF^
d efense patrols. " The paper also said that this plan would contribute to
accomplishing the computerization of the population already under way,
"the work of Israeli experts."'^

. By 1985, 80 percent of the adult population was said to have been
entered in the computer.^'

Israeli technicians also work training Guatemalan bureaucrats how to
use computerized information and management systems.^*

Control of the Rural Population

The aspect of Israeli cooperation with Guatemala with the most
serious implications is the role played by Israeli personnel in the universally
condemned rural "pacification" program. Extreme maldistribution of
land — exacerbated by encroachment on indigenous land — was a major
cause of the present rebellion. After trying several different approaches, the
military, under Rios Montt, embarked on a resolution of the problem,
substituting forced relocation and suppression for equitable land dis-
tribution.

In 1982 Israeli military advisers helped develop and carry out Plan
Victoria, the devastating scorched earth campaign which Rios Montt
unleashed on the highland population. In June 1983, the Guatemalan
embassy in Washington confirmed that "personnel sent by the Israeli
government were participating in the repopulation and readjustment
programs for those displaced." Rios Montt himself told the Washington

Israel and Central America

119

Times that the Israeli government was giving his administration help with
the counterinsurgency plan called "Techo, tortilla y trabajo" (shelter, food
and work)." The "three T's" followed an earlier Rios program called
Fusiles y Frijoles, or beans and bullets, where wholesale slaughter was
combined with the provision of life's necessities to those willing to
cooperate with the military.^*

The success of the government's initially savage but sophis-
ticated campaign against the rebels has come without significant
U.S. military assistance, and top field commanders say that none
is necessary now to finish the guerrillas.

"We declared a state of siege so we could kill legally," Rios Montt told a
group of politicians. The Roman Catholic Conference of Bishops called
what Rios was doing "genocide."" Following Rios' overthrow, his
successor Mejia Victores continued the program, proclaiming that model
villages would be extended throughout the country.'^

As the army bombed, strafed and burned village after village, an
estimated 1 00,000 peasants escaped across the border to Mexico" or to the
mountainous territory controlled by the guerrillas. Others were captured
by the military. Many of those who went to the guerrillas were later forced
by hunger to surrender themselves to the military. Their fate was
confinement in model villages, what were called strategic hamlets during
the U.S. assault on Vietnam. In Guatemala there was a plan drawn up
grouping these in four "poles of development." The scheme piggybacked
on a series of older plans involving the corruption of cooperatives.

There was a short-lived cooperative movement in Guatemala in the
early 1970s, spearheaded by Roman Catholic priests. It was meant to
provide credit and agricultural support that would obviate the need for
indigenous people to migrate to coastal regions for ill-paid and unhealthy
seasonal employment picking coffee and other export crops. At one time it
involved 750,000 Mayan peasants. U.S. AID provided funds for credit
unions, and briefly, the movement was sponsored by the Laugurud
government. Although the cooperatives did not begin to address the basic
tragedy of the Indian highlands — landlessness — the government's support
of the program was attacked by the Guatemalan right as "communist."
The army took over at least one large cooperative and later, when the
government moved to open up land for settlement by landless Indians,
large tracts were immediately grabbed up by the military and the wealthy.^"

In 1977, two Laugurud officials, Col. Fernando Castillo Ramirez,
director of the National Cooperative Institute, and Leonel Giron, head of
colonization programs in the northern area (the Franja Transversal del

120 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Norte) that was to be opened for development, visited Israel. Following
that visit

Israeli advisers arrived in Guatemala to plan civil action
programs in the conflictive Ixcan area, heartland of support for
the...EGP and scene of constant military repression of local
cooperative members.^'

In 1978, Israel began a two-year scholarship program under which
numerous Guatemalan officers and government officials studied "cooper-
ativization and rural development," courses provided by the Israeli
Foreign MinistQ^^s^hiternatiqnal Coogeration^JDivision. Lucas Garcia
adopited some aspects of Israel's kibbutz and moshav (collective and non-
collective agricultural settlements, respectively) into his 1979 "Integral
Plan of Rural Communities" aimed at zones of conflict.

Israeli techniques — surpassing inspiration that also came from Taiwan
and South Korea — were also the main guiding principles for the far more
sweeping "pacification" program designed and implemented in 1 982 under
Rios Montt. ^2

The model villages turned the cooperative philosophy of user- or
owner-control on its head. In the model villages of the Program of
Assistance to Areas in Conflict (PAAC), food — often donated by inter-
national relief organizations — was doled out in exchange for compliance
with the military's orders.

In model villages the military or military-appointed commis-
sioners control everything from latrine installation to food
distribution and have created a structure parallel to civilian
administration, which is left essentially powerless.^'

Another twist to the model village scheme is the emphasis on the
growth of non-traditional specialty crops for export. Air Force Col.
Eduardo Wohlers, who in 1 982 assumed charge of the civic action aspect of
PAAC, visited Israel and studied "the elements of agricultural production
on the kibbutz." Wohlers designed an agricultural collective based on the
kibbutz^* — a "distorted replica of rural Israel" commented one observer*^ —
and construction was begun on a prototype in July 1 9 8 3 at Yalihux in Alta
Verapaz.^'

Col. Wohlers described how the cooperatives would be turned into
profitable operations:

We foresee huge plantations of fruit and vegetables, with storage
and processing facilities and refrigeration plants. We aim to put
in the entire infrastructure for exporting frozen broccoli,
Chinese cabbage, watermelons — a total of 15 new crops.*'

Israel and Central America 121

Members of the Guatemalan military — many have grown wealthy
over the last two decades — have invested in warehouses and refrigeration
facilities in order to realize the economic opportunities of these new
specialty exports.** One colonel said that the pacification plan called for the
incorporation of one million people into the poles of development — "the
entire hinterland."*'

In addition to training Col. Wohlers and his colleagues, the Israelis
have provided technical assistance for the model villages.'"

It is a devilish plan, turning to the world a face of peaceful existence and
productivity — the perfect model of a "backward" people in the process of
development. Daily existence in the model villages is a matter of complete
subjugation. The military assigns inmates to various projects such as road
building — the roads are to provide the military with access it did not have
when early in the decade it attacked the highlands — and tells them what
crops they will plant. Two representatives from each project sit on a central
decision making board which also includes representatives of the Guate-
malan military and the civil patrols which they dominate." This "mono-
lithic structure. ..guards against the risk that the community will develop
objectives contrary to government or military policy."'^

The military has also encouraged the formation of producer associa-
tions, which give the impression of voluntary organizations.''

The domination also has its exploitative angle, as the military controls
not only each individual's daily life, but is also the sole source of seeds,
fertilizer and credit. Naturally, the military is also the sole marketing agent
for the villages' produce.'*

The comprehensive manner in which villages are governed has
disrupted traditional of lines of authority. "Previous systems of settling
disputes and selecting leaders have no meaning in this context."'^

The forced relocation has wrenched the indigenous people from their
land, from which they drew much of their identity, where they buried their
dead and the umbilical cords of their children." Being forced to grow alien
crops in the place of the corn which occupies a central place in Mayan
culture is, as the military is no doubt aware, a "deliberate act of cultural
destruction."'''

Confinement in a model village is sometimes preceded by a term in a
political "reeducation" camp,'* lasting from two to six months."

One of the most oppressive features of Guatemala's pacification
program is the "civilian self-defense patrols,"'"" whose ranks are filled by
coercion, with most joining out of fear of being called subversive,'"' and
thus marked for torture or execution. '"^

1 2 2 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Those who do serve in the patrols must "turn in their quota of
'subversives.'" Otherwise, "they will be forced to denounce their own
neighbors and to execute them with clubs and fists in the village plaza."""

The patrols are believed by most analysts to have been suggested by
Israelis.'"* They have had a profound effect on Mayan society, both
psychologically, "a permanent violation of our values or a new negative
vision," as the country's Catholic bishops charged,'"' and practically, as
long shifts on patrol prevent fulfillment of family and economic
obligations.'"*

In 1 983 the Guatemalan government estimated that 850 villages in the
highlands had "self defense" units.'"' The following year the U.S. embassy
in Guatemala estimated that 700,000 men had been enrolled in the units, '"^
armed with Israeli assistance. Currently 900,000 men are organized into
the civil patrols.'"'

In late 1 983, U.S. customs agents in Miami held up an Israeli freighter
carrying 1 2 ,000 rifles— reports varied as to whether they were World War
I bolt-action Remingtons or Mausers— headed for Guatemala, which chief
of state Mejia Victores confirmed Guatemala had bought from Israel.""
Mejia said they were for "troops in training."'" It appears as if these totally
antiquated arms were purchased after the U.S. turned down an appeal by
Mejia's predecessor for a donation of "old rifles for use by civil defense
patrols.""^

In May 1984, SI AG (Servicio de Informacion y Analisis de Guate-
mala) released details of a meeting between U.S. and Israeli representatives
and members of the Guatemalan government in Guatemala on December
10 and 12, 1983.

According to SIAG, plans were formulated at that meeting for
industrial development in a number of regions, among them the Indian-
dominated highlands and a stepped-up effort to quell the insurgency, which
by that time had unified in an umbrella organization URNG (Unidad
Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca). The report said that the cheap
labor to run the planned industries would be drawn from the development
poles."'

Whether or not this plan is ever fully implemented, the implications of
the labor conditions already established in the model villages are enormous.
In 1983, labor leaders charged that work was performed in the model
villages "without remuneration.""*

In 1985 inmates of three model villages in Quiche said that they were
often formed up into press gangs by the army to repair roads, work on
fortifications, "clear fields of fire," and build new model villages, all
without pay. Moreover, the residents told a reporter that the work for the

Israel and Central America 123

army did not leave time to work the insufficient plots of land they had been
assigned and that they were not allowed to leave.'"

Food was obtainable, in at least some instances, only from military
stores (a version of the company store in so many North American mining
towns) giving the military yet another means of control over the village
inmates."*

In 1986, opposition sources within Guatemala also knew of instances
in which work in the model villages was not performed for wages, but only
in exchange for staple foods — the very corn and beans the inmates are no
longer allowed to grow for themselves. In a word, slave labor.'"

The Guatemalan government, in facing a broad based popular
movement, has come to resemble the Israelis on the West Bank
and Gaza: they are an occupying army. They must use force to
stop dissent, but also need to plan for the more long-range effort
of social control. Thus the Israeli plans at home provide a
prototype for solving Guatemalan problems."^

It is no accident that the Guatemalans looked to the Israelis for
assistance in organizing their campaign against the Indians, and having
followed their mentors' advice, wound up with something that looks quite
a bit like the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories of the West
Bank and the Gaza strip. As the Israelis wrecked the local economy and
turned the occupied territories into a captive market and a cheap labor pool,
the Guatemalan military has made economic activity in the occupied
highlands all but impossible."'

As it is openly acknowledged in the Israeli media that the Palestinian
population must not be allowed to exceed the Jewish population,'^" it is
common knowledge that the Guatemalan military would like to reduce the
Mayan population to a minority.'^'

But most of all there is the unyielding violence of the suppression. The
occupation regime Israel has maintained since 1967 over the Palestinians
(and its occupation of the Syrian Golan Heights, the Egyptian Sinai and
Southern Lebanon) has trained "an entire generation of Israelis.. .to impose
Israeli rule over subject peoples. "'^^ "The Israeli soldier is a model and an
example to us," Gen. Benedicto Lucas said in 1981.'^'

It was in the coercive resettlement program that Israel's activities in
Guatemala intersected most directly with those of the Christian right
surrounding the Reagan Administration. This was particularly true during
the reign of Rios Montt. Montt was a so-called "born-again Christian," a
member ("elder") of the Areata, California based Church of the Word, a
branch of Evangelical Gospel Outreach.

1 24 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

In Guatemala, the Christian right was interested in converts — by the
end of 1 982 reactionary Protestants had succeeded in recruiting 22 percent
of the population to their theology of blind obedience and anti-com-
munism.'^* They were particularly hostile to Catholicism, especially
"Liberation Theology," which many of the Guatemalan military deemed
responsible for the insurgency.

Right-wing Christian organizations seemed to be especially drawn to
the harsh social control being exerted on the highland Mayans. During the
Rios Montt period, foreign fundamentalists were permitted access to
military operational zones, while Catholics were turned away — or at-
tacked. During this period "many Catholic rectories and churches in
Quiche [a highland province] [were] turned into Army barracks. "'^^ In late
1983, the Vatican itself protested the murder of a Franciscan priest in
Guatemala and the (exiled) Guatemalan Human Rights Commission
(CDHG) charged that in the space of several months 500 catechists had
been disappeared. In October the police caught and tortured some religious
workers.'^*

Meanwhile, Rios Montt surrounded himself with advisers, both
North American and Guatemalan, from his Verbo church, and what
appeared to be a loose coalition of right-wing fundamentalist organizations,
most notably Pat Robertson's Christian Broadcasting Network, began an
extensive fundraising drive and also started sending volunteers to Ixil
Triangle villages under military control. Rios Montt chose Love Lift
International, the "relief arm" of Gospel Outreach, Verbo's parent church,
to carry the food and supplies purchased with the money raised. Verbo
representatives, along with an older evangelical outfit, the Wycliffe Bible
Translators (WBT/SIL, the latter initials for the Summer Institute of
Linguistics, an organization whose CIA connections are long and impec-
cable and which has often been charged with involvement in massacres of
indigenous peoples throughout the Americas), arranged with the govern-
ment "to take charge of all medical work in the Ixil Triangle, and for all
education in Indian areas up to the third grade to be taught in Indian
languages with WBT/SIL assistance," through the Behrhorst Clinic.
WBT/SIL and the Clinic's parent, the Behrhorst Foundation, incorporated
with Verbo Church into the Foundation for Aid to the Indian People
(FUND API), whose stated purpose was to channel international Christian
donations to refugees and which coordinated volunteers from U.S. right-
wing religious organizations.'^''

Although nothing has yet emerged which definitively ties Israeli
activities in Guatemala to those of the religious right, it is reasonable to
assume there is contact. Since the late 1970s the government of Israel has

Israel and Central America 125

devoted considerable energy to befriending such political luminaries of
rightist evangelism as Jerry Falwell and Pat Robertson, having turned to
these groups after the National Council of Churches passed some mildly
reproving resolutions about the Middle East. The Christian extremists tell
Israel what it wants to hear. Jerry Falwell found justification in the Bible for
an Israel encompassing parts of "Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt,
Sudan and all of Lebanon, Jordan, and Kuwait."'^^ Pat Robertson praised
the Reagan Administration's veto of a UN Security Council resolution
condemning Israel's invasion of Lebanon with some gobbledygook tying
the invasion to the fundamentalist superstition that Israel will be the site of
the last battle, Armageddon: "Israel has lit the fuse, and it is a fast burning
fuse, and I don't think that the fuse is going to be quenched until that region
explodes in flames. That is my personal feeling from the Bible." '^'
Robertson urged his viewers to call the White House and voice their
support for the Israeli invasion.

Untroubled by the scene in Armageddon when all the Jews will be
converted (or damned), Israel welcomed the "Christian Voice of Hope"
radio station and its companion "Star of Hope" television to Southern
Lebanon, and, even though proseletyzing is illegal in Israel, provided the
stations with Israeli government newscasts. Supported by donations from
U.S. right-wing evangelicals, and in particular by Pat Robertson's
Christian Broadcasting Network, the stations were "used as a military
tool" by the Israeli proxy South Lebanon Army.""

Aside from the religious right and their secular allies, the Guatemalan
model villages have been universally condemned. Until 1985 a bipartisan
majority opposed the granting of any U.S. aid that would strengthen the
development poles. '^' This, of course, stopped short of undercutting
support for the "pacification" program, as funds received from U.S. AID
and other foreign sources freed up government funds for use on the model
villages. In 1984, U.S. AID granted Guatemala $1 million which was used
for constructing infrastructure for the model villages.'" Americas Watch
Vice Chairman Aryeh Neier pointed out that humanitarian assistance from
the U.S. has "played an essential role in the Guatemalan Army's
counterinsurgency programs," enabling the army to distribute (or with-
hold) food to exact compliance with its resettlement program. '^^

Even with the transition to an elected government in 1986, the model
villages continued under military control. The military made sure of that:
before it turned power over to its civilian successors, the Mejia Victores
regime promulgated a series of decrees defining the programs relating to the
poles of development as part of the "counterinsurgency," and thus its
purview."*

126 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

The model villages also received the economic backing of the elected
government of President Vinicio Cerezo, which exempted vegetable
exports from a proposed tax on exports.'" In the first few months of
Cerezo's administration, new villages were begun in Alta Verapaz and El
Quiche departments.''*

This is not so surprising when it is recalled that the Guatemalan
military decided to step aside (formally speaking) because during the final
six years of its rule the nation's once-robust economy had withered. The
quetzal had declined from its half-century of parity with the dollar to 3.80
in late 1 985.'" Most foreign funders had conditioned aid to Guatemala on
the election of a civilian government. Wishing to avoid responsibility for
the sinking economy, the Guatemalan military ceded some of the trappings
of power to obtain foreign aid for its pacification program ."^

In 1984, elections were held to seat a Constituent Assembly, charged
with writing a constitution. Two rounds of presidential elections followed
in late 1 985. While the 1 985 election campaign was in progress Col. Byron
Disrael Lima, the commander of Quiche department and head of the local
"Interinstitutional Coordinator," a body set up by the army to extend its
direct control to every locality, noted that even after the transfer to civilian
government, military influence on the local body would continue. Lima
believed that was the natural order of things. He noted that,

there's a civilian wave in Latin America now, but that doesn't
mean military men will lose their ultimate power. Latins take
commands from men in uniform. ..The civilians don't work
until we tell them to work. They need our protection, control
and direction.

Lima went on to express his admiration for Napoleon and Hitler and his
respect for conquerers and "warriors" like the Israelis.'"

Also in Quiche, a model village resident said "here we don't know
about political parties. I don't know what party I would vote for. The
lieutenant says that political parties are not good for us."'*"

In June 1986 Guatemalan refugees, Mayans living under the protec-
tion of sanctuary workers in the U.S., told a reporter for National Public
Radio that if they return the Cerezo government says they must go first to
an indoctrination camp and then be assigned to a model village.'*'

The real tragedy is the number of foreign officials willing to be fooled.
In January 1985, Rep. Stephen Solarz visited Guatemala City and
promised a resumption of U.S. aid as soon as power was turned over to a
civilian government.'"'^

In the Autumn of 1 986 President Cerezo toured Europe and assured
less-than-skeptical heads of state that human rights abuses in Guatemala

Israel and Central America

127

had ceased. Beyond the massive assault on the rights of those confined to
model villages, the kidnappings, disappearances and broad-daylight execu-
tions had continued since Cerezo's January 14, 1986 inauguration and
were still going on as he spoke. The European media carried the allegations
about the ongoing official violence in Guatemala by representatives of
GAM, the Mutual Support Group, made up of relatives of the dis-
appeared,'*' but Germany, France, and Belgium did not flinch from
commitments made that summer to provide aid to Guatemala.'**

Inroads into Economic and Political Life

As with its links to South Africa, Israel's military relations with
Guatemala have led to a number of economic and political bonds. The
Guatemalan ambassador to Israel summed up the present state of bilateral
relations:

From Israel, we buy electronics, radar and communications
equipment and we send it civilian machinery for repairs.
Likewise, dozens of young Guatemalan professionals attend
international cooperation centers to acquire Israeli know-how,
especially in agronomic industry. Israel imports from Guate-
mala coffee, cardamom, precious wood, Guatemalan crafts,
sesame and nickel amongst others, and provides technical
assistance for the exploitation of Guatemala's many natural
resources. This forms the basis for the excellent relations that
fortunately exist between the peoples and governments of
Guatemala and Israel.'*^

For Guatemala, it was easy: "We're isolated internationally," said a
prominent Guatemalan. "The only friend we have left in the world is
Israel."'*^ Toward the end of his rule, Gen. Mejia Victores was scheduled
to visit Israel but had to cancel the trip when a political and economic crisis
erupted.'*' As with the leaders of the apartheid government, the Guate-
malan head of state would not have received a warm welcome in many
other countries.

The bonds have been building for several years. On June 15, 1982,
just nine days after Israel invaded Lebanon, Guatemala's Minister of
Economy Julio Matheu Duchez visited Israel to sign a trade agreement
under which each nation granted the other "most-favored nation" status
and pledged to cooperate in the fields of industry, agriculture, development.

128 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

and tourism. Signing for Israel was Trade and Industry Minister Gideon
Pat, who disclosed that a joint commission of representatives from each
country would meet "from time to time" to monitor the agreement's
implementation.'**

According to George Black, the tourism component of the agreement
involved a special pitch to Jewish communities in New York, Miami and
Los Angeles about the wonders of Guatemala. Discussions were held
between Israel's El Al airlines, Guatemala's AVIATECA and Air Florida
about joint promotion campaigns involving the Sheraton Hotel in Guate-
mala City. The hotel is owned by the Kong family, "which has extensive
links to the far-right Movement of National Liberation (MLN).">*'

American Jews might be targeted because apparently it is not safe for
Israelis to tour Guatemala. The Israeli consul in Guatemala said he could
not guarantee one of his countrymen's safety. '™ The threat might not come
only from the insurgents: by 1985 there were complaints among Guate-
malan noncombatants about Israel's extensive involvement in Guatemala's
internal affairs.

On November 17, 1983, according to the Guatemala-based Central
America Report, the two signed another trade and economic cooperation
agreement, its purpose "to strengthen friendly and commercial relations
and to facilitate as far as possible economic cooperation on a basis of
equality and mutual ad vantages. "'^^

Israel also promised help with Guatemala's telephone system,'" and
an Israeli arms dealer set up a school for training telephone company
personnel. 'J*

Israeli firms are now said to have extensive agribusiness investments,
held through intermediaries, in Guatemala.'^^

Israeli "security" firms have also found employment in Guatemala,
sending rent-a-Rambo commandos to implement security for wealthy
planters. These portable goon squads, which have proliferated in Israel as
the large officer corps reaches retirement age in a soured economy, are by
no means strictly private operations. All must pass a government test and all
the techniques and equipment they take abroad must be approved by the
defense ministry.'^'

Israel's Tadiran and South Africa's Consolidated Power have estab-
lished a joint undertaking in Guatemala to assemble and sell electronic
equipment.'^' Always eager for international contact. South Africa fol-
lowed Israel to Guatemala where it too is involved in advising the
"pacification" program.'^^ \^ gaj.|y 1980s, the white government also
offered to send counterinsurgency troops to Guatemala.'^' The relation-
ship clicked with the Guatemalan military. In August 1986, the army

Israel and Central America 129

overrode the national assembly's motion to break diplomatic relations with
the apartheid regime.'^"

Israel began dealing arms out of Guatemala. Eagle Military Gear
Overseas set up shop on a secure floor of the Cortijo Reforma Hotel in
Guatemala City, opposite army headquarters. In 1 982 Ignacio Klich wrote
that Eagle's Tel Aviv headquarters was referring Central American buyers
to its regional sales office in Guatemala.'" Also known as Eagle Israeli
Armaments and Desert Eagle, the company is owned by Pesakh Ben-Or,
an Israeli paratrooper who got his start in arms dealing as chauffeur for
another Israeli arms dealer. '^^ By one account Ben-Or drove for David
Marcus Katz, an Israeli who has lived for many years in Mexico and is
known as one of Israel's major arms dealers.'*^

Under the military regime, Ben-Or's links to the Guatemalans were
said to be so good that

almost all the representatives of the Israeli arms factories,
security apparatus and electronics firms who want to establish
connections in Guatemala arrive at the conclusion that it is better
to do it through him.'**

That includes the giants Israeli Military Industries and Tadiran — Ben-
Or claims to have had a hand in the army communications school —
although these behemoths are said not to have a high opinion of him."'

According to a contra leader, the contras' chief link to Israel is through
the Israeli embassy in Guatemala City. Pesakh Ben-Or also sold arms to the
contras through the armed forces of Honduras, although it is not clear
whether he made the sale through Eagle in Guatemala or from his residence
in Miami.'*'

Israel got close enough to Guatemala to exercise more than a bit of
leverage in internal Guatemalan affairs. There was the overthrow of Chief
of State Romeo Lucas Garcia and his replacement with Rios Montt. There
was also Israel's more than active interest in the 1985 Guatemalan
presidential elections.

Although it was very evident to journalists that Israel did not enjoy
wide popularity among the population as a whole,'*' Israel had clout where
it mattered, as was demonstrated early on in the campaign, when all the
major candidates met with Latin American B'nai B'rith representatives and
pledged to work on the continued improvement of relations with Israel.
The candidate of the ultra-right MLN party, Mario Sandoval Alarcon,
pledged to move Guatemala's embassy to Jerusalem.'**

Israel was trying very hard in 1985 to persuade Guatemala — and
Haiti, Honduras, Panama and Uruguay — to follow in the footsteps of El
Salvador and move to Jerusalem.'*' Already very close to Israel in 1980,

130 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

when the UN asked all governments to relocate their embassies to Tel
Aviv, Guatemala resisted the move. However, threatened by Arab buyers
of its important cardamom crop, Guatemala reluctantly transferred its
embassy. At the same time its foreign ministry said the move to Tel Aviv
"would not alter Guatemala's traditional political stance toward Israel."''"

Pesakh Ben-Or promised a $ 1 0,000 campaign contribution to one of
the candidates, Jorge Carpio Nicolle, "and at a certain stage an additional
$50,000 was spoken of."''' This is only one of many reports of Israeli
contributions, which are often made to defense ministries in hopes of
gaining arms contracts.'" Ben-Or also hired Israelis to train a team of
bodyguards for candidate Carpio."'

Initially favored by the U.S., Carpio was openly antagonistic to
Nicaragua""* while Christian Democrat Vinicio Cerezo made it clear that
he would follow the military's policy of neutrality in the region and steer
clear of cooperating with the Reagan Administration's activities against
Nicaragua. Cerezo won.

Although candidate Cerezo said he would look into Israel's relations
with the military,'" when he worked out a deal with the military (pledging
no Argentine-style trials and no interference with such "security" matters
as the development poles) and promised the landed aristocracy that there
would be no agrarian reform,"* he might have included maintenance of the
Israeli connection as part of the package. Attending Cerezo's inauguration,
Israel's labor minister somewhat embarrasedly explained to the new
president that Israel was not involved in Ben-Or's campaign activities.'"

When Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir visited Central America the
following May, Guatemala was one of the stops on his itinerary. It was
expected that Shamir would receive a chilly reception, "^ but from what
could be observed, he had a full measure of official attention, meeting with
President Cerezo and addressing the national legislature."'

Whether or not Israel was disappointed with the outcome of the
elections, Hebrew-speaking security operatives stood guard at the election
night press center.'^" A few weeks after the inauguration of President
Cerezo, Defense Minister Gen. Jaime Hernandez Mendez said that the
Israeli ambassador to Guatemala had recently offered military cooperation
to the new government'" and, despite expectations that the U.S. would
displace Israel as Guatemala's prime military supplier, an Israeli source said
that Israel might indeed increase its military links with Guatemala. '^^
notable, however, that in restructuring the police, the Cerezo government
looked to Spain, Mexico and Venezuela for training and equipment.'"

Relations with civilian-run Guatemala remained cordial enough for
Israel to take on a bit of international diplomacy. During a July 1986 visit to

Israel and Central America

131

Israel, Manuel Esquivel, the prime minister of Belize, asked the Israeli
government to "use its influence" and act as a restraining force on
Guatemala. Esquivel said that Israel's arms sales to Guatemala gave the
Jewish state the "right to speak about, to influence the use of those arms."'^"*

In September 1 984, Belize, formerly British Honduras, had established
diplomatic relations with Israel for that very reason. Belize was in constant
fear of its neighbor, whose military rulers frequently trumpeted their
irredentist claims (usually when the Guatemalan economy merited having
popular attention deflected elsewhere). '^^

During Esquivel's 1986 visit, Israel was able to score a minor
diplomatic coup by bringing the Guatemalan ambassador to Israel to a state
dinner in his honor. The two sat at the same table.'^* It was the first time
that representatives of the two countries had such a meeting. Shortly after
the dinner encounter, Guatemala's President Vinicio Cerezo said if a
delegation from Belize came to Guatemala and requested a meeting he
would be happy to meet with them.'^'

Considering that the election that brought Cerezo to power was
geared toward obtaining aid from European nations, Guatemala was not
lacking in motivation to attend the dinner: better relations with Britain, a
member of the European Community would certainly help that process
along. Guatemala was at the same time moving toward the reestablish-
ment of diplomatic relations with London, broken in 1 98 1 over the issue of
Belize. '^' Although given independence in 1 98 1 , Belize has been protected
against Guatemala by a garrison of British soldiers. Nonetheless, it is not
often that Israel, in its international isolation, has had an opportunity to
play such a role.

Israeli advisers continue to work in Guatemala. During his 1 986 visit,
Shamir said he had offered to increase the technical and scientific links that
bring many Guatemalans on scholarship to Israel each year. Exactly how
many are involved in the development poles is not known. An Israeli
foreign ministry spokesperson admitted to three Israelis, t eaching "irri ga-
tion and^ te chniq ues for org^anizing youthjrioyemgnts and community
centers." "' The numbers are also probably euphemistic.

Certainly the advisers are not a democratizing force. Mercedes Sotz
Cate, the financial secretary of the Guatemalan Municipal Workers Union,
was seized and tortured for five hours on February 12,1986. His abduction
came at the beginning of a violent union-busting campaign by the mayor of
Guatemala City, Alvaro Arzu Irigoyen. Sotz said that his torturers were
Israeli agents in the employ of the mayor. When questioned, Arzu
"admit[ted] only to people of different nationality who work for the city

132 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

without a salary." At least one Israeli was identified as part of a group
"advising" the municipality and Arzu confirmed this."^

As to Israel's influence over Guatemala: whatever else it was, it made
the military government impervious to U.S. wishes. In 1979 the Carter
Administration proposed restoring a $250,000 military training grant to
Guatemala out of concern "that U.S. relations with the Guatemalan
military were deteriorating to the point of endangering all of Washington's
mfluence in the largest and most populous Central American country."

The Carter State Department wanted to have Guatemalan officers and
military technicians back for training in the U.S. "as a wedge to get back on
better terms with the military leaders.""' Congress didn't buy this, just as it
did not yield to the Reagan Administration's far more passionate represen-
tations for a reestablishment of ties with Guatemala.

The extent of Guatemala's independence from U.S. pressure was
clearly evident in 1983 and 1984, when the Reagan Administration was
trying to organize Central America against Nicaragua. Guatemala refused
to participate in the reactivation of CONDECA, a regional military pact
established in 1964, and, irrespective of the shrill anti-communism of its
domestic politics, continued to adhere to a neutral— sometimes an even
vaguely supportive— position toward Nicaragua. A National Security
Council document classed this position "a continuing problem" and
proposed increasing pressure on Guatemala."*

Indeed, while ignorning Reagan entreaties for cooperation, the
Guatemalan government under Mejia Victores sought to approach Wash-
ington through Israel, lobbying the 1 1th convention of the Federation of
Jewish Communities of Central America and Panama, held in Guatemala
City, to help Guatemala improve its relations with the U.S. Addressing the
convention, Guatemala's foreign minister "denounced U.S. policy toward
Guatemala as not equitable and praised Israel's friendship and coop-
eration.""^

Abdication of Responsibility

It is a mistake to conclude that U.S. complicity in the genocidal war of
the Guatemalan generals ended when the Carter Administration pulled the
plug on military aid in 1 977. When the U.S. intervened in Guatemala and
overthrew its liberal, democratically elected government in 1954,"^ it
effectively transferred rule to the country's military, which has held power
ever since. Even the civilian presidency of Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro

Israel and Central America 133

was (with U.S. acquiescence) immediately subjugated by the military."'
To cite only one example of the continuity that makes the last three tragic
decades of Guatemala a U.S. responsibility: the dossiers that formed the
basis of the intelligence unit G-2's death squad selection process also date
back to 1 954. After the fall of the government of Jacobo Arbenz, the army
confiscated the membership lists of the many organizations which had
blossomed during the all-too-short hiatus between repressive regimes —
Guatemala was ruled by the oppressive dictator Jorge Ubico until 1 945,
when he was bloodlessly replaced by a popular government under Dr. Juan
Jose Arevalo — and from these lists culled 70,000 "communists." These
files were updated during the 1960s and used for assassinations during a
U.S. -supported counterinsurgency."^ In the 1970s Israel stepped in and
helped with the computerization of the whole bloody system.

It does not take convoluted reasoning to conclude that "both the U.S.
and Israel bear rather serious moral responsibility" for Guatemala."' Since
1978, however, Congress has done little more than beat down the most
outrageous of President Reagan's requests for aid for the military regime.
Nor did large numbers of peace and solidarity activists mount an active
campaign, even when the slaughter reached a peak.

Major Israeli Weapons Sales to Guatemala

Item

Comments

Reference Source

7 201-IAI Arava
planes

10 201-IAI Arava
planes

5 troop-carrying
Asimo helicopters

10 RBY MK armored
cars

Ordered and delivered
1976

Ordered 1977; deliv-
ered 1977-78

Delivered 1974-77

5 field kitchens

4 delivered 1974-77

SIPRI, Yearbook 1977, p. 316.

SIPRI, Yearbook 1978, p 262;
SIPRI, Yearbook, 1979, pp.
214-215.

"Growing Arms Race in Cen-
tral America May Heat up Re-
gion, " Christian Science
Monitor, 28 October 1981.

U.S. Congress, House, Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, Eco-
nomic and Military Aid
Programs, p 84.

Ibid.; Klieman, Israel's Global
Reach, p. 135.

(continues)

1 3 4 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

(continued)

Item

Comments

Reference Source

50,000 Galil assault
rifles

1,000 machine guns

3 naval coast guard

ships
(Dabur boats)

Grenade launchers
81-mm mortars
120 tons of ammuni-
tion

Bulletproof vests
Military tents

Shields
Tear gas
Gas masks

Fire ejectors

Tactical transmission
system

Radar system

High-tech products:

• Radar

• Intelligence infor-
mation computing

15,000 delivered
1974-77

Talks started in 1978

Arrived in Guatemala's
Santo Tomas de Castilla
port 3 months after sus-
pension of U. S. military
aid

Bought by Interior
Minister Donaldo Al-
varez in 1980 visit to
Israel

Used to burn bushes
and people. Captured
by EGP from govern-
ment troops

Cover the whole coun-
try. Bought 1977 or
1978

Has 5 receivers. Bought
end 1980. Israeli con-
trolled and directed

Christian Science Monitor, 28
October 1981.

Ibid.

Mauricio Goldstein, "Con
Armas Israelis Asesinan al
Pueblo Guatemalteco, " Punto
Final Internacional, August
1981, p 14; interview with
"Emilcar," nom de guerre,
high ranking official in the Po-
litical Wing of the Guatemalan
EGP, Managua, Nicaragua, 18
August 1982.

Goldstein, Punto Final Inter-
nacional, August 1981, p 14;
Nuevo Diario, 28 September
1981.

Ha'aretz, April 1979, quoted
in Ignacio Klich, "Guatemala's
Back- Door Arms Deals," 8
Days, 13 March 1982.

Interview with Emilcar

Ibid.

Ibid.; "Israel Aliado de la Dic-
tadura Guatemalteca," OLP
Informa (Mexico City), April
1982, p 8.

Ibid.; News from Cuatemala 3
(October 1981): 1.

Latin America Weekly Report,
5 September 1980, p 8; El
Dia, 8 May 1982: interview
with Emilcar; John Rettie,

Israel and Central America

135

(continued)

Item

Comnients

Reference Source

and communica-
tions equipment
• Radar circuits to .
detect guerrillas
smuggling arms

Helmets

5 million rifle bul-
lets

h-

Bought in 1977 for $1.8
million through David
Marcus Katz

Shipload light arms 65 tons delivered 1977

10,000 105-mm
HEAT (high-ex-
plosive anti-tank)
ammunition

Kfir fighters

Supplied 1981-82 to
the army for $6 million

Unspecified number

Manchester Guardian Weekly,
10 January 1982.

Le Monde, 25 January 1979.

Excelsior, 18 July 1977, p 2A;
interview with Emilcar.

SIPRI, Yearbook 1980, p 144.
SIPRI, Yearbook 1982, p 188.

Klieman, Israel's Global
Reach, p 135.

Chart from Bishara Bahbah, Israel and Latin America: The Military Connection, New York: St. Martin'.s, 1986.

Nicaragua Under Somoza

Stretching Somoza's Lifeline

With few qualms and minimal outside criticism, Israel came to the
rescue of Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza Debayle and, from
September 1978toJuly 1979, helped him stave off history. Later itwould
be thrown up to Israel that when Washington and just about every other
government in the world was boycotting Somoza, Israel had been willing
to provide him with weapons.

But Israel was indebted to Nicaragua, was always the rejoinder. The
"debt" in actuality was not to Nicaragua, but to the father of Somoza
Debayle, Anastasio Somoza Garcia, who had been installed as head of the
National Guard by the U.S. marines in 1 93 3 and had muscled his way into
what he called the "presidency"— it was definitely the top spot in the
government — the following year.

Somoza Garcia was assassinated in 1956. For the next eleven years a
son Luis and a chorus line of Somoza relatives filled his position, which was
finally assumed by his son Anastasio Somoza Debayle. The debt of which
the Israelis speak was incurred in the late 1 930s when Somoza Garcia acted
as a front for arms purchases the pre-state Zionist military forces, the
Haganah, made in Europe. He was well paid for the trouble he took to sign
his name to the required documents.

137

138 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

After World War II, Somoza gave Haganah buyers Nicaraguan
diplomatic passports and again signed the receipts for the weapons they
purchased. He took cash up front for his services, over $200,000 deposited
in his personal New York bank account and a large diamond and some other
gifts on the side. He never complained about a balance due.'

Some Israeli leaders might have cherished feelings of gratitude for
Anastasio Somoza Garcia. They might have wanted to do his son, who
visited Israel in 1 96 1 ^ a good turn. That there was a distinction between the
national entity, Nicaragua, blurred as it was by four decades of Somozas
who owned much of the country as well as ruled it, and the Somoza family
dynasty might not have occurred to the Israelis. It is remarkable that it has
not occurred to many in the United States.

If scales must be used, it should be taken into account that, following a
technical aid agreement in 1 966, Israel made Nicaragua a major beneficiary
of its development programs. It also provided emergency relief after
Nicaragua was devastated by an earthquake in 1972.'

To reckon its debt to the Somozas, Israel sometimes notes the
unswerving support Nicaragua gave it at the UN, voting in favor of Israel
more often than the U.S.!* Those votes, however, did not represent the
people of Nicaragua; they reflected the Somoza family's political interests,
primarily staying in the good graces of U.S.-connected loan givers.
Somoza Debayle was notorious for taking heavy commissions on loans to
the Nicaraguan government — sometimes even pocketing the loans them-
selves. Part of the $ 1 .6 billion debt left when he was driven from Nicaragua
was for loans to his own and his associates' private businesses. (The new
Nicaraguan government reluctantly assumed all the dictator's debts, as that
was the only way to obtain credit with Western lenders.^)

These Israeli debts were repaid in a strange coin to the people of
Nicaragua, who were bombed and shot with Israeli-supplied ordnance in a
carnage that went on for weeks, if not months, longer than it would have
without help from Israel, which supplied 98 percent of the dictator's
weaponry during the last six months of his rule.'

Somoza had been introduced to Israeli weapons in 1974 at a special
showing arranged for him in Managua.' He had bought Dabur class patrol
boats and Arava STOL aircraft; by the time he fought his final battle he
would have 14 Aravas to rush his troops from place to place. ^

Soon after Somoza's U.S. aid was blocked, insurrection flared against
him. In September 1978, there was fighting in most of Nicaragua's cities
and a massive general strike in Managua that was supported by virtually the
entire business community. Somoza shot his way out of it. His National
Guard used 1 ,000 Uzi submachine guns and Galil rifles from Israel, and

Israel and Central America

139

Somoza was expecting "thousands more" Galils.' Although most Latin
American leaders were hoping for his downfall, Somoza survived the
September challenge. "Israeli-made weapons helped to save the Somoza
dynasty," read one headline.'"

That autumn, Israeli rifles and ammunition arrived in large quantities.
Some of the Galil rifles were "sent directly to a special terror unit
commanded by Somoza's son, which carried out the murder of political
opponents, among them women and children."" The Guard also used the
new Israeli weapons in its "clean-up" operations, which went on during
October 1 9 78 in half a dozen cities. The majority of the victims — many of
them were shot by the Guard at their own front doors — were between 1 4
and 2 1 years of age and were marked for execution simply because they
lived in neighborhoods where the Sandinista National Liberation Front
(FSLN) had been active.'^

An Israeli adviser "who presented himself as an Israeli army officer"
was also present in Nicaragua and worked in Somoza's bunker in Managua.
The adviser allegedly represented David Marcus Katz, the Mexico-based
Israeli arms dealer with close ties to the right wing Israeli settlers
movement. Gush Emunim."

Israeli arms shipments continued to arrive. Several shipments came by
air and were delivered at night during a curfew. Among the weapons
delivered this way were surface-to-air missiles (although the Sandinistas
did not have an air force). Israel had at one point given its word that it
would not ship arms to Somoza. Now it denied doing so, but U.S. officials
said that Israeli arms were still arriving in Nicaragua. "Our people in
Managua tell us that the streets are starting to look like Jerusalem because
the National Guard is wearing Israeli berets," said one U.S. official.'*

By the following spring Israel was sending Somoza really big stuff:
nine combat-armed Cessna aircraft and two Sikorsky helicopters. The
FSLN shbt down seven of the Cessnas.'^ Somoza got better use out of the
helicopters, which he called "skyraiders."'* He had his Guards use them as
platforms for machine gun strafing; and from 3,000 feet above ground,
soldiers rolled bombs out of the helicopter doors. '^

"The Government is dropping 500-pound bombs from helicopters on
rebel-held shantytowns, reportedly killing as many as 600 people in one
day. Soldiers routinely kill suspected rebels they capture," wrote the New
York Times correspondent in Managua of the final weeks of the war.'^ After
having all but five cities and a great part of Nicaragua's industrial
infrastructure destroyed," on July 17, 1979, Somoza cleaned out the
national treasury and fled the country.

1 40 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Less than three weeks earher, Israel had at last agreed to honor a
request from the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv to halt its weapons shipments
to Nicaragua. Israel ordered a freighter carrying two patrol boats to divert
its course from Nicaragua, and "agreed to call off other planned shipments
of ammunition and weaponry to Somoza for the time being. "2" Somoza
claimed that another ship carrying Israeli weapons was turned back only
miles from Nicaragua's coast and he could not get that shipment out of his
mind. The arms it carried, he said,

had been paid for before the ship ever left Israel... That ship
carried, among other military items, ten thousand anti-tank and
anti-personnel grenade rifles with ammunition... That precious
cargo could have won the war for the anti-Communist forces of
Nicaragua... Somewhere in Israel there is a large consignment of
arms and ammunition which could have saved Nicaragua.

Certainly there had been some criticism of Israel's role in the bloody
war against the Nicaraguan population. The opposition newspaper La
Prensa had said that the Nobel Peace Prize given to Israeli Prime Minister
Menachem Begin was "tainted" by Israel's arms sales to Somoza." And the
Costa Rican paper La Republica wrote that "the whole world should join in
asking Israel to stop sending weapons of aggression, oppression and
death...""

But in the United States, where the Carter human rights doctrine had
supposedly constituted a decisive step in the right direction, there were
blank stares— in the other direction. Somoza's henchmen are said to have
killed one member of every family in Nicaragua. It seems fairly obvious in
retrospect that many Nicaraguan lives might have been saved had peace and
solidarity activists in this country made loud and persistent demands that
Israeli arms shipments be stopped.

There had been so little public interest in what Israel was doing for
Somoza, however, that the State Department felt secure in dishing out
nonsense on the subject. A representative from Nicaragua's Broad Opposi-
tion Front visited Washington in November 1978 to ask the Carter
Administration to stop the Israeli arms shipments. A State Department
source said the appeal had been rejected and that the administration had
decided not to prevent Israel from supplying "light weapons" to Somoza:
"If Somoza goes, we would prefer to see him go peacefully. We would not
like to see him toppled in an armed revolt." The thinking was that, given
time, a "moderate element" might emerge to succeed the dictator.

Forcing Israel to stop supplying Somoza with arms "remained a U.S.
option that might be used in the future," continued the source, who
expressed confidence that although there was no legal mechanism by which

Israel and Central America 141

the U.S. could stop Israel, U.S. influence could certainly force a halt to
Israeli gunrunning.^^

When the administration fin3ily did compel a halt to the Israeli arms
shipments the reason it gave was strikingly similar: "additional arms would
undercut efforts to replace Somoza with a moderate government.""

In the aftermath of the war, leaders of the victorious FSLN presented
Cuban leader Fidel Castro with a Galil rifle captured from the National
Guard. Nicaragua repudiated the small debt remaining on the books for
Somoza's arms purchases from Israel." Relations between Israel and the
new Nicaraguan government were frosty; according to one account the
nonresident Israeli ambassador to Nicaragua did not receive accreditation
from the new government. 2** Nicaragua invited the PLO, with which some
of the Sandinistas had long had close ties, to establish an embassy in
Managua and in 1981 warmly welcomed the organization's leader, Yasir
Arafat. On August 6, 1982, citing the "annihilation" of Lebanese and
Palestinians during Israel's siege of Beirut, Nicaragua announced that it was
breaking diplomatic relations with Israel.^'

There is a certain symmetry to all the indebtedness: Somoza I giving
his friendship for cash in advance; Somoza II giving his support at the UN,
and then paying cash up front for weapons. And then, years later, the
wretched remnants of the National Guard turning up in Israel, claiming
that last boatload of weapons. By then they were called contras.

There is another dire symmetry to this story: while Israel's relatively
autonomous aid to Somoza delighted the forces of the far-right who were
blocked by the Carter Administration from aiding him themselves, when
the contras were created and thrown against Nicaragua by the Reagan
Administration, Israel was a reluctant participant, but nonetheless a key
one, demanding a heavy price for its help.

Major Israeli Weapons Sales to Nicaragua

Item

Comments

Reference Source

14 201-IAI Arava Ordered 1973. 5 deliv-
planes ered 1974, the rest

1975-77. Unit cost
$650,000

4 armed patrol boats Only one or two are
left. Somoza loyalists
used the rest to flee

SIPRI, Yearbook 1974. p. 282,
Yearbook, 1975, p. 240, Year-
book, 1977, p. 330.

Newsweek, 20 November
1978, p. 68; Interview with
Marwan Tahbub, PLO Ambas-
sador, Managua, Nicaragua, 15
August 1982.

(continues)

142 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY
(continued)

Item

Comments

Reference Source

1 light military
transport plane

67 tactical radios

Helicopters
Small patrol boat
Heavy mortars
Machine guns

Heavy combat tanks
Light artillery
Missile launchers
Patrol vehicles
Helicopters

2-3 radars

Trucks

Flack jackets
Mortars

Missiles

500 Uzi submachine
guns

500 Gahl assault ri-
fles

5 plane loads of
arms

Most likely Westwind Le Monde, 4 July 1979.

2 plane loads of
arms

Delivered 1974-77, Val-
ued at $0.3 million

Delivered 1978

Old Sherman tanks de-
livered May 1975.
Other cargo ships were
in route

Delivered to Somoza
but no time to set them
up

Anti-aircraft, surface-to-
surface missiles and
ground-to-ground mis-
siles. Delivered secretly
by two Israeli planes

Delivered November
1978. Planes landed at
a private track in Mon-
telimar, east of Man-
agua

Delivered at Las Mer-
cedes Airport
November 1978. Other
sources indicated there
were 3 planes

U.S. Congress, House, Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs, Eco-
nomic and Military Aid
Programs, p 84.

Latin America Weekly Report,
16 May 1980, p 10.

Ha'aretz, 10 May 1978; inter-
view with Ambassador Tah-
bub.

Interview with Ambassador
Tahbub.

Newsweek, 20 November
1978, p 68.

Ibid.; New York Times, 19
November 1978; Excelsior, 8
June 1979, p 20A.

Newsweek, 20 November
1978, p 68; Haolam Haze, 4
October 1978.

El Sol, 18 November 1978.

Jerusalem Post, 15 November
1978; Newsweek, 20 November
1978, p 68.

Israel and Central America

143

(continued)

Item

Comments

Reference Source

Sea-to-sea missiles

T-54 and T-55
tanks

World Business, 6 October
1980.

Klieman, Israel's Global
Reach, p 135.

Chart from Bishara Bahbah, hrael and Latin America: The Military Connection, New York: St. Maj

Israel and the Contras

Some accounts set the commencement of Israeli aid to the contras as far
back as their launching in 1979.' It is even possible that Israel made a
seamless transition from Somoza to the contras through its contacts with
some of the figures in the private network that was exposed when the
Iran-contra scandal broke in November 1986 (see below). A part of this
network "began funneling aid to Somoza via Israel and EATSCO," a
shipping company created by other members of the network to take
advantage of the U.S. weapons Egypt would be receiving as a result of the
Camp David accords, after the Carter Administration cut off aid to
Nicaragua.^ When the dictator was ousted, network associates of former
CIA agent Edwin Wilson — now serving time in federal prison for selling
explosives to Libya, among other deeds — and former CIA agent Thomas
Clines transferred a "security assistance program" they had put together
for Somoza to the contras.' This would have involved outfitting the dregs
of Somoza's secret police in Honduras, a cynical holding operation that
continued until January 1981, when the Reagan Administration took
office.*

One of the administration's first moves was to arrange with Argentina
for trainers for the contras. Veterans of the Argentine "dirty war" were
enthusiastic about exporting their skills and their politics. They trained the
contras until Washington and Buenos Aires came to a parting of the ways,
after the Reagan Administration sided with Britain during the Mal-

145

1 46 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

vinas/Falklands War.^ During the Argentine period, the Israeli ambassador
to Costa Rica supplied the contras with passports and aliases so that they
could travel through Central America/ Besides traveling for their own
"business," at least one contra has been implicated in a Central American
assassination: that of the revered Archbishop of San Salvador, Oscar
Arnulfo Romero.'

At the same time, the administration approached Israel to become
mvolved in the assault on Nicaragua: in a pattern that was later to become
apparent as the raison d'etre of the Iran-contra scandal, sometime before June
1 98 1 Israel was provided with satellite pictures of Iraq's nuclear reactor at
Osirak "within the framework of an appeal to Israel for help to the
contras." Israel used the pictures to destroy the reactor.* It is not known to
what extent, if any, Tel Aviv responded to the administration's appeal.

By late 1 982, however, Nicaragua was accusing Israel of arming and
aiding the rag-tag bands of National Guardsmen in Honduras.'

The best-substantiated knowledge of Israel's entry into the war
against Nicaragua is its agreement with the CIA in either 1981 or 1982 to
supply East bloc weapons to the then-covert mercenary operation. After
having been "restrained" a bit by Congress during the 1 970s, the CIA was
experiencing difficulty procuring "untraceable" weapons for the contras
and was embarrassed when some of the mercenaries appeared on U.S.
television in early 1982 brandishing U.S. weapons. In a display of caution
that would mark all their dealings with the contras, the Israeli government
made a pretense of refusing U.S. requests for such weapons "through
normal diplomatic channels," while some former Israeli intelligence
officials approached the CIA with an offer to supply East bloc arms, which
Israel has in abundance. The Agency assumed that the offer had the
backing, awareness or sponsorship of the Israeli government. There is
some question as to whether the CIA accepted this particular offer,'" but an
arrangement was indeed made in the early 1 980s to supply the contras with
East bloc light arms and shoulder-fired missiles, selling the weapons
through the CIA, which in turn passed them on to the contras and the
Afghan rebels. This particular arrangement apparently continued until
1986, "[w]hen the Israelis presented their bill for $50 million... [and] the
CIA pleaded poverty, paying $30 million in arms, not cash.""

Former FDN Director Edgar Chamorro said the contras were
speaking of Israel as an international supporter in 1982.12 December of
that year, the FDN leadership met with Ariel Sharon, Israel's defense
minister, while he was on a visit to Honduras. An arrangement was made at
that time to funnel Israeli-held East bloc arms to the contras through
Honduras. '3

Israel and Central America 147

Sharon's activities during and after that visit suggest that he and Gen.
Gustavo Alvarez Martinez, the head of Honduras' armed forces, made the
Reagan Administration an offer to take over the contra program. In Israel
recriminations were being directed at Sharon over the debacle of Israel's
invasion of Lebanon, which Sharon had muscled through the government.
Sharon arrived unannounced in Honduras, because, it was said, no one in
Washington had been willing to receive him.'* He would shordy be
relieved of his defense portfolio following an investigation that established
his responsibility in the massacres of Palestinians in the Sabra and Chatila
refugee camps.

Accompanying Sharon were the director of the Israeli defense
ministry and David Marcus Katz, Israel's Mexico-based arms agent.

Although Sharon denied having come to deal arms, news immediately
spread that he and Alvarez were trying to close a deal for Israel's Kfir C-2
jet fighter planes.'*

As the Kfir contains a U.S. -made engine, Israel needed U.S. permis-
sion to sell the aircraft to Honduras. Washington had been refusing to sell
Honduras the comparable F-5 because it did not want to introduce a new
level of sophistication in the region's armaments. It was feared that
acquisition by Honduras of such an advanced plane would justify
Nicaragua's obtaining the equivalent MiG; and that, the administration had
made excruciatingly clear, would be regarded as a "provocation"'^ likely to
be met with an airstrike — or worse.

Even though there could be no deal for the Kfir without the blessing of
the U.S., Alvarez and Sharon agreed to the sale of 12 of the aircraft,'* at a
price of $100 million. Honduras had no money for the deal (and lots of
starving, illiterate people, but that didn't bother either buyer or seller), so
Sharon asked the Reagan Administration to finance it." An agreement
Israel signed with the U.S. in 1979 included such a funding mechanism,
which is most unusual, as it flies in the face of the rationale for U.S. military
assistance— the recipient must "buy American. "^o However, until late
1986 there was no evidence that Washington had ever contemplated
bankrolling an Israeli arms sale.

The only thing that could possibly have tempted the Reagan White
House into such a deal would have been a Sharon- Alvarez proposal to take
over the contras, which were then in the process of being abandoned by
their Argentine trainers.

There is no question that Sharon and Alvarez would have enjoyed
leading the mercenaries into Nicaragua. Alvarez was an obsessive anti-
communist and an advocate of the Argentine-style security state. Whether
against Nicaragua or his domestic oponents, he advocated "preventive"

148 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

war without frontiers.^' Ariel Sharon once said Israel's own "strategic and
security concerns" stretched from Central Africa to "beyond the Arab
countries in the Middle East."^^ Going in the other direction, he said that
Israel had strength enough to "reach the gates of Odessa." Sharon would
have played to the administration's obsession with the "Soviet threat" in
Central America.^'

Even though it would soon be pressing Israel to do exactly what
Sharon put forward, the Reagan Administration did not accept Sharon's
proposition, most likely because Sharon was roundly disliked in Wash-
ington^* and other Israeli officials might have nixed any dealings with him.

Four years later, when U.S.-Israeli dealings over the contras had
become firmly established, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin offered
NSC staffer Oliver North 20-50 Spanish-speaking advisers for the contras
in exchange for approval of the sale of Kfirs to Honduras." In 1982,
however it would have been difficult for the administration to finance the
sale of Kfirs to Honduras without exposing to the public, especially to the
Congress, a great deal more of its thinking about Nicaragua (i.e., that its
real plans had nothing to do with interdicting arms to the Salvadoran rebels.
Its excuse at that time, but were really aimed at overthrowing the
government in Managua). The then-burgeoning CIA might have been
plannmg to make a big splash with Nicaragua; it would be several months
before the full glare of congressional scrutiny withered the agency's
grasping tentacles and sent the administration begging to Israel.

In 1 983 reports of Israeli weapons shipments to the contras surfaced.
ARDE, the Costa Rica-based Revolutionary Democratic Alliance contra
group led by Eden Pastora had received 500 AK rifles from Israel.^* In
October 1983, FDN— the Nicaraugan Democratic Front— Director Edgar
Chamorro said that the Honduran-based main mercenary force had
received 2,000 AK-47s from Israel." At the time, that was one-quarter of
the FDN's armed membership.

It is interesting that while the FDN mercenaries were most closely
identified with the Somoza regime which Israel had aided so loyally, it was
with ARDE in Costa Rica that Israel seemed to be the most involved in
1983 and 1984. Pastora had fought with distinction (and flamboyance) in
the revolution and had been in the Sandinista government. It is widely
understood that Pastora quit the Directorate, the government that held
power in Nicaragua prior to the November 1984 elections, when he
realized that he would not be top dog. That he then chose to actively
oppose Managua might also be attributed to his suspected links to the CIA,
dating back to before the fall of Somoza.^s

Israel and Central America 149

Pastora always distinguished himself from the FDN leaders, who
were close associates of Somoza. It is not clear that his men were so
ideologically discriminating. Many deserted him for the paymasters of the
;FDN when the CIA, after sustained attempts including a May 1984
bombing that claimed the lives of eight bystanders, finally succeeded in
shutting ARDE do wn.^' But in 1 983-84 Pastora made it a point of pride to
claim that he received no money from the CIA. The agency went along
with this contention, as Pastora was an attractive exhibit for members of
Congress who got a little queasy about the Somocistas in Honduras. It
was also hoped that he could win over some elements of the Socialist
International.

However, it was generally assumed that Pastora was receiving
laundered CIA support.^" Certainly the CIA was active in Costa Rica,
bribing officials to tolerate the presence of the contras" and running its own
mercenaries, a motley bunch of Europeans (some with service for the South
African minority regime) and right-wing Vietnam veterans.'^

Israel was apparently one of a number of channels through which arms
and funds came to Pastora, and the date when the pipeline was turned on
can be set rather precisely to July or August 1983. In June of that year,
ARDE had been on the verge of folding, its coffers down to $3,000. In
September Pastora was able to increase his guerrilla force from 300 to
between 2,000 and 3,000 and was planning to arm an additional 2,000 to
3,000. He boasted of "increased donations from individuals in Venezuela,
Colombia, Mexico, Peru and some European countries," as well as "private
American organizations and some Jewish groups." But later, pointing to
the armaments he had received, Pastora said, "only the CIA or the Israelis
could give us these."'* Pastora also told one reporter that the Israeli
ambassador had offered to sell him weapons.'^

The mention of assistance from Jewish groups was a repetitive theme
with ARDE. It is not clear whether ARDE leaders used "Jews" as a
euphemism for Israel, or if one or more U.S. Jewish organizations had
actually been funding the contras.

Alfonso Robelo, then political leader of ARDE, said the mercenary
grouping received "financial aid from German and Venezuelan citizens,
Mexican organizations, U.S. Jewish organizations, as well as from
Germans and Cubans in exile." He said he did not care where these donors
got the funds they gave ARDE.'* Another time Robelo reeled off a list of
ARDE backers that included "the democrats of Venezuela and Mexico, the
Nicaraguan exile community [colonias nicaraguenses] and the Jewish com-
munities of the United States."'' Yet another time Robelo said "we are

1 50 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

receiving help from many democrats and private companies in France,
Spain, Venezuela, Mexico, Colombia, and even Jews. "^s

Israeli arms also reached ARDE through Panama. In the autumn of
1 985, Alvin Weeden, a Panamanian attorney and former secretary general
of the Popular Action Party (PAPO), said that Gen. Manuel Antonio
Noriega, commander-in-chief of the Panama Defense Forces, had been
obtaining the "materiel needed by the Southern Front to continue its
struggle" from Israel. Noriega then distributed the supplies to ARDE, and,
according to Weeden, reaped profits for himself.

Weeden said his information came from Dr. Hugo Spadafora.
Spadafora, a Panamanian physician, had fought with other guerrilla
movements before volunteering with ARDE. Weeden, who said the
physician had left ARDE because of Pastora's close connection with
Noriega, had been engaged by Spadafora to represent him in making
declarations about Noriega's malfeasance and links with narcotraffickers.
Spadafora was gruesomely murdered soon after.^'

Israel had very close links with Noriega, who had met with "high-
ranking" Mossad agents in Canada and Europe as well as Panama. At one
point, U.S. intelligence agencies suspected that a campaign "contribution"
of many millions of dollars from Israel to Panamanian President Eric
Arturo Delvalle had been an indirect payoff to Noriega "who is well placed
to intercept and relay coded U.S. data on Latin America— a lucrative arms
market for Israel."^"

In early 1 984, as Congress took steps to curtail and then cut off funds
to the contras, Israeli support for the mercenaries "became crucial to the
war's continuation.'"" Several contra leaders said that they had made
arrangements to get Israeli assistance.''^

When their U.S. aid was all spent, Israeli aid to the mercenaries began
to escalate. In early 1985, both Reagan Administration officials and
members of Congress said that Israel had stepped up shipments of rifles,
grenades and ammunition and sent more advisers. «

At a March 3 1 press conference in Managua, government spokes-
person Rosa Passos announced that Nicaragua had intercepted a ship
delivering a large cargo of weapons to the contras in Honduras. The ship
had come from Asia, Passos said, and the shipment had been arranged by
the Israeli government.**

Nicaraguan soldiers were also finding Israeli-made weapons and
uniforms on dead contras.« A reporter for National Public Radio saw
Israeli-made artillery pieces at the FDN's Las Vegas camp in southern
Honduras.** In a display set up by the government in Managua, there were
many captured Israeli weapons.*^

Israel and Central America

151

Jack Terrell, a former mercenary now at the International Center for
Development Policy in Washington, said he was in Honduras when an
Israeli shipment arrived for the contras. Terrell also recounts an experience
that suggests that regular and frequent shipments came from Israel. In
November 1984, he asked FDN chief Adolfo Calero for Uzis and 9 mm
ammunition for a commando raid on Managua. Calero told him, "I'll get
this as soon as I can. We're expecting two ships in from Israel in February.
When they get in, you will get your stuff." Terrell said that the Uzis
arrived and were given out to the contras.

The sales were made by Israeli arms dealers, he said, and the
documents covering the shipment were signed by Honduran officials (who
made 30 percent on the deal).

Terrell also said that Adolfo Calero's brother Mario had been to Israel
to buy 10,000 AK-47s, said to have been captured in Lebanon.*^

Contra leaders said that they normally obtained arms from Israel
through the Israeli embassy in Guatemala. They explained that it was rare
for the contras to deal directly with Israel and even more unusual for one of
them to go to Israel. "We do not have a formal relationship with the
Israelis," explained a contra leader. "We work with them quietly, usually
outside Israel. There is no need for us to go direcdy to Israel."*'

This circumspection was dictated by Israel's fear that congressional
opponents of contra aid would be angered — a fear which later proved
unwarranted — if its contra connections were exposed in the U.S. media.

Yet in addition to the visit by Mario Calero, at least one other high-
ranking contra, Julio Montealegre, a Miami-based aide to Adolfo Calero,
went to Israel seeking arms — specifically Somoza's last consignment,
which Israel recalled just before the dictator fell. Montealegre spent two
weeks in Israel in January/February 1986.'° It is ironic that the contras,
whose Washington backers tried so hard to portray as "democrats,"
considered themselves entitled to weapons paid for by Somoza. But they
did: "We have been trying to get those arms for a long time," said a contra
leader.^' A member of the Israeli Knesset said that the government had
agreed to Montealegre's request.

The timing of Montealgre's trip, immediately after the U.S. and Israel
started shipping arms to Iran under a secret Presidential "Finding" and an
arrangement between the White House and the Israeli government that
some of the (inflated) profits from those sales were to go to the contras,
suggests that the contra aide was after more than Somoza's last arms order.
As the diverted funds are believed to have been recycled in Israel to
purchase arms for the contras,^' it is likely that Montealegre was picking
out weapons from Israel's inventory for the contras.

152

ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

During the 1985-86 period, Israel sent at least six shiploads of East
bloc assault rifles, grenade launchers and ammunition to Honduras for the
contras. Also, some of the 400 tons of weapons supplied to the contras by
the "private" network coordinated by Lt. Col. Oliver North of the
National Security Council staff came from Israel. These arms were
delivered to Ilopango Air Base in El Salvador by Southern Air Transport,"
a former CIA proprietary and, during the second Reagan term, one of the
companies included by North in what he called Project Democracy. One
planeload of arms— it included AK-47 rifles and ammunition— came
directly from Israel to Honduras in November 1986.^*

Another shipment, a "significant quantity" of East bloc arms, was
offered by Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin on September 12,1 986.
They were picked up during the following week and taken on a foreign-
flag vessel to Central America. But, after the Iran-contra scandal broke, this
ship— like Somoza's last ship— was recalled to Israel." This was the arms
consignment for which President Reagan was asked to "thank" Prime
Minister Peres during a September 15, 1986 meeting.^s

Many, if not most of these sales were made through the private dealers
Israel uses to establish "plausible deniability" of its politically risky
dealings. With the breaking of the Iran-contra scandal, some of the activity
of those dealers were exposed, revealing an interconnected web of
operators. It is striking that all of the Israeli dealers involved in the Iran arms
sales also made at least one sale of weapons to the contras, perhaps to oblige
the Reagan Administration, which was making it possible for them to earn
fat commissions on the Iran-Iraq war.

Well before the Iran-contra operation began, in late 1984 and early
1985, Al Schwimmer, one of Israel's premier arms dealers, an initiator of
the Iran arms sales involving Washington, and a close friend and special
assistant to Prime Minister Shimon Peres, had "made an undetermined
number of sales of Israeli-owned weapons" to the contras.^'

Ya'acov Nimrodi, who figured prominently in the arms-to-Iran
deahngs, also handled arms shipments financed with a donation of several
million dollars, given by the Israeli government to the contras at the request
of CIA Director Casey.'" A former Nimrodi employee said the sales were
made through a U.S. company owned by Nimrodi, who had done the deal
as a "favor" to the contras, taking only a "small fee" for himself."

Pesakh Ben-Or, an Israeli arms dealer based in Guatemala and Miami,
sold three shipments to the contras through the Honduran military. He
gave the Israeli defense ministry documents of sale bearing the signature of
Col. Julio Perez, chief of logistics in the Honduran Army's Ordnance
Corps.

Israel and Central America 153

The consignments included such items as RPG-7 grenade launchers,
which the Honduran army does not even use; the contras, however, do use
them."

Another company with Israeli links is Sherwood International Export
.; Corp. Former U.S. diplomat Wayne Smith said the Reagan Administration
had "used Sherwood before for weapons sales to the FDN" and that the
I CIA had frequently used it so that Israel wasn't directly supplying the
(contras. Smith said he had been told by an administration official that a
shipment of weapons Sherwood sold the contras had come from Israel's
East bloc stocks.**

As hkely as not, the SA- 7 surface-to-air missile which the contras used
I to bring down a Nicaraguan helicopter in December 1 985 came from Israel.

The contras bought the missiles "by the dozens" starting in mid- 1985.*^
i Some were purchased by Gen. John Singlaub, others came from Israel.**
i Opinions vary as to whether Ben-Or or Sherwood*'' was the source.*^
Possibly both were.*'

Moreover, Ben-Or's operation and Sherwood are connected by a
tangle of other Israeli arms dealers. At the time it was selling arms to the
contras, Sherwood employed Pinhas Dagan and Amos Gil'ad, an Israeli
transport officer, in senior positions.^"

Dagan, who had once represented lAI in territory stretching between
Mexico and Colombia, had lived in Ben-Or's Miami house.^' Gil'ad was an
acquaintance of Gerard Latchinian, arrested by the FBI in an assassination
plot against then Honduran President Roberto Suazo Cordoba. Gil'ad
introduced Latchinian to Pesakh Ben-Or.'^

Latchinian, whose role in the assassination plot was to obtain the
necessary weapons, had at one time employed Emil Sa'ada," identified by
Honduran military sources as one of two former Israeli military men who
had "helped arrange" arms shipments to the contras in deals dating back to
1984.

The other Israeli was Yehuda Leitner, who worked for one of Sa'ada's
Honduran operations. Leitner was also employed by ISDS, an Israeli
"security expertise" exporter.'*

Both Sa'ada and Leitner were former Israeli military officers." Both
denied having sold arms, charging they were being scapegoated in the
shuffle resulting from the Iran-contra scandal and from rivalry among
regional arms deals, "including Marcus Katz."'*

David Marcus Katz "helped broker [a] deal with the contras in
1985."" To bring the connection around full circle, Pesakh Ben-Or began
his career as Katz's chauffer.'*

1 54 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Israel or its associated arms dealers might also have participated in the
diversion of U.S. arms to the contras. A former U.S. Army combat pilot
and supply officer now working as an arms expert for a conservative
Washington think tank said that he had quizzed "Americans who had
visited rebel training and supply camps in Honduras, and their conclusion
was that the U.S. Defense Department was the ultimate source, through
theft, cut-out deals with Israel and other governments, of most of the rebel
arms." He said that items such as batteries and aircraft parts had been
officially accounted as discarded scrap and "had actually been diverted in
good working order to the rebels.""

Former CIA analyst David MacMichael said thac there had been a
great deal of stolen ordnance; and much that was reported used in training at
an Alabama base could have gone to the contras.^"

The Israelis vehemently denied my arms shipments to the contras, or
any contact with them at all. They kept on denying any contra connection
even after the Senate Intelligence Committee investigating the Iran-contra
affair issued its January 1987 report which implicated the Israeli defense
minister in the sales.

The nearest Israel came to acknowledging its role with the contras was
in a leaked government story that attempted to explain how Yitzhak Rabin
had become personally involved in one particular shipment: An Israeli
"senior security source" explained that after "Oliver North drove us crazy
with his requests to supply arms to the contras," Rabin had agreed to send
"several hundred Soviet-made rifles" to the administration to do what it
wanted with them. These same sources claimed that all Israeli shipments
destined for the contras were actually sent to "official U.S. Administration
elements. "8' Rabin himself was more terse in his denial:

I turned down the request of a U.S. official— a member or
employee of the National Security Council at the White
House—who made such a proposal to Israel. I told him we had
enough problems of our own and we had no plans whatsoever to
give any direct assistance, either in the form of instructors,
advice, or weapons.

Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, Israeli weapons
did not reach the contras.

Israel and Central America 155

Advisers

In early 1983, 50 Israeli specialists in guerrilla and psychological
warfare were said to have gone to El Salvador and Honduras. That
summer intelligence sources said that Israel was providing "special"
guerrilla training to the contras.**

From all appearances the only thing "special" the contras learned to do
was brutalize the civilian population of Nicaragua and kidnap young men
for incorporation into the mercenary ranks. Yet the Israelis drew top pay
for their work: $6,500— $10,000 a month, compared with the $5,000-
$7,000 for Argentine advisers. The CIA is thought to have paid their
salaries. 85 Perhaps the pay was based on the fearsome international
reputation of the Israeli military— Israeli "security companies" regularly
charge double the going rate for bodyguards for European businessmen**
—rather than their performance.

An Israeli mercenary who had served in Central America said that
Israelis were training and supervising the contras. He said they were
recruited by "foreigners with excellent Israeli connections." Another
Israeli mercenary said that the Defense Ministry was aware of the Israelis
working with the contras and that they use IDF manuals and catalogs.*'
These are clear signs of an official connection.

Although the Israeli government gets extensive mileage out of
claiming that its nationals, often retired military officers, working as
advisers or arms merchants, are merely private citizens, there is over-
whelming evidence that those who follow both professions are under the
control of Tel Aviv.

Every "security technique" must be approved by the government for
export. In 1986, there were approximately 20 "security companies"
licensed by the defense ministry to export their services; many of these
were newcomers to a rapidly expanding field. The defense ministry "often
passes less-desirable clients to private consulting firms."**

One such company is International Security and Defense Systems
(ISDS, see above). Its offices in a kibbutz near Tel Aviv are full of
mementos from the Honduran, Salvadoran, Chilean and Ecuadoran
militaries. A company employee trained the Honduran president's body-
guard in 1982.*"

Even when these "experts" are not on government business their
activities are regulated by the Israeli government. T here is an obligatory
six-month course^iven_bythe Israeli government " wliich trains people in'

156 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

special security methods. " At least one ofthe proliferating Israeli "security
companies" requires its employees to take the course.'"

The private Israeli "security" teams work all over the world, from the
gaming tables of Sun City in South Africa to the plantations of wealthy
Latin Americans. The going rate for an Israeli is $5,000 per month." One
of the Israeli companies even gives courses for children, executives and
individuals.'^ Another provides a " Tour an d Secure" package, a two- week
^'^iY-iaJ srael evenly divided between tourmg]an3" learning karate an"d
we apons handling for a co st of $2 ,800 including round trip airfare from
New York.'3 ' -

All of this is done in close proximity to, if not in conjunction with,
another Israeli growth industry— the marketing of sophisticated "security"
devices. Items such as 360-degree video cameras in car antennas, laser
beams that capture conversations in rooms hundreds of feet away, and
virtually undetectable infrared audio monitoring devices'* are available in
1 retail outlets.'^

Major weapons systems, however, are sold to governments. The
Israeli individuals who make the sales — mostly retired military officers
unable to find suitable employment in the civilian economy— do so on
behalf of the government, for a commission of at least ten percent.'^ Their
function is to provide protective layers of "deniability" between the Israeli
government and the bad publicity that often follows disclosures of arms
sales to outlaw regimes and mercenary bands.

Until recently, Israeli arms dealers (700-800 by_offici,aiestimates)
carried letters of introduction from~tHe defense ministry. Following a~
number of scandals, most notably the arrest of retired General Avraham
Bar- Am in an attempted $2.5 billion sale sale to Iran," the procedure was
changed. Now the dealers are issued two official certificates for each sale.
The first document will list the purchaser, the intermediaries in the sale, and
the precise weapons involved. The second document will be a permit
containing the terms of sale and specifying the payment arrangements.'^

When he was Israel's military attache in Washington, Gen. Uri
Simhoni met with contra leader Adolfo Calero to discuss working with the
contras. "I heard that he might be of service to us once he retired," Calero
said."

Several months after U.S. military aid to the contras resumed in late
1986, the IsraeHs were still m demand as advisers. Speaking anonymously
on the state-run television, an Israeli said "I conducted negotiations with
the contras. They need light weapons, ammunition.. .They want advisers
from Israel." He said there were more Israelis working with the contras,

Israel and Central America

157

and that relations between the two groups were "outstanding"; in his
words, "you feel after a day like you've known them for years."'™

A report in early 1987 said that Israeli advisers were training the
contras at U.S. Army bases in Honduras. There were conflicting reports as
to whether the Israelis were being paid by the Honduran government or, as
Israeli military sources claimed, "American sources or intelligence
groups."""

Laundered Funds

As soon as President Reagan started to feel pinched by congressional
restrictions on CIA spending for the contras, he began asking Israel to
donate or launder funds for the mercenaries he was fond of calling "the
moral equals of our founding fathers." In early 1984, Israel gave a "well-
concealed" several million dollars which was believed to have gone
through a South American intermediary. The amount was probably
reimbursed in Israel's U.S. aid.'"^

By September of that year, of $ 1 5 million collected for the contras, the
Israeli government gave just under $5 million, Part of Israel's contribu-
tion was in East bloc and Chinese-made weapons and part was in cash to
"help contras meet their $800,000 monthly payroll. "i"*

In 1 985 and 1 986, the discreet contribution would be replaced by the
wholesale kickback, as administration officials and their cronies who had
recently left government posts for private life left no stone unturned in the
search for funds to continue the contra war.

In July 1985, the administration legalized its solicitation by inter-
vening in a House-Senate conference committee and insisting on the
redrafting of an amendment to the $12.6 billion foreign aid bill-
containing $27 million "non-lethal" aid for the contras— written by
Senator Claiborne Pell (D-Rl). In its original form, the Pell Amendment
forbade the administration from making a formal or informal arrangement
with U.S. aid recipients to aid the contras. On threat of presidential veto of
the the entire bill. Sen. Pell, Foreign Relations Chairman Richard Lugar
(R-IN) and White House and congressional staff sat down together and
rewrote the amendment.

The State Department explained that the Pell Amendment might have
prevented the president from soliciting "nonlethal" aid from Israel,
Taiwan, South Korea, and other such allies, some of which had already
spoken to the White House about donations.

1 58 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

The new language imposed by the administration read:

The U.S. shall not enter into any arrangement conditioning
expressly or impliedly the provision of assistance under this
act.. .upon provision of assistance by a recipient to persons or
groups engaging in an insurgency. ..against the government of
Nicaragua.

Both houses of Congress passed this language without debate, just before
they adjourned for the summer."'^

CIA Director Casey and UN Ambassador Vernon Walters, himself a
long time covert operator,'"* visited a number of U.S. clients and urged
contributions. Both Israel and Egypt donated money in response to these
pleas "when reminded of the substantial U.S. aid they receive. " Some of
the money Israel gave is said to have been passed through Oliver North. '"^

Another round of shakedowns was carried out by retired Air Force
General Richard Secord, a leading participant in the contra supply network
run by the White House National Security Council (NSC) staff and also in
the arms-to-Iran scam run jointly by the NSC and Israel. Saudi Arabia was
the biggest giver to this campaign, and the leverage Secord had over the
Saudis had quite a bit to do with Israel.

He reminded them that the administration had stuck its neck out and
"defied the powerful pro-Israeli lobby" in a bruising fight to win
Congressional approval of the the sale of AW AGs surveillance planes to the
Kingdom. As a deputy assistant secretary of defense, Secord had led the
campaign for the sale. (NSC staffer Oliver North had assisted him.) He told
the Saudis that he had later been forced to resign because he had angered
powerful people. (Another reason Secord resigned was an investigation
into his business dealings with Edwin Wilson, the former CIA operator
now in prison for his dealings with Libya.)

Secord spent the Saudi money on East bloc arms from Egypt, from
Israel and from international arms dealers.""

Recycling the money given by Israel in the Israeli economy would
become a pattern. For all that Israel, with its very well known economic
problems, gave the contras, it made money every step of the way. Much of
what Israel put into the pot was returned to the Israeli government in the
form of arms sales. The contras were a closed market to which Israel had
privileged access. Former contra leader Edgar Chamorro has pointed out
that arms dealers do not seek out the contras, nor do the mercenaries often
make purchases on the open market. He explained that "a very few people,
close to the White House, tell the FDN how to get weapons. Calero is told
by the people in charge where to go to buy weapons. They even make the
connections."""

Israel and Central America

159

When the Iran-contragate investigators went looking for the money
that Oliver North said had been skimmed from the profits made on U.S.-
Israeli arms sales to Iran and diverted to the contras, there was no hidden
heap of cash to be found. Many observers are certain that the cash went to
Israel, which then shipped weapons to the contras.

The Covert Alliance

Beneath the apparent symmetry of these deals were three years of
anguished bargaining between Israel and the Reagan Administration. What
occurred across tables and desks in the United States and Israel was at least
as significant and potentially as deadly as the weapons that went to the
contras. Indeed, the money, the arms, and the advisers were all offered by
Israel as substitutes for what the Reagan Administration was really asking
for. All the dickering began and ended with a stalemate: the administration
was "delighted" with Israeli arms sales in Central America,"' but
frustrated beyond belief that Israel declined to take a splashy public role
with the contras, both in Central America and in the U.S. body politic.
Wishing not to antagonize its liberal supporters, Israel insisted on a covert
role in both arenas. At the same time, it twisted and turned to see if it could
not reconcile the two opposing claims on its loyalty. Ultimately, tensions
with the White House over the level of Israel's support for the contras
contributed to the Iran-contra scandal.

However, the investigative broom that sweeps out the debris of the
Iran-contra mess is unlikely to disturb the murky corner in which Israel's
role was generated. Behind protective shadows is a structure developed
during the Reagan years that makes Israel an ex officio— pcdoice an
uncontrollable— arm of U.S. foreign policy. This function was but one
element of the bilateral relations, which during the Reagan years were
cemented to such an extent, that, as Secretary of State George Shultz put it,
no subsequent, possibly less friendly, administration would be able to
dismantle them."^

At the heart of that structure is a "strategic alliance," committed
several times to paper, but actually developed in the hothouse atmosphere
of the privateering Reagan Administration.

In March 1979, after the Camp David Accords between Israel and
Egypt, the U.S. and Israel had signed a Memorandum of Agreement
entailing U.S. commitments to help Israel boost its weapons exports. On
November 3 0, 1 98 1 the Reagan Administration signed a Memorandum of

160 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Understanding (MOU) on Strategic Cooperation with Israel, incor-
porating some elements of the 1979 pact and adding some mild language
about mutual defense.

The term strategic— a word very popular in the Reagan years with
men who wished to clothe their base idiocies with a smug semblance of
considered policy— referred to cooperation the two countries planned to
undertake in the developing world. This was the heart of the agreement. Of
prime interest to Israel was Africa, where it hoped to use U.S.-funded
programs to tempt the continent's governments back into its diplomatic
embrace."'

Signed by Secretary of Defense Alexander Haig and Defense Minister
Ariel Sharon, the MOU was suspended almost immediately, after Israel
annexed the Syrian Golan Heights. Tel Aviv insisted that the MOU lived
on in spirit, and that parts of it were covered by the 1 9 79 memorandum. '

Its actual revival would come when the administration became
interested in what Israel could do for it in Central America, an interest
which also helped Washington overcome its "anger" at Israel's behavior
during the war in Lebanon. In fact, both Israeli and administration sources
said that Israel's potential as a helpmeet was the only bright spot in relations
between the two countries during the 1982-1983 period."^

In 1 983, the administration made a direct request to Israel to arm the
contras.116 It also wanted Israel to lend its political support to the contras,
which had not, to say the least, attracted an instant following in the U.s!
When Israel was not forthcoming, the administration first attempted to
force the issue by making it public. The New York Times was the vehicle of
choice.

On Its front page one July morning was news that the administration
had encouraged Israel to increase its presence in Central America "as a way
of supplementing American military aid to friendly governments and
supporting insurgent operations against the Nicaraguan Government,"
especially if Congress moved to forbid the CIA from continuing its
support. Israel had begun sending artillery pieces, mortar rounds, mines,
hand grenades and ammunition captured in Lebanon to Honduras "for
eventual use by the contras," and was behaving more like a U.S. surrogate
than the private arms dealer it used to be. Israel heatedly denied the part
about being a surrogate."'

The administration then attempted to coax Israel into a more favorable
mood. Israel was, at the same time, trying to nail down some concessions
from the U.S. Alexander Haig, who had been very partial to Israel, had
resigned, and over the course of 1 983 there had been considerable sparring
within the administration over the nature of U.S.-Israeli relations. Haig's

Israel and Central America

161

successor, George Shultz, had begun his tenure determined to maintain the
friendship of Arab nations with an "even-handed" policy in the Middle
East. However, after intensive lobbying by pro-Israel forces in the State
Department and by the Israeli ambassador to Washington, Shultz was
persuaded to a policy skewed toward Israel: complete favoritism expressed
in an open alliance. The Israelis had argued against the traditional "even-
handedness" of U.S. policy (in reality the "balance" had been little more
than rhetoric), pushing instead the notion that an overt U.S. alignment with
Israel would "show the Arabs" that their cause was hopeless and that close
relations with Washington must be achieved via deference to Israel."^

Shultz, joined by former Haig aide Robert McFarlane, at the time
deputy national security adviser, presented a position paper to the
President recommending "strategic cooperation" with Israel. Their main
selling point was that such a pact would help contain the Soviet Union. In
October 1983, President Reagan signed National Security Decision
Directive 1 1 1 establishing strategic cooperation with Israel."'

In Washington on November 29 of that year, Israel's Prime Minister
Yitzhak Shamir and President Reagan announced that their two govern-
ments had agreed on closer cooperation, which Shamir said included "a
dialogue on coordinating activity in the third world.'''^" (It was perhaps
coincidental that the agreement was sealed on the day set aside by the UN
for the Palestinian people, but given the Israeli attention to detail, perhaps
not.) A formal agreement was signed the following March,'^' by which
Israel agreed to become an unreachable arm of covert U.S. policy. No
public debate. No outcry from the Congress. Liberal members were then
battening on wine and cheese provided by anti-intervention activists and
giving assurances of their commitment to opposing the Reagan foreign
policy.

During his Washington session Shamir was also promised increased
U.S. aid, short term economic credits, concessions on the sales of Israeli
weapons systems to the U.S., and a Free Trade Agreement.'" There was,
as Secretary of State Shultz admitted, "no visible quid pro quo in the pact
with Israel. "123 There was only the Boland Amendment, forbidding U.S.
agencies from aiding the contras, passed several weeks earlier, and the
beginnings of a concerted search by the White House and CIA Director
Casey to find alternate sources of support for the obsessive campaign
against Nicaragua. '^^

That semi-formal discussions about Central America had been going
on between the U.S. and Israel for some time before the administration
moved to offer Israel the strategic agreement, strongly suggests that Israel
was being offered incrementally greater rewards to persuade it to play a

162 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

leading part in the war against Nicaragua. These discussions began in the
framework of a bilateral political-military committee put together by
Robert McFarlane. In 1982, as an aide to Secretary of State Haig,
McFarlane had come to know (and deeply admire) David Kimche,
director-general of the Israeli foreign ministry, the nation's top civil service
post. Kimche had been the number two man in Israel's secret service,
Mossad, and during the prime ministership of Yitzhak Shamir (late 1 982 to
late 1984) he served as de facto foreign minister. When McFarlane
transferred to the White House, he established links between Kimche and
senior State Department officials which resulted in a committee, whose
charge was to meet every spring and fall (alternately in Washington and
Jerusalem) and "look at the big picture," meaning everything outside the
Middle East.'" The committee would eventually be subsumed under the
November 1983 strategic agreement.

In June 1983 the group had discussed Central America—specifically
"the intention of the U.S. Administration to get Israel to supply the armies
of the pro-American regimes there" with the funds "the U.S. cannot
directly transfer to its allies in the region.. .paid to Israel directly from the
United States."'^* At other meetings they discussed ways of countering
Nicaragua's growing international political support; once they conspired
on ways to block Nicaragua from becoming the chair of the Nonaligned
Movement.'^''

However, the strategic agreement, signed eleven days after contra aid
ran out, failed to move Israel into the proper frame of mind for declaring
war on Nicaragua. A former U.S. official "who routinely reviewed
intelligence reports" said that the administration made "at least two
attempts in 1984 to use Israel to circumvent a Congressional ban on
military aid to the contras."'28 The requests included "bridging financing"
(funds to tide the mercenaries over until congressional or other means of
support could be found), weapons and training. Israel later refused a
request to launder and pass along U.S. funds to the contras.'^'

After the last covert contra money was spent on March 8, 1984,1'"
with Congress still howling about the CIA's mining of Nicaragua's ports,
the administration went several steps beyond polite requests.

With David Kimche due in Washington in April for the regularly
scheduled meeting of the political-military committee, the administration
tried to drag Israel over the threshhold separating overt and covert with an
unparalleled series of news leaks.

A story popped up in Israel that the committee would be discussing a
U.S. proposal for making Israel a conduit for U.S. aid to anti-communist
forces in Central America and that the U.S. would establish a fund

Israel and Central America

163

"independent of the government budget to finance projects suggested by
Israeli experts""' in Central America and Africa."^

In addition to passing money, said another Israeli report, the
administration would seek "a higher Israeli political profile in support of
U.S. policy in Central America" in exchange for funding Israeli foreign
projects. Additionally, "the administration would like to see Israel
encourage its own supporters in the Congress, the Jewish community and
elsewhere to become more assertive in backing the contras."'"

It is almost certain that the leaks were generated in Washington, where
"some Administration officials in recent weeks ha[d] talked privately about
the possibility of persuading friendly governments, such as Israel to
help.""*

CIA Director Casey let it be known he was thinking about asking
another country, "such as Saudi Arabia," for money for the contras."^
Later the CIA admitted having "unofficially" asked Israel and Saudi
Arabia to support the contras . ' When the Iran-contra scandal broke, Israel
and Saudi Arabia would appear as major supporters of the contras.

Perhaps the most unifying moment in the history of the venal and
fractious contra movement came when the administration lined up
mercenary spokesmen to make public statements about the possibility of
Israeli aid. The Somocist FDN said that as Congress had not voted the |2 1
million sought by the White House, it was going to ask Israel for aid. On
April 15, FDN officials said they were meeting with U.S. intelligence
officials "to discuss their options for finding new funds." FDN chief
Adolfo Calero said, "We have looked for private money, but there isn't
enough. We need a government. We think the Israelis would be the best,
because they have the technical experience."

Another contra leader suggested that Israel might help the contras "as
a favor to the Reagan administration," and out of consideration for the $2.6
billion in U.S. aid it received from the U.S. that year."'

That same week, ARDE leader Eden Pastora lamented that non-U. S.
aid came to ARDE on condition of anonymity."^

The FDN's Washington representative also implored Israel to come to
the aid of the contras. Arguing that Israel and the contras had overlapping
interests because the PLO was aiding Nicaragua, Bosco Matamoros also
warned that there was an "increase in anti-Semitism and anti-Israeli feeling
in other countries in Central America, where rebels are being helped by the
Sandinistas and the PLO.""'

The most spectacular blast in the administration's campaign came from
Honduras, courtesy of network television. Pentagon reporter Fred Francis

1 64 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

said that NBC had "learned" that Israel, "at Washington's urging has
armed a quarter of the rebel army."

Enrique Bermudez, the FDN's military chief, appeared on camera to
say: We recen^ed some weapons from the, the, that Israeli government
took from PLO in Lebanon [sic]." While the camera followed a contra air
drop into Nicaragua," Francis' voice-over was more to the point-
Washington has kept the contras on a short leash, won't let them win and
instead might be about to completely abandon them; at which point 'said
francs the contras will be "forced to turn again to Israel and others to save
themselves from becoming refugees of a war lost in a divided Wash-
ington. ''*"

There is no doubt that the contra appeal was stage-managed. Israeli
radio pointed out that the CIA "keeps a tight reign" on the contras and that
Bermudez would never have spoken "without CIA approval or en-
couragement."''"

It is likely that Israel protested the publicity. The State Department
issued a statement saying that the U.S. had "no intention of providing
funds to third countries for the purpose of supporting covert activities in
Central America.

By the time David Kimche actually met with Lawrence Eagleburger
of the State Department on April 26, there was intense media interest in
what Israel might be about to do with the contras. The Israeli Embassy in
Washington relayed a message "that the growing controversy over the
Administration s policy in Central America could damage Israel's standing
with Congress. i.^^^j also been warned by congressional Demo-
crats that It should stay far away from the administration's operations in
Central America.'**

The real sticking point, however, was Israel's objection to the role the
administration had envisioned for itself. Israel was perfectly willing to
participate in a joint attack on Nicaragua, but not, in the words of a former
diplomat, to get the onus for assisting the contras while the U S is
standing aside and keeping their hands clean."'"

After his meeting, Kimche had breakfast with reporters and "acknow-
ledged that the talks had included discussion of how Israel might increase its
technical assistance programs in Third World areas, including Central
America. But, he insisted, he hadn't "come to arrange how Israel is going
to take over the contras," and said the aid under discussion would be limited
to "peaceful projects."'**

Nevertheless, in reporting that breakfast meeting, National Public
Radio noted speculation about a new fund that the U.S. would create
ostensibly for non-mihtary aid projects which reportedly would allow the

Israel and Central America 165

U.S. to funnel extra money for covert aid which could then be channeled by
Israel when needed."

Kimche ran through the gamut of Israeli denials: Israel had no contacts
with or arms sales to the contras; Israeli policy is to only sell arms to
"constitutionally organized countries and not to unofficial organizations";
Israel might have been mentioned in connection with East bloc arms
supplied to the contras, but those shipments were "without our consent and
without our knowledge"; stories of Israeli arms going to the contras might
have come from the contras "in the hopes that members of Congress
sympathetic to Israel would then look more favorably on U.S. covert
activity."'*' All of these were lies, yet even after the breaking of the
Iran-contra scandal they continue to be blithely issued in the face of
overwhelming evidence. No matter, they were always accepted at face
value by Congress and, to a lesser extent, the media.

Disappointed, the administration lined up behind Israel with a
statement that no agreement had been reached on funding Israeli aid
programs and that the U.S. had not asked Israel to become involved in the
contra program.'*^ As a consolation prize, Israel increased its aid to the
contras. It would soon begin supplying money for the contras as well as
arms.

There is no question that this tension ultimately led to the proposal to
transfer funds from the secret (and massive) sales of arms to Iran in which
Israel involved the administration beginning in August 1985. There may
have been other factors and other covert operations involved,'*' but the
Israeli desire to keep the U.S. involved with the Iran program set against the
administration's constant pleas for Israeli help with the contras is the
transparently logical genesis of the scam whereby Iran was overcharged
and the excess funds were applied to the war against Nicaragua.

This lends credence to evidence given to the Senate Intelligence
Committee by Attorney General Edwin Meese, that Oliver North had
described the idea in detail as having originated with the Israelis.
Uncertainty stemming from the informal circumstances in which Meese
interviewed NSC staffer Oliver North over which Israeli — David Kimche
or terror adviser Amiram Nir — was the intellectual author of the scheme
has been used to discredit the notion of the idea's Israeli origin.'^"
Conveniently forgotten is a report that the Senate Intelligence Committee
had been given "secret evidence strongly suggesting that the plan to divert
money from the Iran arms operation to the Nicaraguan Contras was first
put forward by Mr. Shimon Peres, then the Israeli Prime Minister."'^'

The decision was an official Israeli government one, at the highest
level. The other Israelis had simply been the messengers, bringing the

1 66 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

suggestion to Washington during crucial January 1986 meetings on
whether the U.S. would continue with the Iran arms sales. Israel had
already been using some of the Iran arms sales profits to pay off Iranian
"moderates" at the suggestion of arms dealer Ya'acov Nimrodi. Israel
hadn't wanted to tell its American partners about this nifty trick, according
to Adnan Khashoggi, the Saudi arms dealer involved in the U.S.-lsraeli
dealings with Iran,'" but apparently did so to save the Iran program and
forestall another barage of administration publicity about how Israel
should take up the cudgels against Nicaragua.

Soon after Israel refused an overt role with the contras. Undersecretary
of Defense Fred Ikle asked Israel to send advisers to El Salvador "openly, as
a demonstration of Israeli participation in the load the United States bears in
Central America."'^' The request underscored one of Israel's two main
attractions to the administration— the extensive and longstanding ties Israel
had developed throughout Central America. (The other was Israel's
domestic political clout, discussed below.)

In 1983 Israel probably knew its xyay around Costa Rica and
Honduras better than the CIA did.

Honduras

Honduras was one of Israel's first arms customers in Central America.
Between 1 975 and 1 977, this second poorest of all countries in the Western
Hemisphere bought 20 French super-Mystere fighter planes from Israel.
Delivered at a time when it was U.S. policy to discourage the acquisition of
sophisticated weaponry in Central America, these were the first supersonic
aircraft in the region; some were equipped with Israeli-made Shafrir heat-
seeking missiles.'^*

The Hondurans bought a range of other Israeli arms: Arava STOL
aircraft,'" a fleet of armored vehicles mounted with recoilless rifles,'" and
Galil rifles and Uzi submachine guns.'^^ For all its poverty, when Ariel
Sharon visited Honduras, he was calling on one of Israel's three biggest
clients. '58 In the wake of Sharon's visit came more arms and training—both
in Israel and Honduras— for officers, pilots and troops.'^'

In 1 98 1 , Israeli radar operators were at work at a Honduran airbase. '*"
Honduran officials never chafed at the Israeli presence— on the contrary, on
one occasion, exasperated with the on-again off-again contra war, Hon-
duran military leaders suggested that Israel, Chile, Colombia or Brazil take
over the contra program for the U.S.'*' Gen. Julio Perez, the Honduran

Israel and Central America

167

army logistics chief, signed false end user certificates for Israeli weapons
shipments to the contras.'*^

Israel also benefited from the fits and starts with which Honduras
assented to serve as a U.S. "aircraft carrier." In October 1986, in an effort
to get Honduras to agree to tolerate U.S. training of contras on its soil, the
U.S. revived the notion of selling the Hondurans advanced aircraft.
Emblematic of Israel's in-touch status in Honduras, before Washington
could prepare the papers for the F-5Es it was offering, Israel had the
Tegucigalpa government's signature on a preliminary agreement to buy 24
Kfir combat aircraft — a deal that could be worth as much as $200 million.
To coax their quick agreement, Israel had assured the Hondurans that
Washington would finance the deal. An incredulous State Department
official said no such approval had been given. At the time the Jerusalem Post
said that the National Security Council would have final say on the
arrangements.'*' Later it would be revealed that the Kfir sale was one side
of a quid pro quo which would have sent Israeli advisers to the contras. Still
later, the Kfir sale fell through.

Costa Rica

Someday it may be precisely known how great a role Israel played in
subverting the government of Costa Rica to accede to Washington's use of
its territory as a secondary base in the war against Nicaragua. More is
presently known about how the U.S. bribed Costa Rican officials to turn a
blind eye to the contras; how they ran a CI A and then a "private" operation
the northern part of the country, which included foreign mercenaries, drug
running, a clandestine airstrip, and at least two assassination attempts and
managed to exercise a progressively greater influence on the small,
relatively democratic nation's media, as the contra campaign wore on.'**

Israel, however, had the inside track. Luis Alberto Monge, elected to
the Costa Rican presidency in 1982, is probably one of the strongest
Zionists in Central America. Formerly Costa Rican ambassador to Israel,
during his presidential campaign Monge promised to move Costa Rica's
embassy to Jerusalem, while his foreign-minister-to-be said that the
National Liberation Party would hold relations with Israel to be a
"principal preoccupation. "'*5 In May 1982, Costa Rica became the first
government to return its embassy to the city which all other nations had
deserted when Israel annexed and declared Jerusalem its undivided capital
in 1980.'**

1 68 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Costa Rica did not have an army, but it did have one of the highest
foreign debts in the world, and that gave Israel somewhat of a handle Soon
after his election, Monge met in the U.S. with Israeli Prime Minister
Menachem Begin, who introduced him to a number of leading bankers
thus helping him to renegotiate Costa Rica's debt to private banks '

Begin pressed Monge hard to abandon the neutrality Costa Rica had
rnaintamed since 1948, in effect seconding the words of Reagan's UN
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, that if Costa Rica warned aid from
Washington, it would have to create an army.'^^

Begin offered military aid-'*'' and in January 1983 the Costa Rican
Public Security Minister visited Israel, touring defense plants and meeting

f7n'cf T'' ^"S'" '"'^ Minister Yitzhak

Shamir Shamir had been in Costa Rica the previous October and offered
non-military cooperation.'"

Limited amounts of Israeli military aid began to flow to Costa Rica's
police forces ' and Israelis came to train the security police, special tactical
squads'" and intelligence agents."* Israelis themselves carried out various
intelligence activities" in Costa Rica.'"

Israel's parastatal Tahal collaborated with with U.S. AID to develop a
border barrier comprising roads, electronic barriers, and an agribusiness/
setdement scheme.'^^ It was an open secret that this installation was part of
the campaign against Nicaragua.

A Classic Case of Disinformation:
"Anti-Semitism and the Sandinistas"

The War for the Jews

There is probably only one thing for which the Reagan Administra-
tion must be forgiven: its failure to understand why Democrats in Congress
fairly swooned with approval for Israel's acts of military aggression, while
remaining obdurately disapproving of similar moves made by the White
House.' At least half of the administration's effort to make Israel a full
partner in the contra war was aimed at harnessing Israel's political clout to a
policy which the public consistendy found utterly loathsome.

As an Israeli columnist put it, "American cooperation with Israel can,
during any U.S. military activities in the Caribbean, make the difference
between success and failure in the House of Representatives."^

When Israel's political support was restrained by its need to cater to its
liberal constituency, which includes not only members of Congress, but the
vast majority of Jews in the United States, the obvious task for the
administration was to convert that constituency.

From mid-1983, when it began importuning Israel to get involved,
until Congress passed contra aid in June 1986, the administration carried
out a nonstop effort to win Jewish support for the contras. Using methods
that were sometimes crude, sometimes slick, occasionally anti-Semitic and
almost completely unsuccessful, the administration hammered away.

169

1 70 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

The same July day that leaked news of Israel's activities in Central
America appeared on the front page of the New York Times marked the
debut of a campaign to smear Nicaragua's government with charges of
anti-Semitism. The previous day the President had used a White House
briefing for Jewish groups to launch a campaign of spurious charges of
anti-Semitism against the government of Nicaragua. This was part of what
the White House called "public diplomacy" — appeals to various special
interest groups to support its policies, especially its contra policy.^ The
Jewish appeal had been cooked up by the CIA, and it was anti-Semitic to
the core.

Former FDN leader Edgar Chamorro told of how he had met with
three CIA officers in Coral Gables, Florida in the spring of 1983. It was
decided at that meeting to "target" American Jews with stories about
Sandinista anti-Semitism. The CIA thought this would be a worthwhile
propaganda exercise because, recounted Chamorro, "They said that the
media was controlled by Jews, and if we could show that Jews were being
persecuted, it would help a lot."

The CIA knew in advance that Isaac Stavisky and Abraham Gorn, the
two men they planned to have at the White House briefing, had been
persecuted for their collaboration with Somoza, not for their religion.'*

The White House had also learned, four days earlier, from its
ambassador in Managua that the charges were spurious. A cable from the
embassy stated:

[T]he evidence fails to demonstrate that the Sandinistas have
followed a policy of anti-Semitism... Although most members of
Nicaragua's tiny Jewish community have left the country and
some have had their properties confiscated, there is no direct
correlation between their Jewish religion and the treatment they
received.^

Nevertheless, at the briefing the President, with the usual coy litde
catch in his voice, accused Nicaragua of anti-Semitism. Rabbi Morton
Rosenthal, the director of the Anti-Defamation League's (ADL) Latin
America division, explained that Stavisky and Gorn had been driven out by
the Sandinistas, who had expropriated their property and seized the
synagogue in Managua.^

Actually, as many subsequent investigations would point out, the
Jewish community in Nicaragua had been miniscule, numbering around
50, down from around 150 before the massive 1972 earthquake.^ In
January 1979 Gorn, the recognized leader of the small Jewish community, ^
took delivery of a Honduran shipment addressed to the Somoza National

Israel and Central America

171

> Guard.' The Nicaraguan human rights organization said Gorn received a
*telegram notifying him of the shipment from a "Jewish citizen of
Honduras," the implication being that Gorn was not only a social intimate
of Somoza, but also involved in Israeli arms deals.'" Gorn's associate,
iStavisky, "apparently has admitted running guns for Somoza.""
, After the dictator's fall, many who had enjoyed his patronage — ^Jews
and gentiles — fled. The assets of collaborators were seized under clearly
defined laws.'^ And contrary to Washington's disinformation, investigators
! found several Jewish-owned businesses still in operation.''

The investigators included a delegation of members of New Jewish
Agenda,'* a group from Moment Magazine,'^ Rabbi Balfour Brickner of the
Stephen Wise Free Synagogue in New York,'* and the executive director of
the Milwaukee Jewish Council." Local groups also investigated the
charges of anti-Semitism and reported back to their communities that they
were spurious.

Latin American investigators were harsher in their refutations. Sergio
Nudelstejer, who heads the American Jewish Committee's Mexico office,
said that the Jews left Nicaragua because of "factors other than anti-
Semitism, including their belonging to the propertied classes." A press
release issued by the World Jewish Congress said Panama City Rabbi
Heszel Klepfisc had been to Nicaragua in September 1 983 and found that
there was an "anti-Israel" tendency, but no anti-Semitism. '^ "The
statements of Rabbi Rosenthal are not based on fact and do damage to the
Jewish cause in Central America and, in my opinion, also to Israel,"
Klepfisz, a recognized leader of Latin American Jewry, wrote in a letter in
April 1984."

In its analysis of the situation, the Council on Hemispheric Affairs
(COHA) noted that, "while anti-Zionism sometimes spills over into anti-
Semitism, there is litde evidence that this has transpired in contemporary
Nicaragua." COHA saw Nicaragua's position as determined by

the sort of sympathy with the Palestinian cause that is de riguer
[sic] among left-leaning Third World regimes. This sentiment,
coupled with the role Israel has played in arming rightist
regimes throughout Latin America, has prompted the San-
dinistas to adopt an avowedly anti-Zionist foreign policy.^"

A State Department Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs team also carried out extensive interviews in Nicaragua and turned
up no evidence of anti-Semitism. 2'

Journalists' reports corroborate what the investigators found. After
having spoken with Jews still living in Nicaragua (this did tend to refute the

1 72 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

charges of the entire community having been driven into exile) as well as
the Nicaraguan government, Edward Cody of the Washington Post reported
that all agreed that the synagogue was not confiscated, but abandoned by
the Jews and later used by the Nicaraguans for a childrens' association."

Although in 1982 the pro-government Managua paper Nuevo Diario
had run a series of articles which the president of the Mexican branch of
B'nai B'rith perceived as anti-Semitic,^^ several journalists determined that
the editors had merely confused the terms for Jew and Israeli.^t According
to the Nicaraguan government's human rights unit, the article causing
particular distress had been one of a series, reflecting the views of
theologians who had spoken at the Church of the Nazarene in Managua."

Clerical anti-Semitism in Nicaragua does not seem to be limited to
pro-government forces. Bishop Miguel Obando y Bravo, an avid par-
ticipant in the Reagan Administration's war against Nicaragua, preached an
October 1984 sermon in Managua containing these lines:

[T]he leaders of Israel... mistreated [the prophets], beat them,
killed them. Finally as supreme proof of his love, God sent his
divine Son, but they.. .also killed him, crucifying him. ..The
Jews killed the prophets and finally the Son of God.. .Such
idolatry calls forth the sky's vengeance."^*

Obando, who has since been appointed Cardinal, did not deign to reply to a
query by Rabbi Ronald B. Sobel, chair of the ADL Intergroup Relations
Committee." There is no trail of press clippings pointing to an ADL
pursuit of this matter.

As had many other investigators, a North American Jewish woman
who had lived in Nicaragua for three years noted that there was much
ignorance, with Nicaraguans believing that Jews killed Christ. "The
hardest question was from Nicaraguans who wanted to know why Jews
and Israelis wanted to kill them. They know only one Hebrew word—
Galil— written on all the weapons in the hands of the contras."^*

For Its part, the Nicaraguan government was quite sensitive to the
issue. "We have broken our relations with Israel, but we go out of our way
to show our love and respect for the Jewish people," stated Foreign
Minister Miguel D'Escoto.^'

That these charges were far fetched was underscored by the failure of
the State Department to include anti-Semitism in the annual critique of
Nicaragua it published in its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for
1980, 1981 and 1982.3° In 1983 it noted the ADL report.^' Except for
Assistant Secretary of State Elliott Abrams, who said that Nicaragua was
anti-Semitic because it recognizes the PLO," the State Department

Israel and Central America

173

confined its energies to putting out tracts "proving" that Nicaragua was
part of an international "terrorist" network."

But the charges were not without some effect: the home of the
Nicaraguan consul in Toronto was stoned by members of the Jewish
Defense League. And Rep. Michael Barnes (D-MD) who, as chair of the
subcommittee on Latin America of the House Foreign Affairs Committee,
was always popping up on television opposing the administration's contra
policy, released a letter to Managua accusing Nicaragua of "government-
sponsored anti-Semitism" and declaring himelf outraged at reports he had
read about the "forced exile by your government of the entire Jewish
community."'^

Rather than uniting the U.S. Jewish community behind the Reagan
policy, the controversy over the ADL's charges caused consternation and
disputes among major U.S. Jewish organizations." Without disputing the
question of anti-Semitism, Henry Siegman, Executive Director of the
American Jewish Congress noted that.

The only significant question before the American people with
respect to Nicaragua is whether the appropriate response to the
dangers posed by the Sandinistas is military assistance to the
contras...To invoke anti-Semitism as an expedient to gain
support for controversial policies not only brings these policies
further into question, but also compromises the battle against
anti-Semitism. 3^

It is possible that the campaign even backfired, causing previously
uncommitted Jews to take a stand against the contra war and the
administration's Central America policy. The American Jewish Congress
passed a resolution opposing contra aid." Jews also began participating in
the sanctuary movement, protecting refugees from El Salvador and
Guatemala from the Reagan Administration. By early 1987, 340 Reform
temples, a dozen Conservative congregations and several Jewish organiza-
tions, including New Jewish Agenda, had formally affiliated with sanc-
tuary coalitions.'^

One of the founders of the sanctuary movement. Rabbi Joseph
Weizenbaum of Temple Emmanu-El in Tucson, remarked that he en-
deavors to convince the Central American refugees with whom he works
that "there's more to Judaism than the foreign policy of Israel."''

In a crowning irony, it was later revealed that the White House Digest
for July 20, 1 983, the day that Stavisky and Gorn had made their debut as
"victims" of the Sandinistas, had had the references to Sandinista "anti-
Semitism" deleted, presumably after the cable from Ambassador Quainton.

1 74 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

But in his public remarks the President read the deleted text,*" and both he
and the ADL's Rosenthal would continue to preach what they knew to be
lies as gospel.

Rabbi Rosenthal in particular would keep working the subject, with
hysterical charges that the whole Jewish community had been driven out of
Nicaragua. He issued a "white paper" reiterating his initial fraudulent
allegations m March 1986— the same day that President Reagan read a
televised speech containing the assertions that the Jewish synagogue in
Managua had been "desecrated and firebombed"— it had a molotov
cocktail thrown with small effect against its door during the war against
Somoza,ii~and that the "entire Jewish community" had been "forced to
flee Nicaragua."^ The ADL's "white paper" was distributed to members
of Congress.*'

And as regularly as clockwork, before a vote on contra aid, "victims"
of Nicaraguan anti-Semitism would come forward to do what they could
for the cause.

Relatives of the "exiled" Nicaraguan Jews surfaced in 1 985 as part of a
campaign launched to lobby for $14 million in contra aid. Billed as
"conservative Nicaraguan Jews," Elena Corn (the daughter-in-law of
Abraham) and Sarita and Oscar Kellerman joined contra leaders in a
national campaign "to convince American Jews that the Sandinista
government is anti-Semitic and anti-Israel." The campaign specifically
targeted Jewish members of Congress and members of Congress with large
Jewish constituencies who had opposed contra aid. The three exiles joined
contra leaders for Washmgton press conferences and then met individually
with members of Congress, at synagogues and with "conservative" groups.
They called fresh attention to the old charges of Nicaraguan anti-
Semitism.''''

In 1986 seven exiles appeared at a Washington press conference
sponsored by the rightist National Jewish Coalition. ''^

Over the years, as the administration despaired and labored to recruit
Israel to its cause, there were other approaches made to Jews, seeking their
backing for contra aid, but also, given the intervention of Israeli diplomats
in the 1 986 contra aid battle, "discreetly encourag[ing] American Jewish
bodies to lobby Congress in favor of the $100 million the President was
asking for the mercenaries,"'"* almost certainly, to soften up public opinion
to a possible future overt Israeli role in the contra program.

Much propaganda was made of the links between Nicaragua, Iran,
Libya and the PLO. "If the Sandinistas are allowed to consolidate their
hold on Nicaragua," intoned President Reagan, "we'll have a permanent
staging ground for terrorism. A home away from home for Qadhafi, Arafat

Israel and Central America

175

I' and the Ayatollah, just three hours by air from the U.S. border. '"'^ (At the
' time, of course, the man reading those lines was selling arms to "the
I Ayatollah.")

Under the masthead of White House Digest, the administration
distributed, until at least early 1985, a propaganda piece entitled "The
PLO in Central America." Derogatory cartoons indicated connections
between the PLO and various "terrorist" organizations. The FSLN was of
course included, but so were defunct groups such as the U.S. Black Panther
Party and South American organizations that had long since become
.electoral formations. Of Israeli origin, the White House giveaway had been
photocopied from a piece given out by the far-right Jewish Institute for
National Security Affairs GINSA).''8 One of the founders of JINSA was
Michael Ledeen, who figured prominently in the Iran-contra scandal.

The point was made repeatedly that Khadafy, Arafat and Khomeini
were using Nicaragua as a "terror base." In actuality Nicaragua's ties with
the PLO were, in addition to the diplomatic sphere, mainly in civil aviation,
agriculture and technical assistance.*' In early 1985 the Nicaraguan
embassy in Washington explained that some military training had been
accepted from Libya, and that, even though Col. Khadafy had offered
troops, these had been declined, as Nicaragua was bending over backwards
to avoid anything which might be perceived by the administration n
provocation.^" The connection with Iran was primarily an oil-for-sugai
barter arranged in early 1985.^' Otherwise it was limited to verbal
solidarity between two victims of U.S. aggression." Only later would it
become known that NSC staffer Lt. Col. Oliver North was overcharging
Iran for U.S. arms and diverting the profits from those sales to the contras.

It IS, of course, impossible to assess exactly what impact the anti-
Semitism charges and the hyperbole about Iran, Libya and the PLO had on
Jewish citizens. That the administration never altered the content of its
campaign for Jewish support of its contra program did not necessarily
connote success— instead it indicated a stubborn belief that Jews would
respond as Jews, rather than members of the body politic. In other words:
anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, right-wing Jewish groups worked eagerly
with the administration to convert U.S. Jews to the contra cause.

At a White House meeting on March 5, 1986, President Reagan
lobbied leaders of major Jewish organizations to support the 1100 million
contra aid bill to be considered by the House of Representatives. He
reiterated the propaganda about the PLO, Iran and Libya, and suggested an
additional special "Jewish" reason for supporting the contras: Jews should
support contra aid because U.S. credibility to allies in Latin America and to
Israel was at stake.

1 76 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Kenneth Bialkin, the chairman of the Conference of Presidents of
Major Jewish Organizations, and at the time leader of the ADL, endorsed
the Reagan policy, but he stressed that he could not endorse it on behalf of
the entire Jewish community which the conference purports to represent.

Other Jewish rightists did not make the kind of prominent headlines
Bialkin did. JINSA, for instance, confined its efforts to a letter to the editor
of the Wall Street Journal repeating the spurious anti-Semitism charges and
to repetitious anti-Nicaragua propaganda in its newsletter. In the Congres-
sional Record of March 19,1986, Rep. Vin Weber (R-MN) inserted a letter
signed by prominent Jews such as Max Fisher and Jack Stein, a former
president of the Conference of Major Jewish Organizations, stressing the
connections between Nicaragua and the PLO and Libya.

The administration also used individual Jews in its efforts to sway
Jewish opinion. In the spring of 1986, the President entertained a group
including Wall Street crook Ivan Boesky — before he was busted for insider
trading, Boesky was a leading donor to Jewish causes — and ultraright
Jewish Senator Chic Hecht (R-NV)."

The contras were at best half-way down the list of priorities of Jewish
right-wingers, but the President's objectives neatly dovetailed with the
aims of these groups, which have long sought to shift the Jewish
community to the right. Premised upon the notion that the primary
"mission" of Jews in the U.S. is to support Israel, the argument of these
rightists is that alliances are best made with proponents of unbridled
military spending and unreasoning hostility toward the nations of the East
bloc and much of the Nonaligned Movement. The proponents of a Jewish
shift to the right further argue that Jews, who have historically been
involved in disproportionate numbers in struggles for social and economic
justice, have become too affluent and powerful to have common interests
with the left.

There have always been Jewish right-wingers, out of synch with the
Jewish experience of suffering and persecution and out of step with the
mainstream. Early in the century the high tone German- American Jews
disdained Eastern European Jews who were fled pogroms and starvation to
arrive in the U.S. in great numbers. The Russian Jews were labeled "anti-
American" and the newcomers' Yiddish newspapers were decried as
"socialistic" by the German-born Jews.^' In more recent times, Jewish
leaders worked with the McCarthy committees to "convict" leftist Jews.

This push to the right was given new impetus under the Herut
governments of Menachem Begin (1977-1983) and Yitzhak Shamir
(1983-1 984), who encouraged U.S.Jewish organizations to make common
cause with televangelists such as Pat Robertson and Jerry Falwell,

Israel and Central America 177

preachers who used religion to mobilize millions into the political process
in support of 19th century social norms and madcap military spending.
That these biblethumpers had traditionally been the reservoir of anti-
Semitism troubled Begin not — nor, for that matter, ADL's Nathan
Perlmutter.^^

The tactics underlying this strange mating were expectations that
far-right fans of military spending would support continued high levels of
U.S. military aid to Israel (they do not appear to have done so with the
regularity of the liberal Democrats) and that the televangelists would pump
tourists into Israel. This has been the case, to a limited degree, with both
Robertson and Falwell and their local clones. However, the friendship has
been accompanied by the spread of a very bizarre, cultlike approach to the
Jewish state. Called premillenialism, devotees literally believe Biblical
predictions that the last batde of Armageddon (against the "Northern
Satanic force," i.e. the Soviet Union) will be fought in Israel — it will, of
course, be nuclear — and Jesus Christ will "return" and gather up the true
believers into a "rapture," while the rest of the world agonizes in war and
turmoil.^' There are shades of anti-Semitism to this school of superstition:
believers say that all of the Jews must be gathered back in Israel before the
commencement of the end of time, which they so eagerly await.*"

Although the tours and paraphernalia of this cult are not selling quite
as well as they used to,*' those who subscribe to it become passionate
devotees of Israel, visiting sites of the coming war, and adopting the Israeli
line of dismissing with contempt all Arabs, particularly the Palestinians."

It could not possibly be an accident that the Begin love affair with the
right-wing evangelicals began at the very time that South Africa was
beginning to establish links with, and funnel money to, the same groups.
The religious right — to call it partial to South Africa is to understate the
case — is given a great deal of the credit for the election of Ronald Reagan in
1980.

The years when the administration was trying to harness willing Jews
to its Central America policies were years of considerable contention
between Jewish liberals and the less extreme shadings of Jewish rightism.
The invasion of Lebanon had been a watershed, with some Jewish liberals
resentful of pressure from the Begin government to quell their criticism and
support the war. Hoping to foster civil rights, Jewish- Arab contact, and to
prevent the strengthening of settlements in occupied territories and of
hardline religious institutions, some of these liberals began exploring
methods of channeling their donations to Israel to projects not controlled
by the government-linked Jewish Agency.*' Some Jewish liberals began to

1 78 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

argue that Jews must avoid making Israel the sole criterion of their political
commitment and direct their political work toward multi-issue coalitions.''*
This sparring has bypassed the many Jews outside the organized
community. Jewish voters have not responded to the call from the right.
Jewish males were the only white ethnics to vote against President Reagan
in 1 984. In the March 20, 1 986 vote on contra aid, 2 1 of the 30 Jewish
members of the House voted no. Prior to the vote, members of Congress
had received a letter from the Union of American Heb rew Congregations,
a grouping identified with ReformedJkjdaisi^^

'"^P.££S££ ?ted by UA HC^opposed military aid to the contras. The letter also
refuted the anti-Semitism charges against Nicaragua.*^

Will the Lessons Be Learned?

If Israel is to be disengaged from the war against Nicaragua, the
impetus will have to come from the U.S. In Israel there has been only the
smallest voice of opposition to involvement with the contras and it has
quavered. That voice has originated with the leaders of the Mapam party, a
socialist Zionist party whose base is the kibbutzim and which, until 1 984,
had been part of the Labor Alignment, only breaking away when Labor
joined Likud to form the 1984 unity government.

A high-ranking Mapam delegation visited Israel in late 1 984 and on its
return formed the Israeli Committee of Solidarity with Nicaragua,' a group
which several Israelis described as "tiny" and "quiet."

Two years later a delegation from Nicaragua's Agrarian Reform
Research and Study Center was said to have been set to visit Israeli
distribution cooperatives and kibbutzim as guests of Mapam. It was
possibly Mapam's hope that contact with Nicaraguan officials might lead to
an improvement of relations between the two countries.^ The visit,
however, never materialized and soon after the eruption of the Iran-contra
scandal the Israeli press said it had been canceled.'

Responding to an article in a British magazine about the visit, the
Nicaraguan Ambassador to the UK said that Nicaragua had never
contemplated sending a delegation to Israel.*

Instead of explaining why Nicaragua might under the circumstances
have difficulty approaching Israel, Mapam showed journalists a letter it said

179

1 80 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

was from the Nicaraguan delegation. A Mapam leader said Nicaragua had
canceled the visit because of "Arab pressure." Mapam also remained
"curiously silent" about the sale of Israeli Kfir combat jets to Honduras,
under discussion at that time^ and deemed to be a major escalation of the
situation in Central America.

The Israeli government itself has blown hot and cold about Nicaragua.
Its most enthusiastic statements about improving relations, however, came
soon after the Iran-contra scandal broke, as Israel sought by every means
possible to demonstrate that it could not possibly have had any connection
with the contras. The Israeli government propagated a story in the New
Y ork Times that between 1 982 and 1 986 it had tried to repair its relations
with Nicaragua, offering development assistance programs and the pos-
sibility of diplomatic recognition as a means of boosting Nicaragua's image
"with an important sector of American political opinion."*

The Nicaraguan government had quite a different perspective on what
Israel had been trying to do. The government of Nicaragua would make no
official comment on the Israeli claims, but a well-informed source, speaking
on condition of anonymity, said that contacts between the two govern-
ments had been scant, limited to the occasional encounter at the United
Nations. Moreover, according to this source, Nicaragua believes that Israel
has played a generally counterproductive role in Central America, aiding
the Guatemalan and Salvadoran military forces in their bloody attempts to
stifle domestic opposition, as well as supporting the contras.

Where is the truth.' Israeli officials, for instance, say that when they
were offering Nicaragua diplomacy and assistance they also pointed out
that Israel "was refraining from helping the contras," even though
Nicaragua's solidarity with the PLO and its vote in the UN with the
Nonaligned bloc were "viewed as provoking Israel.

Israeli officials routinely profess support for the Contadora peace
process led by Panama, Mexico, Venezuela and Colombia. However, in
1 983 it took quite a bit of effort for the Contadora nations to get a statement
from Israel supportive of their efforts to find a peaceful setdement for
strife-torn Central America. ^

In 1 984 it was Nicaragua, not Israel, which offered to normalize ties.
Talking to a visiting New Jewish Agenda delegation. Vice President
Sergio Ramirez said that were Shimon Peres "to consolidate political
power in Israel, there could be some prospect" for Nicaragua to reassess its
relations with Tel Aviv.'

But under Peres, Israel aided the Reagan Administration's vendetta
against Nicaragua. In June 1986 Foreign Minister Yitzhak Shamir made
the bizarre charge that impoverished Nicaragua was aiding the Palestine

Israel and Central America

181

f Liberation Organization.'" He later said that Nicaragua was aiding
■ "terror," which he called "an international monster spread over con-
, tinents." Shamir "congratulated the United States on its anti-terror war in
South America," saying that Israel "favors cooperation for the suppression
of terror."" Several months later, Israeli military sources charged that
Nicaragua's national airline Aeronica had sold Fatah, the principal
component of the PLO, four DC-8 aircraft to transport troops and military
equipment. William Ramirez, Nicaragua's transport minister, heatedly
denied the charge. "We would certainly like to have DC-8s," he said, and
went on to list all nine planes in Nicaragua's civil aviation fleet.

At the UN, Israel was the only country to vote with the U.S. against a
1 986 resolution demanding that Washington revoke its economic embargo
against Nicaragua.'^ On an earlier resolution upholding a World Court
judgment against the U.S. and demanding that Washington cease its aid to
the contras, approved by the General Assembly on November 3, Israel
joined El Salvador and the U.S. in casting the only negative votes.'*

With the probable defeat of further contra aid in the wake of the
Iran-contra scandal, there will again be a vacuum in Central America;
floating in it will be thousands of untethered contra mercenaries. Opinion is
divided on whether Israel will also withdraw or whether it will increase its
involvement with the contras, spurred on perhaps by the same minority
factions in the U.S. establishment which developed and ran the war against
Nicaragua in the first place.

Given its past track record in Central America, if there is money to be
made — two possible sources are narco-profits and donations from South
Africa, which would have strong motivation for playing such an interna-
tional role — and political leverage to be gained, Israel would very likely
continue its low-profile assistance to the contras.

Passive speculation about which outcome is more likely is not
worthwhile if the goal is to dissuade Israel from delving further into the
Central American bloodbath. Public pressure applied as never before must
block that option; it leads to nothing more complicated than murder — and
our complicity in it.

Conclusion

iiiiiiiiiiiiiiitiiiiiiiiiiiiifiiii

Conclusion

What use is it to save Central Americans from death at the hands of
U.S. -sponsored governments and mercenary bands if it is only to deliver
them to the same clients and cutthroats courtesy of Israel.' Is work on behalf
of the liberation struggle in South Africa of any use if Israel is not prevented
from arming and entrenching the minority regime.' Yet, given the difficulty
of restraining any of Israel's actions, is it not impossible to force a halt to
these often clandestine activities, which are both lucrative and protected by
powerful players in the U.S. establishment?

It might be argued that in this era when the word conservative is used
where "fascist" would be perfectly appropriate, and when "liberal"
connotes those who drift in and out of "bipartisan consensus," progressives
should be satisfied with any shred of victory they can achieve. However,
unless the goal is a smug self-delusion, that is a lame argument. And when
the issue is preventing Israel's support of repressive forces, a good case can
be made that progressives have not fought very hard. Despite Israeli
leaders' insistance that many of these interventions are carried out as part of
Israel's "strategic" alliance with the U.S.; despite the unparalleled amount
of U.S. assistance Israel receives, which makes it a virtual ward of this
country; and despite the reality that the victims of Israeli aggression have
no reason to distinguish its depredations from U.S. policy — many progres-
sives refuse to be informed about, much less take responsibility for, Israel's
activities.

185

186

ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Responsibility is incumbent in the inextricable relationship between
progressive victories on Central America, which have forced the U.S. to
pull back, and the following escalation of Israeli involvement in the same
area. Guatemala is an example in progress, albeit largely ignored. Meaning-
ful sanctions against South Africa have also led to stepped-up Israeli efforts
to arm Pretoria (sometimes with U.S. technology) and to peddle South
African exports here.

However, there is much to suggest that sentiment exists for assuming
that responsibility in a serious way. And there is even more cause for hope
that a reasonably spirited fight against Israel's intervention will succeed.
Conversely, failure to fight Israel's intervention in Southern Africa and
Central America will greatly impair the U.S. left, already sorely wounded
by its failure to include in its galaxy of concerns the Palestinian cause.

What are the objectives in this fight, and what are the obstacles which
must be overcome.' Simply stated, Israel must be identified as the scavenger
of abandoned U.S. policy that in reality it is. Activists and progressive
officials must be brought to understand that what Israel does outside the
Middle East — and inside, too — has "made in U.S.A." stamped all over it.
When Israel's actions are acknowledged to be our responsibility, it will be
readily apparent that the solutions lie in U.S. leverage applied to Israel-
leverage that exists in abundance, but has never been used.

Standing between the present situation and that goal is one main
obstacle: fear — fear and its twisted reflection, cowardice. To a lesser extent,
the bonds developed over several decades between the U.S. covert
establishment and Israel will resist uncoupling.

The fear of confronting Israel is not misplaced. Often critics of Israeli
policy have suffered damage to their reputations, have lost their jobs, and,
in at least one case (that of Alex Odeh, Southern California director of the
American- Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, assassinated by a bomb
in October 1985), have lost life itself. There is no single source of this
threat, no nerve center directing damage control for Israel. Instead it
emanates from a number of organizations, which over the years have
developed hyperagressive methods of defending Israel.

At a minimum, Israel 's defenders demand of those who wish to remain
in their good graces uncritical, unswerving loyalty. The most commonly
used method of extracting compliance is to brand critics as "anti-Semites."
This is almost always a false charge, equating criticism of the policies of the
government of Israel with hostility toward Jews. Nevertheless, in the wake
of the Holocaust, it is a potent and disquieting sobriquet, reverberating
especially harshly in the ears of those who have sincerely struggled to
conquer their racism.

Conclusion 187

The purpose of these charges of anti-Semitism — and they are leveled
with equal flagrance at Jews and non-Jews alike— is to place Israeli policy
beyond the reach of acceptable public discourse. It is tremendously ironic
that those who purvey them have rarely bothered to distance themselves
from the far more prevalent racism directed against Arabs (but of course,
this form of bigotry seems to work in Israel's favor).

One of the most extreme— and successful— examples of savaging all
opposition is the U.S. Congress, where the slightest dissent against Israeli
positions means almost certain opposition in the next election. In 1982,
Israel's lobby AIPAC br agged that pro-Israel activists had defeated Illinois
Republican Paul FindTey by pumping $685,000 in pro-Israeli political
I action committee (PAC) contributions into the campaign of his opponent.
Findley had represented his district for 22 years, had "voted consistently
for aid to Israel," but had, as a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee,
taken an active interest in U.S. Middle East policy, urged negotiations with
the PLO, and had himself met with PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat.' In
addition to the PAC contributions (from every state in the country),
AIPAC and its allies had discouraged politicians and performers from
appearing on Findley's behalf, and had organized pickets and precinct
walkers to insure his defeat. Findley wondered whether he had been
"chosen for a trip to the political gallows to discourage other Congressmen
from speaking out." When he asked an AIPAC staffer he was told, "You
were the most visible critic of Israeli policy. That's the best answer I can
give." Findley wondered, "could Israel's supporters not tolerate even one
lonely voice of dissent?"^

Curiosity and dissent are a constant threat, urgently requiring
suppression. When Sen. Abraham Ribicoff (D-CT), a Jew and a strong
supporter of Israel, developed a practice of freely criticizing Israeli policies
at private meetings between influential senators and visiting Israeli officials
in the mid-1970s, Israeli officials said "[b]y asking obviously hostile
questions... he was encouraging his colleagues to take critical views of the
Israeli position."' When Ribicoff agreed to have lunch with a representative
of the PLO and another senator, Thomas Eagleton (D-MO), happened on
the luncheon and joined the party, that was proof that "when a Jewish
senator takes a position that undermines polices of the Israeli government
...it makes it a lot easier for the non-Jews in the Senate to abandon pro-
Israeli positions."*

AIPAC does not wait until elections to make its influence felt. It
coordinates the response of thousands of members throughout the country,
who, on a moment's notice, will deluge their representatives in Washington
with phone calls, letters, or even telegrams;^ AIPAC has on file signed

188

ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

proxies for the latter, so there will be no delay/ Although it is Israel's
.J5gjstered foreign a^^^ also a networking mechanism for

national and regional Jewish leaders, many of whom sit on its governing
bodies.^

To the power of AIPAC must be added

the jietwork of congressional aides strongly sympathetic to
Israel who meet frequently to coordinate efforts to pass critical
legislation and also write bills and speeches on Israel for the
members of Congress for whom they work.^

In practice this works to stifle any serious consideration by Congress
of issues relating to Israel. Action in Congress is limited to moving on
Israel's agenda: withholding arms sales from Arab countries, passing
resolutions forbidding U.S. officials from meeting with the FLO, passing
resolutions condemning UN resolutions critical of Israel, and, of course,
passing ever more monumental no-strings-attached aid appropriations for
Israel.

While AIPAC and the various Jewish organizations devote con-
siderable energy to lobbying Congress, they also devote themselves to
defending Israel in other areas of public life: JpcalpgHtks, academia, media,
the ar ts^ In research spurred by his experience at the hands of this network,
Paul Findley chronicled some of the casualties: a campaign against the
Hartford (Connecticut) Seminary involving charges that its long-respected
Islamic studies program was anti-Semitic and an "al-Fatah support
group";' a shrill campaign against the Georgetown Center for Con-
temporary Arab Studies for having accepted funds from Arab govern-
ments;'" a campaign against a similar program at Villanova, a Catholic
university in Pennsylvania, and against Middle East Studies programs
nation wide;" a 1980 campaign against the director of the University of
Arizona's Near Eastern Center featuring charges that she was "running a
pro-Arab propaganda network," forcing the resignation of both the
director and her superior.'^

A longrunning media vendetta was launched against the Very
Reverend Francis B. Sayre, dean of the (Episcopalian) National Cathedral
in Washington, D.C. after he preached a sermon in 1 972 criticizing Israel's
treatment of Palestinians under occupation. Sayre later acknowledged that
the attacks truncated his career.'^ Findley also found numerous instances of
inti midation campaigns against political or ganizations, journalists, and
media outlets. ~ ~~

There are similar tales from every community and every aspect of
public life. The successful campaign to get the Boston Symphony
Orchestra to drop a performance with Vanessa Redgrave in 1982 made

Conclusion 189

national headlines. Others make only a local stir, destroy careers, and then
slip unnoticed into history.

Local elections are a focus of intense activity, particularly where black
candidates are involved. Because they have been among the most stalwart
supporters of Palestinian rights, and because they have access to one of the
largest voting blocs in the Democratic Party, black politicians experience
particularly heavy pressure from pro-Israel activists. There is a history of
friction, over the Middle East and affirmative action, between black and
Jewish leaders, dating back to the Black Power movement and intensifying
with the campaign around the Bakke anti-affirmative action case and the
forced resignation of the Carter Administration's UN Ambassador An-
drew Young for meeting with a representative of the PLC* Pro-Israel
activists have scarcely concealed their interest in helping to determine
which black politicians come to national prominence.'^ Thus candidates for
local offices as unrelated to foreign policy as county supervisor are judged
on their positions on Israel. Some are pressured privately and others are
asked to endorse a sort of "loyalty oath," often reflecting such extremist
Israeli positions as rejection of negotiations with the PLO.'^

The climate has been well prepared for such pressure tactics. There
was little protest, except from American- Arab organizations and organiza-
tions working on Middle East-related issues, when both AIPAC and the
ADL published and circulated "enemies of Israel" lists.''

Most insidious is the constant barrage of Arab-as-terrorist propaganda
loosed on Israel's behalf. It has become perfectly acceptable for candidates
for office to refuse the donations of Arab Americans. The Mondale 1984
campaign declared it had a policy of returning such donations." In 1986,
Joseph Kennedy, Jr. returned a $100 donation to his congressional
campaign from family friend and former U.S. Senator James Abourezk.

It should not be surprising that, after failing to win a conclusive
victory in its persecution of the sanctuary movement," when the Reagan
Administration next decided to move against domestic dissent its target
was eight Palestinian resident aliens and the Kenyan wife of one of them.
They were arrested on January 27, 1987 after a full-blown FBI investiga-
tion. However, as the investigation failed to turn up any evidence of
"terrorism," they were held for deportation on a violation of the
McCarthy-era McCarran- Waiters act — specifically for disseminating lit-
erature advocating the goals of "world communism. "^^ There was an
immediate outpouring of support from the civil liberties community and
also from those concerned with the rights of immigrants and refugees. A
strong defense committee was formed. It is still not clear whether the lesson
of the administration's attempt to take advantage of the outsider status of
the Palestinian movement has been fully absorbed by the left.

1 90 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

That Los Angeles was the scene of this testing of the water could not
have been more ironic. Slightly more than a year before the arrests Alex
Odeh, the Southern California regional director of the American-Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC), had been assassinated in nearby
Santa Ana by a bomb rigged to go off when he opened the door to the ADC
office.^' The FBI has continued to maintain that it is investigating that
murder — but it has not yet been solved.

Odeh had been interviewed on television the previous night, com-
mending the efforts of Egypt and PLO Chairman Yasir Arafat to negotiate
an end to the hijacking of the cruise ship Achille Lauro." An earlier bomb
attempt at the Boston ADC office resulted in the death of a police officer as
he tried to defuse it. Other officers of ADC have been threatened, as have a
number of individuals who speak out against Israel.^'

If this organized intimidation was all there was to the Israeli defense
system abroad it would be formidable. But there is more. A recent
mvestigation revealed the existence of an organized c am paign to influ ence
t he coverage given Israel by the U.S . media. Called the HjsbaraProject—
Hasbara being Hebrew for propaganda— the project has enjoyed the
participation of leading lights of the U.S. corporate media. Israeli diplomats
are trained through apprenticeships at Madison Avenue advertising
agencies and public relations firms. They are taken to meet "top editors and
executives at the New York Times, the Washington Post, and the network
evening news shows," as well as editors and broadcasters around the
country. They sit in on editorial conferences. Thus they develop both the
contacts and techniques for getting a story killed or shaded. Often their
efforts are buttressed by pressure from U.S. Jewish groups, which have
succeeded in killing some television programs outright, intimidating the
advertisers of others, and getting advertisements for opponents' causes
canceled.^*

Stephen Rosenfeld of the Washington Post observed:

They want 100 percent. They don't want fairness; they want
unfairness on their side, and when they don't get it they accuse
the press of being unfair. Most journalists get so much
uninformed, unfair whining from the organized Jews that
Jewish organizations— and ultimately Israel— may lose their
credibility.^^

That day is far off. For now, the executive producer at Nightline
admits that Israel is "overrepresented" on the show, and that the PLO is
excluded— because it is not considered a "counterpoint to Israel. "^^

Underlying these efforts are the covert activities of Israeli agents of
Mossad and possibly other intelligence services. Mossad, according to one

Conclusion 191

U.S. intelligence expert, "[has] penetrations all through the U.S. govern-
ment. They do better than the KGB."" It is well known that Israel
regularly monitors U.S. government communications (in order to be able
to respond in a timely manner to any contemplated new policy directions.)
"We have to assume that they have wire taps all over town," said a senior
State Department official.

Mos sad also, according to a 1979 CIA study, "a cquires data for
factions in thelVest . ' ' According to tKisTtudy7Mossad
u ses domes nc^ro^sFaeTi gre^^ work as well as highly-placed figures
i n a variety of walks o f life.^^ Some activists suspect Israeli involvement in
COINTELPRO, the CIA program of the 1960s and 1970s that targeted
domestic dissidents.

It is because these organizations and their methods have been allowed
to proceed unchallenged for so long that they now appear so menacingly
invincible. It is unlikely that they will melt like the Wicked Witch of the
West with the first bucket of water. Nonetheless, insiders are aware that the
juggernaut has little depth. "You have an underlying fragility that was only
overcome by political fear," remarked a Defense Department official, in an
attempt to describe a sudden outpouring of negativity toward Israel among
government bureaucrats following the arrest of Jonathan Jay Pollard for
spying for Israel.^'

Of particular concern to Jews who have never felt that the pro-Israel
network represented them, its actions only confirm the old shibboleths of
anti-Semites: that Jews control the media; that they conspire to control the
government. Some worry that an anti-Semitic backlash is inevitable. The
vehement champions of Israel have no answer to this dilemma. They have
been riding high for so long, it has perhaps not occurred to them that they
have created something of a monster, with at least the potential capacity to
inflict harm on its creator as well as its intended victim.

For the moment, however, it is the progressives who are facing the
monster— or would be, if they only dared to look. The fight will have to be
waged where the challenge is: in the Congress and electoral politics; and in
political and cultural life on a local level. The costs of blindness and
passivity, in the long run, are apt to be even higher than a head-on
confrontation.

1 92 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

In Congress

Although it seems all but impossible to present a counterweight to the
pro-Israeli lobby, there is already evidence that issues concerning Israel's
behavior outside the Middle East are a key point of vulnerability. This
suggests that it will be easier to persuade both activists and legislators to
deal with Israeli intervention outside the Middle East than with anything
Israel does within its own bailiwick. This is a tactical rather than a moral
question. Israel's lobby is armed to the teeth on issues relating to
brutalization of the Palestinians under occupation, Israel's use of Lebanon
for target practice and spare water, and its strange assortment of strategies,
alliances and enemies among the regional actors.

The lobby is weaker where Israeli dealings with oppressor regimes
outside the Middle East are concerned. Israel's ludicruous denials of any
involvement with the contras after the Iran-contra scandal broke demon-
strated two things: there is an absolute lack of excuses for such behavior;
Congressional Democrats are offended by these activities,'" although they
are too well disciplined to squawk about them. AIP AC doesn't have much
to say either, at least nothing suitable for publication.

Particularly hot potatoes have been issues dealing with Israel's
relations with South Africa. The Jewish rank and file is also profoundly
disturbed, preferring not to try to talk about why Israel must continue
selling arms to South Africa. ''

Everything Congress has ever done on this subject has been awkward,
like children trying to get the cookie jar back on the shelf before being
noticed. If anti-apartheid organizations had not been so delicate about
avoiding discussion of Israel's support of the white regime, on at least two
occasions Congress might have been left with no recourse but to do the
right thing and apply pressure on Israel to halt its dealings with South
Africa.

Had there been a presence by representatives of anti-apartheid
organizations when Rep. John Conyers (D-MI) proposed legislation on
South Africa's nuclear weapons, things might have gone differently indeed.
This is a supersensitive issue — not the nuclear arsenal of South Africa per se
but its nuclear mentor, Israel — which, if Congress faced, might result in
cutting off aid to Israel. U.S. law calls for cutting off aid to a client which
shares nuclear technology with a non-signer of the Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty. (Neither Israel nor South Africa has signed the treaty.)

When Rep. Conyers attempted to amend the 1985 foreign aid bill with
an amendment, which he said was "a very simple prohibition that provides

Conclusion 193

that no foreign assistance, military or economic, may be provided to any
country having a nuclear relationship with South Africa," the following
dialogue occurred in the Africa subcommittee of the Foreign Affairs
Committee:

Conyers: All this amendment does, and it names no
countries and it indicts no nations, is that we say that, any nation
from this point on. ..having anything to do with developing
nuclear capability with South Africa could be prohibited from
receiving assistance from the United States...

[Howard] Wolpe [(D-MI), Chair of the subcommittee]: I
have some concerns about the amendment as it has been drafted,
if I understand it correctly it could result in the cutoff of cash
sales, military equipment to some U.S. allies and NATO, for
example, France for example, if they have a nuclear relationship.

I think, though, this is an issue that needs to be explored. I
would suggest that this matter be further explored in committee
hearings. ..'2

Wolpe persuaded Conyers to withdraw the amendment on the promise of
considering the issue during hearings on nuclear proliferation. That was in
1985 — Conyers had just released a report on the 1979 nuclear test
conducted by South Africa and Israel — and those hearings have never been
held, largely through lack of expressed constituent interest, according to
some congressional insiders.

Another such scene played itself out in the Senate the following year,
again without any activist input. This time, fortuitously, the results were
better. But lack of constituent action has almost totally vitiated what could
have been a real victory. Together with Sen. Dan Evans (R-WA), Sen.
Charles Mathias (R-MD) — he was retiring and had nothing to lose—
amended anti-apartheid legislation to penalize U.S. aid recipients which
had military dealings with the apartheid regime. This section of the Evans-
Mathias amendment caused great consternation among Democrats on the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The committee retreated behind closed doors where, according to a
staff member, the implications for Israel were openly discussed. Three
votes were taken on the amendment. On the first vote Senator Alan
Cranston (D-CA) joined rightist Republicans Helms, Boschwitz, Pressler
and Murkowski in the minority. On a move for reconsideration, a 9-8
victory was wrested by Israel's friends, who on that pass included
Democrats Pell, Biden, and Dodd as well as Cranston. A third vote,
occasioned by a change of heart on the part of Sen. Christopher Dodd
(D-CT) affirmed the amendment by a vote of 10-7. Of the committee's

1 94 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Democrats, Cranston and Claiborne Pell remained in the minority with
Jesse Helms and company.

Although Sen. Pell's seniority would shortly boost him into the chair
of the Foreign Relations Committee, the Rhode Island Democrat had never
put himself forward as a national leader. Quite the reverse was true of
Cranston, who in 1984 ran for the Democratic nomination for President
and portrayed himself as the candidate of the nuclear disarmament
movement. Also in 1 984, Cranston had led the pack in an outcry over the
administration's efforts to transfer nuclear energy technology to the
Peoples Republic of China. Acting on a briefing from the Israeli embassy,
he worked to block the China sale for a year on the grounds that China
might transfer the technology to Pakistan for its "Islamic bomb.""
Cranston also styled himself one of the Senate's most adamant oponents of
apartheid. Prior to his votes with Jesse Helms in the Foreign Relations
Committee, he had introduced to the Senate the very exemplary bill against
apartheid authored by Rep. Ronald V. Dellums (D-CA) that was passed
by the House.^"*

Interestingly, this was AlPAC's one notable failure in several years. It
let this language, which became Section 508 of the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986, slip into law. AIPAC had no chance to knock it
out, as the bill was never debated before being passed by the Senate and the
House, and then passed again by both hduses over the President's veto.
However, just before the report mandated by Section 508 on U.S. allies
dealing weapons to South Africa was due to be submitted to Congress,
Israeli leaders worked out a gesture acceptable to Congress and the
admmistration: a March 18 cabinet decision to phase out existing arms
contracts and refrain from signing new ones. No mention was made of
nuclear cooperation. Moreover, it was reported in Israel that during a
January visit to South Africa, Defense Minister Rabin had signed new
long-term contracts," thus making the March 1 8 decision utterly— and
insultingly — meaningless.

Immediately after the Israeli Cabinet announcement, representatives
of AIPAC, the American Jewish Committee, the American Jewish
Congress, the Religious Action Center of the Reform movement and
U.S. Reps. Barney Frank (D-MA), Sander Levin (D-MI), Martin Frost
(D-TX), and Howard Berman (D-CA) met with members of the
Congressional Black Caucus and offered support for increased U.S. aid to
Africa in exchange for silence on the contents of the report.'^ According to
an extremely well-informed source, pressure on caucus members was very
intense. Congressional sources said heavy constituent pressure would be
needed to force Congress to break its silence and to act."

Conclusion 195

In February 1987, a follow-up sanctions bill sponsored by Rep.
Dellums was introduced. It also contained language barring U.S. aid to
allies with a military relationship with South Africa, but that language was
withdrawn in March after pressure from pro-Israeli partisans.

In the Democratic Party

The battle lines in the Democratic Party arena have already been
sketched out — by the money men and bosses — to include the Middle East.
This became apparent during Jesse Jackson's campaign for the 1984
Democratic presidential nomination. A wedge was driven into the left and
it was partly immobilized by debate over whether Jackson was "anti-
Semitic." Anti-Semitism was not the real question, of course. It was
Jackson's independent position on the Middle East, mild as it may have
been, but threatening enough as an example to call forth a shrill and
hysterical campaign against Jackson as an "enemy of Israel."

Pro-Israel activists play up — indeed, often overplay — the fact that a
great deal of the early money that plays such a determinative role in the
candidate selection process in the Democratic Party comes from Jews.
Candidates for Senate are very likely to have been prescreened by Israel's
friends before they are presented to the voters. Presidential candidates —
always with the lockstep Middle East position, along with the standard
issue Cold War interventionism — are habitually shoved down the throats
of the prime constituencies of the party, minorities, progressives, peace
activists. (Sometimes this gets out of hand, when too many pass muster.
There was an unseemly competition before the 1984 New York primary,
with several Democratic presidential candidates striving to be seen as the
most ardent supporter of a bill mandating the move of the U.S. embassy in
Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem,'^ despite warnings from U.S. diplomats
that this would lead to worldwide protests against the U.S.")

The result of all this is an incapacitating dishonesty between activists
and legislators who have carved out their turf on a specific area of concern.
In this respect, Alan Cranston is the shining exemplar. In his 1986 race for
reelection, Cranston received more money from pro-Israel PACs than any
other candidate running that year. He also received support from peace,
anti-intervention, environmental and social justice activists, who performed
the crucial phone-banking and precinct- walking that resulted in his victory

1 96 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

by the narrowest of margins. He is now shared, much like a vacation
condominium, by groups with diametrically opposing interests.

But Cranston is not the only one. Howard Berman, for example,
champions liberal causes and then sits down with representatives of the
Israeli Embassy and U.S. AID to determine where Israeli government
experts will work in Central Americano and with his black colleagues to
persuade them not to object to the carnage inflicted by Israel on struggling
South Africans. A survey in late 1 985 found not one instance where a
member of Congress had alerted organizations fighting contra aid that that
year's contra aid package had been attached by the House leadership to two
bills carrying aid to Israel. In 1985, $27 million in contra aid flowed from
congressional coffers.

This situation is replicated many times with never a confrontation,
although obviously part of this problem could be remedied simply by-
holding legislators' feet to the fire, giving them cause to resist the pressures
of the pro-Israeli forces. There are very specific and reasonable demands to
which lawmakers could be forced to respond. For instance: Congressional
action against Israeli military and nuclear dealings with South Africa; as
part of a broader campaign against U.S. funding of Vietnam-style
pacification in Central America, a clear opposition to funding Israel to
collaborate on the programs.

All the usual tactics should be used: visits to district offices of
Congressional representatives; letter writing (which is more effective when
a written response is requested); individuals or organizations can call radio
talk shows and write "op ed" pieces. Occasional phone calls to congres-
sional offices and media editors are also helpful. Calls should be made after
votes, as well as before them, expressing either agreement or disagreement
with the position taken. This conveys a continuing interest in the issue.

In pressuring legislators there is an obvious problem to be overcome.
Progressives, even when they are organized around one issue, are not
"single issue," the way the pro-Israeli forces are. Instead, for the best of
reasons, their interest is more than single issue. Thus, organizations and
individuals concerned with the Middle East and with Israel's support of
bloody oppressors are likely to settle for candidates like Cranston, because
they are "good" on so many other vital issues. And everybody takes it as a
given that if a candidate or serving member of Congress begins to talk
meaningfully about Israel, Israel's lobby will blow her or him out of the
water.

It IS worth trying anyway, especially on members of the House of
Representatives. There are several dozen members of the 100th Congress
(elected in 1 986) who would probably respond (gratefully) to constituent

1

Conclusion 197

pressure to bar Israel from Central America and from military deals with
South Africa. Perhaps more would take advantage of any opening created
for them to abandon the hypocrisy that has prevailed until now.*'

To Gain the Advantage

To avail themselves of this opening and to create others, organizations
will first have to open up the issue of Israel's military, economic and political
support of South Africa and its actions in Central America. While some
anti-apartheid organizations have discussed it, others, have shied away for
fear of losing Jewish support and being marginalized by charges of
anti-Semitism.

Local organizations rather than their national offices are probably
better positioned to initiate discussion of Israel's impact on their area of
concern. National organizations often come under intense pressure which
can involve loss of funding or loss of access to members of Congress. One
very prominent national human rights organization has been concerned
about Israeli activities in Guatemala for several years. It has felt compelled,
however, to limit its expression of concern to private communications with
Israeli officials.

Local organizations often are not constrained by the need to fund paid
positions. They don't depend on elite cocktail parties. They can demand
that Israeli complicity in murder — and Israeli violations of Palestinian
human and national rights — be halted. Their determination to end Israel's
undercutting of positive U.S. foreign policy positions can be expressed
directly to Congress or used to fortify the resolve of national organizations,
which can then report that grassroots sentiment is making discussion
imperative. Local action should also, of course, be conveyed to the local
media and put forward in coalitions.

Organizations have many means, through the media or through public
education campaigns, to communicate their demands. The International
Fellowship of Reconciliation approached the Israeli government directly,
in an open letter "To the People of Israel and their Government" which
appeared in the weekly supplement of Al Hamishmar (the Mapam-linked
daily). The letter was a direct and respectful plea that Israeli aid to the
government of Rios Montt cease. The Fellowship called attention to Israeli
military and "pacification" assistance to Guatemala and concluded:

We respect the Jewish desire for the right to self determination of
a people, based on its tradition, beliefs, and values. We therefore

i

1 98 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

believe that you can understand the need of the people of Central
America to decide the future of their nations without outside
interference. We request of you not to stand in their way.''^

Coalitions which come together to put on a major demonstration
frequently debate the inclusion of a demand concerning the Middle East.
Sometimes these efforts are successful, sometimes not. But each time the
subject of Israel — its intervention outside the Middle East, its crimes against
the Palestinian people, or its position in U.S. military doctrine — is
discussed, valuable work has been done. Fear is conquered, the issue is
legitimized, some layers of self-delusion and hypocrisy about the realities
of Israel's role in world affairs are stripped away.

U.S. activists often receive an education in solidarity work when they
learn that the South Africans or Central Americans that they support have
strong and well developed bonds with the PLO. Many are surprised to
learn how great the PLO's contribution to Nicaragua's development has
been. Speakers from the ANC have made it a point to mention the links of
solidarity between their organizations and the PLO; they have done much
to educate U.S. activists on the justice of the Palestinian cause.

Unfortunately solidarity workers have been slow to communicate
what they have learned to the larger U.S. progressive community. And
until broad sectors of the U.S. left come to grips with their isolation from
the international movements for peace and justice, they will face impedi-
ments to the creation of a truly mature and effective movement, one that is
reflective of the extra responsiblity we bear as the opposition in the world's
prime international offender.

Some Success Stories

Several organizations have raised and acted on issues of Israel's
overseas activities. None has suffered undue consequences.

The Board of Trustees of the Unitarian Universalist Association
passed a motion calling on the governments of the U.S. and Canada to
"withhold foreign aid to any government which is aiding in the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons for South Africa, or which is sending military or
'security' equipment or advisers to the Union of South Africa.""" The
National Conference of Black Lawyers has condemned the overall Israeli-
South African relationship. At its fall 1986 national convention the
Coalition of Black Trade Unionists considered a resolution condemning

Conclusion 199

Israel's ties with South Africa, and later passed a milder version which did
not name Israel.

The Council on Hemispheric Affairs conducted a study of Israeli-
Nicaraguan relations and not only published the results, but conducted a
media campaign to publicize its report.'*''

New Jewish Agenda investigated the allegations of Nicaraguan "anti-
Semitism" and published pamphlets refuting the charges, as well as
supporting the sanctuary movement and dealing with Israel's role in
Central America. One pamphlet concluded, "As Jews concerned about
Israel's security and well-being, we believe that the Israeli government can
find ways to support itself economically without losing sight of its moral
vision.

There has even been a demonstration against Israel's ties to South
Africa and its involvement in Central America — in San Francisco in June
1985. Sponsored by a wide ad hoc coalition of Central America, anti-
apartheid. Middle East, and human rights organizations, the demonstration
got press coverage and no one reported suffering attacks from pro-Israeli
activists.

San Francisco anti-apartheid activists also worked actively to defeat a
contract between the city and Israel's national shipping line, Zim. There
was no ultimate victory: even after it was proven that Zim did business with
South Africa (and thus was in violation of the city's anti-apartheid
ordinance) the Board of Supervisors voted to lease port space to the line.
But the struggle drew headlines for weeks, as well as editorials in the city's
major dailies. Moreover, despite the strongarm tactics one supervisor
charged had been applied to the Board, not one of the several organizations
involved reported a loss of members, funds, or community standing.'**

Numerous forums and discussions on Israel's foreign policy have been
held at campuses and in communities across the country. Occasionally
these programs have been disrupted by pro-Israeli activists, but many have
been well attended and have received favorable press coverage. In 1 986, the
November 29 Committee for Palestine organized a tour which included
speakers from the ANC. This was especially successful in educating people
on the political implications of Israeli-South African relations.

These are only a few instances. Doubdess there are others where the
pro-Israel juggernaut was confronted and reduced in its legendary
dimensions. It would be good if they were known about. It would be better
if they were multiplied across the country.

Until the message is received in Washington that an end to Israel's
foreign activities is an integral part of the progressive agenda, Israel's ability
to take on the rejected fragments of U.S. policies will remain a problem

200 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

with profound consequences for politics and foreign policy decisions in this
country. For Israel's victims in Central America, Southern Africa and
elsewhere, the consequences will be fatal.

Footnotes

Introduction

1. "Pretoria Unveils Updated Jet Fighter," Reuters, International Herald
Tribune, ]u\y \1,\9%6.

2. Radio South Africa (Johannesburg) External Service "Africa Today"
program, 0100 GMT, July 17, 1986.

3. Ibid.

4. "Revealed: the secrets of Israel's nuclear arsenal," Sunday Times,
Octobers, 1986.

5. Stephen Green, Taking Sides: America's Secret Relations with a Militant
Israel, William Morrow & Company, New York, 1984, pp. 148-169.

6. "France admits it gave Israel A-bomb," Sunday Times, October 12,
1986.

7. James Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, Quartet, London, 1984, pp.
154-157.

8. "Revealed: the secrets of Israel's nuclear arsenal" (see note 4), quotes a
retired U.S. official as confirming this, the latest of many such reports.

^- Martin Bailey, " Th e Blooming of Op eration Flower," The Observer
(London), February 2, 1986; an earlier report oTtHiiTollaBoration by Claudia
Wright appeared in theNew Statesman on August 2 3 , 1 985. See also "Iran: The
Flower and the Yixer ," Israeli Foreign Affairs, March 1986.

10. "Vanunu Brought from Rome," Israeli Foreign Affairs, January 1987
and "Support Builds for Vanunu," Ibid., March 1987.

1 1 .Jonathan Marshall, Peter Dale Scott, and Jane Hunter, The Iran-Contra

201

202 Footnotes to pages 4-9

Connection: Secret Teams and Covert Actions in the Reagan Era, South End Press
Boston, 1987. '

12. James Brooke, "A cryptic call launched Guatemala coup," Miami
Herald, March 28, 1 982; Rios was initially head of a 3-man junta, but he soon
muscled his two partners out of the way and dissolved the triumvirate in June
1982.

13. Ma'ariv (Tel Aviv), cited by Ignacio Klich, "Caribbean boomerang
returns to sender," The Guardian (London), August 27, 1982.

14. "Guatemalan Army Topples President in a Brief Battle," New York
Times, August 9, 1983.

15. Davar (Tel Aviv), February 14, 1984, translated in Israeli Mirror
(London), No. 679, February 27, 1984.

16. "The Israeli Connection," Economist, November 5, 1977.

17. After the 1977 UN Arms Embargo, the Boers were able to continue
buildmg weapons systems of several European countries, most notably France,
under license. Also, at one time or another, weapons technology— and
occasionally weapons— were obtained from the U.S., Italy, Britain, West
Germany and other European countries. None of these deals provided' South
Africa with such a consistent and vital flow of weapons and technology as it got
from Israel.

18. Cheryl A. Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest
University of Illinois Press, Urbana, 1986, pp. 23-31 contains a summary of
the history of the period leading up to and immediately after the adoption of the
partition plan.

19. Yoram Peri and Amnon Neubach, The Military -Industrial Complex in
Israel, International Center for Peace in the Middle East, Tel Aviv, January
1985, p. 3 1 ,

20. Edwin Black, The Transfer Agreement, MacMillan, New York, 1984,
pp. 4-5, 1 3 and passim.

21. Ibid., pp. 104-109 and passim.

22 . Ibid. , p. 1 3 . A protest statement sent to a planning committee said, in
part, "The American Jewish Committee and B'nai B'rith are conviced that the
wisest and the most effective policy for the Jews of America to pursue is to
exercise the same fine patience, fortitude and exemplary conduct that have been
shown by the Jews of Germany. This is not a time further to inflame already
overwrought feelings, but to act wisely, judiciously and deliberately "

23. Ibid., pp. 'i\A6.

24. Ibid., p. 104 and passim.

25. Ibid., passim., David S. Wyman, The Abandonment of the Jews
Pantheon, New York, 1 984, passim.

26. Jozef Garlinski, (Auschwitz historian) Letter to The Sunday Times
August 30, 1981.

27. This was the Biltmore Program, subscribed to by most of the major
Jewish organizations. It vested diplomatic and political authority in the Jewish
Agency. Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest, pp. 25-26.

28. Wyman, Abandonment of the Jews, p. 1 75. A special American Jewish

Footnotes to pages 9-12 203

Commission set up in 1981 analyzed the performance of the major organiza-
tions during the pre-war and war years. (Walter Goodman, "U.S. Jews'
response to Holocaust," New Fork Times, in Oakland Tribune, March 21,
1984).

29. Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest, pp. p. 33.

30. Green, Taking Sides..., pp. 123-147.

31. Paul Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, Lawrence Hill, Westport, CT,
1985,p. 117.

12. Ibid., p. 116.

33. Ibid., p. 1 19. See also Green, Taking Sides..., p. 25.

34. Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest, p. 9 1 .

35. Green, Taking Sides..., pp. 180-214. It was in this war that Israel
attacked and almost sank the U.S.S. Liberty, an unarmed intelligence ship.
Evidence strongly suggests that the Israeli attack was deliberate, intended to
keep the U.S. from learning about its plan to invade Syria. James M. Ennes, Jr.,
Assault on the Liberty, Random House, NY, 1 979, presents documents and other
material in support of this position, which Israel has strongly denied, insisting
the attack was an accident.

36. Information Please Almanac! 98 5, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston,
1985,p. 212.

37. Green, Taking Sides..., p. 246.

38. /^i<^.,pp. 248-50.

39. Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, 122.

40. Eli Eyal, "Waiting for a Signal," Ma'ariv, June 2 1, 1974 in SWASIA,
August 2, 1974.

41. Wolf Blitzer, Between Washington and Jerusalem, Oxford University
Press, New York, 1985, pp. 14-15.

42. Ibid.

43. Grace Halsell, Prophecy and Politics, Militant Evangelists on the Road to
Nuclear War, Lawrence Hill & Co., Westport CT, 1986.

44. Wolf Blitzer, End of the Honeymoon, Jerusalem Post Magazine, January
16, 1987.

45. Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, p. 140.

46. Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest, pp. 330-376.

47. In his book The Fateful Triangle, The United States, Israel & the
Palestinians, South End Press, Boston, 1 983, Noam Chomsky chronicles many
occasions on which Israel, backed by the U.S., has turned its back on an
opportunity for peace. Without a doubt there are cynics in both legislative and
executive branches who knowingly work to sustain a state of constant tension.
Congress' role is to passively support that status quo, rather than to create or
devise a strategy that might lead to peace. While it is questionable that most of
the members of Congress who adamantly support Israel understand anything at
all about the Middle East, the complaisance of their "team spirit" contributes to
Israel's ability to "hang tough."

48. Aaron Klieman, Israel's Global Reach: Arms Sales as Diplomacy,
Pergamon-Brassey's, Washington, London, N.Y., 1985, pp. 16 and 26

204 Footnotes to pages 12-15

(footnote 7).

49. Leonard Slater, The Pledge, Simon & Schuster, N.Y., 1970, passim,
recounts the varied means of arms procurement the Zionists employed.

50. Klieman, Israel's Global Reach, pp. 17-19 and passim.

51. Andrew J. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, Council on Foreign
Relations, Princeton University Press, 1982, p. 161.

52. Klieman, Israel's Global Reach, p. 20.

53. Ibid., p. 23.

54. Bishara Bahbah, Israel and Latin America: The Military Connection, St.
Martin's Press, New York, & Institute for Palestine Studies, Washington,
1986, pp. 38-53.

55. Richard Deacon, Israel's Secret Service, Taplinger, New York, 1977,
pp. 208-209.

56. Klieman, Israel's Global Reach, p. 23.

57. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, p. 1 6 1 .

58. "Israel is Trying to Increase Weapons Sales Abroad," New York
Times, January 12, 1976; John Yemma, "Israel guns for worldwide arms
market," Christian Science Monitor, December 27, 1982; Yoram Shapira, and
Joel Barromi, Israel-Latin American Relations, Transaction Books, New Bruns-
wick, NJ, pp. 104-108.

59. Dan Fisher, "Stung by Criticism, Israel Reviews Its Arms Industry,"
Los Angeles Times, September 18, 1986.

60. Peri and Neubach, The Military-Industrial Complex in Israel, p. 68.

61. Pierre, The Global Politics of Arms Sales, p. 125.

62. Peri and Neubach, The Military-Industrial Complex in Israel, p. 81.

63. Fisher, "Stung by Criticism, Israel Reviews Its Arms Industry."

64. Citing SIPRI which gave Israel a ranking of 7th for 1982, Peri and
Neubach, The Military-Industrial Complex in Israel, p. 68.

65. Klieman, Israel's Global Reach, p. 22.

66. Peri and Neubach, The Military-Industrial Complex in Israel, p. 68.

67. Klieman, Israel's Global Reach, p. 57.

68. Bahbah, Israel and Latin America: The Military Connection, Table 3, p.

34.

69. List compiled from lists in Klieman, Israel's Global Reach, pp. 135-142,
with addition of Cameroon, Sri Lanka, Iran, South Africa, the European
countries and other^changest^f author.

70. Teodoro Ducach, "America Latina, Mercado Fundamental Para las
Armas Israelies," Excelsior, May 8, 1986.

71. F"isher, "Stung by Criticism, Israel Reviews Its Arms Industry."

72 . It is not clear whether Bokassa, or President Hastings Banda of Malawi
ever bought arms from Israel, but they did receive Israeli training for various
military and pre-military youth forces, as noted by Israel Shahak. Isr ael's Global
Role, Weapons for Repression, Association of Arab-American University
Graduates, inc., BelmontTMA^ 1982, pp. 22-23.

73. Fisher, "Stung by Criticism, Israel Reviews Its Arms Industry."

74. Klieman, Israel's Global Reach, p. 99. For several years Ariel Sharon has

Footnotes to pages 15-21 205

been Israel's minister of trade and industry.

75. Quoted from Peri and Neubach, The Military-Industrial Complex in
Israel, p. 4; the term "security establishment lobby" from p. 53; the relative
strengths of foreign ministry and export aparatus from p. 81. Klieman makes
much the same argument.

16. Ibid., 81.

77. Ignacio Klich, "Nouveaux debouches en Chine pour Israel," Le Monde
Diplomatique, March 1985.

78. "Israel and Ethiopia," Israeli Foreign Affairs, May 1985.

79. "The Israeli Connection" (see note 16).

80. Ha'aretz, August 25, 1981 in Jane Hunter, No Simple Proxy, Israel in
Central America, Washington Middle East Associates, Washington DC, 1 987,
pp. 79-80.

Part I: Israel & South Africa
History

1. "Into Africa via The Back Door," Time, April 26, 1976.

2. Naomi Chazan, "Israeli Foreign Policy Towards South Africa,"
African Affairs, Summer, 1983, p. 171.

Z. Ibid., p. 199.

4. Noam Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle, passim, details both the
bankruptcy of many of Israel's "doves" and of Americans, liberals and many
leftists, so corruptly eager to adulate not only the Israeli "doves" but much of
the Israeli political spectrum. Dr. Israel Shahak, a concentration camp survivor
who provides English-language translations of the Hebrew press goes further,
challenging the "myth" "that the [organized] American Jewish community is
especially devoted to human, or civil rights, to democracy and to other 'good
causes.'" In an article in Middle East International, "The U.S. Israel lobby: fact
and myth," November 9, 1984, Shahak points out that because of organized
Judaism's "totalitarian or Stalinist support for the state of Israel," its motives in
supporting other struggles are suspect: "Can we. ..believe that a community, as
expressed by its organizations, which denies the concept of equality of rights in
Israel and the territories occupied by it, supports it in Alabama.'" Shahak also
points out that part of the exceptional influence of the organized Jewish
community (see conclusion) derives from its associations with civil rights
struggles. Many black observers have long pointed out that this association was
patronage, rather than partnership.

5. Aharon Klieman, Israeli Arms Sales: Perspectives and Prospects, Jaffee
Center for Strategic Studies (Tel Aviv University), Paper No. 24, February
1984, p. 37.

6. Eric Rosenthal, "Jews in South African Trade and Commerce," South
African Jewry 1965, Johannesburg, 1965, pp. 141-153, in Richard P. Stevens &
Abdelwahab M. Elmessiri, Israel and South Africa, The Progression of a

206 Footnotes to pages 21-24

Relationship, New World Press, New York, 1976, p. 72.

7. Gideon Shimoni, Jews and Zionism: the South African Experience (1910-
1967), Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1980, pp. 3, and Chapter 2,
"The Communal Ascendancy of Zionism," pp. 27-60. Xhe South A frican
Jewjsh population has been fairly constant since early in the century, at about

110,000. —

''~''~~8~Ibid., pp. 42-47.

9. Memorandum on Africa, Weizmann to Smuts, February 26, 1948, in
Stevens and Elmessiri, Israel and South Africa, pp. 91-94.

10. Shimoni, Jews and Zionism, pp. 47-49. (Those were the days when
South Africa was admitted to international organizations.)

1 1 . "For love and money," Israel. A survey. Supplement to Financial Mail,
(Johannesburg), May 1 1 , 1 984, p. 4 1 ; Ami Raz, "Africa-Israel Ltd. where did
all the profit come from.'" Jerusalem Post, November 5, 1986.

12. Quote from Ha'aretz, August 20, 1986 transl. in Israleft, #287; other
details in David Lipkin and Rafael Man, "South African Jews invested millions
in Israel, Ma'ariv, January 27, 1987 translated by Israel Shahak, in Collection:
Israel, South Africa and the U.S.A.

13. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, p. 7.

14. Shimoni, Jews and Zionism, pp. 203.

15. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, pp. 3-5.

16. Shxmoni, Jews and Zionism, p. 207.

17. lbid.,Y>- 237.

18. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, quoted from p. 9, preceding material
from pp. 6-9.

19. Sh\mom, Jews and Zionism, p. 210.

20. Transvaler, December 1, 1946, Ibid., pp. 203-204.

2 1 . Quotation from Rand Daily Mail, May 11,1 956 in AFP (Agence
France-Presse), Africa South of the Sahara Bi-weekly Interafrican News Survey,
Paris, May 11, 1956, June 15, 1956.

22. Rita E. Hauser, "Israel, South Africa and the West," South Africa
International, October 1980 (reprinted from Washington Quarterly, Summer
1979).

23. Chazan, "Israeli Foreign Policy..." (see note 2).

24. Abdelkader Benabdallah, L'Alliance Raciste Israelo-Sud-Africaine, Les
Editions Canada-Monde- Arabe, Montreal, 1979, pp. 83.

25. Chart from information provided by Israel's Division of International
Cooperation in Shimeon Amir, Israel's Development Cooperation with Africa,
Asia, and Latin America, Praeger, New York, 1974, p. 113.

26. Figures from Israeli Foreign Ministry 1971 in Samuel Decalo, "Afro-
Israeli Technical Cooperation: Patterns of setbacks and success," Curtis and
Gitelson, eds., Israel in the Third World, Transaction, New Brunswick, NJ,
1976, p. 93.

27. Akiva Eger, "Histadrut: Pioneer and Pilot Plant for Israel's Interna-
tional Cooperation with the Third World," in Curtis and Gitelson, Israel in the
Third World, pp. 75-81.

Footnotes to pages 24-26 207

28. Babcock, Washington Post,]\ine. 15, 1986. For more details of Israel's
development assistance in Africa see Jan Nederveen Pieterse, Israel's State
Terrorism and Counterinsurgency in the Third World, Near East Cultural and
Educational Foundation of Canada and International Center for Research and
Public Policy, Washington DC, 1986; Hilmi Yousuf, African-Arab Relations,
Amana Books, Brattleboro, VT, 1986.

29. Quote from South African Zionist Federation, "Minutes of Boards of
Hon. Officers of the Federation and Board, March 21,1 962," in Shimoni, /^m
and Zionism, p. 319. Chapters entitled "South Africa and Israel: Strained
Relations," and "Coping with the Crisis," pp. 305-353 provide an extremely
valuable view of the dynamics governing Israeli-South African relations vis-a-
vis the South African Jewish community.

30. Ibid.

31. Chazan, "Israeli Foreign Policy..." (see note 2).

32. Ibid. The contribution was rejected.

33. Yousuf, African- Arab Relations, p. 56 and passim.

34. C.L. Sulzberger, "Strange Nonalliance," New York Times, April 28,
1 97 1 , in Stevens and Elmessiri, Israel and South Africa, pp. 130-131.

35. Rand Daily Mail, October 10, 1967, in Rosalynde Ainslee, Israel and
South Africa: An unlikely alliance? United Nations Centre Against Apartheid,
July 1981, (Document No. A/Ac. 1 1 5/L.396)

36. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, pp. 12-13.

37. "The Israeli connection," The Economist, November 5, 1977.

38. Shimom, Jews and Zionism, p. 356.

39. Citing various dates of Rand Daily Mail, in Ainslee, Israel and South
Africa: An unlikely alliance? p. 3.

40. Hirsh Goodman, "International hypocrisy," Jerusalem Post, January
23, 1987.

41. Willie J. Breytenbach, "Isolation and Cooperation," Africa Report,
November- December 1980.

42 . Rand Daily Mail, May 1 0, 1 969, in Ainslee, Israel and South Africa: An
unlikely alliance? p. 6; S^cAa^a (Journal of the African National Congress), April
1970.

43. Shimoni, Jews and Zionism, p. 357.

44. Sunday Times, October 10, 1976 in Ainslee, Israel and South Africa: An
unlikely alliance? p. 8.

45. C.L. Sulzberger, "Strange Nonalliance," (see note 34).

46. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, p. 114.

47. Sunday Times, October 10, 1976; The Star (Johannesburg), May 25,
1973 in Benabdallah, L'Alliance Raciste Israelo-Sud-Africaine, p. 180.

48. C.L. Sulzberger, "Strange Nonalliance," (see note 34).

49. Rand Daily Mail, September 11, 1971, in Ainslee, Israel and South
Africa: An unlikely alliance? p. 8.

50. Susan A. Giltelson, "Israel's African Setback in Perspective," Curtis
and Gitelson, eds., Israel in the Third World, pp. 182-199 and Yousuf, African-
Arab Relations, Chapter 5, "The African Drive for Peace in the Middle East,"

208 Footnotes to pages 26-30

pp. 78-94 offer interesting (and contrasting) discussions of this period. Figure
of 22 derived from chart, "Black African states which severed Diplomatic
Relations with Israel, 1967-1973," on p. 94.

51. Shimoni, /^wj and Zionism, p. 357.

52. South Africa Digest, Week ending October 19, 1973 in Stevens and
Elmessiri, Israel and South Africa, p. 132.

53. Cape Times, October 12 and 17, 1973, in Ainslee, Israel and South
Africa: An unlikely alliance? p. 9; also Africa News, November 8, 1973, citing
The Daily Telegraph, (n.d.) in Stevens and Elmessiri, Israel and South Africa, p.
133.

54. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, p. 15.

55. Hauser, "Israel, South Africa and the West" (see note 22).

56. CapeTimes, October 12and 17, 1973;/«'U)w^C/!ro«ic/^ (London), June
28, and August 2 , 1 974, in Ainslee, Israel and South Africa: An unlikely alliance?
p. 9.

57. These visits, each with its reference to the daily press of the time, are
enumerated in Ainslee, Israel and South Africa: An unlikely alliance? pp. 7 and 8.

58. Breytenbach, "Isolation and Cooperation."

59. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, p. 43.

60. /^ii.,p. 17.

61. Wolf Blitzer, "Washington and Jerusalem," Jerusalem Post, June 13,
\915,\nSWASIA,]\intll, 1975.

62. "The Israeli connection" (see note 37).

63. The Guardian, ]u\y 8, 197 5 m Jerusalem Post, ]u\y 10, 1975 summarized
mSWASIA,]vi\y 25, 1975.

64. "The Israeli connection."

65. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, pp. 15-16.

66. Ibid., pp. 131-133.

67. Ibid.; Murray Waas, "Destructive Engagement: Apartheid's
'Target U.S.' Campaign, The National Reporter, Winter 1985.

68. Ibid.; Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, p. 133 mentions the $100
million.

C69. Louis Rapoport, "Mystery Milchan," Jerusalem Post Magazine,
February 21, 1986.

70. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, p. 16.

7 1 . Jonathan Bloch and Andrew Weir, "The Adventures of the Brothers
\ Kimche," The Middle East, April, 1982; Rapoport, "Mystery Milchan,".

72. Dov Alfon, "Israel — South Africa: Business (almost) as usual," Koteret
Rashit, June 25,1 986, translated by Dr. Israel Shahak, in South Africa and Israel.

Footnotes to pages 31-34 209

Arms Industry

1. "A Very Welcome Visit," South Africa Digest, April 16, 1976.

2. Terrence Smith, "Vorster Visit to Israel Arouses Criticism," New York
Times, April 18, 1976.

3. "Vorster: Man on a Wagon Train," Tiwz^, June 28, 1976 in Stevens and
Elmessiri, Israel and South Africa, p. 69.

4. Benjamin Pogrund, "Israel's South African Ties," Jerusalem Post, April
20, 1976 in SWASIA, May 7, 1976.

5. Felix Kessler, "Israel Takes on an Odd New Ally, Wall Street Journal,
April 23, 1976; Sharm El-Sheikh: Rabin lauds South Africa's Detente Bid,"
Jerusalem Post Weekly (sic), April 13, 1976, in Stevens and Elmessiri, Israel and
South Africa, pp. 152-153. In Rabin's pretty words can be construed an
endorsement of South Africa's attempts to impose a pax africana on the
continent, to continue "creating coexistence" by warehousing blacks in
bantustans, and to continue to defy international pressure to dismantle
apartheid.

6. "Mount of Olives and Sharm El-Sheikh."

7. "Vorster Visit to Israel Arouses criticism" (see note 2).

8. Chazan, "Israeli Foreign Policy..."

9. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, p. 17 and passim.

10. "Hands Across Africa," South African Digest, April 23, 1976, in
Stevens and Elmessiri, Israel and South Africa, pp. 149-150.

11. "Need unites," The Economist, December 20, 1980.

12. Major Gerald J. Keller, U.S. Marine Corps, "Israel South African
Trade: An Analysis of Recent Developments," Set and Drift, Naval War College
Review, Spring 1980.

13. "Revealed: the secrets of Israel's nuclear arsenal;" Adams, The
Unnatural Alliance, pp. 180-181 (see note 4, introduction).

14. "France admits it gave Israel A-bomb" (see note 6, introduction).

15. "Revealed: the secrets of Israel's nuclear arsenal" (see note 4,
introduction).

1 6 . Interview with Theodore Taylor (a protege of Robert Oppenheimer)
by Noah Adams, All Things Considered, National Public Radio, October 6,
1986, transcript courtesy of Charles R. Denton.

17. Shai Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence, A Strategy for the 1980s,
Columbia University Press, New York, 1982 discusses all of these themes —
and also what the possible Western reaction to a declared Israeli nuclear posture
would be.

18. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, pp. 147-148.

19. David Horovitz, "Israel reportedly urged India to join attack on
Pakistan nuke plant," Jerusalem Post Foreign Service, in Northern California
Jewish Bulletin, February 27, 1987.

20. "France admits it gave Israel A-Bomb" (see note 6, introduction).

21. Keller, "Israeli-South African Trade..."

210 Footnotes to pages 34-36

22. Washington Post, February 16, 1977 in Dr. Ronald Walters, The
September 22, 1979 Mystery Flash: Did South Africa Detonate a Nuclear Bomb?
Washington Office on Africa Educational Fund in cooperation with Congress-
man John Conyers, the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation and the World
Campaign Against Military and Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa,
May 21, 1985.

23. Washington Office on Africa, Stop the Apartheid Bomb, pamphlet,
February 1983.

24. AFP, Le Monde, September 17, 1985, cited an article in the South
African magazine Optima by a South African diplomat formerly attached to the
International Atomic Energy Agency.

25. There was considerable discussion at the July 1986 meeting of the
OAU of a military offensive against apartheid. Except for ten rifles offered by
President Thomas Sankara of Burkina Faso, (AFP, 0807 GMT, August 3,
1 986 in FBIS Middle East and Africa, August 5, 1 986, p. P-3) the force is still at
the talking stage. "Spotlight on apartheid," West Africa, August 4, 1 986 gives a
sense of the debate that is now going on.

26. SIPRI Yearbook 1985, p. 322.

27. Jonathan Kwitny, "Nigeria Considers Nuclear Armament Due to
South Africa," Wall Street Journal, October 6, 1980 and "Africans are Advised
to Develop Atom Arms," New York Times, June 10, 1983 in Leonard S.
Spector, The New Nuclear Nations, Vintage Books, New York, 1985, p. 213.

28. Stop the Apartheid Bomb (see note 23).

29. Maps shown to author by an ANC London representative, October
1986.

30. Walter Pincus, "S. Africa Uranium Plant Reported Ready," Washing-
ton Post, in Los Angeles Times, October 2, 1986, also Andre Payenne, "La
bombe atomique est une realite au pays de I'apartheid, " Le Journal de I'Economie
Africaine, October 1985.

3 1 . This gambit is suggested in Stop the Apartheid Bomb (see note 23).

32. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, p. 170.

33. Speech to South African Institute of International Affairs, Johannes-
burg, September 13, 1986, Ibid., p. 171.

34. Ibid., pp. 180-181 and p. 195, which names the journalists as Eli
Teicher and Ami Dor-on and their government sources.

35. "Halting Pretoria's A-test," Newsweek, September 5, 1977.

36. "A Friend in Need".

37. Walters, The September 22, 1979 Mystery Flash, p. 1.

38. Ibid., p. 5.
19. Ibid., p. 16.
'^Q.lbid.,p.\.

41. Jack Anderson, "U.S. Knewin Advance of Mystery Blast," Washing-
ton Post, April 26, 1 985 and another columns in Washington Post, September 14,
\nQ,Ibid.,p. 12.

42 . Thomas O'Toole, "South Africa Ships in Zone of Suspected N-Blast,"
Guardian, januaiy 31, 1980, Ibid., p. 12.

Footnotes to pages 3 6- 3 9 211

43. Stephen Talbot, "The Case of the Mysterious Flash," Inquiry, April
21, mo, Ibid., p. 16.

44. Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology,
Ad Hoc Panel Report on the September 22 Event, July 15, 1980, Ibid., p. 5.

45. Thomas O'Toole, "Neutron Bomb Suspected in Africa Blast,"
Washington Post, March 9, 1980, Ibid., p. 7 and passim.

46. Thomas O'Toole and Milton Benjamin, "Officials Hotly Debate
Whether African Event was Atom Blast," Washington Post, January 17,1 980,
Ibid.,'{>. 14.

^7. Ibid., p. 15.

48. Stephen Talbot, "The Case of the Mysterious Flash," Inquiry, April
21, mo. Ibid.

49. "Evidence shows S. Africa tested A-bomb in '79," Reuter, Jerusalem
Post, May 22, 1985.

50. Judith Miller, "2 in House Withdraw Atom Curb," New York Times,
December 9, 1981 in Feldman, Israeli Nuclear Deterrence, p. 226.

51. Walters, The September 22, 1979 Mystery Flash, p. 2.

52. Ibid., p. 17.

53. Congressional Record—House, ]u\y 11, 1985, p. H 5469.

54. David Taylor, "Israel-South Africa Nuclear Link Exposed," The
Middle East, April 1981.

55. David K. Willis, "How South Africa and Israel are maneuvering for
the bomb," Christian Science Monitor, December 3, 1981.

56. Judith Miller, "Nuclear Contacts Quiedy Widened by Israel, Taiwan
and South Africa," New York Times, ]une 28, 1981. Reference is made in this
article to Taiwan, with which both Israel and South Africa have had some
nuclear cooperation.

57. Walters, The September 22, 1979 Mystery Flash, p. 3.

58. Author's interview with Robin Morgan, head of Sunday Times Insight
Team, October 19, 1986. Insight Team produced the Sunday Times reports
cited above (October 5 and 12, 1986.)

59. BBC TWO TV Newsnight, 2250 GMT, July 11, 1985, transcript
courtesy of Palestine Liberation Organization, London.

60. Martin Bailey, "South Africa's Island Bombshell," The Observer,
(London), December 28, 1986.

61. Interview, January 1987.

62. Jewish Telegraphic Agency Bulletin, January 26, 1970, in Abdelwahab
M. Elmessiri, "Israel and South Africa: A Link Matures," in Stevens and
Elmessiri, Israel and South Africa, pp. 67.

63. C.L. Sulzberger, "Strange Nonalliance."

64. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance devotes a chapter (pp. 38-71) to the
complicated series of ruses by which South Africa gained the SRC gun,
bringing to public view the results of several government investigations and an
investigation by the Burlington Free Press (Vermont). These and other sources
are summaried in his notes, pp. 206-207.

65. Hyam Corney, "Israel helped CIA get arms to S. Africa— TV report,"

2 1 2 Footnotes to pages 40-4 1

Jerusalem Post, October 21, 1980.

66. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, pp. 38-71.

67. Taylor, "Israel-South Africa Nuclear Link Exposed."

68. Rand Daily Mail, January 30, 1979 in Policies of Apartheid of the
Government of South Africa, Special Report of the Special Committee against
Apartheid on recent developments in the relations between Israel and South Africa,
November 2, 1979, UN Document 79-28658.

69. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, pp. 105-107.

70. "Pistol Shipment now to go to South Africa via Israel," Arbeiter-
Zeitung (Vienna), June 29, 1983, in FBIS Western Europe, July 6, 1983, p.
E-1.

71. "A Friend in Need".

72. Hauser, "Israel, South Africa and the West."

73. William E. Farrell, "Israeli Tours South Africa As Arms-Trade Furor
Grows," N^TO York Times, February 10, 1978.

74. Bernard D. Kaplan, "South Africa's enemies are also Israel's enemies,"
San Francisco Examiner, July 11, 1 976. These were said to be part of the arms
Israel captured during the 1973 war. They might have been, but they might
also have been weapons Israel obtained on the international arms market (or
perhaps even fabricated). A former CIA officer has told the author that Israel is
the second biggest dealer, after the USSR, of East-bloc weaponry. The same
would hold true regarding arms Israel would ship to Iran and to the contras, all
of which were said to have been captured in Lebanon.

75. The Economist Foreign Report, March 26, 1980 in Ainslee, Israel and
South Africa: An unlikely alliance? p. 1 3.

76. Johathan Broder, "Israel Grows Sensitive over Links to South Africa,"
Chicago Tribune, April 2, 1977.

77. Dial Torgerson, "Weizman Reportedly Visited South Africa," Los
Angeles Times, March 20, 1980.

78. Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily, March 1 6, 1 983 in Peter L. Bunce,
"The Growth of South Africa's Defence Industry and its Israeli Connection,"
Journal of Royal United Services Institute, London, June 1984.

79. Cited in William E. Farrell, "Israeli Tours South Africa As Arms-
Trade Furor Grows," New York Times, February 10, 1978.

80. Broder, "Israel Grows Sensitive over Links to South Africa" (see note

76).

8 1 . The low number comes from the contention of Naomi Chazan (to Le
Monde, August 14, 1985) that sales to South Africa represent "only" 5percent
of Israel's military exports. The high figure from New York Times, March 1 9,
1987.

82. SIPRI Yearbook 1981, p. 84, 86.

83. The loyalty and enforcement to maintain the blanket of silence is
apparently so complete that Israelis were literally shocked that Mordechai
Vanunu would reveal the workings of the Dimona nuclear plant.

84. Economist Foreign Report, November 2 , 1 977 in Adams, The Unnatural
Alliance, p. 93.

Footnotes to pages 4 1 -42 213

^5. Ibid., p. 93.

86. "I saw homeland police and members of the SADF laugh and joke as
they hurled teargas canisters into buses full of cheerful, chanting people in
KwaNdbele yesterday," wrote a reporter on the front page of the Johannesburg
Star. {Johannesburg Star, May 15, 1986 in FBIS Middle East and Africa, May
19, 1986, p. \J-2l;New York Times, May 15, 1986 has a picture of this incident
in which two youths were killed.)

"A one-year-old baby fainted after inhaling teargas fumes when security
forces fired at mourners in the Port Elizabeth township of Kwazakhele during a
funeral of unrest victims," reported the South African radio. (SAPA, Johan-
nesburg, 1932 GMT, March 8, 1 986 in FBIS Middle East and Africa, March
10, 1986, p. U-10.)

"Four Saulsville children had to be treated by a local doctor after teargas
had been sprayed into their home on Saturday." (SAPA, 1 107 GMT, March
17, 1986 in FBIS Middle East and Africa, March 18, 1986 p. U-9.)

"President of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches, Dr. Allan
Boesak, is considering laying charges after a teargas canister was lobbed into his
car at a church service in Elsies River today." (SAPA, 2130 GMT, July 20,
1986 in FBIS Middle East and Africa, July 21, 1986, p. U-6.)

"In February 1987 white government authorities acknowledged 20
instances in which teargas was used against prisoners since the declaration of the
1985 state of emergency." (SAPA, 1620 GMT, February 10, 1987, in FBIS
Middle East and Africa, February 11, 1987, p. U-6).

87. For more details see Jane Hunter, "The Tel Aviv-Pretoria Arms
Link," Israeli Foreign Affairs, February 1986.

88. "Spy Plane Had Israeli Patent," Tanzanian Daily News, June 3, 1983;
Joseph Hanlon, "South Africa Adopts Israeli Military Tactics," New African,
August 1983.

89. Al-Safir (Beirut), April 26 and May 13, 1986, in FBIS Middle East &
Africa, and confidential sources. For complete account and analysis see Jane
Hunter, "Copters for Pretoria," and "Zaire: Way Station to Iran," Israeli
Foreign Affairs, June 1986 and January 1987, respectively. It is possible that
part of this shipment was involved in the Iran-contra affair, in which South
Africa's role has barely begun to be explored, but in which it seems fairly clear,
money and materiel were shifted around from one band of US-backed
mercenaries to another, as well as to Iran.

90. Sunday Telegraph (London), November 16, 1987 cited by South
Africa Press Association, 1340 GMT, November 16, 1986 in FBIS Middle
East & Africa, November 19, 1986, p. U-12.

91. Martin Streetly, "Israeli airborne SIGINT systems," Jane's Defence
Weekly, December 27, 1986; The SIPRI Yearbook 1984, p. 243, lists " B-707-
320B Transports sold to South Africa," with the notation that this aircraft is also
designated B-707-344C.

92. Interview with Martin Streetly, December 1986. See also Jane Hunter,
"More Military Deals With South Africa," Israeli Foreign Affairs, February

2 1 4 Footnotes to pages 42-44

1987.

93. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, pawiw., Bunce, "TheGrowth of South
Africa's Defence Industry and its Israeli Connection."

94. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, pp. 106.

95. "The Israeli Connection."

96 Adams The Unnatural Alliance, p. 122; Norman L. Dodd, "African
Navies South of the Sahara," Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, vol. 109,no
3, pp. 53-54, in Bunce, "The Growth of South Africa's Defence Industry and
its Israeli Connection."

97. "A Friend in Need".

98. Jane's Infantry Weapons 1982-83, p. 167 in Bunce, 'The Growth ot
South Africa's Defence Industry and its Israeli Connection."

99 Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, pp. 122-123.

100. BBC World Service, 0606 GMT, June 6, 1986 in "'Israeli' Missile
Sinks Ship," Israeli Foreign Affairs, July 1986.

101. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, pp. 122-123.

102. "The Israeli Connection."

103. Aviation and Marine International, February 1980, Strategy Week,
November 24: 30 1980, and .4 rw«rfa/«f^?-«<i?wn<i/,January 1980 in Adams, T/z^

Unnatural Alliance, p. \23. , ,t, „ ^, , j j ,

1 04. Christopher Coker, "Botha's Threat from the West, The Independent
(London), October 8, 1986.

\^S.Ibid. , ^ . .

106. Charles R. Denton, "Submarines for Israel," Israeli Foreign Affairs,

February 1986. „ . „ .

107. "W. German sub plans sold to S. Africa," AP, San Francisco Examiner,

December 11, 1986. ,

108. Mark Daly, "South Africa's Cheetah Mirage update, Jane s Defence

Weekly, July 26, 1986.

109 Denton, "Submarines for Israel" (see note 106).

110. Charles Babcock, "How U.S. Came to Underwrite Israel's Lavi
Fighter Project," Washington Post, August 6, 1986.

111. Richard Witkin, "U.S. Plane Deal Spurs Drive in Israel to Build Own
Jet," New York Times, May 21, 1978.

112. John Fialka, "Israel Bucks Big Leagues in Arms Sales, Wall Street
/oarM/, June 22, 1984. ■ r t

113 "House Panel Votes Amendment Clearmg U.S. Funds tor Lavi,
Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 25, 1985. These concessions
amounted to $250 million in 1984, and $200 million m 1985 and 1986.^

114. Broder, "Israel Grows Sensitive over Links to South Africa" (see

IxY Jerusalem Domestic Service, 1 1 05, 1 200 and 1 900 GMT, March 1 9,
1980 FBIS Middle East and Africa, March 19, 1980, p. I-l.

116 Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, p. 109. This information has been
repeated many times, most recently by Michael Hornsby, "Pretoria Shows off
its Military Might, The Times of London, September 14, 1984; Dial Torgerson,

Footnotes to pages 44-47 2 1 5

"Weizman Reportedly Visited South Africa," also mentions Weizman's secret
trip-

117. Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv, "Has congress Doomed Israel's Affair
With South Africa.'" (Editorial Section) Washington Post, February 22, 1987.

118. Babcock, "How U.S. Came to Underwrite Israel's Lavi Fighter
Project."

119. "Strangers and Brothers," Sunday Times of London, April 15,
1984— article based on James Adams' The Unnatural Alliance.

120. "Lavi Contracts With U.S. Companies Detailed," Aviation Week &
Space Technology, January 21, 1985.

121. "Decrease in U.S. Aid to Israel May Force Halt in Lavi Program,"
7*i<i.,June 9, 1986.

122. "Lavi - lAI seeks U.S. partner," Flight International, May 3, 1986.

123. Rita E. Hauser, "Israel, South Africa and the West."

124. Hirsh Goodman of Jerusalem Post quoted by Oakland Tribune editorial
"Dog fighter or dog of a fighter?" August 22, 1986.

125. Daniel Snyder, "Japan Eyes U.S. For Fighter," Defense Week, May
27, 1986.

126. Fialka, "Israel Bucks Big Leagues in Arms Sales" (see note 112).

127. Charles Babcock, "How U.S. Came to Underwrite Israel's Lavi
Fighter Project,".

128. "Northrop Hahs Work on F-20 Fighter Plane," AP, Los Angeles
Times, November 18, 1986.

129. "Decrease in U.S. Aid to Israel May Force Halt in Lavi Program"
(see note 121).

130. Leonard Silk, "Military Costs An Israeli Issue," New York Times,
June 4, 1986.

131. "House Leaders: Release Lavi Funds," Defense News, July 21,1986.

132. "Dog fighter or dog of a fighter?"

133. Fialka, "Israel Bucks Big Leagues" (see note 112).

134. "The Israeli connection," Military Technology, MILTECH 20, pp.
26-36 in Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, pp. 1 10-1 11.

U5.Ibid.,p. 110.

Arms Sales & Policy

1. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, p. 123

2. Ibid., pp. 112-113; collaboration also noted by Broder, "Israel grows
sensitive..."

3. Judy Siegel, "Plans launched for absorbing South African Jews,"
Jerusalem Post, August 20, 1985

4. Farrell, "Israeli Tours South Africa..." (see note 78, chapter 3).

5. Yediot Aharonot, February 15, 1981, translator unknown.

2 1 6 Footnotes to pages 48-51

6. Luanda Domestic Service, 1430 GMT, May 29, 1985, FBIS Middle
East and Africa, May 30, 1 985, p. U- 1 . The commando also explained that his
groups' orders had been to make the attack appear as if it had been perpetrated
by UNITA, the South African- and U.S. -backed mercenaries pitted against
Angola.

7. PANA (Pan African News Agency, Dakar) 0901 GMT, November
1 0, 1 986 in FBIS Middle East and Africa, November 1 3 , 1 986, p. U-5; SAPA,
Johannesburg, 1735 GMT, October 28, 1986 and llanga (Durban Zulu
language publication), October 27-29, 1986, in FBIS Middle East & Africa,
October 29, 1986, p. U-10.

8. SAPA, 1 143 GMT, January 22, 1987 in FBIS Middle East & Africa,
January 23, 1987, p. U-1.

9. Michael Parks, "Black Neighbors Say S. Africa Risks War in Region,
Blame Pretoria in Death of Machel," Los Angeles Times, October 30, 1 986. The
day before Machel was killed there were reports from Mozambique of great fear
and expectations of a South African attack to overthrow the Frelimo
government {Observer, October 19, 1986). Zambia had just discovered and
broken up a Unita supply route {West Africa, October 20, 1986).

10. National Public Radio, All Things Considered, October 24, 1986.

11. "Samora Machel's Last Flight: Fake Racist Beacon Downed Plane,"
The Herald (Harare), October 28, 1986, in FBIS Middle East and Africa,
November 5, 1986, p. U-1 3.

12. SAPA, 1722 GMT, January 22, 1987 in FBIS Middle East & Africa,
January 23, 1987, pp. U-1-2.

13. Jim Fish, "Last day of a president," The Guardian (London), October
21, 1986.

1 4. Quarterly Economic Review of Zaire, Rwanda, and Burundi, No. 4,1985.
15.SAPA,Johannesburg, 1735GMT,October28, 1986, in FBIS Middle

East and Africa, October 29, 1986, p. U-10.

16. Paul Fauvet, "Machel's Plane May Have Been Lured Off Course,"
Guardian (New York), February 4, 1987.

1 7. Station commentary on Johannesburg Domestic Service, 0500 GMT,
December 12, 1984 in FBIS, Middle East and Africa, December 20, 1984, p.
U-4.

1 8. Jonathan Kapstein, "Armed Confrontation Builds in South Africa," in
Proceedings of the U.S. Naval Institute, December 1981, p. 32, in Bunce, "The
Growth of South Africa's Defence Industry and its Israeli Connection."

1 9. W. Andrew Terrill, "South African Arms Sales and the Strengthening
of Apartheid," Africa Today, 2nd Quarter, 1984.

20. This section is based on author's interviews and Setting U.S. Policy
Toward Apartheid, Senate Report 99-370, Calendar No. 775, 99th Congress,
2nd Session, August 6 (legislative day, August 4) 1986. For more extensive
coverage of the legislation and reactions to it, see issues of Israeli Foreign Affairs
for September and October, 1986 and January, February and March 1987.

2 1 . Thomas L. Friedman, "Israelis Reassess Supplying Arms To South
Africa," New York January 29, 1987.

Footnotes to pages 51-53 217

22. Benny Morris, "Israel to keep status quo with SA," Jerusalem Post,
January 28, 1987.

23. Melman and Raviv, "Has Congress Doomed Israel's Affair With
South Africa?"

24. Friedman, "Israelis Reassess Supplying Arms To South Africa" (see
note 19).

25. Newsweek, February 2, 1987.

26. Melman and Raviv, "Has Congress Doomed Israel's Affair With
South Africa.'" (see note 116, chapter 2).

27. Dan Fisher, "Israel to End Arms Sales to S. Africa," Los Angeles Times,
February 12, 1987.

28. Ibid. The only promises Israel has kept with any regularity are its vows
to mount military attacks every time it experiences what it perceives as a
"terrorist" attack within the territory it occupies.

29. Asher Wallfish, "Israel's [sic] won't 'play tricks' over Pretoria,"
Jerusalem Post, January 28, 1987.

30. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, p. 125.

3 1 . Melman and Raviv, "Has congress Doomed Israel's Affair With South
Africa.'"

32. UND0C. A/33/22/Add. 2,paras. 17, \9 m A.ms\tt, Israel and South
Africa: An Unlikely Alliance? 'p- 13.

33. South Africa Digest, March 30, 1979 and The Star (weekly airmail ed.,
Johannesburg), June 16, 1 979 in Special Report of the Special Committee against
Apartheid..., p. 4.

34. Guatemala! Guatemala News and Information Bureau, (Oakland CA.),
September-October 1986.

35. The Star, no date given, cited by Jerusalem Domestic Service, 1700
GMT, May 24, 1982 in FBIS Middle East and Africa, May 25, 1982, p. 1-4.

36. SIPRI Yearbook 1986, p. 399.

37. "Is Israel Still Selling Arms to Iran.'" Israeli Foreign Affairs, February
1985; "Iran Mystery Plane," Ibid., November 1985 (this turned out to be one
of the joint U.S.-Israeli shipments that came to light when the Iran-contra affair
broke) "The Great Iran Arms Sale Plot," Ibid., June 1986; "Israel's Peccadil-
los," /^irf., October 1986.

38. Martin Sieff, "S. Africa barters arms for oil; Iran, Iraq get same
weapons," Washington Times, December 23, 1986.

39. Ibid.

40. "Fib of the Month," Israeli Foreign Affairs, August 1986.

41. Simon Malley, "Le contrat Hassan Il-Peres," Afrique-asie, week
ending September 21, 1986 and "Ifrane's Hidden Agenda," Israeli Foreign
Affairs, November 1986.

42. Klieman, Israel's Global Reach, p. 140

43. "Des officiers israeliens sur le 'mur,'" Afrique-asie, week ending
October 19, 1986.

44. Al-Sh'ab (Cairo), January 20, 1987 in FBIS Middle East & Africa.

45. W. Andrew Terrill, "Potential Global Responses to South African

2 1 8 Footnotes to pages 54-56

Arms Export Policies," Africa Today, 2nd Quarter, 1984 makes this argument
in urging that the UN embargos on arms sales to South Africa and arms
purchases from South Africa be upheld.

46. "The strong alliance between Israel and South Africa derives from
their similarity of condition — both are settler colonial states which see
themselves as outposts of Western civilization in 'a sea of barbarism.' Though
the South Africans quite openly acknowledge this affinity, the Israelis find it
more a source of embarrassment than pride." Alfred Moleah, "The Unholy
aUiance," Palestine Focus, August 1983. "One thing that brings them together is
their total opposition to the right to self-determination for the indigenous
people of South Africa and for the Palestinian people. Of course, there are other
parallels: the use of religion as a basis, or spiritual rock. ..the claim of
predestination, or divine right; and the view of Palestine and South Africa as
'promised lands."' Mfanafuthi (Johnny) Makatini, director of International
Affairs Department and Chief Representative to the United Nations of the
ANC, Interview in Geneva, September 1 983 in Steve Goldfield, Garrison State,
Palestine Focus Publications, San Francisco/EAFORD, London and New
York, 1985, p. 65.

47. Kenneth Adelman, "The Club of Pariahs, "/i/nVa/^fport, November-
December 1980

48. Kaplan, "South Africa's enemies are also Israel's enemies."

49. Paul Moorcraft quoted by Paul Van Slambronck, "South Africa and
Israel: birds out of favor flock together," Christian Science Monitor, June 6, 1983.

50. Sunday Express, no date or place given, quoted in "The Israeli-South
Africa Axis— a Treat to Africa," Sechaba (official organ of the African National
Congress), April 1970.

51. Broder, "Israel Grows Sensitive..."

52. Adams, "Israel and the Fortification of South Africa," Chapter 5 in
The Unnatural Alliance, pp. 73-101.

53. Ibid., p. 80.

54. Howard Taylor, Jr. and John Flinn, "Tutu tells clergy he's troubled
by reported Israeli ties toS. Africa," San Francisco Examiner, Jamiaiy 22, 1986.

55. Roy Isacowitz, "S. Africa blacks want ties with groups here,"
Jerusalem Post, July 26, 1985.

56. Jerusalem Domestic Service, 0700 GMT, August 11, 1985, in FBIS-
Middle East and Africa, August 13, 1985, p. 1-7.

57. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, in Northern California Jewish Bulletin,
April 11, 1986.

58. Letter signed by L. Hlongwane to City Press, November 10, 1985.

59. Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, p. 93, citing Israeli intelligence sources
and Israeli and South African diplomatic sources (note, p. 208).

60. Yoram Peri, "Les relations d'Israel avec I'Afrique du Sud ne sont ni
morales ni rentable," Davar,]u\y 9, 1 978, translation from Hebrew into French
from unknown source.

61. Drew Middleton, "South Africa Needs More Arms, Israeli Says,"
New Fork Times, December 14, 1981.

Footnotes to pages 56-59 219

62. Uri Dan, "The Angolan Battlefield," Monitin, January, 1982,
translated by Dr. Israel Shahak, Shahak Collection, early 1982.

63. For a full account of South Africa's brutal occupation of Namibia see
John Ya-Otto, Battlefront Namibia, Lawrence Hill & Co., Westport CT, 1 98 1 .

64. "Namibia Offer Merely Diplomatic 'Cheap Shot,'" Rand Daily Mail,
June 8, 1984 in FBIS Middle East and Africa, June 8, 1984, p. U-5.

65. Johannesburg Domestic Service, 1500 GMT, June 11, 1984, FBIS
Middle East and Africa, June 12, 1984, p. U-3.

66. "Israel to Provide Development Aid," The Windhoek Advertiser, April
22, 1985, in JPRS (U.S. Govt. Joint Publications Research Service) Sub-
Saharan Africa, June 13, 1985.

67. "Benefits of Ministers' Visit to Israel Reviewed," Windhoek Observer,
July 26, 1986 mJPRS.

68. Hillel Schenker, "Facing the Third World," Israel Horizons, March-
April 1986.

69. SWAPO representative Hidipo Hamutenya interviewed by Tom
Foley ("SWAPO leader: Namibia is held hostage by U.S.") Peoples Daily
World, September 23, 1986.

70. Adams, "Strangers and Brothers."

71. Quoting Def. Minister Magnus Malan, Johannesburg Domestic
Service, 0600 GMT, May 13, 1985 in FBIS Middle East and Africa, May 13,
1985, p. T-5.

72. Joseph Hanlon, "South Africa adopts Israeli military tactics," New
African, August 1983.

73. Chomsky, The Fateful Triangle, pp. 217-228.

74. Maputo in English to Southern Africa, 1 800 GMT, October 17,1985
in FBIS Middle East and Africa, October 21, 1985, p. U-1.

75. As reported by BBC World Service, 1025 GMT, January 7, 1986,
taped from relay broadcast by KXLR-AM, San Francisco.

76. "South African Defends Raids on Neighbor Nations," New York
TiwM, May 21, 1986.

77. Asher Wallfish, "Sharon on Attacking 'Terrorist' HQ in Jordan,"
Jerusalem Post, July 30, 1985 in FBIS, Middle East and Africa, July 30, 1985.

78. Frank J. Prial, "Israeli Planes Attack P.L.O. in Tunis, Killing at Least
30; Raid 'Legitimate,' U.S. Says," and Bernard Gwertzman, "As U.S.
supports Attack, Jordan and Egypt Vow to Press for Peace," New York
Times, October 2, 1985; John Bulloch, "PLO Victims were Mossad Agents,"
Daily Telegraph (London), October 3, 1985.

79. For an account of that attack see "'Israeli' Missile Sinks Ship," Israeli
Foreign Affairs, July 1986.

80. Richard Hall, "Angola worried by Israelis next door," Observer,
January 23, 1983.

81. Alan Ben- Ami, "U.S., Israel involved in Angolan arms affair, too,"
Jerusalem Post, December 19, 1986.

82. Hall, "Angola worried by Israelis next door."

83. James Brooke, "CIA said to Send Rebels in Angola Weapons via

220 Footnotes to pages 59-62

Zaire," New York Times, February 1, 1987.

84. EFE (Spanish News Agency, Madrid), 1300 GMT, January 16, 1983
in FBIS Middle East and Africa, January 19, 1983, p. 1-5.

85. Eliezer Strauch, "Israel Seeks Contact with Former Portuguese
Colonies in Lisbon," Espresso (Lisbon), February 16,1 985, JPRS SubSaharan
Africa, March 29, 1985.

86. Quoted in West Africa, November 12, 1984.

87. Jonathan Bloch, "Israel's new openings in Africa," The Middle East,
January 1985 and author's confidential sources.

88. Kinshasa Domestic Service, 1130 GMT, February 10, 1984, citing
Jornalde Angola, in FBIS Middle East and Africa, February 13, 1984, p. S-2.

89. "Israelis 'aiding MNR rebels,'" Africa Analysis (London), November
28, 1986.

90. The Independent (London), November 29, 1986. For an excellent
analysis of Israel's activities in Africa see Bloch, "Israel's new openings in
Africa."

91. Gerald Nadler, "4 Nations Plan Swap of Political Prisoners," Miami
Herald, February 26, 1978; author's source.

92. "Released Israeli tells of interrogation in Mozambique," /?r«M/ew Post,
February 21, 1983.

Economy

1 . Yosef I. Abramowitz, Jews, Zionism & South Africa, B'nai B'rith Hillel
Foundations, no date, p. 1 7, which equivocates: "even if the IMF statistics do
not tell the whole story, as some people maintain, Israel's trade would still be
marginal compared to the major industrialized Western countries." The only
other significant commodity of trade between Israel and South Africa is the
indirect purchase of diamonds through London." This work denies Israeli arms
sales to South Africa and carries an apology wrested from Sen. William
Proxmire, (D-WI) who had read some figures about that arms trade from the
work of Aaron Klieman. See Israeli Foreign Affairs, May 1985.

2. Financial Mail (Johannesburg), September 14, 1979, in "Policies of
Apartheid," p. 5; this estimation has since been repeated by Adams and others.

3. The figure given for the 11 months ending in November 1986 was
$1.56 billion. Simon Louisson, "Diamond industry sees downturn ahead,"
Jerusalem Post, January 9, 1987.

4. Ibid.

5. Originally noted in "For Love and Money," its existence was verified
by reporter Jeffrey Blankfort in April 1986

6. Barry Sergeant, "Embattled Israel draws SA investors," Sunday Times,
Business Times, September 9, 1984.

7. Avi Temkin, "Israel Seeking Increased South African Aid," Jerusalem

Footnotes to pages 62-65 221

Post, February 4, 1 983 in FIBS Middle East and Africa, February 4, 1983, p.
1-11.

8. Michael Yudelman, "Who buys what from whom," Jerusalem Post, ]u\y
11, 1986.

9. Sergeant, "Embattled Israel draws SA investors;" "Israel and S. Africa
tighten trade ties," Financial Times, December 15, 1980; Chazan, "Israeli
Foreign Policy Towards South Africa;" Malcolm Fothergill, "Aid reform
plans, urges Hersov," The Star (Johannesburg), November 21, 1983.

10. Ethan Nadelman, "Israel and Black Africa: a rapprochement.'" /sz^fM/
of Modern African Studies, No. 19, 1981, p. 191 in Chazan, "Israeli Foreign
Policy Towards South Africa."

11. These are detailed in Chazan, "Israeli Foreign Policy Towards South
Africa, fn 39.

12. Yitzhak Rabi, "Free Trade Area agreement boosts Israeli trade to the
U.S.," JTA in Northern California Jewish Bulletin, December 26, 1986.

13. "For love and money," p. 41.

14. Friedman, "Israelis Reassess Selling Arms to South Africa."

15. "For love and money," p. 41.

16. "Israel and S. Africa tighten trade ties."

17. "For love and money," p. 41.

18. Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), August 18, 1982 in in FBIS Middle East and
Africa, August 20, 1982, p. I-l 1.

19. Ibid.; Chazan, "Israeli Foreign Policy Towards South Africa;" Raz,
"Africa-Israel, Ltd..."

20. "For Love and Money..."

21. "For Love and Money;" Adams, The Unnatural Alliance, p. 26. Under
both EEC (European Economic Community) and U.S. rules a minimum
amount of value added must be added to products for reexport. Enforcement
takes the form of a complaint by an injured competitor to trade authorities
and/or the civil courts.

22. Zoram Shapiro, A Study of Some of the Factors Influencing the Use of
Israel as a Springboard for South African Exports (Unpublished MBA thesis),
University of Cape Town, 1979, p. 142.

23. Israel supplement to Financial Mail, September 14, 1979, in "Policies of
Apartheid..." p. 7.

24. Temkin, "Israel Seeking Increased South African Aid."

25. Ainslee, Israel and South Africa..., p. 22.

26. The Star (Johannesburg), April 19, 1980, Ibid., p. 23.

27. Shapiro, op. cit., p. 18.

28. Ainslee, Israel and South Africa..., p. 22

29. Financial Mail, September 14, 1979, Ibid., p. 19; Shapiro, op. cit., pp.
22-23.

30. Dan Fisher, "Israel Needs Time on S. Africa," Los Angeles Times,
February 21, 1987.

31. Ha'aretz, December 31, 1981 (sic, probably 1980) in Israeli Mirror,
February 2, 1981.

222 Footnotes to pages 65-67

32. According to Dr. Israel Shahak the kibbutzim are quite deeply
involved with South Africa (correspondence with author).

33. "U.S.-Israeli Trade Pact Benefits SA Exporters," Business Day
(Johannesburg), September 23, 1985 in JPRS SubSaharan Africa, November
7, 1985.

34. "Exports to Israel," South African Digest, November 29, 1985.

35. BBC World Service, 0503 and 0603 GMT, November 4, 1985,
relayed on KXLR-AM, San Francisco.

36. Business Day, ]une. 3, 1985.

37. The Star, December 19, 1985 in FBIS Middle East and Africa,
December 20, 1 985, p. U-4. The decline of the rand after Western banks refused
to roll over South Africa's loans also played a part in this surge.

38. JohnTilston, "SA exports R 1,3 bn up in first 2 months," Business Day,
April 16, 1986.

39. Jerusalem Post, June 8, 1 986 in FBIS Middle East and Africa, June 1 1 ,
1986, p. 1-4.

40. The South African bureau of trade and industry urged censorship of
trade statistics, which "could easily be used by our adversaries..." (Johannes-
burg SAP A, 1650 GMT, August 6, 1986 in FBIS Middle East and Africa,
August 7, 1986, p. U-4).

41. "Liat: Israeli-South African Firm Moves in on Sierra Leone," Israeli
Foreign Affairs, Feb. 1987.

42. Julie Fredericks, Morning Edition, National Public Radio (NPR),
April 3, 1985; also, "Is There Life After Sanctions," £««o/wwf, July 26, 1986.

43. Peter Allen-Frost, "SA aid in Israeli rail line possible," The Star, July
12, 1984.

44. Slomo Avineri, "A timely delay," Jerusalem Post, Nov. 12, 1985.

45. "Sanctions busting SA-style," Keutei, Jerusalem Post, Oct. 10, 1986.

46. "Advert by 'Israel firm' offers to bust sanctions," [bid.,Nov. 1 7, 1 986.

47. Roy Isacowitz, "Embassy closure upgrades image," Ibid., June 17,
1986.

48. IDF Radio, 1400 GMT, June 16, 1986, in FBIS Middle East and
Africa.

49. Andrew Whitley, "Israeli delegation set for trade talks with S. Africa,"
Financial Times, Aug. 6, 1986.

50. Jerusalem Post, Aug. 8, 1986 in FBIS Middle East and Africa, Aug. 8,
1986, p. 1-3.

51. All Things Considered, NPR, Aug. 13, 1986.

52. Whitley, see note 49; reference to increased trade in a Reuters report
cited by Washington Jewish Week, "Israel Talks Trade with South Africa,"
Aug. 28, 1986.

53. All Things Considered,NPR, Aug. 13, 1986; also typical was the BBC
"Newsreel" report broadcast several times on Aug. 13-14, 1986.

54. Reuters, "Pretoria holds talks to increase trade ties with Israel,"
Jerusalem Post, Aug. 14, 1986.

55. Avi Temkin, "S. Africa investments deal renewed," Ibid., Aug. 18,

Footnotes to pages 67-69 223

1986.

56. See, for instance, David Landau, "Towards a science-based economy,"
Jerusalem Post, Independence Day Supplement, April 24, 1985, typical of a
spate of articles (which have not yet produced the desired trend).

57. U.S. Assistance to the State of Israel, GAO Uncensored Draft Repezt^
American- Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, Washington DC, 1983, p.
55. "Mexico Deal," Israeli Foreign Affairs, September 1985. Israel currently
obtains most of its oil from Mexico.

58. Quentin Peel, "Israel and S. Africa in Major Coal Deal," Financial
Times, Jin. 16, 1979.

59. "The Israeli Connection," op. cit.

60. "Israel Moves Toward More Coal Use," Journal of Commerce, Feb. 12,
1986.

61. Ha'aretz, June 20, 1984, in Klieman, Israel's Global Reach, pp. 152,
164-165.

62. Avraham Dishon, "Israeli investors set up industries in South Africa,
Yediot Ahronot, June 21, 1984, trans. Israel Shahak, Collection: Israel and South
Africa, summer 1984.

63. UPI in San Francisco Examiner, Aug. 20, 1985.

64. Michael Parks, "Under Threat of Sanctions, S. Africa Prepares for
Siege," Los Angeles Times, Sept. 15,1986 lists this eventuality among a number
of other medium-term consequences of sanctions.

65. Macabee Dean, "South African blacks and whites all in the same boat,"
Jerusalem Post, Oct. 24, 1985.

66. Johannesburg Domestic Service, 1700 GMT, March 3, 1983, in FBIS
Middle East and Africa, March 4, 1983, p. U-4.

67. Computer Mail, supplement to Financial Mail, Jznmiy 31, 1986.

68. "Closer Scientific Ties with South Africa Planned," Ha'aretz, April 26,

1984, in FBIS Middle East and Africa, April 26, 1984, p. 1-5.

69. Yossi Melman, "Secret S. African-Israeli Pact," fane's Defence Weekly,
Feb. 23, 1985. AquvaEldar, "Cooperation Agreement Reported Signed with
Sout Africa," Ha'aretz,Feh. 14, 1985, FBIS Middle East and Africa, Feb. 15,

1985, p. 1-4.

70. Whitley, "Israeli delegation set for trade talks with S. Africa."

71. "Closer Scientific Ties with South Africa Planned."

72. "Technion 'no' to spending cut," Jerusalem Post International Edition,
July 2-8, 1984.

73. Jean-Pierre Langellier, "La visite du chef de la diplomatie sudafricaine
illustre les relations etroite entre les deux pays," Le Monde, Nov. 6, 1984.

74. Advertisement for Afitra, in Supplement to Financial Mail, op. cit., p. 35.

75. "For love and money," p. 42.

224 Footnotes to pages 71-73

Bantustans

1. New African (London), in Africa Diary, May 21-27, 1982.

2. Jerusalem Domestic Service, 0500 GMT, March 4, 1983 in FBIS
Middle East and Africa, March 10, 1983, p. 1-6.

3. Roy Isacowitz, "Aridor involvement in Ciskei 'likely to harm Israel,'"
Jerusalem Post, June 20, 1984.

4. The Sowetan, March 10, 1983; Johannesburg Radio, and Israeli Radio
for March 4, 1983, in SWB / Monitoring Report ME7274/ii, March 5, 1983.

5. The same sources as footnote 4, above, but cited by Africa Report,
May-June, 1983.

6. Elazar Levin, "Foreign Investments/Awakening Africa. Ciskei—
Another Israeli Speculation," Koteret Rashit, February 13, 1985, translated by
Dr. Israel Shahak, Collection: Israel and South Africa.

7. Keesings Volume XXX, February 1984, p. 32661.

8. Roy Isacowitz, "Government leery of MKs' Ciskei Jaunt," /^raM/m
Post, April 7, 1985.

9. Akiva Eldar, "Milo's law office deals with a Ciskei representative,"
Ha'aretz, June 29, 1984, in Shahak, Collection: Israel and South Africa, op. cit.
Isacowitz, "Government leery of MKs' Ciskei Jaunt."

10. Isacowitz, "Government leery of MKs' Ciskei Jaunt."

1 1 . Joshua Brilliant, "Ciskei president at West Bank twinning," Jerusalem
Post International Edition, Week ending November 10, 1984; Levin, "Foreign
Investments/ Awakening Africa."

12. Hyam Corney, "SA upset by Israel ties with black homelands,"
Jerusalem Post, July 2, 1984.

13. Levin, "Foreign Investments/Awakening Africa."

14. Roy hicowitz, Jerusalem Post, August 11, 1985.

15. Roy Isacowitz, "Israelis linked to Ciskei corruption," Jerusalem Post,
July 31, 1985.

U.lhid.

1 7. Ibid.; Roy Isacowitz, "Ciskeian legal team was in Israel to investigate
corruption charges," Jerusalem Post, August 1, 1985.

18. Isacowitz, "Israelis linked to Ciskei corruption."

19. Isacowitz, "Aridor involvement in Ciskei 'likely to harm Israel'"; The
Argus , September 8, 1983, from ANC Briefing.

20. Isacowitz, "Israelis linked to Ciskei corruption."

2 1 . Isacowitz, "Ciskeian legal team was in Israel to investigate corruption
charges."

22. Isacowitz, "Israelis linked to Ciskei corruption."

23. Davar, August 19, 1984, in FBIS Middle East & Africa, August 21,
1984, p. I- 16; also Keesings, op. cit. which says thebantustan "defense minister"
confirmed the purchase of aircraft.

24. Sunday Times of London cited in "Pretoria upset by Israel ties with
black homelands," Jerusalem Post International Edition, July 8-14, 1984.

Footnotes to pages 73-76 225

25. Ibid.

26. Private Eye, No. 640, June 27, 1986.

27 . Rand Daily Mail,December 15, 1981, in Adams, Unnatural Alliance, p.

96.

28. Barry Streek, "Israel woos SA homelands," Guardian (London),
October 15, 1983.

29. Sowetan, June 22, m'i, ANC Briefing. \,

30. "South African Homeland Opens an Office in Israel," Reuters, New\
York Times, June 5, 1985.

31. AP, in Washington Times, August 29, 1985.

32. Keesing's, op. cit.

33. ITIM (Tel Aviv), 1950 GMT, October 30, 1984, in FBIS Middle
East & Africa, October 31, 1984, p. 1-6.

34. Earlier a PFP spokesman had noted that the "Indaba," or gathering, at
which the plan had been drawn up, had been touted by South Africa's
ambassadors as proof of liberalization — ^Johannesburg SAP A, 0913 GMT,
November 18, 1986, in FBIS Middle East and Africa, November 20, 1986, p.
U-10. For background on Buthelezi and a full discussion of his dealings with
Israel see Jane Hunter, "Israel and the Bantustans," Journal of Palestine Studies,
Spring 1986.

35. "Survey South Africa," Economist, September 19, 1981.

36. Michel Bole-Richard, "L'autre facon de combattre apartheid," Le
Monde, }u\y 10, 1986.

37. Christine Abdelkrim, "Pretoria: le montage Buthelezi," Afrique-Asie,
No. 358, October 7, 1985.

38. SAPA, 1139 GMT, June 26, 1 986, in FBIS Middle East and Africa,
June 26, 1986, p. U-4.

39. "South Africa Waives Ban to Let Moderate Zulu Chief Hold Rally,"
New York Times, }une 30, 1986.

40. SAPA 1 505 and 1 73 3 GMT, December 6, 1 986 in FBIS Middle East
and Africa, December 8, 1986, p. U-10.

4 1 .Alan Co well, "Violence Erupts at Black's Rites in a 'Homeland,'" and
"Violence and Apartheid," New York Times, August 15, 1985 and August 12,
1985 respectively.

42. Wolf Blitzer, "Unclear on Apartheid," Jerusalem Post, August 10,
1985. During the same period South Africa was sending emissaries to the U.S.
Jewish community, reminding them of South Africa's exceptional support for
the Jewish state and urging them to "rethink traditional attitudes" — Sanford
Ungar, "South Africa's Lobbyists," New York Times Magazine, October 13,
1985.

43. Jerusalem Domestic Service, 1600 GMT, August 5, 1985, in FBIS
Middle East and Africa, August 6, 1985, p. I-l; "Peres: Israel totally rejects
apartheid," Jerusalem Post, August 6, 1985.

44. DanielJ. Elazar, "Ideas forPrctom," Jerusalem Post, August 16, 1985.

45. Jerusalem Domestic Service, 0700 GMT, August 11, 1985, in FBIS
Middle East and Africa, August 13, 1985, p. 1-7.

226 f ootnotes to pages 77-79

46. Roy Isacowitz and David Richardson, "More help to South Africa's
blacks likely after Zulu chief's visit," Jerusalem Post, August 15,1985; Thomas
Friedman, "Zulu Leader Sets Primary Demands," New York Times, August
14, 1985.

47. David Richardson and Roy Isacowitz, "Focus" (Interview with
Buthelezi), Jerusalem Post, August 16, 1985.

48. Isacowitz and Richardson, "More help to South Africa's blacks..."

49. Isacowitz and Richardson, "Israelis to study aid projects for Zulus,"
Jerusalem Post, August 23, 1985.

50. Isacowitz and Richardson, "More help to South Africa's blacks likely
after Zulu chief's visit."

51. Abdelkrim, "Pretoria: le montage Buthelezi."

52. "Focus on Africa," BBC World Service, 1515 GMT, March 19, 1986,
in FBIS Middle East and Africa, March 26, 1986, p. U-7.

51 . Israel Magazine,he^rd kugusx 18, 1985 on KQED-FM,San Francisco.

54. Near East Report, August 19, 1985.

55. This is used repeatedly in handouts distributed by pro-Israeli activists
and appears in Yosef I. Abramowitz,/^w^, Zionism & South Africa, B'nai B'rith
Hillel Foundations, Washington DC, no date, but first appeared in summer
1 985, p. 17. This book defines its task as "expos[ing] the inappropriateness and
destructive nature of anti-Zionism and in particular, its irrelevance to the
anti-apartheid movement," p. 6.

56. The Israeli mission to the UN was first to report and shrilly protest the
meeting. Its source, according to news accounts at the time, was intelligence
provided by Mossad (Paul Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, Lawrence Hill &
Company, Westport, CT, 1985, p. 148, based in part on an interview with
Young; and Robert G. Weisbord and Richard Kazarian, Jr., Israel in the Black
American Perspective, pp. 121-133, who argue against this construction, but
end up giving it even more credence).

57. Charley Levine, "South African Zulu Chief is Ardent Supporter of
Israel," JTA, in Washington Jewish Week, July 10, 1986. Buthelezi also
confided that some of his best white friends were Jewish. The entire piece has a
whiff of South African money: for one thing, KwaZulu is treated by Levine as a
legitimate entity, never identified as a bantustan (although JTA datelines it
"Ulundi, Kwazulu (sic) South Africa"). Levine is identified as a "public affairs
analyst and journalist based in Jerusalem."

58. Ibid.

59. N. Perlmutter and D. Evanier, "The African National Congress, A
Closer Look," ADL Bulletin, May 1986. Perlmutter is the National Director of
the organization. The article contained such earthshaking revelations as:
"Sechaba, the ANC magazine, is printed in Communist East Germany"; and
"In 1982, seven members of the ANC national executive committee were
identified in sworn testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Security
and Terrorism as SACP [South Africa Communist Party] members. The
30-member national executive committee now has 1 2 to 1 5 members said to be
affiliated with SACP." Sen. Denton, whose committee elicited that exciting

F'ootnotes to pages 79-84 227

testimony, was apparently too far to the right even for the good citizens of
Alabama, and he was defeated in the 1986 elections.

60. Ibid.

61. See also Jane Hunter, "Attempts to Defame the ANC," Israeli Foreig n
.j^anr, September 1986, from which this section was adapted. '~ "

6i. Washington Times, ]une 18, 1986.

63. Charley Levine, "Arab Terrorists Aid South African Groups,"
Washington Jewish Week, July 10, 1986. In dwelling on the connections
between the ANC and the South African Communist Patty, Levine seems to be
transfixed by the role of Joe Slo vo, the white Jewish chairmahof the SACP, and
also commander of Umkhonto We Sizwe, the ANC's military wirjg.

Political and Cultural Ties

1. Tom Tugend, "Centre forward," Jerusalem Post, April 18, 1986.

2. Author's investigation.

3. Tugend, "Centre forward."

4. Roy Isacowitz, "S. Africa blacks want ties with groups here," Jerusalem
Post, July 26, 1985.

5. Tugend, "Centre forward."

6. Dan Fisher, "S. African Blacks See Israel Traming as Aid for Future,"
Los Angeles Times, April 8, 1986.

7. Jonathan Broder, "Israelis investing in South Africa's future," Chicago
Tribune, March 16, 1986.

8. Tugend, "Centre forward."

9. William Claiborne, "Black S. Africans Train in Israel," Washington Post
April 8, 1986.

10. Hugh Orgel, "Histadrut Seeking Links with South African Black
Unionists," JTA January 22, 1986.

11. Interview with aide to Tom Hayden.

12. Tugend, "Centre Forward."

1 3 . "Hayden reveals his CIA role during Vietnam War," AP, San Francisco
Examiner, June 21, 1986.

14. Jon Wiener, "Tom Hayden's New Workout," The Nation, November
29, 1986.

15. Claiborne, "Black S. Africans Train in Israel."

16. Gideon Remez, "Pressure Mounts in Israel to Dissociate from South
Africa," Washington /^ww/z Week, }u\y 10, 1986.

1 7. Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa, Special Report of
the Special Committee against Apartheid on Recent Developments in the Relations
between Israel and South Africa, General Assembly Thirty-fourth session
Agenda item 28, 79-28658, November 2, 1979.

18. "Suspension tactique des rencontres sportives," Yediot Aharonot,

228 Footnotes to pages 84-87

January 22, 1979 (French translation of unknown origin); Jersualem Post,
January 23 & 24, 1 979 in Policies of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa,
p. 8.

19. Jerusalem Radio, January 30, 1979 in Policies of Apartheid of the
Government of South Africa.

20. Los Angeles Times, September 30, 1986.

2 1 . Jack Leon, "S. Africa may be kept out of Maccabiah," Jerusalem Post,
June 9, 1985.

22. Ibid.

23. Jack Leon, "S. Africa Maccabiah visa ruse.'" Jerusalem Post, July 17,
1985.

24. Jack Leon, "Facing up to the Maccabiah problems," Jerusalem Post,
July 12, 1985 and letter to the Jerusalem Post from Hanna Foighel, whose
information on the 1 984 meeting came from members of the Danish Maccabiah
team, August 25, 1985.

25. Jack Leon, "Israel's top 3 to play in South African Open," Jerusalem
Post, November 13, 1986.

26. "Shadow on Amos' gloiy," Jerusalem Post, November26, 1986. When
interviewed by South African television — a most important part of the exercise
is for the South Africans to demonstrate for the home and overseas audiences
that foreign athletes are not only willing to play in South Africa, but enjoy
it — Mansdorf disingenuously noted that "The crowd is very fair, they are not
influenced by partiality to local players." Dudley Kessel, "Amos marches to
S.A. iiml," Jerusalem Post, November 23, 1986.

2 7. "Shadow on Amos' glory," a comment which ends by suggesting that
the tennis players could make things right by "assert[ing] their loathing of
apartheid."

28. Jack Leon and Benny Morris, "Israeli tennis players did not break
rules," Jerusalem Post, November 26, 1986.

29. Jerusalem Post, November 26, 1986.

30. Register of Entertainers, Actors and others who have performed in
Apartheid South Africa, UN Centre Against Apartheid Notes and Documents,
86-11227, April 1986.

3 1 . The Star (Johannesburg, weekly airmail ed.), April 8, 1 985 in Recent
Developments Concerning Relations between Israel and South Africa, Special Report
of the Special Committee Against Apartheid, General Assembly, Fortieth Session,
85-28121 1609n (E), October 14, 1985, p. 11.

3 2 . Haaretz, July 6, 1 986, in FBIS Middle East and Africa, July 7, 1 986, p.

L6.

}}. Israel Magazine,he2.rd August 17, 1986onKQED-FM,San Francisco.

34. The Star (Johannesburg), September 19, 1984, Recent developments
concerning relations between Israel and South Africa, .

35. Interview with Barry Streek, April, 1986.

36. Michal Yudelman, "Travel in a Troubled Paradise," Jerusalem Post,
December 2, 1985, Supplement on South African Tourism.

37. Haim Shapiro, "Israelis visit South Africa as others begin to shun it,"

Footnotes to pages 87-89 229

Jerusalem Post, October 29, 1985.

38. The Star, May 20, 1986, in FBIS Middle East and Africa, May 22,
1986, p. U-12.

39. Jerusalem Post, September 24, 1986, October 17, 1986.

40. Ha'aretz, October 1 6, 1 986 in FBIS Middle East and Africa, October
technology to South Africa is being violated."

who actually decide to take up residence in Israel have lately been very small.

40. Jerusalem Post, September 24, 1986, October 17, 1986.

41 . Alex Berlyne, the author of these pieces, tried to use a zippy style and
convey a sense of good fun, but his credentials as a judge of "reform" in South
Africa are a bit shaky, as he could not resist throwing in such material as this
limerick: "His daughter's name is Wong Wong/ Arid she sure is yellow all
right/ Her boyfriend belongs to the Royal Marines/ But two Wongs don't
make a white." Of course \i was the "complexity" of the white government's
problem with the black majority that Berlyne was supposed to explain awa^x

42. "Israeli Left Attacks South Africa; Israeli Rightists Defend It," INB,
Jewish Press, August 22, 1986. This, even though, according to the article, at
least ten of the kibbutzim associated with Mapam had "active business links"
with South Africa and the one kibbutz which in 1 986 decided to sever its links
with the apartheid state required three meetings to arrive at a vote to stop
shipping their machinery products to South Africa.

43. "Israeli Left Attacks South Africa..." notes that one of the organizers
of a demonstration outside a cabinet meeting on South Africa was Stanley
Goldfoot. Goldfoot, originally from South Africa and jailed in connection with
the 1 947 murder of Count Bernadotte, received money from the U.S. religious
right on behalf of Jewish criminals plotting to blow up the Dome of the Rock in
Jerusalem. The Lifta gang was rounded up by Israeli authorities prior to the
deed and many members were jailed for earlier attacks on Palestinians. (Michael
and Barbara Ledeen, "The Temple Mount Plot," The New Republic, June 1 8,
1984.)

44. JTA, November 15, 1985. The government actually did decide to
delay dispatching its legate, but it was never clear whether the decision was
prompted by the protests or the desire to keep a low profile until after that
autumn's UN session on South Africa had been held.

45. Jerusalem Post, December 8, 1985.

46. Morning Edition, National Public Radio, January 13, 1986.

47. Ma'ariv, October 2 1 , 1984 in FBIS Middle East & Africa, October 22,
1984, p. L12.

48. Roy Isacowitz, "Ministry to consider EEC decision on S.A. sanc-
tions," Jerusalem Post, September 18, 1986.

49. Section 508 (a) says "The President shall conduct a study on the extent
to which the international embargo on the sale and exports of arms and military
technology to South Africa is being violated.

508 (b) says, "Not later than 1 79 days after the date of enactment of this
Act, the President shall submit to the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and the chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report

230 Footnotes to pages 89-97

setting forth the findings of the study required by subsection (a), including an
identification of those countries engaged in such sale or export, with a view to
terminating United States military assistance to those countries." The section
was numbered 505 in earlier versions of the bill.

50. Roy Isacowitz, "Why Israel is Unlikely to Opt for Sanctions,"
Jerusalem Post, ]u\y 11, 1986.

5 1 . "Cameroon Renews Diplomatic Ties," Israeli Foreign Affairs, October
1986.

52. Ha'aretz, August 28, 1986, in FBIS Middle East and Africa, August
29, 1986,p. I-l.

53. Isacowitz, "Ministry to consider EEC decision on S.A. sanctions."

54. Roy Isacowitz, "What's good for the Jews of South Ainca}" Jerusalem
Post, November 22, 1986.

55. Shlomo Avineri, "South Africa, a Zionist emergency," Jerusalem Post,
February 2, 1986.

56. "No wish to join sanctions on SA," Jerusalem Post, February 4, 1987.

57. Hauser, "Israel, South Africa and the West."

58. "Israel Moves to Block Congress, Save South African Arms Sales,"
Israeli Foreign Affairs, April 1987.

Part II: Israel & Central America
El Salvador

1 . "Dear Colleague" letter circulated with the draft legislation, HR 5424,
June 1984.

2. Testimony of Jeffrey A. James, adjunct professor at American
University, before House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee
Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, on HR5424, June 7, 1984
(typed copy). James also said: "Israel has made great strides since 1948 to give
her considerable credibility as a developmental role model and as a donor of
technical assistance. The communial [sic] organizational structures and idealogy
[sic] have seemed particularly appropriate for the Third World nations also
preemenently [sic] concerned with nation building through consensus politics."

It did not occur to James to mention that, in most countries where Israel
works, the consensus is between the forces of reaction there and in the U.S., and
most often the military.

3. Jewish Telegraphic Agency, November 29, 1985. Contrary to the
original rationale for CDR, with the exception of Ghana, all the projects were in
nations with longstanding ties with Israel.

4. "Development Aid to Central America," Israeli Foreign Affairs, June
1986. This article is based on contracts and other U.S. AID documents relating
to the three projects.

5. Inter-Hemispheric Resource Center Bulletin, (Box 4506 Albuquerque,
NM 87196), no date— received May 1986; and Sara Miles, "The Real War,

Footnotes to pages 97-99 231

Low-Intensity Conflict in Central America," NACLA Report on the Americas,
April-May 1986. Both outline the Reagan Administration's attempts to
translate into military technique its vicious fantasies of reversing liberation
struggles.

6. "Development Aid in Central America."

7. Ignacio Klich, "Israel Arms the Dictators," drawing on information
from Jane's Fighting Ships, SIPRI Yearbooks and Strategy Week in Middle East
International, December 23, 1982; Penny Lernoux, "Who's Who of Dictators
Obtain Arms from Israel," National Catholic Reporter, December 25, 1981.

8. Edy Kaufman, Yoram Shapira, and Joel Barromi, Israel-Latin American
Relations, Transaction, New Brunswick, NJ, 1979, p. 105.

9. Interview with Guerra y Guerra, February 1983. Guerra was one of the
reformist "young officers" who overthrew President Romero in 1979 and
were driven out in their turn in 1980 by more conservative (U.S.-backed)
military officers.

10. Chris Hedges, "Salvadoran colonel who mutinied is back in war,"
Christian Science Monitor, September 26, 1984.

11. Julia Preston, "Ochoa, A Good Fighter but Too Independent for
Salvador Army?" Christian Science Monitor, Jinmty 13, 1983. For a full profile
of this hard-line officer see, "Israel's Salvadoran Protege," Israeli Foreign
Affairs, April 1985.

1 2 . This premise already had the support of Congress, which in 1976 had
passed legislation linking U.S. aid to human rights practices (Journal of
Commerce, March 18, 1977). In actual practice during the Carter Administra-
tion, the aid going to big violators, e.g. South Korea and the Philippines, was
not cut off because they were strategically important. Only Argentina, Chile,
Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala were affected by the policy.

13. Department of Defense figures show that between 1950 and 1980,
2097 Salvadorans, 3334 Guatemalans, 3834 Hondurans and 5679 Nicaraguans
had participated in U.S. IMET (International Military Education and Train-
ing) training programs, DOD Foreign Military Sales and Military Assistance
Facts, December 1980 in Arnon Hadar, TheAJnited States and El Salvador:
Political and Military Involvement, U.S. -El ^Ivador Research & Information
Center, Berkeley, CA, 1 98 1 , p. 1 26. /

14. Tom Barry, Beth Wood, and Deb Preusch, Dollars and Dictators, Grove
Press, 1983, is an excellent examination of the interplay between U.S.
government and U.S. corporate inflvience on Central America.

15. Hadar, The United States and El Salvador, p. 20.

16. Alan Nairn, "Behind the Peath Squads," Progressive, May 1984.

17. Carolyn Forche and Philip Wheaton, "History and Motivations of
U.S. Involvement in the Control of the Peasant Movement in El Salvador: The
Role of AIFLD in the Agrarian Reform Process, 1970-80," in James
Dunkerley, The Long War, Dictatorship & Revolution in El Salvador, Verso,
London, 1982 (reprinted 1983), p. 98.

1 8. "El Salvador Rejects U.S. Arms Aid," AP, Washington Post, March 1 9,
1977.

232 Footnotes to pages 99- 1 02

19. Dunkerly, The Long War, pp. 1 10-1 1 1.

20. Hadar, The United States and El Salvador, Appendix 13, p. 127.

21. In the shadowy world of arms sales it is very difficult to track the
smaller items, which are not as carefully tracked as the "big ticket" items by
such organizations as SIPRI; thus the sources for the small items in the
accompanying chart are more anecdotal.

22. "Leftist Says Salvadoran Troops Are Being Trained by the Israelis,"
Reuters, New York Times, October 10, 1979.

23. Interview with Guerra, February 1983.

24. Interview with Ramos, January 1983.

25. Hadar, The United States and El Salvador, Dunkerly, The Long War,
passim. Guerra y Guerra relates that Carter Ambassador Frank Devine actively
worked to bring out of the first 1979 junta the exceedingly conservative and
brutal 1980 government controlled by Col.'s Garcia and Gutierrez, which, in
its ultimate version, was fronted by Jose Napoleon Duarte.

26. International Herald Tribune, December 31, 1979, in Ignacio Khch,
"Les choix de Jerusalem en Amerique centrale," Le Monde Diplomatique,
October 1982.

27. Jeffrey Heller, "Salvadoran guerrilla denies attacks on Israeli Targets,"
Jerusalem Post, May 13, 1982. It would not be surprising if one of the guerrilla
groups had carried out the bombing. However, several journahsts have spoken
to this author about the deep and abiding anti-Semitism of the Salvadoran
officer corps.

28. This Week in Central America and Panama, February 25, 1980.

29. Dunkerley, The Long War, passim.

30. Karen DeYoung, "State's Latin Bureau Urges Resumption of Arms
Aid to Salvador," Washington Post, January 10, 1981.

31. Karen DeYoung, "Carter Decides to Resume Military Aid to El
Salvador," Ibid., January 14, 1981 . The Salvadoran far right began a reign of
terror coinciding with the election of Ronald Reagan, an attempt, thought
some, to establish "facts" that Reagan would be most likely to support.

32. Dawr, January 3, 1982, translator unknown. According to the article,
Israel's economic attache in Washington, Danny Halperin confirmed the
transaction.

33. Latin America Weekly Report, December 17, 1982.

34. SIPRI Yearbook 1982, p. 213 in Bishara Bahbah, Israel and Latin
America, The Military Connection, St. Martin's Press (New York) and Institute
for Palestine Studies (Washington), 1986, p. 79.

35. "Napalm: Made in Israel, Used in El Salvador," Israeli Foreign Affairs,
December 1984. The need for napalm was supposedly obviated when the
Salvadoran government began bombing and strafing the civilian population
from A-37 aircraft obtained from the U.S.

36. Heller, "Salvadoran guerrilla denies..." and "Salvadoran envoy blasts
MKs' talks with 'terrorist,'" Jerusalem Post, May 14, 1982.

37. "Latin America's relations with Israel and the Arab World," Special
Report, Latin American Newsletters, November 1985.

Footnotes to pages 1 02 - 1 05 233

38. Ha'aretz, November 12, 1981, in Klich, "Les Choix de Jerusalem ..."

39. Bahbah, Israel and Latin America, p. 152, was given this estimate in
1982 by a PLO representative and told by the international relations
department of the FMLN in Managua that same year that Israeli advisers were
involved with the Salvadoran intelligence services. In late 1982 Arnaldo
Ramos, U.S. representative of the FDR, gave the author those same numbers
and said that many Israelis were working on a secret military base near San
Salvador.

40. Davar, May 3 , 1 984, in FBIS Middle East and Africa, May 4, 1 984, p.

1-6.

41 . Juan O. Tamayo, "Want to buy a fully trained SWAT team?" Miami
Herald, September 4,1986. This article is datelined Jerusalem and so must have
been passed by the Israeli censors.

42 . "El Salvador returns embassy to Jerusalem," /^r«ra/«w2 Post International
Edition, April 22, 1984.

43. Radio Venceremos, 0000 GMT, April 25, 1984 m FBIS Latm
America, April 26, 1984, p. P-9.

44. "U.S. Denies Latin Aid Role for Israel," AP, New York Times, April
22, 1984.

45. "Salvadorans Talk of More Israeli Aid," AP, New York Times, April
21,1984.

46. ACAN, Panama City, 2228 GMT, April 23, 1984, in FBIS Latm
America, April 24, 1984, pp. P-1,2.

47. Reuters, New York Times, April 21, 1984; ironically, the rupture hit
Costa Rica harder than El Salvador, which did not have much of an
international reputation to lose.

48. Doyle McManus, "Demos vying hard to lure wary Jewish voters," Los
Angeles Times, April 2, 1984 in San Francisco Chronicle.

49. "Egypt Warns U.S. on Moving Israel Embassy," UPI, San Francisco
Chronicle, May 2, 1984.

50. "Israel Dara Mayor Respaldo en Armamentos," Excelsior (Mexico
City), April 21, 1984.

51. Teodoro Ducach, "Busca el Gobierno Salvadoreno la Asistencia de
Militares Israelies," Excelsior, August 4, 1983.

52. Edward Cody, "El Salvador, Israel Set Closer Ties," Washington Post,
August 17, 1983.

53. Ducach, "Busca el Gobierno Salvadoreno ..."

54. Arthur Allen, "Say Israel, El Salvador to Strengthen Ties," AP, 0642,
August 17,1983. Prior to the agreement, El Salvador had voted with the vast
majority of UN members in support of the PLO.

55. Cody, "El Salvador, Israel Set Closer Ties."

56. Author's confidentia' sources.

57. Allen, "Say Israel, El Salvador to Strengthen Ties."

58. See Edward S. Herman and Frank Brodhead, Demonstration Elections,
South End Press, Boston, 1984. In the Reagan lexicon the term "democratic
elections" covers a vast galaxy of fraud and venality,, whereas the 1 984 elections

234 Footnotes to pages 105-108

in Nicaragua have been dismissed (only by the Reagan Administration) as
phony and fraudulent.

59. Craig Pyes, "Salvadoran Rightists: The Deadly Patriots," Albuquerque
Journal, December 18, 1 983. This was the first ofa series of articles that ran until
December 22.

60. "Si hay golpe en El Salvador, se retirara toda ayuda belica de EU," El
Dia (Mexico City), April 5, 1984.

61. Robert Leikin, "Ochoa's gambit," Miami Herald, January 16, 1983.

62 . Joanne Omang, "CIA admits funding Salvadoran elections," Washing-
ton Post, May 1 1 , 1 984 in Oakland Tribune. The CIA also pumped some money
into Jose Guerrero's Conciliation Party, which proceeded to surprise observers
by staying neutral, rather than throwing its support to D'Aubuisson.

63. San Salvador Radio Cadena YSKL, 0025 GMT, June 4, 1 984 in FBIS
Latin America, June 5, 1984, p. P-4.

64. "U.S. Officials Cheered by Salvador Arms Aid," New York Times
August 13, 1984.

65. In 1985 Duarte himself told Reuters that he was indeed interested in
having Israel provide military training to the Salvadoran forces.

66. Robert Block, "Israel to Aid El Salvador in Areas tied to Counterin-
surgency," Reuters North European Service, February 22, 1986.

67. Author's confidential sources.

68. San Salvador Radio Cadena YSU, 1 200 GMT, May 2 1 , 1 985 in FBIS
Latin America, May 23, 1985, pp. P-3-4.

69. El Diario De Hoy (San Salvador), July 20, 1984, in FBIS Latin
America, July 23, 1984, p. P-5.

70. Enforprensa, May 17, 1985.

71. Clifford Krauss and Tim Carrington, "U.S. Effort to Win 'Hearts and
Minds' Gains in El Salvador," Wall Street Journal, September 8, 1986.

72. Clifford Krauss, "Salvador Pacification Off to a Shaky Start," Wall
Street Journal, ]\i\y 18, 1984.

73. James LeMoyne, "Salvador Air Role in War Increases," New York
Times, ]\i\y 18, 1985.

74. Jeruslam Domestic Service, 1 1 00 GMT, April 1 3 , 1 984, in FBIS Latin
America, April 13, 1984, p. 1-6.

75. San Salvador, El Mundo, February 23, 1985 in FBIS Latin America,
February 27, 1985, p. P-4.

76. Dan Williams, "Comunidades Fortificadas del Proyecto Piloto de
Achichilco," translated from the Los Angeles Times in Excelsior, February 8
1985.

77. Chris Hedges, "Salvador plans to resettle 500,000 displaced persons,"
Christian Science Monitor, September 28, 1984.

78. Williams, "Comunidades Fortificadas del Proyecto Piloto de Achi-
chilco."

79. Hedges, "Salvador plans to resettle 500,000 displaced persons."

80. Williams, "Comunidades Fortificadas del Proyecto Piloto de Achi-

Footnotes to pages 108-112 235

chilco."

81. Madrid, EFE0427 GMT, August 29, 1985, in FBIS Latin America,
September 4, 1985.

82. Williams, "Comunidades Fortificadas del Proyecto Piloto de Achi-
chilco."

83. Tamar Kaufman, "Salvadoran Jew to discuss U.S. policy in Latin
America," Northern California Jewish Bulletin, September 12, 1986.

84. Block, "Israel to Aid El Salvador."

85. Ibid. The program would have to be propped up like Lazarus.

86. "Asistencia Technologia de Israel a El Salvador," £/ Dia, July 3, 1 986,
which cites Davar.

87. James LeMoyne, "El Salvador's Refugees: The Many Peasants Who
Get Caught," New York Times, July 1,1986. This unpleasant business has been
going on for years. Dr. Charles Clements, who tended patients on Guazapa
Volcano in 1982 and 1983, spoke frequendy on his return of military raids in
which the army would take care to smash every dish a family owned.

88. James LeMoyne, "Salvador War Recovery Plan is Announced by
Army Chief," New York Times, July 30, 1986.

89. Dunkerley, The Longest War, p. 29 and passim.

90. Interview with Guerra y Guerra.

Guatemala

1 . So vicious was the Guatemalan military in its anti-popular war that such
stalwarts of the Reagan policy in Central America as Henry Kissinger, and
Langhorne Motley and Thomas Enders, both formerly Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter- American Affairs, noted its brutality and either affirmed or did
not contest U.S. distance from Guatemala. Milton Jamail and Margo Gutierrez,
It's No Secret: Israel's Military Involvement in Central America, AAUG Press,
(556 Trapelo Rd., Belmont, MA 02178), 1986, p. 51.

2. Allan Nairn, "Terror with a Human Face," Village Voice, November 5,
1985. Other estimates run between 30,000 and 100,000. See also Marjorie
Miller, "Indians' Culture Torn by Guatemalan Political Strife," Los Angeles
Times November 29, 1985.

3. Frank del Olmo, "In Guatemala, Fusiles y Frijoles," Los Angeles Times,
February 11, 1983.

4. Opinion piece by Wayne Smith, former head of the U.S. interest section
in Cuba, New York Times, October 12, 1982 in Jonathan Fried, Marvin E.
Gettleman, Deborah T. Levenson, and Nancy Peckenham, Guatemala in
Rebellion: Unfinished History, Grove Press, Inc., New York, 1983, p. 31 1.

5. "Report Bombs Set off at Israel, Other Embassies in Guatemala," JTA,
January 14, 1982.

6. "Israeli embassy rocked by blast," Miami Herald, August 13, 1982.

236 Footnotes to pages 112-114

7. Cheryl A. Rubenberg, "Israeli foreign policy in Central America,"
Third World Quarterly, July 1986; Kaufman et. al., Israeli-Latin American
Relations, pp. 3 and 138.

8. Jamail and Gutierrez, It's No Secret, pp. 51, 52.

9. Chart from the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 1971, in Kaufman et. al.,
Israeli-Latin American Relations, p. 247; Shimeon Amir, Israel's Development
Cooperation with Africa, Asia, and Latin America, Praeger, New York, 1974, p.
113; Curtis and Gitelson, Israel in the Third World, p. 399.

10. "Shopping Around for Weapons," Central America Report, March 28,
1977. Guatemala actually preempted the move by canceling its agreements
with Washington.

11. George Black, "Israeli Connection— Not Just Guns for Guatemala,"
NACLA Report on the Americas, May-June, 1983.

12. "International Arms Transfers to Central America Since 1969,"
Update (Central American Historical Institute, Georgetown University), July
9, 1984 in Jamail and Gutierrez, It's No Secret, p. 53.

1 3 . "Israel pushes aircraft at interfer," Central America Report, October 3 1 ,
1977.

14. Yoav Karni, "The Israel-Guatemala Connection," Ha'aretz, February
7, 1986, translated in Al Fajr, February 14, 1986.

15. Christopher Dickey, "Guatemala Uses U.S. 'Civilian' Copters in
Warfare," Washington Post, ]zn\inry 23, 1982.

16. "Israel May Become Regional Arms Supplier," December 5, 1977,
and "Israel Pushes Aircraft at Interfer," October 31, 1977, Central America
Report; Bernard Debusmann, "After Embassy Flap, a Look at Israel's Latin
Arms Role," Reuters, Philadelphia Inquirer, April 24, 1984. According to
President Laugurud, five patrol boats had been ordered (Central America
Report, December 12, 1977).

17. Guatemala City Radio Television, 0400 GMl, June 11, ivy-i, m
FBIS Latin America, June 12, 1984.

18. Victor Perera, "Uzi Diplomacy — How Israel Makes Friends and
Enemies Around the World," Mother Jones, July 1985.

19. "Problems From the Barrels of Israeli Guns," Latin America Weekly
Report, May 16, 1980 and Rarihokwats, Guatemala: The Horror and the Hope,
Four Arrows, York, PA, 1 982, p. 1 06 in Jamail and Gutierrez, It's No Secret, p.
53.

20. "Arms seizure irritates Belize dispute," Central America Report, ]u\y 4,
1977.

21. Central America Report, October 17, 1977.

22. Ma'ariv, April 30, 1974, in Kaufman et. al., Israeli-Latin American
Relations, pp. 107-108.

23. "Israel May Become Regional Arms Supplier"; "Israel Pushes Aircraft
at Interfer"; Debusmann, "After Embassy Flap, a Look at Israel's Latin Arms
Role."

24. Karni, "The Israel-Guatemala Connection."

25. Cynthia Arnson and Flora Montealegre, IPS Resource Update,

Footnotes to pages 114-115 237

Washington, June 1982, in "Garrison Guatemala," NACLA Report on the
/iwmVay, January/February, 183, p. 25.

26. Robert Graham, "Barter Revisited: Latin America Takes a Fresh
Look at Countertrade," Financial Times in Houston Chronicle, February 11,
1985.

27. Klieman, Israel's Global Reach, p. 135.

28. Graham Hovey, "U.S. Blocks Saleof Israeh Planes to Ecuadoreans,"
New York Times, February 8, 1977.

29. "Arms seizure irritates Belize dispute."

30. Graham, "Barter revisited: Latin America takes a fresh look at
countertrade."

31. Enfoprensa, March 8, 1985.

3 2 . Interview with information officer, Greek Embassy, Washington DC;
Jerusalem Post, March 30, 1 986 and Hadashot, April 1 , 1 986 in FBIS Middle East
and Africa; a complete account of the seizure of the West Lion appears in Israeli
Foreign Affairs, May 1 986. Inquiries made in Greece in early 1 987 determined
that the case had quietly dropped out of sight.

3 3 . CBS Evening News (Bob Simon reporting from Guatemala) February
16, 1983, in Nat Hentoff, "Should a Jewish State Arm a Christian Slaugh-
terer?" Village Voice, ]untl\, 1983.

34. "Israeh Arms for Sale," Time, March 28, 1983.

35. Interview in Moment, June 1984.

36. "Adquirio Guatemala Aviones Militares," PL, SlAG, Enfoprensa, in
Excelsior, December 6, 1983.

37. Dan Rather, CBS Evening News, February 1 6, 1 983 in Bahbah, Israel
and Latin America, p. 161.

38. George Black with Milton Jamail & Norma Stoltz Chinchilla, Garrison
Guatemala, Monthly Review Press, 1984 p. 156.

39. Allan Nairn, "Controversial Reagan Campaign Links with Guate-
malan Government and Private Sector Leaders," COHA Research Memoran-
dum, October 30, 1980, in Black et. al. Garrison Guatemala, pp. 147-148.

40. Greve, "Israel able to expand role as Latin military supplier."

41. Allan Nairn, "The Guatemala Connection," The Progressive, May
1986. This article details a number of Reagan Administration arms shipments
in defiance of the congressional ban. The Reagan Administration was operating
under the dual handicap of having to slip these items past both Congress and the
British, which continued to object to arms sales to Guatemala (Jackson and
Keatley, "Britain protests at U.S. arms sales to Guatemala," Manchester
Guardian, January 16, 1983.) The Thatcher government has similarly blocked
Israeli arms sales to Argentina through the U.S. government.

42. "Israel desarroUa una industra de guerra en Guatemala, denuncia el
EGP,"£/ Dia, October 11, 1983.

43. Enfoprensa, January 6, 1984.

44. Latin America Regional Reports Mexico & Central America, August 1 7,
1984; in a 1985 special edition, {op. cit.) Latin America Newsletters said that
Austria had provided "the plant and some of the technology" and that a number

238 Footnotes to pages 115-117

of Guatemalan officers had been to Austria for technical training. This would
appear to contradict Gen. Lucas' statement that Israel provided the factory.

45. Kami, "The Israel-Guatemala Connection."

46. "Israel's Part in Central America," (II) Central America Report,
December 14, 1984, in Jamail and Gutierrez, It's No Secret, p. 59.

47. "Industria Militar de Israel en Guatemala," AFP, AP, UPI, ANSA,
Enfoprensa and SIAG, Excelsior, October 1 1, 1983.

48. Cody, "El Salvador, Israel Set Closer Ties."

49. Karni, "The Israel-Guatemala Connection."

50. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on International Relations, Sub-
committee on International Organizations, Human Rights in Nicaragua, Guate-
mala and El Salvador: Implications for U.S. Policy, Hearings, 94th Cong., 2dSess.,
1976, pp. 51-52 in Delia Miller ^Z. al., Background Information on Guatemala, The
Armed Forces and U.S. Military Assistance, Institute for Policy Studies, June

1981, p. 6.

51. Shirley Christian, "Congress is Asked for $54 Million to Aid Latin
Antiterrorist Efforts," New York Times, November 6, 1985.

52. Hentoff, "Should a Jewish State Arm a Christian Slaughterer.'"

53. Israeli Foreign Affairs, November 1985 and April 1986.

54. David Gardner, "How Israelis act as surrogates for U.S. in Central
America," Financial Times, November 27, 1986.

55. James LeMoyne, "Guatemala Crushes Rebels Its Own Way: Ruth-
lessly," New York T^ww, January 13, 1985.

56. Yediot Aharonot, February 7, 1 979 in Bahbah, Israel and Latin America,
p. 162.

57. Panama City ACAN, 2146 GMT, March 23, 1982, in FBIS Latin
America, March 26, 1982 and NACLA interviews in Guatemala City, June

1982, in Black al.. Garrison Guatemala, p. 123. Alvarez, as was Rios, was safe
in Miami.

58. Black, "Israeli Connection — Not just Guns for Guatemala."

59. Allan Nairn and Jean-Marie Simon, "Bureaucracy of Death," New
Republic, ]um 30, 1986; DPA, 2324 GMT, February 5, 1986 in FBIS Latin
America, February 6, 1986.

60. John Rettie, "Israeli arms help Guatemala's fight against Guerrillas,"
Manchester Guardian, Junuiry 10, 1982.

61. "Moderna escuela de transmissiones y electronica del ejercito inaugu-
rada," Diario de Centra America, (Guatemala City), November 5, 1981 in
Cheryl A. Rubenberg, "Israel and Guatemala: Arms, Advice and Counterin-
surgency," Middle East Report, May-June 1986.

62. Rettie, "Israeli arms help Guatemala's fight against guerrillas."

63. Black, "Israeli Connection — Not just Guns for Guatemala."

64. Karni, "The Israel-Guatemala Connection," This installation is
thought to have been destroyed in 1984 by insurgents (David Ferreira,
"Guatemala: Unholy Allies," AfricAsia, November 1984).

65. Nairn and Simon, "Bureaucracy of Death."

66. Luisa Frank and Philip Wheaton, Indian Guatemala: The Path to

Footnotes to pages 1 17-120 239

Liberation, EPICA task force, Washington, 1 984, gives the earliest date among
a number of sources (including "Keeping Track: Israeli Computers in
Guatemala and El Salvador," Israeli Foreign Affairs, March 1985) and Yosef
Pri'el, Davar, August 13, 1982, the latest (autumn, 1981) in Rubenberg,
"Israeli Foreign Policy in Central America."

67. Fr. Ronald Burke, a Catholic priest who had worked since 1 969 in the
highland department of Chimaltenango, noted that "the computerized hit lists
at that time were all coordinated at the annex at the Presidential Palace. And
when I checked it out with the [U.S.] Embassy people they let me know
indirectly that I was on that particular national hit list, and I was advised to get
out of the country, quickly." Interview with Fr. Burke by Lenard Millich,
January 1985.

68. Christopher Dickey, "Guatemalan War Grows Fiercer," Washington
Pwr, January 22, 1982.

69. "Pozos de tortura y trabajo forzado en las aldeas modelo de Guatemala,"
SIAG and Enfoprensa, El Dia, May 22, 1983.

70. "Crearan in Guatemala una tarjeta unica de identificacion personal," El
Dia, August 22, 1986.

71. AFP, 0236 GMT, September 17, 1983 m FBIS Latin America,
September 19, 1983, p. P-17.

72. Cited in Inforpress Centroamericana, August 30, 1984.

73. Victor Perera, "Uzi Diplomacy," Mother Jones, July 1985.

74. Black, "Israeli Connection - Not just Guns for Guatemala."

75. " Asesores Israelies se encuentran en Guatemala," AIP, Enfoprensa and
Salpress in El Dia, June 23, 1983.

76. Nancy Peckenham, "Bullets and Beans," Multinational Monitor, April
1984.

77. Marlise Simons, "Guatemalans Are Adding A Few Twists to
'Pacification,'" New York Times, September 12, 1982.

78. "Habra en Toda Guatemala Aldeas Modelo: Mejia V.," Excelsior,
January 2, 1984.

79. Black et. al.. Garrison Guatemala, p. 155.

80. Alan Riding, "Government-Backed Cooperatives in Guatemala Aid
Indians," September 13, 1975, and "Guatemala Opening New Lands but the
Best Goes to Rich," April 5, 1979, New York Times; Stanley Meisler,
"Guatemalan Co-ops Attract 'Red' Label," Los Angeles Times, February 1,
1976.

81. Black, "Israeli Connection."

82. Ibid.

83. Peckenham, "Bullets and Beans."

84. Ibid.

85. Victor Perera, "The Lost Tribes of Guatemala," The Monthly
(Berkeley, CA.) November 1985.

86. Peckenham, "Bullets and Beans."

87. "Transforming the Indian highlands," Latin America Regional Reports
Mexico & Central America, May 6, 1983.

240 Footnotes to pages 121-122

88. Perera, "The Lost Tribes of Guatemala."

89. Mary Jo McConahay , "Guatemalan town gets a road," Pacific News
Service, Oakland Tribune, July 21, 1985.

90. "Transforming the Indian highlands." See also Douglas Foster,
"Guatemala: On the Green Path," Mother Jones, November-December 1985.

91. Peckenham, "Bullets and Beans"; Christian Rudel, "Pacification
Violente au Guatemala," Le Monde Diplomatique, August, 1985.

92. Peckenham, "Bullets and Beans."

93. Rudel, "Pacification Violente au Guatemala."

94. Ibid.

95. Guatemala: A Nation of Prisoners, Americas Watch, New York, January
1984, p. 82.

96. Marjorie Miller, "Indians' Culture Torn by Guatemalan Political
Strife."

97. Rudel, "Pacification Violente au Guatemala."

98. ElDia, November 12, 1983.

99. Nancy Peckenham, "Campos de reducacion para los indigenas,"
unomasuno, February 12, 1984.

100. The Spanish is patrullas auto-defensas civilas.

101. Simons, "Guatemalans Are Adding A Few Twists to
'Pacification."'

102. In 1983 the National Workers Central (CNT) charged that under
Rios Montt torture chambers were built in some of the model villages and that
peasants who refused to participate in the patrols were punished in these.
("Pozos de tortura y trabajo forzado...")

103. Perera, "The Lost Tribes of Guatemala."

104. Rubenberg, "Israeli Foreign Policy in Central America."

105. Guatemala City Cadena de Emisoras Unidas, 0050 GMT, June 9,
1984 in FBIS Latin America, June 12, 1984, p. P-13.

106. Peckenham, "Bullets and Beans"; Guatemala: A Nation of Prisoners, pp.
85-86.

107. del Olmo, "In Guatemala, Fusiles y Frijoles."

108. "Civil Defense Is Fact of Life In Guztemzh, New York Times, Marcy
4, 1984.

109. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Sustaining A
Consistent Policy in Central America: One Year After the National Bipartisan
Commission Report, Special Report No. 142, Washington, DC, April 1985, p.
12, in Jamail and Gutierrez, It's No Secret, p. 58.

110. "Guatemala Asks Arms' Release," Washington Post, December 27,
1983; Latin America Regional Report, Mexico & Central America, January 13,
1984 says that U.S. officials said the rifles were Remingtons, while Israeli
sources said they were Mausers; Bishara Bahbah (p. 161) says Israel has sold
Guatemala "German-made bolt-action Mauser rifles from 1948 purchases
from Czechoslovakia."

111. "Guatemala Claims Rifles Seized by U.S. Customs," Washington
Post, December 25, 1983.

Footnotes to pages 122-124 241

112. Guatemala City Cadena de Emisoras Unidas, 1230 GMT, December
24, 1983 in FBIS Latin America, December 27, 1983, p. P-13. The antiquated
weapons are in keeping with the reluctance of Guatemalan authorities to arm
the population — in marked contrast to the Nicaraguan government's practice of
distributing rifles.

113. SI AG (Guatemalan Information and Analysis Service), Mexico
City, April, 1984.

1 14. "Pozos de tortura y trabajo forzado..."

115. Loren Jenkins, "Guatemala turns to 'model villages' in its battle
against guerrilla rebels," Washington Post in Philadelphia Inquirer, January 13,
1985.

1 16. Rudel, "Pacification Violente au Guatemala."

117. Moreover, because it occurs in a global economic system, the
exploitation of the Guatemalan peasants creates additional victims. A strike of
food workers against several Watsonville, California processing plants which
account for 80 percent of the frozen broccoli and cauliflower (among other
vegetables) sold in the U.S. and abroad (Antonio Garcia, "Big chill in frozen
food industry," People's World, August 31, 1985)— it began in the fall of 1985
and was still in progress in February 1 987 — over employer efforts to reduce the
base wage from $7.06 to S4.25 an hour is directly related to what is happening
in Guatemala, named as one of the countries where workers do not make that
much in a day. (Robert Lindsey, "New Food Patterns Affect Strike in West,"
New York Ti?w«, January 1, 1986.)

118. Jamail and Gutierrez, It's No Secret, p. 57.

119. Guatemala: A Nation of Prisoners, pp. 85-86.

120. It is the method proposed by Kach party leader Meir Kahane —
expulsion of Palestinians and recommended laws to prevent intermarriage and
the accompanying thuggery — to which other Israeli factions and U.S. Jewish
organizations object, not the ultimate objective of reducing the Palestinian
population of pre- 1967 Israel and the occupied territories.

121. Elizabeth Gray, Report on Sunday Morning, Canadian Broadcasting
Company, heard March 10, 1985, KALW-FM, San Francisco.

122. Rubenberg, "Israeli Foreign Policy in Central America."

123. Ma'ariv, in Shahak, Israel's Global Role, p. 48.

124. Christopher Dickey, "Religious Rivalries Complicate Conflict
Among Guatemalans," Washington Post, January 6, 1983. One interesting
point made in this article is that the fundamentalists had a tendency to split and
that the proliferation of churches tended to disorganize communities and diffuse
opposition to the government.

\25.Ibid.

126. "Este Acto Injustificable Hiere a la Iglesia Catolica, Dice el Nuncio
Apostolico," £xc^/«tfr, November 13, 1983. In November 1983, shortly after
Rios was deposed, the Army chief of staff admitted that a number of Roman
Catholic catechists had been detained at the Puerto Barrios military base after
having been captured that August "for investigation to determine if they are
actual participants in the subversion." (El Dia, November 12, 1983.)

242 Footnotes to pages 124-127

127. Shelton H. Davis, "Guatemala: The Evangelical Holy War in El
Quiche," The Global Reporter, March 1983.

128. Tom Pratt, "Falwell: Israel Needs U.S. Support," Tyler Courier-
Times-Tele graph, (Texas) February 6, 1983, in Alan Dehmer, Unholy Alliance,
ADC Issue Paper #16, Washington, DC, April 1984.

129. CBN, 700 Club, June 9, 1982, Unholy Alliance.

130. Ibid.

131. Off-record interview with House Foreign Affairs Committee
Western Hemisphere Subcommittee staff member, July 1, 1985.

132. Ibid.;]tnk\r\s, "Guatemala turns to 'model villages'..."

133. Letter to New York Times, January 24, 1984.

134. The military also passed a decree granting amnesty to its members for
any crimes they may have committed between 1982 and 1986. Decrees listed
by number in Update on Guatemala, (publication of Nattional Committee in
Solidarity with the People of Guatemala, 225 Lafayette St. , Room 212, New
York, NY 100 12) January-March 1986.

135. Guatemala City Radio-Television Guatemala, 0040 GMT, March
12, 1986, in FBIS Latin America, March 17, 1986, p. P-10.

136. Boletin International (publication of Guatemala Human Rights Com-
mission [CDHG], Mexico City), March 1986.

137. Economist, September 7, 1985; Diario Las Americas, September 8,
1985.

138. James LeMoyne, "In Guatemala, the Army's Retreat May be Good
Politics," New York Times, August 11, 1985.

139. Clifford Krauss, "Guatemala Will Elect A Civilian, but Will He
Control the Military?" Wall Street Journal, October 30, 1985.

140. Piero Gleijeses, "The Guatemalan Silence, New Republic, ]une 10,
1985.

141. All Things Considered, National Public Radio, June 25, 1986.

142. AGN (Guatemala News Agency [Managua]) January 18, 1985; not
exactly the kind of speech Solarz, a liberal by reputation, would be making in
his own Brooklyn district.

143. Heard extensively on RTF (Radio France International) and Spanish
radio stations during the week of October 14, 1986.

1 44. Guatemala City Cadena de Emisoras Unidas, 0050 GMT, September
19, 1986 in FBIS Latin America, September 19, 1986, p. P-8. Following the
restoration of relations with Britain in late 1986, Guatemala expected to receive
aid from the EC itself.

145. Letter to the Editor from Ramiro Gereda Asturias, Jerusalem Post,
July 24, 1986. In his letter, a reply to a statement by the prime minister of
Belize, Geredo insisted that Guatemala "does not buy defensive weapons"
from Israel "because it produces its own."

146. Dial Torgerson, "Tactics Shifting to AU-Out War in Guatemala,"
Los Angeles Times, January 25, 1982.

147. Stephen Kinzer, "Guatemala Chief Confronts Crisis," New York
Times, April 13, 1985; Guatemala City Cadena de Emisoras Unidas, 2350

Footnotes to pages 128-130 243

GMT, June 6, 1985, in FBIS Latin America, June 10, 1985, p. P-10.

148. ITIM (Tel Aviv) 1818 GMT, June 15, 1982 in FBIS Middle East
and Africa, June 16, 1982, p. 1-21.

149. Black, "Israeli Connection."

150. Joel Millman, "Waist Deep" (Book review) Present Tense, Spring
1985.

151. Perera, "The Lost Tribes of Guatemala."

152. Central America Report, December 2, 1983.

153. Dan Rather, CBS Evening News, February 16, 1983, in Bahbah,
Israel and Latin America, p. 163.

154. Gil Kesary, "Pesakh Ben-Or: Business in Darkness," Ma'ariv,
December 13, 1985, translated by Dr. Israel Shahak, Collection: More about
Israeli weapons trade, and the way it influences Israeli politics.

155. Gardner, "How Israelis act as surrogates for U.S. in Central
America."

156. Juan Tamayo, "Want to buy a fully trained SWAT team.'" Miami
Herald, September 4, 1986; Simon Louisson, "How to build a bodyguard
empire," Jerusalem Post, January 23, 1987.

157. "Foreign Policy Put to the Test," Guatemala! (Publication of
Guatemala News and Information Bureau, P.O. Box 28594, Oakland, CA.
94604), September-October 1986.

158. Author's sources; David Ferreira, "Guatemala: Unholy Allies";
Rudel, "Pacification Violente au Guatemala."

159. "Foreign Policy Put to the Test."

160. Cerigua and Enfoprensa, El Dia, August 8, 1986.

161. Ignacio Klich, "Caribbean boomerang returns to sender," (London)
Guardian, August 27, 1982.

162. Kesary, "Pesakh Ben-Or: Business in Darkness"; Juan O. Tamayo,
"Dealers: Israel sent rebels arms," Miami Herald, December 1, 1986.

163. "Israel and Central America," Latin America Regional Report Mexico
and Central America, February 14, 1986.

164. Kesary, "Pesakh Ben-Or: Business in Darkness."
\65.Ibid.

166. Ibid.

167. Perera, "The Lost Tribes of Guatemala"; Teodoro Ducach,
"America Latina, mercado Fundamental Para las Armas Israelis," Excelsior,
May 8, 1986.

168. Enfopresna April 19, 1985.

169. "Early friends take distance," Latin America Newsletters, Special
Report, November 1 985; Israel seems to be firmly convinced that in the field of
diplomacy, at least its pariah variety, examples generate momentum which
generates results.

170. "Cardamom Exports Will Resume, This Week in Central America and
Panama, September 1 5, 1 980. However, Dr. Israel Shahak says he has otserved
an active Guatemalan diplomatic office in Jerusalem.

171. Kesary, "Pesakh Ben-Or: Business in Darkness."

244 Footnotes to pages 130-132

172. Ducach, "America Latina, Mercado Fundamental Para las Armas
Israelies."

173. Kesary, "Pesakh Ben-Or: Business in Darkness."

1 74. Stephen Kinzer, "Guatemalan Voters Will Get a Clear Choice," New
York Times, December 1, 1985.

175. Perera, "The Lost Tribes of Guatemala."

1 76. Margaret Hooks, "Guatemala's new president is ready for challenge,"
Miami Herald, January 16, 1986.

177. "Israel and Central America."

178. Ducach, "America Latina, mercado Fundamental Para las Armas
Israelies."

179. Guatemala City Radio-Television Guatemala, 0400 GMT, May 6,
1986 in FBIS Latin America, May 7, 1986, p. P-2; Juan O. Tamayo, "Israel
won't assist contras, Shamir says after Latin tour," Miami Herald, May 10,
1986.

180. Kami, "The Israel-Guatemala Connection."

181. AC AN, 0011 GMT, February 19, 1986 in FBIS Latin America,
February 20, 1986, p. P-5.

1 82. "Israel increases its presence," Latin America Regional Reports Mexico
& Central America, Jmmty 10, 1986.

183. Stephen Kinzer, "Guatemala Gets Help in Rebuilding Its Police,"
New York Times, May 18, 1986.

184. Jerusalem Post, July 17, 1986.

1 85. Milton Jamail, "Links with Belize," Israeli Foreign Affairs, July 1985.

186. Jerusalem Domestic Service, 1400 GMT, July 9, 1986 in FBIS
Middle East & Africa, July 10, 1986, p. I-IO.

187. El Grafico, (Guatemala City), July 25, 1986 in FBIS Latin America.

188. ACAN (Panama City), 2200 GMT, July 31, 1986 in FBIS Latin
America.

189. Guatemala City Cadena de Emisoras Unidas, 0050 GMT, July 10,
1986 in FBIS Latin America.

190. El Graphico, (Guatemala City) May 7, 1986 in FBIS Latin America,
May 12, 1986, p. P-9.

191 . Tamayo, "Israel won't assist contras, Shamir says after Latin tour."

192. "Demandan los trabajadores municipales de Guatemala, la renuncia
del alcalde," Cerigua and IPS, El Dia, April 6, 1986; Central America Report,
February 21, 1986 and report the same day from SI AG.

193. John M. Goshko, "Controversy Looms Over Bid to Aid Guate-
mala," Washington Post, March 11, 1979.

194. James LeMoyne, "Guatemala Fights Its Bad-Guy Image, New York
Times, December 25, 1984.

1 95. Latin America Regional Report, Mexico and Centra! America, May 4,
1984.

1 96. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, Anchor Books,
Garden City, NY, 1983, provides an account of the destruction of Guatemala
in the interest of "anti-communism" and the United Fruit Company.

Footnotes to pages 133-139 245

197. Black et. ai, Garrison Guatemala, pp. 21-24.

198. Nairn and Simon, "Bureaucracy of Death."

199. Alexander Cockburn, "Sharing Responsibility for Guatemalan
horrors," Wall Street Journal, February 24, 1983. He adds that "investors have
hastened to take advantage of tax incentives, a cowed and ill-paid work force
and plans for military reorganization of the entire fabric of the countryside."

Nicaragua Under Somoza

1. Slater, The Pledge, pp. 257-259

2. Anastasio Somoza Debayle, Nicaragua Betrayed, Western Islands,
Belmont MA 1980, p. 12. (The publisher ofthis autobiography is a John Birch
Society subsidiary.)

3. Ibid., p. 1 73. Kaufman et. al., Israel-Latin American Relations, pp. 118,

204.

4. Kaufman et. al, Israel-Latin American Relations, pp. 107-205.

5. Alan Riding, "Nicaragua Trie.<; Economic Cure," New York Times,
November 27, 1979. "Nicaraguan Debt Obligations Emerge as a Key Pointer
of Junta Policy Direction," Business Latin America, October 10, 1979.

6. SIPRI Yearbook 1980, p. 96. The remaining two percent came from
Argentina and a private dealer in Miami.

1 .Jerusalem Post, February 8, 1974 in Kaufman al. Israel-Latin American
Relations, p. 108.

8. Chart derived from Jane's Fighting Ships, SIPRI Yearbooks, The Military
Balance, Strategy Week, in Ignacio Klich, "Israel arms the Dictators," Middle
East International, December 23, 1982.

9. William R. Long, "Somoza Still Has the Firepower; Can Mass Uprising
Topple Him?" Miami Herald, September 1 7, 1978.

10. "Israeli-Made Weapons Helped Save the Somoza Dynasty," London
Observer Service, Miami Herald, October 18, 1978.

11. Davar, November 13 1979 in Israel Shahak, Israel's Global Role:
Weapons for Repression, Association of Arab- American University Graduates,
Belmont, MA 1982, p. 17.

12. Citing an OAS report of November 1978, James Nelson Goodsell,
"OAS raps Nicaraguan ruler," Christian Science Monitor, November 20, 1 978.

13. Davar, November 14, 1979 in Shahak, Israel's Global Role, p. 17.

14. Robert B. CuUen, "U.S. Won't Attempt to Prevent Israeli Arms Sales
to Somoza," AP, Miami Herald, November 18, 1978.

15. "Nicaragua: Somoza's Guernica," Latin America Political Report, June
29, 1979.

16. Somoza, Nicaragua Betrayed, p. 260.

17. "Nicaragua: destruction with honour," Latin America Political Report,

246 Footnotes to pages 139-146

July 6, 1979.

18. Alan Riding, "Reporters Notebook: Somoza Fighting On as Aides
Panic," New York Times, June 28, 1979.

19. Alan Riding, "Nicaragua After Somoza," New York Times, February
3, 1980.

20. "Israel Agrees to Suspend Nicaraguan Arms Deliveries," Washington
Post, July I, \979.

21. Somoza, Nicaragua Betrayed, p. 239-240.

22. "Begin Peace Prize Called 'Tainted,"' Miami Herald, November 13,
1978.

23. Alan Riding, "Both Sides Prepare for Bloodletting in Nicaragua,"
New York Times, November 19, 1978.

24. Cullen, "U.S. Won't Attempt to Prevent Israeli Arms Sales to
Somoza".

25. "Israel Agrees to Suspend Nicaraguan Arms Deliveries."

26. James Bock, "Israel's role in Central America quiet, longstanding,"
Baltimore Sun, December 5, 1986.

27. Alan Riding, "Nicaragua Tries Economic Cure."

28. Jean-Pierre Langellier, "Israel au sud du rio Grande," Le Monde,
Weekly International Edition, week ending December 7, 1986.

29. Jerusalem Domestic Service, 0900 GMT, August 6, 1982 in FBIS
Middle East and Africa, August 6, 1982, p. 1-9.

Israel & the Contras

1. "Israel-Contras Link Goes Back Years, According to Israeli," AP, San
Francisco Chronicle, December 5, 1986.

2. Jerry Meldon, "The Contra Connection May Go Back As Far As
1979," Boston Globe, November 30, 1986. This article is based on sources of
Daniel Sheehan of the Christie Institute, which filed a racketeering suit against a
number of network operatives and U.S. officials after two journalists were
injured in the attempted assassination of Eden Pastora in 1984. EATSCO was
the Egyptian American Transport Services Company.

3. Ben Bradlee, Jr., "Ex-agent says U.S. shielded 4 tied to contras," Boston
GMf, January 25, 1987.

4. Meldon, "The Contra Connection May Go Back As Far As 1979."

5. Christopher Dickey, With the Contras, Simon & Shuster, NY, 1 985, pp.
112,119,123-4,145-6,155-6.

6. Testimony of Hector Francis, a defecting Argentine contra trainer, to
Latin American Federation of Journalists, Mexico City, published in Barricada,
(Managua) December 2, 1982, translated by Carmen Alegria in Black Scholar,
March- April, 1982.

7. Dickey, With the Contras, op. cit.

Footnotes to pages 146-148 247

8. Ha'aretz, December 5, 1 986 in FBIS Middle East & Africa, December 5,
1986, p. 1-4. This story cites Foreign Report, which it does not further identify
but might be the report by that name produced by the intelligence unit of the
Economist. The story also details an earlier attempt by Iran, under Israeli
pressure, to bomb the Osirak reactor.

9. Jerusalem Domestic Service, 0900 GMT, August 6, 1982 in FBIS
Middle East and Africa, August 6, 1982, p. 1-9.

10. Stephen Engelberg, "Official Says Contacts by Israelis on Arming of
the Contras Date from '82," New York Times, February 8, 1987. Israel
captured a great stock of arms in Lebanon in 1982. However intelligence
sources say that since it captured East bloc arms in its 1967 war, Israel has been
trading in them and is perhaps the second biggest trader in these wares, after the
USSR.

11. Newsweek December 6, 1986. "America's Secret Warriors," Ibid.,
October 10, 1983.

12. Jeff McConnell, "How Israel came to deal with the contras," Boston
Sunday Globe, January 18, 1987.

13. "Israeli arms sales in Latin America," Le Monde (in Manchester
Guardian) 5/6/84; Philip Taubman, "Israel Said to Aid Latin Aims of U.S.,"
New York Times,]u\y 2\, 1983.

14. Edy Kaufman, "The View from Jerusalem," Washington Quarterly,
Fall, 1984.

15. Jacques Lemieux, "Le role d'Israel en Amerique centrale," Le Monde
Diplomatique, October 1984.

1 6. Washington Post, December 7, 1 982; Ignacio Klich, "Israel et L' Ameri-
que Latine," Ibid., February 1983.

17. Latin America Weekly Report, December 17, 1982.

18. SIPRI Yearbook 1984, p. 238.

19. Danny Goodgame, "Israel Asks U.S. to Finance Sales to Latin
America, Miami Herald, December 13, 1982.

20. Ibid.; U.S. Assistance to the State of Israel, pp. 43-45.

2 1 . M. Torres, "La Influencia de Estados Unidos en la formulacion de la
Politica Exterior de Honduras," Boletin Informativo Honduras, Centro de
Documentacion de Honduras, Tegucigalpa, March 16, 1985.

22. Undelivered speech by Sharon, published in Ma'ariv, December 18,
1981, transl. in Journal of Palestine Studies, No. 43, Spring 1982.

23. Gid'on Samet, "Superman Must Take it Easy," Ha'aretz, December 3,
1986, in FBIS Middle East & Africa, pp. 1-3-4.

24. Charles R. Babcock, "U.S. -Israeli Ties Stronger Than Ever,"
Washington Post, August 5, 1986.

25. Report of the President's Special Review Board (Tower Commission
Report), February 26, 1987, p. C-9.

26. Der Spiegel, July 26, 1983 in Jesus Guevara Morin/Notimex, "Israel
es el principal proveedor de armas a los contrarrevolucionarios nicaraguenses,"
unomasuno, April 23, 1984.

27. "An Israeli Connection?" Time, May 7, 1984.

28. "Eden Pastora Unmasked as Longtime U.S. Agent," Counterspy

248 Footnotes to pages 149-150

Sept. -Nov. 1983. According to Hector Francis (see above), Pastora had served
as an informer for the U.S. as early as 1 979, "because he was finding out that he
was not going to have the degree of power that he thought he should have
within the revolution."

29. Caitlin Randall, "Two U.S. journalists are cleared of libeling rancher
in Costa Rica," Miami Herald, May 25, 1986; Jay Ducassi and Christina
Cheakalos, "Journalists suit claims ring tried to kill contra," Ibid., May 30,
1986; Mark Prendergast, "Pro-Contras linked to plot to assassinate Pastora,
envoy," Fort Lauderdale News and Sun-Sentinel, in San Antonio Light, May 22,
1986. After further CIA pressure, Pastora retired in May 1986.

30. "The Most Dangerous Game," Time, October 17, 1983.

31. Joel Brinkley, "Costa Rican Aides Are Said to Take Rebel Bribes,"
New York Times, April 23, 1984.

32. Prendergast, "Pro-Contras linked to plot to assassinate Pastora,
envoy." Martha Honey and Tony Avirgan, La Penca, San Jose, Costa Rica,
draft copy, 1 984, p. 72; later there would be an airstrip, drug dealing and a plot
to assassinate the U.S. ambassador.

3 3 . Juan O. Tamayo, "Mysterious donations boost Pastora's numbers and
goals," Miami Herald, September 9, 1983.

34. Sunday Times (London) August 30, 1983, in Guevara, "Israel es el
principal proveedor de armas a los contrarrevolu-cionarios nicaraguenses."

35. Author's source.

36. Panama City ACAN (dateline, San Jose), 0045 GMT, April 24, 1 984
in FBIS Latin America, April 25, 1984, p. P-12.

37. Sonia Vargas L., Alfonso Robelo, "Pastora debe aceptar union de
ARDE y FDN," La Nacion Internacional, (San Jose, Costa Rica) June 7-13,
1984.

38. Madrid EFE, 022 GMT, September 25, 1 984 in FBIS Latin America,
September 27, 1984, p. P- 15.

39. "Noriega ordeno el asesinato," Rumbo Centroamericano, (San Jose,
Costa Rica) September 26-October 2, 1985.

40. Newsweek, ("Periscope" section) June 30, 1986; see also "General
Noriega of Panama," Israeli Foreign Affairs, September 1986. The Panamanian
military had President Ardito Barletta, Devalle's predecessor, resign to forestall
and investigation into the murder of Spadafora, which many believe would
have implicated the military.

41. Jeff McConnell, "How Israel came to deal with the contras," Boston
Sunday Globe, January 18, 1987.

42. Bob Woodward, "CIA Sought 3rd-Country Contra Aid," Washington
Post, May 19, 1984.

43. Philip Taubman, "Nicaragua Rebels Reported to Have New Flow of
Arms," New York 7"iw?«, January 13, 1985.

44. Chris Maupin, report and report in Nuevo Diario, (Managua) April 1 ,
1985.

45. Chris Maupin, interviews in Nicaragua, March and April 1985.

46. All Things Considered, April 23, 1985.

Footnotes to pages 151-153 249

47. Maupin, eyewitness report.

48. Stephen Engelberg, "Official Says Contacts by Israelis on Arming of
the Contras Date from '82"; Congressional investigators "suspected" the
"basic outline" of Terrell's account "to be accurate."

49. Chris Hedges, "Contra visit to Israel disclosed," Dallas Morning News,
December 10, 1986.

50. Tom Jelton report from Miami, All Things Considered, National Public
Radio, December 6, 1 986; Jerusalem Domestic Service, 1 700 GMT, February
2, 1987, FBIS Middle East and Africa, February 3, 1987, p. 1-3.

5 1 . Chris Hedges, "Contra visit to Israel disclosed," Dallas Morning News,
December 10, 1986.

52. Jerusalem Domestic Service, 1700 GMT, February 2, 1987, FBIS
Middle East and Africa, February 3, 1987, p. 1-3; the Israeli press has
consistently referred to Montealegre as Montenegro.

53. Newsweek, December 15, 1986.

54. Newsday, Jinuziy 18, 1987 cited in Jack Colhoun, "Congress deflects
gaze from contra side of scandal," Guardian, February 4, 1987.

55. Newsweek, December 15, 1986.

56. Ignacio Klich, "Israel and the Contras," Middle East International, April
3,1987.

57. Stephen Engelberg, "Official Says Contacts by Israelis on Arming of
the Contras Date from '82."

58. Report on Preliminary Inquiry, p. 50.

59. Juan O. Tamayo, "Dealers: Israel sent rebels arms," Miami Herald,
December 1, 1986.

60. Glen Frankel, "Israeli Economy Depends on No-Questions-Asked
Arms Sales," Washington Post, December 12, 1986.

61. Tamayo, "Dealers: Israel sent rebels arms."

62. Gil Qeysari and Yosef Walter, "Arms Traced Through Honduras to
Contras," Ma'ariv, November 27, 1986 in FBIS Middle East & Africa,
December 1, 1986, p. 1-7. The original Ma'ariv article (Gil Kesary, "Pesakh
Ben-Or— Business in Darkness," December 13, 1985, translated by Israel
Shahak in Collection: More about Israeli weapons trade, and the way it influences
Israeli politics,) which this one updates focused primarily on Ben Or's activities
in Guatemala. In a telephone conversation Col. Perez confirmed the documents
and verified his signature — one of undoubtedly many instances where Hon-
duran officers acted as forwarding agents for the contras.

63. Frankel, "Israeli Economy Depends on No-Questions- Asked Arms
Sales."

64. Jack Colhoun, "Contra Weapons Conduit Goes through Tel Aviv,"
Guardian, April 16, 1986.

65. Joel Brinkley, "White House Aid to Nicaraguan Rebels Reportedly
Worried CIA," New York Times, August 10, 1985.

66. Ignacio Klich, "Pro the Contras," Guardian, October 11, 1985.

67. Jack Colhoun, "Contra Weapons Conduit Goes through Tel Aviv,"
Guardian, April 16, 1986.

68. A report in Defense and Foreign Affairs "suggests that Ben Or may have

250 Footnotes to pages 153-155

supplied the Soviet SAM-7 missiles." (Cited in "Israel and Central America,"
Latin America Regional Report Mexico and Central America, February 14, 1986).

69. Contra sources said that when they had trouble operating the SAM-7s
Gen. Singlaub arranged for a technician to fix them and train the contras to
maintain them. Singlaub acknowledged the story but "refused to identify the
technician or his nationality, saying, 'It would put too many people in
jeopardy."' Doyle McManus, "Contras Say They Bought Missile From Soviet
Bloc," Los Angeles Times, December 7, 1985.

70. Kesary, "Pesakh Ben-Or — Business in Darkness," Gil Qeysari and
Yosef Walter, "Arms Traced Through Honduras to Contras," Ma'ariv,
November 27, 1986 in FBIS Middle East & Africa, December 1, 1986, p. 1-7;
Jack Colhoun, "Contra Weapons Conduit Goes through Tel Aviv," Guardian,
April 16, 1986.

71. Kesary, "Pesakh Ben-Or — Business in Darkness."

72. Qeysari and Walter, "Arms Traced Through Honduras to Contras."

73. Author's source.

74. "Israel security firm denies aiding Contras," Jerusalem Post, January 1 9,
1987.

75. Klich, "Israel and the Contras."

76. "Israel security firm denies aiding Contras."

77. Frankel, "Israeli Economy Depends on No-Questions- Asked Arms
Sales."

78. Klich, "Israel and the Contras."

79. James Rowen, "Rebels got weapons through theft and third-party
deals," Milwaukee Journal, January 19, 1987.

80. Ibid.

81. Ma '«n'i;, February 1, 1987 in FBIS Middle East & Africa, February 2,
1987, p. 1-2.

82. IDF Radio, 1405 GMT, February 1, 1987, in FBIS Middle East and
Africa, February 2, 1987, pp. 1-2-3.

83. "De nouveaux conseillers israeliens en Amerique centrale," Afrique-
Asie, April 25, 1983.

84. Quoting Washington intelligence sources, ANN, ANSA, AP and
FEE, "Apoyo de Israel, Brasil y Venezuela a somocistas," unomasuno, (Mexico
City) July 1, 1983. These sources also spoke of support from Brazil and
Venezuela.

85. Davar, cited by Latin America Regional Reports Mexico and Central
America, March 23, 1984.

86. Simon Louisson, "How to build a bodyguard empire," Jerusalem Post,
January 23, 1987.

87. Davar, cited by Klich, "Pro the Contras."

88. Juan O. Tamayo, "Want to buy a fully trained SWAT team?" Miami
Herald, September 4, 1986.

89. Ibid.

90. Louisson, "How to build a bodyguard empire."

Footnotes to pages 156-159 251

91. Tamayo, "Want to buy a fully trained SWAT team.'"

92. Louisson, "How to build a bodyguard empire."

93. Tamayo, "Want to buy a fully trained SWAT team?"

94. Lev Bearfield, "Masters of All they survey," Jerusalem Post Magazine,
December 19, 1986.

95. William E. Geist, "About New York— A boutique for All Your
Anti-Terrorist Needs," New York riw«, January 1, 1987.

96. Dan Fisher, "Stung by Criticism, Israel Reviews its Arms Industry,"
Los Angeles Times, September 18, 1986.

97. Jane Hunter, "The Great Iran Arms Sale Plot," Israeli Foreign Affairs,
June 1986.

98. Asher Wallfish, "Scandals prompt change in permits to sell weaponry,"
Jerusalem Post, October 29, 1986.

99. Tel Aviv IDF Radio, 0600 GMT, December 10, 1986 in FBIS Latin
America, December 10, 1986, p. P-16.

100. Michael Preker, "Anonymous Israeli tells of dealings with contras,"
Dallas Morning News, December 7, 1986.

101. Ha'aretz cited in "Israeli contra training reported," Christian Science
Monitor, janmiy 13, 1987.

102. Woodward, "CIA Sought 3rd-Country Contra Aid."

103. "Backdoor Help for Contras, Replaces Congress-Voted Aid," This
Week Central America and Panama, September 17, 1984. Philip Taubman,
"Nicaragua Victims Tied to Recruiting," New York Times, September 4, 1 984.
These figures were estimates by FDN leaders, "government officials" and
"White House sources." Other givers were big U.S. corporations and the
governments of Guatemala, Venezuela, Taiwan, Honduras, El Salvador and
Argentina.

104. Alfonso Chardy, "Private Aid Fuels Contras in Nicaragua," Miami
Herald, September 9, 1984.

105. AP, Washington Post, September 15, 1985; Bird & Holland, "Dis-
patches," The Nation, September 28, 1985.

106. Ellen Ray and William Schaap, "The Modern Mithridates: Vernon
Walters: Crypto-diplomat and Terrorist," CovertAction Information Bulletin,
Number 26, Summer 1986. Walters has played a leading role in a number of the
worst episodes of U.S. intervention: Iran, Brazil, Guatemala, Chile, Argentina
as well as meddling in North and Southern Africa.

1 07. Alfonso Chardy, "How U.S. used network to fund contras," San Jose
Mercury News, October 28, 1986.

108. "Probes Encompass Roles of Casey and CIA," Washington Post,
November 28, 1986.

109. Chardy, "How U.S. used network to fund contras."

110. Jack Colhoun, "Congress of cowards," Guardian, (NY) October 2,
1985.

111. Frank Greve, "Israel reported set to pick up U.S. role with Latins,"
Philadelphia Inquirer, May 31, 1984.

252 Footnotes to pages 159-162

112. "Dine on 'Revolutionary Era,'" Near East Report (publication of
AlPAC, Israel's registered lobby), April 14, 1986.

113. Haaretz, May 20, 1 982 in FBIS Middle East & Africa, May 21,1982,
p. 1-1.

114. U.S. Assistance to the State of Israel, p. 38; David Landau "Israel
Gaining Closer Ties with African States," /^rttM/mFMZ, December 4, 1981 in
Shahak, Israel's Global Role, pp. 46-47; (Sharon said the the U.S. would pay
interest fo&delaying the implementation of the MOU Ha'aretz, May 20, 1982
in FBIS Middle East & Africa, May 21, 1982, p. I-l).

1 1 5. Philip Taubman, "Israel Said to Aid Latin Aims of U.S.," New York
Times, July 21, 1983; "Where the United States Needs Israel," Ha'aretz,
November 11, 1983 in Israel Mirror (no date).

116. "Israel and Central America," Latin America Regional Report Mexico
and Central America, February 14, 1986.

1 1 7. Philip Taubman, "Israel Said to Aid Latin Aims of U.S.," New York
Times, ]u\y2\, 1983.

118. Richard B. Straus, "Israel's New Super-Lobby In Washington:
Reagan and Co.," Washington Post (opinion piece), April 27, 1986, speaks of
the open hostility to Arabs in Congress; the theme that Washington should not
"cater" to Arab governments is echoed frequently by AIPAC and was the
rationale of recent congressional action to block arms sales to Arab states by
conditioning those sales on the willingness of Jordan or Saudi Arabia to
unilaterally negotiate (i.e. abandon demands for a solution to the Palestinian
issue) with Israel.

119. Charles R. Babcock, "U.S. -Israeli Ties Stronger Than Ever,"
Washington Post, August 5, 1986.

120. Interview in Hatzofe, December 16, 1983 in FBIS Middle East &
Africa, December 19, 1983, p. I-l.

121. Ma'ariv, April 10, 1984 in FBIS, Middle East and Africa, April 10,
1984, p. 1-2. The UN condemned it.

122. Yediot Aharonot, December 4, 1983, FBIS Middle East & Africa,
December 6, 1983, p. 1-5.

123. James McCartney, "New Reagan policy stresses Israel, firepower,"
San Francisco Sunday Examiner & Chronicle, December 4, 1983.

124. Chardy, "How U.S. used network to fund contras."

125. Richard B. Straus, "Kimche: The Missing Link Between Iran and the
Contras.'" Los Angeles Times, January 1 1, 1987.

126. "Where the United States Needs Israel."

127. Straus, "Kimche: The Missing Link Between Iran and the Contras.'"

128. "Money Laundering Request," New York Times, November 26,
1986.

129. David K. Shipler, "Israel Was Reportedly Given Differing Signals by
U.S. on Iran Arms Sales," Ibid., November 27, 1986.

130. Chardy, "How U.S. used network to fund contras."

131. Ha'aretz, presumably another fragment of the April 4 report, cited in
"Israeli Latin Role is Denied by U.S," AP, New York Times, April 22, 1984.

Footnotes to pages 163-165 253

132. Ha'aretz, April 4, 1984, excerpt transl. in Israleft No. 244, May 4,
1984; other parts of article cited in Latin America Weekly Report, May 4, 1984.

133. Wolf Blitzer, "U.S. wants Israeli aid in Central America," Jerusalem
Post, April 22, 1984.

134. "Israeli Reports Policy is Not to Aid Sandinista Foes," New York
Times, April 28, 1984.

135. Bob Woodward, "Steps Toward a Disengagement in Nicaragua Are
Recommended," Washington Post, April 13, 1984.

1 36. Bob Woodward, "CIA South 3rd-Country Contra Aid," Ibid., May
19, 1984.

137. "Biggest Nicaraguan Rebel Group Wants Aid from Israel," Los
Angeles Times, (in San Francisco Chronicle April 16, 1984).

138. Pastora Interviewed on Voice of Sandino (clandestine to Nicaragua)
2300 GMT, April 16, 1984 in FBIS Latin America, April 17, 1984, pp.
P-20-21.

139. Amir Oren, "Nicaraguan Rebel Representative Calls for Aid,"
Davar, April 27,1984 [excerpt] in FBIS Middle East & Africa, April 27,1984,
pp. 1-4-5 (and repressive governments were being helped by Israel).

140. Fred Francis, NBC Nightly News, 5:30 p.m. (PDT), April 23,
1 984. Transcript courtesy of November 29th Committee for Palestine, (P.O.
Box 27462, San Francisco, CA 94127).

141. Jerusalem Domestic Service in English, 1 800 GMT, April 25, 1 984
in FBIS Middle East & Africa, April 26, 1984, p. 1-5.

142. "Israeli Latin Role is Denied by U.S," AP, New York Times, April
22, 1984.

143. Oswald Johnston, "Israel Denies That It's Aiding Nicaragua
Rebels," Los Angeles Times, April 28, 1984.

144. Edy Kaufman, "The View From Jerusalem," Washington Quarterly,
Fall 1984.

145. David K. Shipler, "Israel and the U.S. Stay On Speaking Terms,"
New York Times, December 29, 1985.

146. John M. Goshko, "Israel Denjes Arming Nicaraguan Contras,"
Washington Post, April 28, 1984.

147. Kathryn Ferguson report on AlUThings Considered, National Public
Radio, April 27, 1984.

148. John M. Goshko, "U.S., Israel Discuss Increasing Aid to Third
World Countries," Washington Post, April 27, 1984.

149. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, (99th Congress), Report on
Preliminary Inquiry , Washington, DC, January 29, 1986, p. 53 md passim, notes
the testimony of a CIA analyst who believed that some of the profits reaped
from arms sales to Iran had been used for "other projects of the U.S. and Israel."

150. The Report on Preliminary Inquiry, speaks of Nir as the culprit.
Kimche was mentioned first, in earlier reports, e.g. New York Times, December
30, 1986.

151. Christopher Thomas, "Secret evidence suggests Peres originated
Contra cash scheme," Times (London), January 12, 1987.

254 Footnotes to pages 166-168

152. Lally Weymouth, "Khashoggi Speaks," Washington Post, February
1, 1987.

1 53. Davar, May 3, 1 984, in FBIS Middle East & Africa, May 4, 1 984, pp.
I 6-7.

154. SIPRI yearbook 1984, p. 526; Frank Greve, "Israel Reported Set to
Pick Up U.S. Role with Latins," Philadelphia Inquirer, May 31, 1984.

155. Milavnews, ]u\y 1977.

156. Juan Tamayo, "Honduran Forces Too Sparse to Risk War with
Nicaragua," Miami Herald, May 13, 1983.

157. Edward Cody, "Sharon to Discuss Arms Sales in Honduras,"
Washington Post, December 7, 1982.

158. John Yemma, "Israel Guns for Worldwide Arms Market," Christian
Science Monitor, December 27, 1982.

159. Susan Morgan, "Israel selling fighter jets, tanks to Honduras.'" Ibid.,
December 14, 1982; "Alvarez looks for Israeli arms," Latin America Weekly
Report, December 17, 1982; Juan Tamayo, "Honduras seeks to buy weapons
from Israelis," Miami Herald, December 9, 1982.

160. Klich, "Pro the Contras."

161. ACAN-EFE (Panama City— dateline Tegucigalpa), 1925 GMT,
June 21, 1984, in FBIS Latin America, June 22, 1984.

162. This was known as early as 1 985 (Kesary, "Pesakh Ben-Or Business
in Darkness"), and confirmed again on CBS Sixty Minutes February 22, 1987.

163. Jerusalem Post, October 23, 1986 and other sources in Israeli Foreign
Affairs, November 1986 and December 1986.

1 64. Honey and Avirgan, La Penca.

165. Latin America Regional Reports, Mexico and Central America, October
29,1982; Ignacio Klich, "Israel et F Amerique Latine, Le pari d'un engagement
accru aux cotes de Washington," Le Monde Diplomatique, February 1983.

166. "Monge Whistles in the Dark," Latin America Regional Report,
Central America and Mexico, July 7, 1982; Ha'aretz, November 11, 1982,
translated in Israeli Mirror (London).

167. Ignacio Klich, "Israel et L' Amerique Latine."

168. Martha Honey, "Costa Rica Declares Its Neutrality," The Times
(London), September 19, 1983.

1 69. Yoav Karny, "Door is Open for Military Aid to Costa Rica," Yediot
Aharonot, October25, 182, in FBIS Middle East and Africa, October 2 7, 1982.

1 70. Jerusalem Post, January 9, 1 983.

171. David Landau, "Israel to Help Costa Rica's Economy," Jerusalem Post,
October 20, 1982; Karny, "Door is Open for Military Aid to Costa Rica."

172. Jacques Lemiuex, "Le role d'Israel en Amerique Centrale," Le Monde
Diplomatique, October 1984; Miami Herald, September 13, 1983.

173. Diario La Hora (Guatemala), March 19, 1985 in Inforpress Centro-
americana, March 28, 1985. Along with the U.S. and West Germany, Israel
helped train the right-wing paramilitary OPEN; Leslie Gelb, "Israel Said to
Step Up Latin Role, Offering Arms Seized in Lebanon," New York Times,
December 17, l982;ElDia, May 15, 1986, mnshtedin Israeli Foreign Affairs,

Footnotes to pages 168-171 255

June 1986.

1 74. San Jose Radio Reloj, 1 330 GMT, December 4, 1 983, in FBIS Latin
America, December 5, 1985.

1 75. Diario La Hora, op. cit.

176. Ha'aretz, November 1, 1982, transl. in Israeli Mirror; Defense Latin
America, August 1983 and Pittsburgh Press, March 1, 1983 in Counterspy,
September-November 1983; Libertad, (San Jose) May 4-10, 1984 in FBIS
Latin America, May 22, 1984; Dial Torgerson, "Frontier Area No Longer
Neglected," LM^«gf/«Tiw«, May 23, 1 983 ;Jack Anderson, "U.S. and Israel
Aim for Pinch on Nicaragua," Washington Post, February 14, 1983; "Costa
Rica Recibe Donacion Millonaria de Estados Unidos.' A Cambio de Que?"
Inforpress Centroamericana, April 11, 1985.

A Classic Case of Disinformation

1 . Everybody, save a few lonely voices, notably Rep. Ronald Dellums and
other members of the Congressional Black Caucus, concurred, however, on
Libya, which the administration bombed in April 1986. But Israel had also been
designating Libya as an enemy for months.

2. "Where the United States Needs Israel."

3. Taubman, "Israel Said to Aid Latin Aims of U.S."

4. Jeff McConnell, "How Israel came to deal with the contras," Boston
G/oZ-^, January 18, 1987.

5. Latin America Regional Report, Mexico and Central America, May 4, 1984.

6. Taubman, "Israel Said to Aid Latin Aims of U.S."

7. Dan Sudran and Robert Rubin, "In defense of Nicaragua — anti-
Semitism is not evident," Northern California Jewish Bulletin, August 2, 1985.

8. Joseph Berger, "Nicaragua's Jews: Wide Disagreement on Status," New
York Times, April 20, 1986.

9. Edward Cody, "Managua's Jews Reject Anti-Semitism Charge,"
Washington Post, August 29, 1983.

10. Comision Nacional de Promocion y Proteccion de los Derechos
Humanos , Resultados de una investigacion que la comision nacional. . . hizo en relacion a
un comunicado de la "Anti Defamation League (ADL) of B'Nai B'rith" sobre una
supuesta persecucion a la comunidad judia en Nicaragua," Managua, 1983, p. 5.

1 1 . Franz Schneiderman, Bending Swords into Plowshares: An Investigation
of the Tensions between Israel and Nicaragua, special report by the Council on
Hemispheric Affairs, Washington DC, November 26, 1985.

12. Ibid

13. Dan Sudran and Robert Rubin, "In defense of Nicaragua— anti-
Semitism is not evident," Northern California Jewish Bulletin, August 2, 1985.

14. Walter Ruby, "NJA Mission Meets with Nicaraguans," Genesis 2
September/October 1984.

256 Footnotes to pages 171-173

15. Robert Weisbrot, "Dateline Managua: Anti-Semitism or Anti-
climax?" Moment, October 1984.

16. Brickner, "Demythologizing Nicaragua," Christian Century, October
10, 1984.

1 7. Saul Sorrin, "Report from Nicaragua," Reform Judaism, Summer 1 984.

18. Latin America Regional Report, Mexico and Central America, May 4,
1984.

19. Weisbrot, "Dateline Managua: Anti-Semitism or Anti-climax.'"

20. Schneiderman, Bending Swords Into Plowshares..."

21. Robert Weisbrot, "Dateline Managua: Anti-Semitism or Anti-
climax.'" Moment, October 1984.

22. Edward Cody, "Managua's Jews Reject Anti-Semitism Charge,"
Washington Post, August 29, 1983.

23. "De Antisemitismo Accusa Moussali a Nicaragua," Excelsior, June 8,
1983.

24. Author's interviews.

25. Resultados de una investigacion que la comision nacioml...hizo, p. 5.

26. George Black, "Taking Note," Nacla Report on the Americas, June
1986.

27. Cited from Washington Post, January 27, 1985, "U.S. Jews against
Contras," Jewish Currents, June 1986.

28. Nadine Joseph, "3 dispute charges of anti-Semitism by Nicaragua,"
Northern California Jewish Bulletin, December 14, 1984. Although AK-47s are
more commonly associated with the contras, they have been supplied with the
Galil. Others might have preserved the rifles from their service with the
Somocist National Guard.

29. Liz Balmaseda, "Nicaraguan Jews feel sting of ouster," Miami Herald,
July 2, 1983.

30. Sorrin, "Report from Nicaragua,."

31. Robert Weisbrot, "Dateline Managua: Anti-Semitism or Anti-
climax.'"

32. All Things Considered, National Public Radio, August 24, 1984.

3 3 . In August 1 985 the State Department published a polemic entitled The
Sandinistas and Middle Eastern Radicals, which it described as "An unclassified
report on Sandinsita ties to Middle Eastern radicals, including Sandinista
participation in Middle East aircraft hijacking and terrorism in 1 970, [sic] and
their continuing relations with these groups and states in the 1980s." For its
"analysis," the Department drew on a narrow swath of rightist sources, such as
Claire Sterling, the ADL, the Council for Inter- American Security, Midstream,
the Heritage Foundation, the Cuban- American National Foundation and the
Center for International Security.

34. Edward Cody, "Managua's Jews Reject Anti-Semitism Charge,"
Washington Post, August 29, 1983.

35. Weisbrot, "Dateline Managua: Anti-Semitism or Anti-climax.'"

36. "Anti-Semitism Should Have No Place in the Nicaragua Debate,"
Letter to the New York Times, April 18, 1986.

Footnotes to pages 173-177 257

37. Mideast Observer, April 1, 1986.

38. Tom Tugend, "American Jews split over sanctuary issue," Jerusalem
Post, March 13, 1987.

39. "U.S. Jews Offer Sanctuary," Israeli Foreign Affairs, June 1985.

40. Evans & Novak, "The Missing Paragraphs," Washington Post, July 27 ,
1983.

41. Joseph Berger, "Nicaragua's Jews: Wide Disagreement on Status,"
New York Times, April 20, 1986.

42. Alexander Reid, "Jewish League Reports on Bias in Nicaragua," New
York Times, April 5, 1986.

43. Author's source.

44. Laurie Becklund, "Sandinistas Are Anti-Semitic, Group Charges,"
Los Angeles Times, March 14, 1985.

45. "Ex-Nicaraguan Jews accuse Sandinistas of anti-Semitism," JTA in
Northern California Jewish Bulletin, April 18, 1986.

46. Ignacio Klich, "Initiative from Niciiigm," Jerusalem Post, November
11, 1986.

47. Mideast Observer, March 15, 1986; New York Times, March 6, 1986.

48. Interview with Michael Saba, 1985.

49. Interview with Zehdi Terzi, Palestine Liberation Organization
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, February 1985.

50. Interview with Miriam Hooker, Nicaraguan Embassy press attache,
February 1985.

51. L« Prensa (Managua), January 25, 1985 in FBIS Latin America,
January 28, 1985, p. P-13; Managua Domestic Service, 2306 GMT, January
25, 1985 in FBIS Latin America, January 28, 1985, p. P-12; durmgthe same
period Iran negotiated trade agreements with Honduras, Uruguay, Brazil and
Argentina.

52. In 1984 Iran and Nicaragua issued a joint communique condemning
U.S. military maneuvers in Central America and the Persian Gulf, the invasion
of Grenada, and the racist regime in South Africa, and declaring support for the
Palestinian and Polisario causes (Havana International Service, 1600 GMT,
March 18, 1984 in FBIS March 20, 1984, p. Q-9).

53. New York Times, March 6, 1986; "Reagan Bids Jews Support
Contras," Israeli Foreign Affairs, April 1986.

54. Mideast Observer, April 1, 1986.

55. Author's source.

56. Moses Rischin, The Promised City, Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA, 1962, p. 97 in Roberta Strauss Feuerlicht, The Fate of the Jews,
Times Books, New York, 1983, pp. 93-94 and passim.

57. Victor Navasky, Naming Names, Viking, New York, 1980, pp.
97-142.

58. Nathan and Ruth A. Perlmutter, The Real Anti-Semitism, Arbor
House, 1982, argues that fundamentalists make better allies than the more
liberal Christian organizations, such as those grouped in the National Council
of Churches, with their tendency to issue statements supportive of Palestinian

258 Footnotes to pages 177-181

rights.

59. Donald E. Wagner, "Anxious for Armageddon," All in the Name of the
Bible, edited by Hassan Haddad and Donald E. Wagner, PHRC Special Report
#5 , (The Palestine Human Rights Campaign, 1 Quincy Court, 220 South State
St., Suite 1 308, Chicago, IL 60604) April 1 985, pp. 1 2-24; thanks also to Sara
Diamond, for many illuminating explanations of premillenialism.

60. Perlmutter, The Real Anti-Semitism, it>Y>- 171-172.

6 1 . According to Sara Diamond, the focus of the leading televangelists has
become more political, less "supernatural."

62. Grace Halsell, Prophecy and Politics: Militant Evangelists on the Road to
Nuclear War, Lawrence Hill & Co., 1986. The author provides first-hand
evidence of President Reagan's adherence to this superstition.

63. "U.S.Jewry no longer is Israel's hckey ," Jewish Post and Opinion, April
3, 1985.

64. David Silverberg, "Which priority for Jews: Israel or liberal causes.'"
Northern California Jewish Bulletin, November 22, 1985.

65. "U.S. Jews against Contras," Jewish Currents, June 1986.

Will the Lessons Be Learned?

1. "Nicaragua: Efforts to Heal," Israeli Foreign Affairs, February 1985.

2. Jerusalem Post, November 1 1,1986.

3. Ibid., December 4, 1986.

4. Letter to editor. Middle East International, December 19, 1986.

5. Latin American Weekly Report ]mwiTy 15, 1987.

6. Henry Kamm, "Israel Said to Seek Restoration of Diplomatic Ties with
Nicaragua," New York Times, December 12, 1986.

7. Ibid.

8. E. Kaufman, "Israeli Involvement in Latin America," in W. Perry & P.
Wehner (eds.), The Latin American Policies of U.S. Allies, Praeger (ca. 1 984), p
144.

9. Genesis 2, Sept.-Oct. 1984.

10. "Nicaragua ayuda a la OLP, acusa Israel," AP, La Jornada, lune 19,
1986.

11. Ha'aretz, June 18, 1986 in FBIS Middle East & Africa, June 19, 1986,
p. 1-2.

12. ANSA (Italian news agency) in La Jornada, January 6, 1987.

13. UPI, Houston Post, December 6, 1986.

14. "Una derrota politica de Reagan en la ONU," Barricada, November 4,
1986.

Footnotes to pages 187-189 259

Conclusion

1. Paul Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, Lawrence Hill, Westport CT,
1985, pp. 12-22.

2. Ibid., pp. 21-22.

3. Wolf Blitzer, Between Washington and Jerusalem, Oxford University
Press, New York, 1985, p. 116.

4. Ibid., p. 115. It is striking that no pretense is made that Israel might be
supported on principle!

5. Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, p. 35.

6. Richard H. Curtiss, A Changing Image: American Perceptions of the
Arab-Israeli Dispute, American Educational Trust, Washington, DC, 1986, p.
270.

7. Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, p. 36.

8. Robert Scheer, "Israel Lobby— Clout but No Monolith," Los Angeles
Times, April 7, 1983.

9. Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, pp. 187-188.
\O.Ibid., 194-199.

\\. Ibid, pp. 199-211.
U. Ibid., pp. 212-241.
U. Ibid., pp. 253-259.

1 4. Robert Weisbord and Richard Kazarian, Jr., /jw/ in the Black American
Perspective, Greenwood Press, Westport, CT, 1985, chronicles black -Jewish
relations from a Zionist perspective, and in so doing betrays the heavy-handed
manipulativeness with which Jewish organizational leaders have dealt with
black politicians and organizations.

15. Earl Raab, "Timely book deals with feelings of blacks toward Israel,"
Northern California Jewish Bulletin, June 7, 1985 reviews the Weisbord-
Kazarian book and notes that "We all have a stake in which segment of [the]
black elite wins the minds of the black populace." The segment of that black
"elite" to be excluded was described by Charles Silberman, the influential
author of A Certain People — American Jews and Their Lives Today, as "younger
persons with higer education" who ascribe to "the political anti-Semitism that
pervades the ideology of the left worldwide." (Elsa Solender, "Author says
doomsayers wrong on U.S. Jewry's fate," Ibid., September 27, 1985.) The
"political anti-Semitism" referred to is, of course, anti-Zionism.

16. Such incidents have been reported to the author many times — as they
would be to anyone who bothered to ask.

1 7. Rubenberg, Israel and the American National Interest, pp. 336-338.

18. Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, p. 135.

19. The administration secured a conviction of leading sanctuary activists
in Arizona in 1986, but popular sentiment was so heavily against its targeting
the mostly religious movement for spying and prosecution — and against its
vindictive policies of returning Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees to almost
certain political execution — that it has not sought to follow up its largely

260 Footnotes to pages 189-195

Phyrric victory.

20. The Los Angeles Times, has had the most complete coverage of this
case, beginning on January 28, 1987.

21. "Bomb Kills Leader of U.S. Arab Group," UPI, New York Times
October 12, 1985.

22. Letter from James G. Abourezk, National Chairman of ADC,
October 13, 1985.

23. A totally apolitical Palestinian-owned restaurant chain in suburban
Chicago had one facility bombed to the ground. Others closed after a campaign
against the chain featuring such tactics as posters saying "Mediterranean House
food in your stomach is like Jewish blood on your hands," and "Money Spent
Here Supports PLO Terrorism," applied to restaurant walls and adorned with
red paint and raw liver. The excuse for the campaign was that among the radio
advertising bought by the chain were spots on a Palestinian radio program. It
also bought spots on Jewish programs (Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, pp.
290-293). — ■

24. Robe rt I. Fried man, "Selling Israel to America," Mother Jones, Feb.-
March, 1987: ' ' -

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. Newsweek, September 3, 1979 in Findley, They Dare to Speak Out, p.

148.

28. Ibid., pp. 149-151.

29. David K. Shipler, "Israel and the U.S. Stay on Speaking Terms," New
York Times, December 29, 1985.

30. Wolf Blitzer, "End of the Honeymoon," Jerusalem Post Magazine,
January 16, 1987, reveals that offense was taken; there is no public record.

31. "U.S.Jews weigh Israel— S. Africa arms A&a\s" ]T A., Jerusalem Post,
February 20, 1987.

32. Congressional Record, July 11, 1985, H 5469.

33. "Reagan's China Card Trumped," Israeli Foreign Affairs, December
1984.

34. The Senate version of the bill was later accepted by the House, in the
interests of haste.

35. Ha'aretz, March 20, 1987, quoted verbally by Israel Shahak, Stock-
holm, March 26, 1987.

36. Larry Cohler, "Black leaders agree to mute attack on Israel-S. Africa
tie," Washington /^lijw/i Week, in Northern California Jewish Bulletin, April 10
1987.

37. Author's sources. For a full history of the moves leading up to the
report see "More Military Deals With South Africa," "Arms Sales to South
Africa— Four More Years," and "Israel Moves to Block Congress, Save South
African Arms Sales," Israeli Foreign Affairs, February, March and April 1 987.

38. Doyle McManus, "Demos vying hard to lure wary Jewish voters," Los
Angeles Times, (in Oakland Tribune April 2, 1984).

39. New York Times, (in San Francisco Chronicle, March 12, 1984).

Footnotes to pages 196-199 261

40. Interview with Berman aide, "Israeli Development Aid to Central
America."

41. It is also within the realm of possibility for activists, especially in
coalition with unions or some other group with access to minimal funding, to
put together a winning primary campaign in some congressional districts. In the
aftermath, there would, naturally, be a struggle to get party support for an
independent candidate, progressive across the board and willing as well to
confront Israel, but in his first race for mayor of Chicago Harold Washington
demonstrated that similar problems could be overcome (to the shame of those
who caused them).

42. March 18, 1983.

43. The January 31, 1986 press release announcing the resolution— and
another condemning anti- Arab racism in the U.S.— said that the resolution was
passed "with the full understanding that Israel was the military supplier that
receives the most American aid."

44. This is the report cited above. Unfortunately, except for a very
positive column by Colman McCarthy, the COH A report was largely ignored.

45. Jews and Central America: the Need to Act, New Jewish Agenda, New
York, 1985. Also Jews and the Sanctuary Movement.

46. "Zim Sails On," Israeli Foreign Affairs, November 1986.

Index

Abourezk, James, 189
Abrams, Elliott, 172
Achille Lauro, 87, 190
Adams, James, 23, 26, 43, 52
ADL (Ami- Defamation League of

B'nai B'rith), 78, 80, 82, 170,

172, 173, 174, 177, 189
Aeronica, 181
AFL-CIO, 99

Africa, 2 1,24, 25, 26, 28, 3 1,34, 57,
65,74,95,103,148,160,163,193

Africa-Israel Investments, 22

African National Congress (ANC),
35,58, 74, 78, 79, 82, 198, 199

Afro- Asian Institute, 57, 77, 82

Agency for International Develop-
ment see AID

Agrexco, 64

Agri-Carmel, 69

Agridev, 69

Aguilar, Joaquin, 101, 102

AID,96,97,108,119,125,168,196

AIFLD (American Institute for Free
Labor Development), 99

AIPAC (American Israel Public Af-
fairs Committee), 10,50, 187, 188,
189, 192, 194

Algeria, 2

AUon, Yigal, 23,31

Alta Verapaz, 115, 120, 126

Alvarez Martinez, Gustavo, 147
Alvarez Ruiz, Donaldo, 116
American- Arab Anti-Discrimination

Committee, 87, 186, 190
American Israel Public Affairs Com-
mittee, see AIPAC, 78,
American Jewish Committee, 8,171,
194

American Jewish Congress, 8, 55,

173, 194
Americas Watch, 125
Amigos del Pais, 1 15
Anglo American, 64
Angola, 1,16,28,41,43,48,56,57,

59

ANSESAL, 98, 99
Antarctica, 38, 39

Anti-Defamation League of B'nai

B'rith see ADL
Arafat, Yasir, 87, 141, 174, 175, 187,

190

Arava STOL (Short take-off and
landing) aircraft, 26, 98, 101,
110, 112-113, 133, 138, 141, 166

Arazi, Yardene, 86

Arbenz, Jacobo, 133

Areata, California, 123

ARENA (Nationalist Republican
Alliance), 103, 105

ARDE (Revolutionary Democratic

263

264 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Alliance), 148-150, 163
Arens, Moshe, 44, 45
Arevalo, Juan Jose, 133
Argentina, 14, 15, 44, 52, 130, 145,

146, 147, 155
Aridor, Yoram, 72
Ariel, 74

Arizona, University of. Near Eastern

Center, 188
Armageddon, 125, 177
Arzu Irigoyen, Alvaro, 131
Asia, 95

Asimo helicopters, 133
Australia, 14, 36
Austria, 40

Baker, David, 38
Balfour Declaration, 2 1
Bantustans, 55, 68, 71-77, 90
Bar- Am, Avraham, 1 55
Barbados, 113
Barnes, Michael, 173
Baron, Sydney, 29
BBC, 38

"Beans and Bullets," 119

Begin, Menachem, 10, 26, 71, 72,

104, 112, 168, 176, 177
Behrhorst Clinic/Foundation, 124
Beit Berl, 81
Belgium, 26, 114, 127
Belize, (formerly British Honduras)

112, 113, 114, 131
Bell helicopter, 40
Ben Gurion, David, 24, 26
Ben Gurion University, 69, 86
Ben-Or, Pesakh, 129, 130, 152, 153
Bergmann, Ernst, 35
Berman, Howard, 96, 97, 194, 196
Bermudez, Enrique, 164
Bet Shemesh engine plant, 44
Beukes, Hennie, 72, 73
Bialkin, Kenneth, 1 76
Biden, Joseph, 193
Bingham, Jonathan, 37
Black, George, 128

B'nai B'rith, 8, 79, 129 see also ADL

(Anti-Defamation League)
Boeing 707 aircraft, 42
Boesky, Ivan, 1 76
Bokassa, Jean-Bedel, 14
Boland Amendment, 161
Bolivia, 14

Bophuthatswana, 73, 74, 77, 86

Boschwitz, Rudy, 193

BOSS (Bureau of State Security), 27

Boston Symphony Orchestra, 188

Botha, P.W., 1,26, 29, 34

Botha, Pik, 48, 49

Botswana, 58

Brazil, 14, 99, 166

Brickner, Balfour, 171

Britain, see UK

Bull, Gerald, 39

Bumpers, Dale, 105

Burkina Faso, 24

Business Day, 66

Buthelezi, Gatsha, 55, 74-80, 82, 83
Cabinda, 48

Calero, Adolfo, 151, 156, 158, 163

Calero, Mario, 151

Cameroon, 14, 90

Camp David Accords, 10, 37, 66,

145, 159
Campaign California, 83
Campaign for Economic Democracy,

83

Canada, 39, 85, 150, 198

CapeTown, 71,81,86, 87

Caribbean, 16

Carpio NicoUe, Jorge, 130

Carter Administration, 7, 10, 15, 36,
37, 78, 89, 97, 99, 101, 111,
112,114,115,132,140-141,145,
189

Carter, Jimmy 82

Casey, William, 152, 158, 161, 163
Castillo Ramirez, Fernando, 119
Castro, Fidel, 141
Catholic Church, 108, 119, 124

Index 265

Cayman Islands, 1 14

Cengue, Lifford, 79

Center for Foreign Policy Options
(CPFO), 81-83

Central African Republic, 14

Central America, 97, 98, 100, 102-
105, 109, 130, 132, 148, 152,
155,159,161-164,166,167,170,
171,173,177,180,181,185,186-
200

Central America Report, 128
Central American Confederation of

Jewish Communities, 108
Central Selling Organization (of

DeBeers), 61
Cerezo, Vinicio, 126, 127, 130, 131
Chalatenango, 107
Chamorro, Edgar, 148, 158, 170
Chatila (refugee camp), 147
Chavez Mena, Fidel, 103, 106, 109
Cheetah, 1-2, 42, 43, 44
Chemavir-Masok, 52
Chemtra, 64

Chile, 13, 14, 43,44, 105, 155, 166
China, Peoples Republic, 14, 15, 33,
194

Christian Broadcasting Network,
124

Christian Voice of Hope radio, 125

Church of the Word, 123, 124

CIA, 3,4,24,28,29,36, 37, 39,59,
60, 83, 99, 100, 106, 124, 145,
146,148,149,152-155,157,158,
160-164, 166, 167, 170, 191

Ciskei, 71-73, 74

Ciskatex, 72

City Press, 55

Civil Patrols, 107, 121, 122

Clark Amendment, 16, 29

Clark, Dick, 29

Classic Cars, 72

Coalition of Black Trade Unionists,
198

Cody, Edward, 1 72
COINTELPRO, 191

Colombia, 14, 149, 150, 166, 180
Commonwealth of Nations, 23, 59,
113

Eminent Persons Group, 58
Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act

of 1986, (Section 508), 6, 49-51,

89, 91, 194
Computer (intelligence), 100, 117,

118, 133
CONDECA, 99, 132
Conference of Presidents of Major

Jewish Organizations, 176
Congress, 3-7, 9-12, 36-38, 44, 45,

49-52, 65, 79, 80, 89, 91, 95,

96, 99, 101-103, 105, 106^ 111,

115,116,132,148-151,157,158,

161-165,169,174,175,178,187,

188, 191, 192, 194, 197
Congressional Black Caucus (CBC),

37, 76, 194
Congressional Record, 1 76
Conlog, 64

Consolidated Power, 52, 128
Constable, John, 101
Contadora, 180

Contras,3,5, 10, 103,114, 129, 141,
145-166,169,172,173,176,178,
179, 181, 192, 196

Conyers,John, 37, 38, 192, 193

Copenhagen, 40

Costa Rica, 13, 74, 96, 99, 103, 148,

149, 166-168
Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 171,

199

Cranston, Alan, 50, 193, 194, 195
Cuba, 43, 141
Curtis, Ira, 73
Cyprus, 59

D'Aubuisson, Roberto, 98, 103, 105
Dabur patrol boat, 40,43, 113, 134,
138

Dagan, Pinhas, 153
Dan, Uri, 56
Davar, 109

266 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Davis Cup, 85
Dayan, Moshe, 24, 27
Deaver, Michael, 1 1 5
DeBeers, 6 1

Defense Intelligence Agency, 36
De Gaulle, Charles, 12
DEGEM Systems, 116
Dellums, Ronald V., 50, 194, 195
Delvalle, Eric Arturo, 150
Democratic Party, 189, 195
Denmark, 40
Denton, Jeremiah, 79
deSapio, Carmine, 29
D'Escoto, Miguel, 172
de Villiers, Les, 29
Diamonds, 61
Dideco, 109
Dimona, 2, 33, 34, 38
Dodd, Christopher, 193
Dominican Republic, 1 3
dos Santos, Jose Eduardo, 59
Duarte, Jose Napoleon, 101, 103,

105, 106, 107, 109
Durban, 76, 87,
Duvalier, Jean-Claude, 14

Eagle Military Gear Overseas (Eagle
Israeli Armaments, Desert Eagle)
129

Eagleburger, Lawrence, 164
Eagleton, Thomas, 187
EATSCO, 145
Eban, Abba, 77, 114
Ecuador, 14, 114, 155
Economist, 28, 75
Efrati, Amikam, 60
EGP, (GuerHlla Army of the Poor),
115, 120

Egypt, 3,9, 10,23,25,26, 37, 42,
66, 103, 104, 123, 125, 145, 158,
159, 190

Eilat, 66

Eisenhower, D wight D., 9
Elbit, 47
ElDia, 118

Elron, 64

El Salvador, 6, 14, 74, 98-110, 111,
112,115,116,129,152,155,166,
173, 180, 181

England, see United Kingdom

Epol, 64

Erasmus, E.G., 23
Erlich, Simcha, 26
Eshkol, Levi, 35
Esquivel, Manuel, 1 3 1
Ethiopia, 14, 15

Euromoney Trade Finance Report,
53

European Community (EC), 63, 64,
89, 131

Evangelical Gospel Outreach, 123
Evans, Dan, 49, 50, 193
Export Bulletin, 65

Falwell, Jerry, 125, 176, 177

Farber, Rafi, 87

FBI, 153, 189, 190

FDN (Nicaraguan Democratic

Force), 146, 149, 150, 151, 153,

158, 163, 164, 170
FDR (Democratic Revolutionary

Front), 100, 101, 102, 103, 105
Federation of Jewish Communities

of Central America and Panama,

132

Financial Times, 59
Findley, Paul, 187, 188
Fisher, Max, 1 76

FLNA (Angolan National Libera-
tion Front), 59

FMLN (Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front), 100, 103

Fonda, Jane, 81, 83

Ford Administration, 28, 112

Ford, Gerald, 10

Fouche, J.J., 27

Foundation for Aid to the Indian

People (FUND API), 124
Framatome, 38

France,2, 7, 10, 26, 33,35, 38, 41,

Index 267

60, 73,98,99, 114, 127, 150, 193

Francis, Fred, 163

Frank, Barney, 194

Frost, Martin, 194

FSLN (Sandinista National Libera-
tion Front), 139, 141, 175

FUSADES, 97

Fusiles y Frijoles, 1 1 9

Gabriel missile, 40, 43, 52, 59, 1 13
Galil assault rifle, 43 , 1 1 0, 1 1 3 , 1 1 5,

134, 138, 141, 142, 166, 172
GAM (Mutual Support Group), 1 2 7
Garcia Granados, Jorge, 1 12
Gaza, see Occupied Territories
Gazelle helicopters, 42
Georgetown Center for Contempor-
ary Arab Studies, 188
Georgetown University Center for
Strategic and International Studies,
105

Gerber-Goldschmidt, 69

Germany (Federal Republic — West
Germany), 22, 35, 43, 57, 86, 108,
109, 127, 149

Germany (Nazi), 8

Ghana, 14,24, 96

Gil'ad, Amos, 153

Giron, Leonel, 119

Golan Heights, see Occupied Ter-
ritories

Goren, Osias S., 82

Goren, Shlomo, 27

Corn, Abraham, 170, 171, 173

Gorn, Elena, 1 74

Gospel Outreach, 123, 124

Great Britain, see United Kingdom

Greece, 26, 114

Greenberg, Maxwell F., 82

Greenpeace, 39

Greenstein and Rosen, 64

Guanacaste, 96

Guatemala, 4, 13, 14, 26, 52, 53, 95,
97,99, 100, 107-9, 112-135, 151,

180, 186, 197
Army School of Transmissions

and Electronics, 116, 129
Human Rights Commission

(CDHG), 124

Municipal Workers Union, 131
Guerra y Guerra, Rene Francisco,

98, 100, 102, 109
Guerrero, Jose Francisco, 104, 105
Guerrilla Army of the Poor see EGP
Gur Construction Company, 73
Gush Emunim, 139
Gutierrez, Margo, 112
Guttfreund Hanchel, Enrique, 108

Ha'aretz, 69

Haganah, 137, 138

Haig, Alexander, 1 1 5, 1 60, 1 6 1 , 1 62

Hannaford-Deaver, 115

Haifa, 40, 47, 86, 87

Haiti, 14, 129

(Al) Hamishmar, 197

Hanlon, Joseph, 57

Harvard University, 101

Hasbara Project, 1 90

Hasenfus, Eugene, 3

Hassan II, King, 53

Hauser, Rita, 90

Hayakawa, S.I., 29, 83

Hayden, Tom, 81, 82

Healey, Denis, 75

Hebrew University, 88

Hecht, Chic, 176

Helms, Jesse, 50, 106, 193, 194

Hempstone, Smith, 79

Hendler, Archie, 64

Hernandez Mendez, Jaime, 130

Herut Party, 72

Herzl, Theodore, 2 1

Herzog, Chaim, 26

Histadrut, 24, 57, 62, 64, 69, 77,

82, 83, 99. See also Afro-Asian

Institute; Koor
Hod, Mordechai, 25, 54

268 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Holocaust, 9, 20, 21, 32, 55, 81, 186

Honduras, 14, 96, 97, 98, 99, 115,
129,145,146,147,148,150,152,
153,154,155,160,163,166-167,
171, 180

Honey Crunch, 64

Horwood, Owen, 68, 73

Hurwitz, Oscar, 29

Ikle, Fred, 166

Independent Television (UK), 39

India, 33

Indian Head, 72

Indian Ocean, 36

Indonesia, 14

Inkatha, 75, 76, 77

Interconair, 42

International Center for Develop-
ment Policy, 150

International Cooperation Division
(of Israeli Foreign Ministry), 120

International Fellowship of Recon-
ciliation, 197

International Institute for Strategic
Studies, 40

International Tennis Federation, 85

Iran,2,14, 15,52,66,151,152, 156,
165, 166, 174, 175
Iran-Iraq War, 152

Iran-contra Affair, 3-4, 11, 15, 52,
97, 145, 146, 152-154, 159, 165,
175, 179, 181, 192

Iraq, 33, 52, 53, 125, 146

Iscor, Ltd., 66

ISDS, (International Security and De-
fense Systems) 153, 155

Iskoor, 45, 52, 62, 64, 66

Islamic Conference Organization,
103

Israel Aircraft Industries (lAI), 2,13,

32,41,44,47, 98, 104, 153
Israel Chamber Orchestra, 86
Israel-South Africa Friendship Lea-
gue, 26

Israel-South Africa Industrial and Ag-

ricultural Research and Develop-
ment Programme, 68
Israel Tennis Authority, 85
Israeli-South African Friendship Lea-
gue, 88

Israeli Military Industries, (IMI), 129
Italy, 40,87, 114
Ixil Triangle, 124

Jackson, Jesse, 195

Jamail, Milton, 112

Japan, 44, 64, 78

Jane's Defence Weekly, 69

Jepson, Roger, 29

Jericho missile, 38

Jerusalem Post, 76, 85, 88, 89, 167

Jewish Agency, 85, 177

Jewish Defense League, 1 73

Jewish Institute for National Secur-
ity Affairs, wJINSA

Jewish Telegraph Agency QTA),
78, 96

Jewish Week (Washington, D.C.), 78,
80

JINSA, 175, 176
Johannesburg, 87
Johnson Administration, 10
Jordan, 9,25, 58-59, 102, 125
"Judea and Samaria" see Occupied
Territories

Kahane, Meir, 72
Kaibiles, 113
Kalahari Desert, 35
Katz, David Marcus, 129, 139, 147,
153

Katzir, Ephraim, 31, 113
Kaunda, Kenneth, 48
Kellerman, Sarita and Oscar, 1 74
Kennedy Administration, 10, 99
Kennedy, Edward, 37
Kennedy, Joseph, Jr., 189
Kenya, 14

Kfir aircraft, 5, 13, 14, 44, 52, 114,

135, 147, 148, 166, 180
KGB, 191

Index 269

Khashoggi, Adnan, 42, 166
Khomeini, Ayatollah, 175,
Kimche, David, 77, 90, 103, 162,

164, 165
Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 168
Kissinger, Henry, 16, 28
Klepfisc, Heszel, 1 7 1
Klinghoffer, Leon, 87
Knesset, 15, 66, 84, 102, 114, 151
Koeberg nuclear reactor, 38
Koor, 64, 65, 69
Kruger Park, 87
Kruger, S., 68
Kuwait, 125
KwaZulu, 74, 77, 78

Labor Alignment, 1 79

La Prensa (Managua), 140

La Republica (Costa Rica), 140, 146

Latchinian, Gerard, 153

Latin America, 95

Laugerud Garcia, Kjell, 113, 119

Lavi aircraft, 43, 44, 45

Lebanon, 33, 57, 58, 63, 83, 98, 123,

125,127,141,147,151,160,164,

177, 192
South Lebanon Army, 125
Ledeen, Michael, 175
Leiken, Robert, 105
Leitner, Yehuda, 153
LeMoyne, James, 109
Lesotho, 26
Levin, Sander, 194
Levine, Charley, 80
Liat, 66
Liberia, 14

Libya, 58, 78, 80, 145, 158, 174,

175, 176
Liebes, Ernesto, 100
Likud coalition, 72, 179
Lithuania, 2 1
Lobby, pro-Israeli, 11-12
Lopez Nulla, Reynaldo, 107
Los Alamos National Laboratory,

36

Los Angeles, 8 1
Love Lift International, 124
Lucas Garcia, Benedicto, 113, 115,
117, 123

Lucas Garcia, Romeo, 4, 113, 116,

117, 120, 129
Lugar, Richard, 157

Ma'ariv, 89

Maccabiah Games, 84-85

Machel, Samora, 48, 49, 58

MacMichael, David, 1 54

Magana, Alvaro, 103, 104, 105, 106

Magana, Ernesto, 104

Malan, Daniel, 22,23

Malawi, 26, 48, 60, 96

Malchi Shipping Tours and Travel

Ltd., 87
Mandela, Nelson, 75, 79
Mansdorf, Amos, 85
Mapam Party, 88, 179, 180, 197
Marcos, Ferdinand, 14, 116
Marion Island, 38-39
Masada, 3 1
Mashav, 97

Matamoros, Bosco, 163
Mathias, Charles McC, 6, 49, 50, 89,
193

Mauritius, 26

Mayans (Indigenous Guatemalans)

111, 121-124, 126
Maylasia, 14

McCarran- Walters Act, 189
McFarlane, Robert, 161-162
Meese, Edwin, 165
Meir, Golda, 25

Mejia Victores, Oscar, 117, 118,

119, 122, 125, 127, 132
Memorandum of Agreement, 1 59
Memorandum of Understanding

(MOU), 159-160
Mendez Montenegro, Julio Cesar,

132

Meridor, Yacov, 16
Merkava tank, 5, 45

2 70 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Index 271

Mexico, 14,67, 118, 119, 130, 139,
147, 149, 150, 171, 180

Milchan, Arnon. 29

Milwaukee Jewish Council, 171

Minty, Abdul, 49

Mirage aircraft, 13, 26, 43, 114

MLN (Movement of National Lib-
eration), 128, 129

MNR (Mozambican National Resis-
tance), 60

Mobutu Sese Sekou, 14, 48, 49, 59

"Model Villages," 120-127

Moment, 171

Mondale, Walter, 189

Monge, Luis Alberto, 167-168

Montealegre, Julio, 151

Morocco, 14, 52, 53

Mossad, 13, 26, 150, 162, 190, 191

Mozambique, 28, 41, 42, 48, 49,
57-60

MPLA (Popular Movement for the

Liberation of Angola), 59
Muenster, 64

Mulder, Connie, 28, 29, 34
Muldergate, 29, 88
Murkowski, Frank, 193

Nahal, 73

Namibia, 25, 26, 55-57
Napalm, 101, 110
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 23
Natal, 74, 75, 76

National Academy of Engineers, 37
National Academy of Sciences, 3 7
National Conference of Black Law-
yers, 198
National Cooperative Institute (Gua-
temala), 119
National Jewish Coalition, 1 74
National Plan (El Salvador), 107
National Public Radio, 41, 88, 126,
150, 164

National Security Council, (NSC),
36, 132, 148, 152, 154, 158, 167,
175

Naval Research Laboratory (U.S.),
36

NBC, 164
Near East Report, 11
Neier, Aryeh, 125
Nesher aircraft, 52
Netherlands, 31 (KLM, 115)
New Jewish Agenda, 171, 173, 180,
199

New York Times, 109, 139, 160,

170, 180, 190
New Zealand, 14
Newport, Eugene (Gus), 59
Nicaragua, 3, 14, 95-98, 130, 132,

137-143, 145-148, 150, 153, 155,

158, 160-163, 165-168, 170-175,
178-181, 199

Nicaragua Agrarian Reform Re-
search and Study Center, 1 79
Nicaragua, Israeli Committee in
Solidarity with, 1 79
Nigeria, 14, 34
Nightline, 190
Nimrodi, Ya'acov, 152, 166
Nir, Amiram, 165
Nixon Administration, 10
Nkrumah, Kwame, 24
Nonaligned Movement, 28, 162,

176, 180
Noriega, Manuel Antonio, 150
North, Oliver, 148, 152, 154, 158,

159, 165, 175

November 29 Committee for Pales-
tine, 199

Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,

35,67, 192
Nuclear Weapons, 2-3, 10-11, 15,

19, 32-39, 89, 192, 193, 198
Nudelstejer, Sergio, 171
Nueva Diario, 1 72
NUMEC, 2

Oakland Tribune, 45
OAS (Organization of American
States), 113

OAU (Organization of African Un-
ity), 25, 34, 60
Obando y Bravo, Miguel, 1 72
Occupied Territories, 2, 33, 54, 60,
74, 90, 116, 123, 160, 177, 188,
192

Ochoa Perez, Sigifredo, 98, 107
Odeh, Alex, 87, 186, 190
Olympics, 84

Olympic Council of Asia, 84
Oppenheimer, 64
Oren Toys, 68

Organization of African Unity, see
OAU

ORPA, (Revolutionary Organiza-
tion of People in Arms), 118
Oto Melara, 40

PAAC (Program of Assistance to

Areas in Conflict), 120
"Pacification," 95, 96, 107-109, 118-

127, 128, 196, 197
Pakistan, 194

Palestine, 7, 11, 21,22,23, 112
Palestine Olympic Committee, 84
Palestine Liberation Organization,

(PLO) 28, 58, 79, 80, 87, 101,

141,163,164,172,174,176,180,

181, 187, 190, 198
Palestinians, 14, 19,77,79,91, 118,

123,141,147,161,171,177,186,

188, 189, 192, 197, 198
Palindaba nuclear reactor, 35
Panama, 14, 99,129,132,150,171,

180

Papua-New Guinea, 14
Paraguay, 14, 31
Passos, Rosa, 150
Pastora, Eden, 148-150, 163
Pat, Gideon, 63, 128
Paz, Yehuda, 82

Pell, Claiborne, 50, 157, 193, 194

Pell Amendment, 157
Perera, Victor, 1 1 3
Peres, Shimon, 28, 29, 35, 53, 66, 76,
89, 101, 102, 152, 165, 180

Perez, Julio, 152, 166

Perlmutter, Nathan, 177

Perrin, Francis, 2, 34

Peru, 14, 149

Philippines, 14, 96, 116

Phoenix Program, 107

Pinochet, Augusto, 14

Plan Victoria, 118

Poles of Development, 119, 121,

122, 125, 130, 131
Polichrom, 64

Polisario Front, see Sahrawi Arab

Democratic Republic
Pollard, Jonathan Jay, spy affair 52,

191

Poran, Ephraim, 72
Portugal, 28, 60, 96
Pratt and Whitney, 44
Pressler, Larry, 193
Progressive Federal Party, 75
Project David, 29
Project Democracy, 152
Project 1,000 (El Salvador), 108

Qaddafi, Muammar, 78, 174, 175
Quiche, 122, 124, 126

Rabanales, Jaime, 1 1 8

Rabin, Yitzhak, 27-29, 31, 51, 148,

152, 154, 194
Radio Venceremos, 1 03
Ramirez, Sergio, 1 80
Ramirez, William, 181
Ramos, Arnaldo, 100
RB Y armored personnel carrier, 113,

133

Reagan Administration, 3, 10-11,
15,37,95,96,100-102,105,106,
111,114,123,130,132,141,145,
147,148,150,153,157-159,162,
163,169,172,176,177,180,189,
194

Reagan, Ronald, 74, 82, 89, 101,
133,152,157,161,170,174,175,
177, 178

Red Cross, International Committee
for, 108

272 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Red Sea, 66

Redgrave, Vanessa, 188
Religious Action Center, 1 94
Religious Right, 4, 10, 124
Rename, see MNR
Reshef missile boat, 42, 43
Revolutionary Organization of Peo-
ple in Arms, see ORPA
Rhodes, Cecil, 21
Rhodesia, 14, 40
Rhoodie, Eschel, 28, 29
Ribicoff, Abraham, 187
_ Rich, Marc, 53

"RTos MonttTElSn, 4, 1 18, 119, 120,

123, 124, 129, 197
Robelo, Alfonso, 149
Roberto, Holden, 59
Robertson, Pat, 124, 125, 176, 177
Roman Catholic Church see Catholic

Church
Romero, Oscar Arnulfo, 146
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 9
Rosenfeld, Stephen, 1 90
Rosenthal, Morton, 170, 171, 174
Rosenwasser, Nat, 72
Rotem, Amnon, 65
Rotoflight Helicopters, 52

Sa'ada, Emil, 153
Sabra (refugee camp), 147
Sadat, Anwar, 10
Safari I nuclear reactor, 35
Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic,
53

Sanders, Edward, 82

Sandinista National Liberation Front

see FSLN
Sandock-Austral shipyard, 47
Sandoval Alarcon, Mario, 129
San Vicente, 107
SATOUR, 87
Saudi Arabia, 3,60, 125, 158
Savimbi, Jonas, 59
Sayre, Francis B., 188
Schneider, Yosef, 72, 74

Schwimmer, Al, 152

Scorpion helicopter, 52

Sebe, Charles, 72, 73

Sebe, Lennox, 72

Secord, Richard, 158

Sentrachem, 64

Seychelles, 87

Shafrir missile, 40, 166

Shamir, Yitzhak, 50, 51, 76, 86, 90,

130,131,161,162,168,176,180,

181

Sharon, Ariel, 56, 59, 146, 148, 160,
166, 168

Sharon, Ilan, 73

Sharrett, Moshe, 24

Sherwood International Export Cor-
poration 153

Shultz, George, 11, 159, 161

SIAG, (Servicio de Informacion y
Analisis de Guatemala), 122

Sierra Leone, 66

Siegman, Henry, 173

Simhoni, Uri, 156

Singapore, 14, 40

Singlaub, John, 153

SIPRI (Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute), 41

Smith, Wayne, 153

Smuts, Jan, 21, 22,

Sobel, Ronald B., 172

Socialist International, 149

Solarz, Stephen, 37, 126

Somoza Debayle, Anastasio, 14, 101,
137-139,140,145,148,149,151,
170, 171, 174

Somoza Garcia, Anastasio, 137-138

Sotz Cate, Mercedes, 1 3 1

South Africa, 1-2, 5, 6, 10, 13-16,
19-93, 106, 127, 128, 149, 156,
177,181,185,186,192,194,197-
200 {see also Israel-South Africa)
Associates of, 86
Congress of South African
Trade Unions (COSATU), 77

Index 273

Council for Scientific and Indus-
trial Research, 27

Development Bank of, 73
South Africa Airways, 73, 87
South African Communist Party, 79
South Atlantic Corporation, 61
South Atlantic Ocean, 36
South Korea, 64, 120, 157
South West African Peoples Organ-
ization, see SWAPO
Southern Air Transport, 1 52
Soviet Union, see USSR
Soweto, 76

Space Research Corporation,

39-40, 52
Spadafora, Hugo, 150
Spain, 130, 150
Speizer, Eliyah, 35
Spiegel, Steven, 81,82
Sri Lanka, 14, 52, 53
Star of Hope television, 125
Stavisky, Isaac, 170, 171, 173
Stein, Jack, 176

Stellenbosch, University of, 64
Stephen Wise Free Synagogue, 171
Stockwell, John, 59
Suazo Cordoba, Roberto, 153
Sudan, 125

Summer Institute of Linguistics, 124

Sun City, 73, 87, 156; see also Bop-
huthatswana

Sunday Times (London), 1

SWAPO (South West African Peo-
ples Organization), 56

Swaziland, 14, 26, 48, 66

Sweden, 80

Switzerland, 13

Syria, 123, 125

Tadiran, 47, 52, 116, 117, 128, 129
Tahal, 168

Taiwan, 13, 14,68, 106, 120, 157
Tambo, Oliver, 79
Tammus, 73
Tanzania, 14
Technion, 69

Techo, tortilla y trabajo, 119
Tel Aviv, University of, 64
Terrell, Jack, 150
Thailand, 14, 96
Thatcher, Margaret, 74
Transfer Agreement, 8
Transvaal Mattress, 64
Truman Administration, 9
Tunisia, 33, 58, 59
Tunney, John, 29, 82
Turkey, 125

Tutu, Desmond, 55, 76, 81, 82

UCLA, 81
Uganda, 14, 54

URNG (Unidad Revolucionaria Na-
cional Guatemalteca), 122

Union of American Hebrew Con-
gregations, 178

USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics), 7, 9, 33, 35, 79, 80, 84,
88, 161, 177

Unita, 42, 59

Unitarian Universalist Association,
198

United Democratic Front (tJDF),
75, 82

UK (United Kingdom), 9, 10, 21-
24, 33, 35, 41, 52, 78, 112, 131,
145, 179

UN (United Nations), 1, 7, 9, 10,
23-26,28,40,41,64, 76,78,102-
104,112,125,138,168,180,181,
189

Development Program, 108
Special Committee Against A-

partheid, 84
Special Committee on Palestine,

112

United to Rebuild, 109
United States-Israel Cooperative De-
velopment Research (CDR), 96-98
Unnatural Alliance, 26
Upper Volta, see Burkina Faso
Uruguay, 129

2 74 ISRAELI FOREIGN POLICY

Uzi submachine gun, 12, 26, 39, 43,
55, 110, 113, 115, 138, 139, 142,
166

van der Bergh, Hendrik, 27
Vanunu, Mordechai, 2-3, 38
Vatican, 124
Venda, 73

Venezuela, 14, 130, 149, 150, 180
Vietnam (South), 10, 56, 57, 95, 98,

107, 149
Vital, 64

Vorster, John, 26, 29, 31-32, 39, 40,

54, 62, 68
Voyager Corporation, 66

Wade, Michael, 88
Wall Street Journal, 1 76
Walters, Ronald, 37
Walters, Vernon, 158
Washington Office on Africa, 37
Washington Post, 172, 190
Washington Times, 79, 118
Weber, Vin, 176
Weeden, Alvin, 1 50
Weizenbaum, Joseph, 173
Weizmann, Chaim, 21, 22
Weizman, Ezer, 44
West Africa, 29

West Bank, see Occupied Territories
West Germany, see Germany (Fed-
eral Republic)

West Lion, 114

White House Digest, 173, 175

Wilson, Edwin, 145, 158

Wise, Stephen, 8

Wohlers, Eduardo, 120

Wolpe, Howard, 38, 76, 193

World Bank, 109

World Campaign Against Military
and Nuclear Collaboration with
South Africa, 37

World Court, 181

World Jewish Congress, 171

Wycliffe Bible Translators, 124

Yacobi, Gad, 109
Yad Vashem, 32
Yalihux, 120

Young, Andrew, 10, 78, 189
Yugoslavia, 1 14

Zaire, 13, 14, 42,48, 59
Zambia, 48, 49, 58
Zelniker, Shimshon, 81-83
Zim, 199

Zimbabwe, 37, 58, 60
Zimcorn, 61

Zionism, 9, 19, 22,28, 31
Zulu, 74, 75, 76
Zululand, University of, 75

^Isra^i Foreign Policy ;

South />l|rica & bentral America

Jane Hunter

While the continuing coilflict in the Middle East keeps Israeli
regional policies on the froni pages, much less is known about
krael's relations with other parts of the world. In this path-
llfieaking book, Jane Hunter exarnines Israeli foreign policy in
afeas of special concern to Americans; relations with South Aftka,
Central America, and policies around nuclear proliferation.

Illuminating the political, military and economic links be-
tween Israel and the apartheid state of South Africa, Hunter^
demonstrates ,how Israel's role counters the isolation of South
Africa and undercuts sanctions injposed by the United States.
Israel's aid to the repressive- #egi'mes of Gliatemala and El
Salvador, as well as Israel's am \o the contras and participation in
the arms-for-Iran scandal, is exarnined.

Hunter concludes with a controversial discussion of how the
U.S. use of Israel as a proxy t^ do our government's "dirty work"
directly opposes our attempts to effect a progressive foreign
policy.

:nd Press /

Boston, MA